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This book is the first publication delivered within the Jean Monnet 
Network on MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES SYSTEMS 
(MAPS), born within the context of the past experiences of Jean 
Monnet activities carried out in the University of Naples 
“L’Orientale”, and involving, as partners, universities of other nine 
different European countries: National and Kapodistrian University of 
Athens; University of A Coruña; University Jean Moulin Lyon 3; 
University of Malta; University of Innsbruck; Queen Mary University 
of London; University Goce Delcev-Stip; University Sarajevo School 
of Science and Technology (SSST); Stiftung Europa-Universität 
Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder).  
According to the aim of MAPS – i.e highlighting key changes and 
best practices relating to general principles and safeguards of asylum 
systems, at the same time analysing weaknesses and the compliance 
with international law obligations to protect asylum seekers, refugees 
and migrants in general – on 23rd September 2019 the First Workshop, 
on “Migration and Asylum Policies Systems, challenges and 
perspectives”, took place at University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
Essays included in this volume are excerpts from the lectures given 
during the Workshop, concerning a critical appraisal of the national 
legal systems of most of MAPS Partners (in the first Part), to which 
contributions on topical issues concerning Asylum and Migration 
under European Law are added (in the second Part), as well as, in the 
third Part, the speeches delivered at the Workshop in Naples from 
Antonio Di Muro (UNHCR) and Riccardo Gatti (ONG Open Arms). 
On the basis of the Project, other publications will follow. The 
hope is that they will be able to testify an increased attention from 
national and international institutions to the issue of migration 
governance, with a view to respecting fundamental human rights as 
consolidated in the second half of the last century and now included in 
the Constitutions and international treaties ratified by European 
States. Unfortunately, the provisional balance of this first part of the 
work carried out within MAPS is not encouraging, and the advent of 
the Covid-19 pandemic has further made it problematic the respect of 
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fundamental principles, in many cases overwhelmed by emergency 
legislation. Of course there is no question here of denying the need to 
resort to extraordinary measures in such worrying circumstances, but 
it seems paradoxical that once again migrants and asylum seekers may 





Migration and Asylum Policies Systems: 
 challenges and perspectives under national legal orders 
 
	  
SEARCH AND RESCUE OF MIGRANTS AT SEA IN RECENT 







1. Introduction. Italian initiatives aimed at countering the arrival of 
boats with migrants rescued at sea 
 
It is well known that, with the downsizing of the “Balkan route” 
following the 2016 agreement between EU Member States and Turkey 
as well as the policy of closure implemented by the so-called “Visegrad 
group”’s countries, the progressive and consequent pressure in the 
central Mediterranean, and especially on Italy, has led to a series of 
initiatives by successive Italian governments, initiatives aimed at 
countering the arrival in the ports of the Peninsula of boats with 
people rescued at sea. Two are the guidelines followed, obviously 
connected to each other: the “outsourcing” of the migratory 
phenomenon’s management, which began in particular through the 
“Memorandum of Understanding on migrants” stipulated with the 
government of Tripoli on 2 February 20171, and the “disengagement” 
with respect to Search and Rescue activities at sea, gradually limiting 
the direct involvement and above all discouraging these operations by 
NGOs, “guilty” of attracting rescued persons to the Italian 
jurisdiction. The first act of this phase can be considered the 
enactment of the “Minniti Code” of July 2017, which set a series of 
	  
* University of Naples “L’Orientale”, Project Coordinator – Chief Leader of the 
Jean Monnet Network “MAPS – Migration and Asylum Policy Systems”. 
1  In comment to which reference should be made to A. Liguori, “The 
Externalization of Border Controls and the Responsibility of Outsourcing States 
under the European Convention on Human Rights”, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 
2018, p. 1228 ff,; ID., Migration Law and The Externalisation of Border Controls, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2019; A. Spagnolo, “The Conclusion of Bilateral 
Agreements and Technical Arrangements for the Management of Migration Flows: An 
Overview of the Italian Practice”, Italian Yearbook of International Law, 2018 p. 211 
ff. 
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rules to be followed by NGOs, through very questionable provisions2. 
Among the latter we would like to point out here, since it constitutes a 
precedent with respect to interpretation of the right of innocent 
passage by the regulations subsequently adopted in Italy, and on 
which we shall dwell, the commitment “not to enter Libyan territorial 
waters, except in situations of serious and imminent danger that 
require immediate assistance, and not to hinder the activity of Search 
and Rescue (SAR) by the Libyan Coast Guard, in order not to hamper 
the possibility of intervention by the competent national Authorities in 
their territorial waters, in compliance with international obligations”. 
This is, of course, an untenable demand for a ship flying a foreign flag, 
since it would be required not to exercise its right of innocent passage 
through the territorial waters of a third State! Subsequently, in perfect 
harmony with the political winds blowing through Europe and 
facilitated by the lack of solidarity shown by the European Union’s 
partners in the management of landings, the new Italian government 
undertook, starting in June 2018, a series of measures aimed at closing 
ports to all vessels (in the case of the ship Diciotti also to an Italian 
military ship!) with migrants on board, rescued at sea. And so, in 2018 
and 2019, the two so called “security decrees” arrived. These decrees 
provide, among other things, measures to combat the phenomenon of 
irregular migration by sea at all costs, including through a progressive 
detachment from the international commitments undertaken, as we 
will try to demonstrate. At the time of writing various appeals are 
pending before the Constitutional Court and, in the political arena, 
amendments are being discussed. 
In the few pages that follow I would like to dwell in particular on a 
single aspect of the “security decree bis” (n. 53/19 converted by law n. 
77 of 8 August 2019) which concerns the interpretation of the right of 
innocent passage in the territorial sea, an institution codified by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in Montego 
Bay in 1982 (hereinafter UNCLOS) and ratified by Italy with law n. 
689 of 22 December 1994. 
 
	  
2 On the “Minniti Code” see M. Ramacciotti, “Sulla utilità di un codice di 
condotta per le organizzazioni non governative impegnate in attività di Search and 
Rescue (SAR)”, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2018, p. 213 ff.; F. Ferri, “Il Codice di 
condotta per le ONG e i diritti dei migranti: fra diritto internazionale e politiche 
europee”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2018, p. 189 ff. 
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2. The right of innocent passage as “revisited” by Article 1 of the so-
called “security bis” decree n. 53/2019 
 
Article 1 of the “security bis” decree inserts in Article 11 of 
Legislative Decree No 286 of 25 July 1998, the new paragraph 1-ter by 
which it attributes to the Minister of the Interior, in his capacity as 
national authority of public security, in the exercise of the 
coordination functions attributed to him by law, the power to restrict 
or prohibit the entry, transit or stopping of ships in the territorial sea, 
with the exception of military vessels and ships on non-commercial 
government service, for reasons of public order and security, or when 
he deems it necessary to prevent the “prejudicial” or “non-innocent” 
passage of a specific ship in relation to which the conditions set out in 
Article 19, paragraph 2, letter g) of UNCLOS can be fulfilled - limited 
to violations of immigration laws. 
The right of innocent passage, referred to in Articles 17 et seq. 
UNCLOS, consists of the right of each State to transit with its ships 
(private and public) through foreign territorial seas provided that such 
transit is harmless, i.e. does not disturb the “peace, good order and 
security” of the coastal State3. This is provided for in Article 19, first 
paragraph, UNCLOS, which reproduces the same rule contained in 
Article 14 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea. In 
the second paragraph, however, Article 19 UNCLOS, unlike the 1958 
version, lists a series of activities whose commission by the foreign ship 
automatically renders its passage not innocent. One of the activities is 
the one mentioned in Article 1 of the decree in question, namely “the 
loading or unloading of materials, currency or persons in violation of 
customs, tax, health or immigration laws and regulations in force in 
the coastal state”. 
The right of passage belongs to any vessel which enters the 
territorial waters of a foreign State only for the purpose of crossing 
them, whether it subsequently enters the internal waters of that State 
(incoming passage), comes from those waters with the intent of 
reaching other destinations (outgoing passage) or, finally, only transits 
parallel to the coast, without entering the internal waters (lateral 
passage). The passage must be rapid and continuous, save for the 
exceptions provided for in the last part of art. 18, par. 2, UNCLOS: 
	  
3 On the right of innocent passage see G. Cataldi, Il passaggio delle navi straniere 
nel mare territoriale, Giuffré, Milano, 1990. 
GIUSEPPE CATALDI 14 
activities necessary for ordinary navigation and, what is more relevant 
in our case, situations of force majeure, danger and need to provide 
assistance to ships and aircraft in danger. 
I believe this necessarily synthetic description of the institute is 
sufficient to reveal the perplexities raised by the formulation of Art. 1. 
Such article, in fact, provides for two distinct hypotheses with regard 
to the power to limit or prohibit the entry, transit or stopping of ships 
in the territorial sea: either for reasons of order and public safety, or 
when the passage is prejudicial or not innocent under Art. 19, para 2, 
letter g) UNCLOS. However, it is not clear how the two hypotheses 
can be distinguished. In other words, Art. 19 UNCLOS allows “for 
reasons of public order and safety” to restrict or prohibit the passage 
of a foreign ship. The assumption is that such passage is not innocent. 
Consequently, the passage of ships exercising the right of innocent 
passage cannot, as a general rule, be prevented, while measures can be 
taken to prevent non-innocent passage (Art. 25 UNCLOS). The 
special provision included in Article 11 of Legislative Decree no. 286 
of 25 July 1998 certainly cannot give new and additional powers to 
limit the right of innocent passage beyond those already provided for 
under Articles 19 and 25 UNCLOS and which constitute the 
perimeter within which the coastal State can take action against the 
foreign ship. It is worth remembering that the existence of a primary 
legal framework obviously does not change the system of 
supranational sources (ratified by Italy) within which such measures 
are inserted and with which they are required to comply pursuant to 
Art. 10, 11 and 117 of the Italian Constitution. This is also expressly 
provided for by the decree in question, which contains a specific 
reference to the necessary “compliance with international obligations”. 
What, therefore, is the rationale upon which the rule in Article 1 is 
based, given that it is not possible to introduce new limits to the right 
of innocent passage, nor is it conceivable that the purpose is a mere 
restatement of those principles? 
The answer must necessarily take account of practice in 
implementing this provision. As it appears from the cases that have 
occurred so far, the will of the legislator appears to be the following: 
except for cases in which the Italian coastal authorities have expressly 
authorized the entry into the territorial sea of a ship with migrants 
rescued on board, such entry is to be considered contrary to “public 
order and public safety”, since the absence of authorization means, in 
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the light of the rules on search and rescue at sea that we shall soon 
examine, refusal to assign the POS (Place of Safety), a refusal based, in 
this case, on the responsibility of another State. This will to qualify the 
passage ex ante as innocent or not is therefore functional to the policy 
of “closure of national ports”. 
The measure of port closure is not in itself excluded by the law of 
the sea, since ports fall within the exclusive sovereignty of the State. 
There is no right of entry into a foreign port under international law, 
since the port is located in internal waters, and unless an international 
agreement has been reached, the coastal State may choose whether or 
not to admit a foreign ship (unlike the territorial sea, where all States 
enjoy the right of innocent passage). Article 25 of UNCLOS also 
provides that the State may refuse entry if the ship violates national 
immigration regulations. However, any ship has the right to enter a 
port if it is itself in a situation of distress, or if the persons on board 
are in difficulty. In this case, the rule of “force majeure” or the “state 
of necessity”, already provided for and codified by the 1923 
Convention on the Regime of Sea Ports, applies. In these cases the 
refusal to accept a ship into a port constitutes a violation of the duty to 
safeguard human life at sea, unless a simple intervention (e.g. medical 
or mechanical repair) carried out on board can be sufficient to put an 
end to the state of necessity, without proceeding to the entry into the 
port. In the specific case of possible asylum seekers on board, when 
the ship is in internal waters and therefore under the jurisdiction of 
the coastal State, said coastal State must verify, person by person, 
whether or not the requirements have been met, otherwise it would be 
in violation of its obligations according to human rights standards, in 
particular the obligation of non-refoulement under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention on refugees and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) as interpreted by the Court of Strasbourg.  
Therefore, the entry into the territorial sea of a ship carrying 
people already rescued in fulfilment of the international obligation to 
save human life at sea is legitimate, and must be considered as an 
innocent passage, because landing in a Place of Safety is functional to 
the completion of rescue operations; in the same way, obviously, the 
entry into the territorial sea in order to rescue people in danger at that 
moment must be considered as an innocent passage. Neither of the 
two activities can be considered to have been carried out in violation 
of national immigration laws, provided that the purpose of the ship is 
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related to the rescue obligations. On this point, Italian case law is 
abundant and almost unanimous4. 
 
 
3. Search and Rescue Obligations according to International Law 
 
A few words on rescue obligations. They are first of all embodied 
in Article 98 UNCLOS, which codifies a very ancient principle of 
customary law, namely the obligation to rescue persons in distress at 
sea, without any geographical indication or limitation, and also 
specifying the need for the State to promote “the establishment, 
operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and 
rescue service”5.  
	  
4 Among the many decisions: Court of Agrigento 7 October 2009, no. 954 in the 
Cap Anamur case; request for dismissal of the Palermo Public Prosecutor's Office,15 
June 2018, in the case involving the ship Golfo Azzurro of the NGO Iuventa; Court of 
Ragusa, office for preliminary investigation decree of rejection of the request for 
preventive seizure, 16 April 2018, confirmed by the Ragusa Court of Review 
(Tribunale del riesame), 11 May 2018 in the Open Arms case; Corte di Cassazione, 
Criminal section I, judgment 27 March 2014, no. 14510 and Corte di Cassazione, 
Criminal section IV, judgment 30 March 2018, no. 14709, which on the subject of the 
subsistence of Italian jurisdiction in relation to conduct, alternatively qualified as 
humanitarian aid operations or aiding and abetting illegal immigration, which took 
place on the high seas, noted that “the rescue intervention is a duty under the 
International Conventions on the Law of the Sea”; Court of Catania, 7 December 2018, 
which with reference to the Diciotti case underlines that “the obligation to save life at 
sea is a precise duty of States and prevails over all bilateral rules and agreements aimed at 
combating irregular immigration”; GIP (Judge for the preliminary investigation) of 
Trapani, decision 3 June 2019, in the Vos-Thalassa case, which recognizes the 
exemption of legitimate defense in the case of migrants rescued and protested with 
force the compulsory accompaniment to Libya; Corte di Cassazione, Criminal section 
I, 23 January 2015, n. 3345, on the subject of “mediated author”, i.e. rescue operations 
provoked by the same smugglers who determine the responsibility of the latter but 
certainly not of those who provide rescue at sea. 
5 “1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can 
do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render 
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all 
possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, 
in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him; (c) after a collision, to render 
assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the 
other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it 
will call. 2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and 
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on 
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More detailed are the provisions of the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the 1979 
Hamburg Convention on Search and Rescue at Sea (SAR). These two 
conventions were amended in 2004, following the case of the 
Norwegian ship Tampa, which in 2001 picked up 438 Afghan asylum 
seekers at sea but was banned by the Australian authorities from 
entering their ports for more than a week, generating a diplomatic 
crisis with Norway, until the situation was resolved by “outsourcing” 
the management of the matter to the State of Nauru, which accepted 
the asylum seekers in exchange for money6. In particular, the 20 May 
2004 IMO (International Maritime Organization) Maritime Safety 
Committee Resolution made it clear that the Search and Rescue 
operation only ends with the disembarkation (in the shortest possible 
time and with the minimum possible diversion of the voyage 
undertaken by the rescuer ship) of the rescued persons in a safe place; 
that the government responsible for the SAR region where the 
survivors were recovered is required to identify the safe place of 
disembarkation and to either provide it directly or ensure that it is 
provided by another state; that a safe place cannot be considered as 
the ship performing the rescue, except for a limited time, and that 
neighboring coastal states, as well as the flag state and any state 
involved (e.g. because it is the nation state of the majority of the crew 
or passengers) cannot be considered to be exempted from liability, 
especially if the government responsible for the SAR region is 
unwilling or unable to intervene. 
 With regard to the latter, it should be stressed that the concern 
has been, especially since 2004, to broaden as far as possible the 
“titles” of competence and thus the scope of the States potentially 
responsible. The rules of the two SOLAS and SAR Conventions, as 
well as IMO recommendations, are based on cooperation (“the 
coordination by one state of rescue action does not free other states”, as 
the IMO states in its recommendations). In fact, the first maritime 
rescue centre that becomes aware of a case of danger, even if the event 
affects the SAR area of another country, must take the necessary 
	  
and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional 
arrangements cooperate with neighboring States for this purpose”. 
6 Incidentally, this is the so-called “Pacific Solution”, i.e. specific to the Pacific 
Ocean, which inspired many European governments that, by their own admission, 
consider it as a good practice to imitate. 
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urgent action and then continue to coordinate the rescue until the 
authority responsible for the area takes over the coordination. The 
State to which the Coordination Centre which first received the news, 
or which has in any case taken over the coordination of the rescue 
operations, has the obligation to identify a safe place on its territory 
where the rescue operations can be completed by the disembarkation 
of the shipwrecked persons, provided that it is not possible to reach 
agreements with a State that may be closer to the area of the event, 
regardless of any consideration regarding the status of the 
shipwrecked persons. 
It is equally clear, however, that there are two problems with the 
application of these rules in the central Mediterranean. The first is that 
Malta, which has a very large SAR area, has not, however, ratified the 
2004 amendments and, in view of the limits of its territory and the 
means at its disposal, it disputes its competence to direct rescue 
operations in its SAR (unless Maltese flag vessels are involved, which is 
a very rare hypothesis), which, moreover, overlaps with the Italian one 
in several places.  
Different but no less problematic is the issue of the Libyan SAR. 
This country, which still lacks an effective government that controls 
the entire territory, although it has declared that it has assumed 
responsibility for search and rescue in the (large) sea area north of its 
coasts, does not even have an efficient coordination centre for rescue 
operations. Moreover, and most significantly, Libya cannot at this time 
be considered, by almost unanimous recognition, as a safe place of 
landing from the point of view of protection of fundamental human 
rights. Indeed, it is clear that the place of disembarkation is 
understood as “safe” when both physical security and the enjoyment 
of human rights are no longer in danger. Corollary to this principle is 
the right, as well as the obligation, to provide the Place of Safety, a 
right to which the rescued persons are entitled7. 
The obligation to save human life at sea, therefore, is obligatory 
for both States (according to art. 98, par. 1 UNCLOS) and masters 
of ships (according to Chapter V, reg. 33 SOLAS, as well as national 
rules on the matter, such as for example art. 489 of Italian navigation 
code). This obligation requires the master to assist persons in distress 
	  
7 In this regard, see the clear statements of the GIP of Trapani, cit. For the 
doctrine please refer to T. Scovazzi, “Human Rights and Immigration at Sea”, in Ruth 
Rubio-Marin (ed.), Human Rights and Immigration, OUP, Oxford, 2014, p. 225 ff.  
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and take them to a safe place “in the shortest possible time”. In other 
words, the event of rescue at sea continues until the master has 
disembarked the persons in a safe place, and its entry into the 
territorial sea and ports of a State cannot be seen in a different light. 
The passage of a ship which has rescued persons in distress, even 
outside the territorial sea, cannot therefore be precluded if the ship 
intends to enter in order to finalize its obligation to save human life 
at sea. This is required by the conventional rules on the rescue and 
salvage of persons at sea already mentioned, which provide for 
coordination between the States involved. Thus the inaction or 
failure by other States to fulfil their obligations is wholly without 
merit. 
Consequently, there can be no automatic refusal of the right of 
passage by virtue of its preventive qualification as not harmless if the 
vessel hosts persons rescued at sea. Correctly, the Court of Palermo, 
section for ministerial crimes, by decision of January 30, 2020 
acknowledged (on p. 37), that art. 11 paragraph 1 ter inserted in 
Legislative Decree 286/98 can only be interpreted, in the light of 
UNCLOS rules cited, as meaning that the prohibition of entry must 
refer “only to cases of illegal immigration not related to a rescue 
operation at sea”. As a result, the Court asked the Senate for 
authorization to proceed against former Italian Minister of the 
Interior, Matteo Salvini, in the case of the Spanish-flagged Open Arms 
vessel chartered by the NGO Pro-Activa Open Arms. 
 The governmental interpretation of the right of innocent passage 
as provided in the “security bis decree” is quite clear in various 
directives of the Ministry of the Interior. 
 First of all, Directive No 14100/141(8), dated 4 April 2019, 
regarding the Alan Kurdi ship, flying the German flag and belonging 
to the NGO Sea Eye, without mentioning the international obligations 
referred to above, nor the rules to be applied in the event of a state of 
emergency, categorically and incontrovertibly affirmed that the flag 
State in this case was competent “to assume a specific role of control 
and coordination of the subsequent activities to be carried out by the 
naval organization”. Thus any transit of the vessel Alan Kurdi through 
the maritime area under Italian jurisdiction in breach of the provisions 
on immigration would necessarily be a non-innocent passage. This 
because the Italian authorities “did not coordinate the event in 
question nor did it take place in waters of national responsibility”. It 
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was therefore instructed to order the vessel to refrain from entering 
and transiting Italian territorial waters. 
But, in the case in point, a request to allocate a POS had been 
submitted to several States. To Libya, which did not reply, or replied 
only after much delay, and which, in any case, for the reasons already 
indicated, is to be considered “out of the game”; to Malta, whose 
reluctance, in light of the non-ratification of the 2004 amendments, is 
well known and not surprising; to Tunisia, a relatively safe country, 
but not equipped to satisfy the needs of the migrants and, according to 
the opinion of the NGO operators, a country lacking a complete 
legislation on the subject of international protection, and which, in any 
case, also did not reply. Does it make sense to discuss the possible 
violation by these States of their international commitments? We do 
not think so, as in this case we are considering the position of Italy. In 
the light of the scope of the rules that have been summarily described, 
the obligation of Italian authorities to attribute the POS once 
requested is all too evident, especially in the absence of a reply from 
other States. In order to escape this logical consequence, the Rome 
Tribunal, section for ministerial offences, in its decree of 21 November 
2019 by which it dismissed the allegations made against former 
Minister of the Interior Salvini with reference to the Alan Kurdi affair, 
stated that these rules do not apply to operations carried out by ships 
professionally engaged in search and rescue at sea. The conclusion, 
again according to this Tribunal, would be that, in the absence of 
specific rules, only the flag State can be said to be obliged to assume 
the resulting responsibilities and that unfortunately, as the flag state in 
this case was Germany, a country far from the theatre of operations, in 
the end ... no one is responsible. 
However, the differentiation of the regime for NGOs whose 
mission is rescue as opposed to state-owned or private vessels that are 
involved “by chance” in rescuing people in danger appears arbitrary 
and, above all, is not provided for in the rules on the matter; this 
presumption of “forcing ad libitum” the rules indirectly attributed to 
NGOs appears neither legitimate nor justified. The Rome Tribunal, in 
a single stroke, presumes to annul the right and duty of the ship's 
captain to assess a specific situation which arises, and the obligations 
of States built up over the years by the Conventions mentioned and 
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the amendments which have been adopted8. But, in light of the 
practice and the rules themselves on Search and Rescue, there is no 
other model, and the solution of relying exclusively on the flag State in 
the absence of intervention by the SAR State is precisely what the 
Hamburg Convention, particularly with the 2004 amendments, sought 
to prevent through the mechanism of solidarity and co-responsibility 
of all the States involved! The Public Prosecutor’s Office too, in its 
request for dismissal in the same case, points out that the 1979 
Hamburg Convention, in section 5.3.4.1. provides that “when a rescue 
coordination centre or secondary rescue centre is informed of the 
existence of an emergency phase and ignores whether other centres 
are taking the appropriate measures, it undertakes to take the 
necessary measures and contacts neighbouring centres with a view to 
designating a centre to take immediate responsibility for the 
operations”. 
Even more explicit in expressing prejudice against the activities of 
NGOs and the need to enforce the rules on SARs mentioned above is 
another directive of the same Ministry, issued just a few days after (15 
April 2019) the one already examined, this time concerning the vessel 
Mare Jonio, flying the Italian flag. In fact, the directive requires that 
the vessel in question must ensure that it complies with the 
instructions given (i.e. not to enter Italian waters), expressly stating in 
the recitals that “interventions by private vessels in specific and limited 
sea areas, which result in the preventive and intentional transport of 
migrants to the European coasts, materialize, also for publicity 
activities, a 'mediated' cooperation which, in fact, encourages the sea 
crossings of foreign citizens not in regular possession of a stay permit 
and promotes, objectively, their illegal entry into the national 
territory”. The directive therefore abides by that idea, which was at the 
basis of the European “rejection” of the Italian Mare Nostrum 
operation, but is completely contradicted by practice, according to 
which an effective Search and Rescue activity provides an incentive 
	  
8 On the obligations and the right/duty of the master of the ship to obey 
international law, and on the relationship with the competence of the State, please 
refer to F. De Vittor, M. Starita, “Distributing Responsibility between Shipmasters 
and the Different States Involved in SAR Disasters”, Italian Yearbook of International 
Law, 2018, p. 82 ff.; M. Starita, “Il dovere di soccorso in mare e il diritto di obbedire 
al diritto (internazionale) del comandante della nave privata”, Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, 2019, p. 5 ff. 
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(“taxi effect” as defined at the time of Mare Nostrum) to departures9. 
In this regard, it is necessary to recall what has already been said, 
namely that the international obligations mentioned, in particular 
Article 98 UNCLOS, commit States to carry out search and rescue 
activities directly, to this end promoting “the establishment and 
permanent operation of an adequate and effective search and rescue 
service to protect maritime and air safety”. In the motion for a 
resolution submitted to the European Parliament on 21 October 2019 
by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “on 
Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean”10, and rejected by 290 votes 
against, 288 in favour and 36 abstentions, the following is emphasized: 
NGOs rescuing migrants were nominated in 2018 for the Sakharov 
Prize; after the Italian operation Mare Nostrum (ceased on 31 October 
2014) there were no State SAR actions in the Central Mediterranean; 
and finally on 26 September 2019 the EU Operation Sophia was 
extended until 31 March 2020 but only for air operations. Therefore, 
NGOs have limited themselves to occupying a space left (maliciously) 
free by States reluctant to fulfil their obligations and thus creating 
problems for commercial navigation. In a statement of 11 June 2018, 
the International Chamber of Shipping in London (the World 
Shipowners’ Association) not incidentally pointed out that “if NGO 
ships are unable to land people rescued in Italy in Italian ports, this 
will also have significant consequences for merchant ships (...), which 
will again have to participate in a significant number of rescues”. The 
“security decree bis” therefore violates the spirit and the letter of the 
international rules mentioned so far from two different points of view. 
First because there is a clear prejudice with respect to the rescue 
activities of NGOs, and secondly because the ultimate goal is, once 
again, the idea that the landing should take place “anywhere except in 
	  
9 See in this regard the paper by E. Cusumano, M. Villa, “Sea Rescue NGOs: a 
Pull Factor of Irregular Migration?”, in Policy Brief. Migration Policy Centre. Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. European University Institute, Issue 2019/22, 
November 2019. The authors, basing their research on data and facts, effectively 
demonstrate how wrong this assumption is. More in general, on the relationship 
between NGOs and Italian authorities on the subject, refer to G. Bevilacqua, “Italy 
versus NGOs: The controversial Interpretation and Implementation of Search and 
Rescue Obligations in the context of Migration at Sea”, Italian Yearbook of 
International law, 2018, p. 11 ff.  
10 2019/2755(RSPP)B9-0154/2019, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo-
/document/B-9-20190154_EN.html9>(06/20). 
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Italy”. In fact, in this regard, it should be remembered that, on various 
occasions, different arguments have indicated that a State other than 
Italy is competent: in the case of the ship Mare Jonio, flying the Italian 
flag, the initial responsibility for landing, according to the Italian 
authorities, did not lie with the flag State but with the State of the 
nearest port. Furthermore, it was claimed that since the vessel was not 
in the Italian SAR, it was not possible for the POS to be identified in 
an Italian port! On the contrary, the priority of a rescue vessel landing 
in its own flag State was already invoked by the Italian Government in 
events involving the vessels Aquarius (UK flag), Sea Watch 3 
(Netherlands), Open Arms (Spain). In the latter case, reference was 
also made to the nearest port (Malta), and the country of the SAR 
region (Libya), while in the case of the refusal of Italian ports to the 
vessel Aquarius, reference was made, as an alternative to the flag (UK), 
to the ownership of the vessel or the nationality of the NGO (France), 
or to the waters where the vessel was located at the time of the 
ministerial declarations (Malta). 
The infringement to the letter of the international rules on the 
subject emerges, as we have attempted to demonstrate, from the claim 
to qualify a priori as offensive the passage into the territorial sea of 
ships engaged in “unauthorized” rescue operations. In this regard, it 
should be recalled, first of all, that, despite the different 
interpretations that States have reserved to the relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS (Articles 17 - 26), the right of innocent passage without the 
need for prior authorization is, in fact, recognized to all foreign ships, 
including warships, even by States which, during the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea as well as in their domestic laws, 
had affirmed the need for authorization by the coastal State or prior 
notification of passage. This conclusion is further supported, in the 
most recent practice, by the attitude of States such as Finland or 
Sweden, which have abandoned their original position in favour of the 
legitimacy of the imposition by the coastal State of the obligation of 
prior notification of passage; at the time of ratification of UNCLOS, in 
fact, they have not deposited any interpretative declaration in this 
respect. A development in customary law in the sense of the legitimacy 
of at least the condition of prior notification of the passage of nuclear-
powered ships and ships carrying radioactive or other intrinsically 
hazardous or noxious substances has, in our view, occurred in recent 
years, mainly as a result of the practice of European States, but this is 
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in the light of an increased sensitivity to values of common interest, 
and we stress values of common interest, such as health and the 
environment11. However, the requirement for authorisation to transit 
remains a practice considered incompatible with freedom of 
navigation. In order to overcome the evident discrepancy with the 
rules of the provisions issued by the Italian legislator, the Rome 
Tribunal, in the decision mentioned above, made a logical and factual 
reversal of the situation and competences in the Search and Rescue 
field represented by the decision, according to which, unlike in cases 
where the State acts directly, ships belonging to humanitarian 
organizations “once the rescue has been carried out, autonomously 
choose the route to travel and the country to turn to for the indication 
of a POS”. But according to the facts, there is no “autonomy”; on the 
contrary, the difficulty of having to act in the absence of indications 
from the States emerges. Hence the impossibility of defining the 





In conclusion, it should be reaffirmed that the means used to cross 
the Mediterranean, and the factual circumstances, lead, ab initio, to a 
state of necessity and therefore the application of the customary rule 
on the duty to render assistance codified in Article 98 UNCLOS. 
Especially in the light of the absence of direct state intervention, the 
legality of the actions carried out by NGOs’ is beyond doubt. It is 
worth remembering that according to the Missing Migrants Project of 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), of the 3,514 
people who died in 2017 in an attempt to emigrate, whose identity has 
been verified, as many as 2,510 have lost their lives in the 
Mediterranean. Moreover, despite a significant drop in arrivals, the 
route from Libya to Europe remains, according to UNHCR, the 
deadliest migration route in the world. In 2018 it was five times more 
fatal than in 2015, mainly due to the reduction in search and rescue 
activities off the Libyan coast. These figures need no comment. 
Consequently, the automatic denial of the right of passage under the 
	  
11 On this point please refer to G. Cataldi, “Problèmes généraux de la navigation 
en Europe”, in Rafael Casado Raigon (ed.), Europe et la mer, II Colloque de 
l’Association internationale du droit de la mer, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, p. 127 ff. 
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administrative measures issued in application of the “security bis 
decree” is illegitimate because it is incompatible with the international 
rules on the matter (art. 17 ff. UNCLOS). This refusal, while recalling 
Italy’s SAR obligations, is motivated by an alleged intention to land 
irregular migrants, on the basis of actions carried out “in full 
autonomy”. The entry into the territorial sea, on the other hand, when 
linked to the Search and Rescue activity and to the right/duty that a 
POS be assigned, is, as such, perfectly legitimate. With regard to that 
part of the “security decree bis” which deals with search and rescue at 
sea, in our humble opinion there is a need for a profound change, in 
light of the evident contradiction with the functioning of the 
international rules on the subject, as is also apparent from the 
absolutely prevailing jurisprudence, which continues to affirm the 
primacy of legality, both domestic and international, without 
surrendering to pressures of alleged exceptional necessity and 
urgency12. 
	  
12 In addition to the case law cited above, see recently Court of Cassation, 3rd 
Criminal Chamber, judgment No 112 of 20 February 2020, in the case of Carola 
Rackete, commander of the vessel Sea Watch 3. For the Supreme Court, the latter, 
from the beginning to the end of the rescue operations, acted in full compliance with 
the obligations imposed by international law, including therefore the decision not to 
comply with the prohibition to enter the territorial sea and an Italian port (prohibition 
issued in execution of the “security decree bis”), forcing the “blockade” opposed by 
the military authorities and leading the migrants rescued on 12 June 2019 to a safe 




THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM IN ITALY 
 







The right to asylum is recognized by Italian law at a Constitutional 
level in a form that goes beyond the limits observed in other 
Constitutional traditions1 and in International Law.2 Article 10, para. 
3, of the Italian Constitution states that: “A foreigner who is prevented 
in his country from the effective exercise of democratic freedoms 
guaranteed by the Italian Constitution has the right to asylum in the 
territory of the Republic, according to the conditions established by 
law”. 
Such a broad formulation was desired by the Constituents, who 
had undergone exile due to their antifascist stance as dissidents and 
partisans, and who were therefore well aware of how essential is to 
find hospitality and asylum abroad when democratic freedoms were 
denied in one’s own country, and one risked arrest, detention, torture, 
and other serious violations of one’s rights. 
Nevertheless, the Constitution refers to an ad hoc law, never 
adopted, for implementation of the right to asylum stipulated in Art. 
10, para. 3. In the absence of any comprehensive framework, the 
Court of Cassation has had to provide guidance regarding application 
of the Constitutional right to asylum, specifying, with an important 
judgment in 1997, that this was a personal right that could be directly 
invoked by those who claimed they could benefit from it.3 In the wake 
	  
*University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
1 For instance the French tradition, from which the Italian Constitution drew 
inspiration. See P. Bonetti, Prospettive di attuazione del diritto costituzionale di asilo in 
Italia, available at: <http://briguglio.asgi.it/immigrazione-e-asilo/1999/giugno/bonetti-
asilo.html> (07/20). 
2 L. Neri, “Il principio di umanità alla prova dell’abrogazione del permesso di 
soggiorno per motivi umanitari”, in Mariacristina Molfetta, Chiara Marchetti (eds.), Il 
diritto di asilo. Report 2019, Fondazione Migrantes, Editore Tau, Roma, 2019, p. 145 
ff., in particular p. 146. 
3 Corte di Cassazione, judgement No. 4674, 26 May 1997. 
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of this judgment, numerous Constitutional asylum requests were 
registered from foreign citizens, among these the application 
submitted by the well-known leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, 
detained in a maximum security prison in Imrali, Turkey. In 1999 the 
Court of Rome recognized, in absentia, Ocalan’s right to asylum as 
stipulated in Article 10, para. 3, of the Constitution.4 
Without a comprehensive legal framework, the structuring of the 
Italian asylum system was made possible through the implementation 
of International Law, particularly the Geneva Convention5 and the 
Schengen Agreements,6 which introduced refugee status and the first 
form of humanitarian protection, as well as EC/EU law on asylum,7 In 
particular we have to mention the directives 2004/83/EC (the so-called 
“Qualification Directive”) 8  and 2005/85/EC (otherwise known as 
“Procedures Directive”), 9 which introduced subsidiary protection and 
regulated the procedures for examination of requests for international 
protection presented within Italian territory or at the borders. 
 
 
2. The forms of protection of asylum seekers recognized by Italian 
law 
 
In the light of the aforementioned normative framework, an 
asylum seeker has the right to enter and stay in Italian territory in 
order to have his or her situation examined by the appropriate 
authorities (Territorial Commissions: administrative bodies 
responsible for examining asylum requests in the first istance) sand 
may not be refused entry, in accordance with Article 19 of the Law on 
	  
4 Court of Rome, judgement No. 49565, 1 October 1999. 
5 Incorporated into Italian law with Law 24 July 1954, No. 722. 
6 L. Neri, “Il principio di umanità”, cit., pp. 149-150. 
7  P. Bonetti, “Il diritto d’asilo in Italia dopo l’attuazione della direttiva 
comunitaria sulle qualifiche sugli status di rifugiato e di protezione sussidiaria”, 
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 1, 2008, p. 14. 
8 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted, implemented by Italy with legislative decree No. 251/2007. 
9 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 




immigration.10 Refusal of entry at the border is also forbidden in the 
case of unaccompanied minors, women who are either pregnant or 
have given birth within six months, and people who are ill, disabled, 
elderly, or who have experienced violence or torture. 
Between 2017 and 2018, Italian government adopted normative 
security measures which narrowed the field of the right to protection 
and brought about a reorganization of the procedures for examination 
of asylum requests. Asylum seekers, following examination of their 
request by the Territorial Commissions,11 may either obtain a form of 
international protection – refugee status or subsidiary protection – or 
fail in their request. In the latter case an applicant may challenge the 
decision by appealing to the court of first instance, although not to the 
court of appeal, as a result of the adoption of the “Minniti decree” in 
2017,12 which also established that the court of first instance could 
decide on a request for international protection without listening to 
the applicant, basing a decision exclusively on a video recording of the 
hearing before the Territorial Commission. 
According to the Geneva Convention and the “Qualification 
Directive”, the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who, “owing 
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country”, or to a stateless person in the same conditions with 
regard to the country of former habitual residence. 13  Subsidiary 
protection can be recognized to a third-country national or a stateless 
person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or, in the case of 
a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, 
	  
10 Legislative Decree, Coordinated Text 25 July 1998, No. 286. 
11 Administrative bodies currently formed of specialized personnel, hired through 
competitive exams, as well as a member of UNHCR.  
12 Decree-law 17 February 2017, No. 13, converted into Law 13 April 2017, No. 
46. 
13 Art. 1, Geneva Convention on Refugees; art. 2, d), of Directive 2011/95/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted. 
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would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15 
of the Qualification Directive. Serious harm consists of: the death 
penalty or execution; torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; a serious and 
individual threat to a civilian’s life by reason of indiscriminate violence 
in situations of international or internal armed conflict.  
It is worth noting that Italian legislators have wanted to align the 
content of subsidiary protection with refugee status, including 
analogous rights, such as the issue of a five-year residence permit, with 
all resulting implications concerning the fulfillment of the 
requirements for the issue of an EC residence permit for long-term 
residents,14 and thus stability and integration, as well as the exercise of 
free movement in the Schengen zone. Beneficiaries of international 
protection are also granted the same right to healthcare as that enjoyed 
by Italian citizens, along with the right to family reunification, without 
needing to demonstrate income and housing requirements as in the 
case of other migrants. 
Italian Courts intervened to specify the field of application of 
international protection, developing a highly advanced case law for 
some sectors, in compliance with obligations deriving from other 
International Treaties to which Italy adheres. Although this is not the 
place for a detailed reconstruction of the jurisprudential approaches 
that have emerged in the last few years, they are worth mentioning. 
We will first highlight the judgements handed down by the Court 
of Cassation in May15 and November 2017,16 which recognized the 
right of international protection for asylum seekers who were victims 
of gender violence, on the basis of the Istanbul Convention of the 
Council of Europe,17 implemented by Italy in 2013. The cases dealt 
with by the Supreme Court involved two women asylum seekers, the 
first, of Moroccan citizenship, domestically abused by her husband, 
and the other, of Nigerian citizenship, abused by her husband’s family 
after his death. In both cases the Supreme Court held that gender-
based violence should be counted as persecution, and thus qualifying 
	  
14 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents. 
15 Corte di Cassazione, order of 17 May 2017, No. 12333. 
16 Corte di Cassazione, judgement of 24 November 2017, No. 28152. 
17 Istanbul Convention Action against violence against women and domestic 
violence, 7 April 2011, implemented in Italy with Law 27 June 2013, No. 77. 




for refugee status, as stipulated in Article 60 of the Convention of 
Istanbul and in the UNHCR guidelines.18 
In spite of such significant judgements, in the GREVIO latest 
report on Italy,19 it is highlighted that practices vary widely depending 
on the geographical area and on the Territorial Commission 
sexamining the application, and that asylum seekers who are victims of 
gender-based violence tend not to receive international protection in 
Italy. 
The case-law on the recognition of international protection for 
victims of trafficking in human beings, and in particular for women 
asylum seekers from Nigeria exploited in the prostitution market, is 
particularly notable 20  too. However, in spite of progress made 
following the adoption of the Warsaw Convention,21 GRETA has 
underlined that the number of people identified and assisted in Italy as 
victims of human trafficking remains small, and a large number of 
unaccompanied minors continue to disappear.22 
Another sector worthy of note is the international protection of 
asylum seekers fleeing persecution because of their sexual orientation, 
with regard to which Italy, in comparison to the EU other European 
	  
18 Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the 
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees, 7 May 2002. 
19 Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence, GREVIO’s (Baseline) Evaluation Report on legislative and other measures 
giving effect to the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), 
ITALY, 15 November 2019. 
20 On this topic, see, among others: D. Belluccio, “Status di rifugiato e vittima di 
tratta: note a margine del decreto del Tribunale di Bari del 10 novembre 2018”, and L. 
Minniti, “La tutela delle vittime di tratta davanti? al giudice della protezione 
internazionale. Le peculiarità, le possibilità, le necessità, gli obblighi”, both published 
on <https://www.asgi.it/> (07/20), 27 February 2019. See also M. Massari, Il corpo 
degli altri. Migrazioni, memorie, identità, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno, 2017; B. Pinelli, 
Migranti e rifugiate, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano, 2019; E. Rigo, “Donne 
attraverso il Mediterraneo. Una prospettiva di genere sulla protezione internazionale”, 
Notizie Di Politeia, XXXII(124), 2016, pp. 82-94; E. Santoro, “Asilo e tratta: il tango 
delle protezioni”, Questione Giustizia, 2018. 
21 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
1 February 2008, implemented in Italy with law 29 November 2010, No. 108. 
22 Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Report 
concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings by Italy, 25 January 2019. 
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Countries systems, has assumed the position of pioneer.23 The Court of 
Cassation,24 established the principle, confirmed by subsequent case 
law, that any law criminalizing homosexuality constitutes a justifiable 
reason for granting international protection to an asylum seeker, 
without the necessity of demonstrating that the rule in question is 
applied, as established, however, by the EU Court of Justice in the  
X.Y. and Z. case of 2013. Indeed, criminal sanction for homosexual 
relations “constitutes on its own a general condition of deprivation of 
the fundamental right to lead one’s own sexual and emotional life 
freely”, and “has automatic repercussions on the individual condition 
of homosexual people, placing them in a situation of objective 
persecution that justifies granting protection”. 
The Court of Cassation, due to the fundamental nature of the right 
of sexual orientation, also rejected discretionary tests, and more 
recently sustained that for recognition of refugee status it is not 
necessary that the asylum seeker’s country of origin criminalize 
relations between people of the same sex. The Territorial Commission 
or the judge of first instance must evaluate the possible risk that a 
person may face in respect of his or her mental and physical 
wellbeing,25 risks that, as the UNHCR guidelines26 state, may derive 
from a climate in the country of origin that is particularly 
discriminatory and oppressive for homosexuals, even in the absence of 
criminalization. 
Mention should also be made of the third hypothesis of serious 
harm envisaged by the Qualification Directive. As is well known, 
migrants who reach Italy come predominantly from the African 
continent, and in particular from sub-Saharan countries. As such, they 
are often classified as “economic migrants” based on nothing more 
	  
23  On this subject, see C. Danisi, “Crossing borders between International 
Refugee Law and International Human Rights Law in the European context: Can 
human rights enhance protection against persecution based on sexual orientation (and 
beyond)?”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2019. See also: 
<https://www.sogica.org> (07/20). 
24 Corte di Cassazione, order of 29 May 2012, No. 15981, T.T. vs. Interior 
Ministry. 
25 Corte di Cassazione, judgement of 23 April 2019, No. 11176. 
26 Guidelines On International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based 
on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of 
the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 23 
October 2012. 




than an evaluation of their nationalities,27 making it difficult for them 
to have access to fair and efficient asylum procedures, especially in the 
hotspots established in implementation of the European Agenda on 
immigration. 28  However, in many cases Italian judges granted 
subsidiary protection to Malian citizens fleeing from a situation of 
general violence linked to war, initially only to people from the north 
of the country, but more recently to applicants from other zones as 
well, since, given the intensification and spread of the conflict, “social 
tensions and terrorist threats, while less intense than in the north of 
the country, have alarming features that, insofar as they are growing 
and uncontainable, lead us to define the conflict as one of high 
intensity.”29 
The approach has become even more restrictive with the adoption 
of an Italian list of safe countries of origin, identified as Albania, 
Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kosovo, Northern 
Macedonia, Morocco, Montenegro, Senegal, Serbia, Tunisia, and 
Ukraine, and the instruction that any request for international 
protection from citizens of these countries be evaluated in light of 
information regarding the countries of origin.30 The asylum request 
evaluation scheme is therefore inverted; the assumption is that any 
applicant from one of the countries on the list runs no risk of 
persecution or serious harm in the event of return, and it is the 
applicant’s responsibility to prove otherwise.31 
 
2.1 Humanitarian protection before the 2018 security decree 
 
Prior to the reform introduced by the 2018 security decree, in 
addition to the two forms of international protection, a third form of 
	  
27  On the distinction between economic and humanitarian migrants see G. 
Cataldi, “La distinzione tra rifugiato e migrante economico: una dicotomia da 
superare?”, in Giuseppe Nesi (ed.), Migrazioni e diritto internazionale: verso il 
superamento dell’emergenza?, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2018, p. 585 ff. 
28 European Commission, A European Agenda On Migration, COM(2015) 240 
final, 13 May 2015. 
29  Court of Perugia, order of 24 April 2020, <https://www.meltingpot.org> 
(07/20). 
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protection was envisaged – humanitarian protection – which in 
practice found wide application, thanks also to the clarification of the 
Italian Courts. 
Article 32, para. 3, of Legislative Decree No. 25/2008 stated that 
“in cases where the Territorial Commission does not admit the 
application for international protection and believes that there may be 
serious humanitarian grounds, it will forward the application to the 
Questore [the Chief of the Police] for the granting of a residence 
permit pursuant to Article 5, para. 6” of the Law on immigration.  
The aforementioned provision linked the issue of the residence 
permit for humanitarian reasons to serious grounds, in particular of a 
humanitarian nature or resulting from the Constitutional or 
International obligations Italy’s. The Italian Court of Cassation 
specified that “the legal situation of foreigners who apply for the issue 
of a permit for humanitarian reasons has a consistency of subjective 
right, to be counted among fundamental human rights”,32 and that the 
competent body to decide on the release should be the Territorial 
Commission, not the Questore.33  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court clarified that this was a form of 
residual and temporary protection, to be taken into consideration only 
if the conditions for granting refugee status or subsidiary protection 
did not exist,34 and that it constituted an open catalogue to be used in 
varied hypotheses.35 
These hipotheses were systematized by the National Commission 
for the recognition of international protection. They included: 
exposure to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment in case of the 
expulsion of the applicant, in accordance with the case law of the 
Court of Strasbourg on the basis of Article 3 ECHR regarding the 
expulsion of foreigners; serious psycho-physical conditions or serious 
pathologies that cannot be adequately treated in the country of origin; 
the temporary impossibility of return due to the insecurity of the 
country or area of origin; serious natural disasters or other serious 
local factors impeding repatriation with dignity and in safety; and the 
family situation of the asylum seeker, which must be assessed in 
	  
32 Corte di Cassazione, order No. 19393/2009 and judgment No. 4455/2018. 
33 Corte di Cassazione, order No. 19393/2009. 
34 Corte di Cassazione, judgment of 21 April 2009, No. 11535. 
35 Corte di Cassazione, order 13 January 2009, No. 19393. 




accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the ECHR concerning 
the right to respect private and family life.36 
In practice, humanitarian protection was used to regularize, inter 
alia, the legal situation of asylum seekers in the following situations: 
victims of torture, violence and rape when they were in Libya or 
during the migration process; single women with children; people 
whose application for international protection was pending and who 
had completed a process of integration; ill people; and even people 
who, upon return to their country of origin, would have found 
themselves in conditions of extreme poverty. 
The residence permit for humanitarian reasons lasted two years 
and involved the recognition of many of the rights associated with 
international protection, as well as the convertibility to residence 
permits for work reasons and family reunification.37  
The normative framework preceding the adoption of decree-law 
No. 113/2018 was completed with permits “for special protection” for 
victims of trafficking in human beings (Article 18 of the Law on 
immigration), “for victims of domestic violence” (Article 18 bis of the 
Law on immigration) and for victims “of particular labour 
exploitation” (Article 22, para. 12 quarter, of the Law on 
immigration), not abolished by the aforementioned decree-law. 
Decree-law No. 113/2018, in force since October 5, 2018, later 
converted into Law No. 132/2018, abrogates the residence permit for 
humanitarian reasons, provides for new types of residence permits, 
and renames others that previously contained the words 
“humanitarian reasons”. In the case of “special” residence permits, the 
issuing authority is the Questore, rather than the Territorial 
Commission for the examination of the application for international 
protection. It should be noted that these are short-term residence 
	  
36  Ministerial Circular No. 00003716 of 30 July 2015, available at: 
<http://briguglio.asgi.it/> (07/20). 
37 On the residence permit for humanitarian protection see M. Acierno, “La 
protezione umanitaria nel sistema dei diritti umani”, Questione giustizia, 2, 2018; M. 
Benvenuti, “Il dito e la luna. La protezione delle esigenze di carattere umanitario degli 
stranieri prima e dopo il decreto Salvini”, Diritto immigrazione e cittadinanza, 1, 2019; 
G. Cataldi, “La distinzione tra rifugiato e migrante economico”, cit; L. Neri, “Il 
principio di umanità”, cit.; C. Favilli, “La protezione umanitaria per motivi di 
integrazione sociale. Prime riflessioni a margine della sentenza della Corte di 
cassazione n. 445/2018”, Questione giustizia, 1, 2018; N. Zorzella, “La protezione 
umanitaria nel sistema giuridico italiano”, Diritto immigrazione e cittadinanza, 1, 2018. 
ADELE DEL GUERCIO 
	  
36 
permits (six months to one year), which are not always renewable due 
to expiry and not always convertible into work reasons, unlike the 
residence permit for humanitarian reasons, which, as we have seen, 
had a duration of two years and guaranteed beneficiaries the 
possibility of its being converted into a work permit upon expiry. 
The need to intervene on humanitarian protection was justified, 
according to the Explanatory Report of decree law No. 113/2018, with 
reference to the instrumental use of it by Territorial Commissions and 
by the judges. The residence permit for humanitarian reasons became 
in practice “the most widely recognized form of protection in the 
national system”, according to the Executive, because of a legal 
definition with uncertain contours and an “excessively extensive” 
interpretation that could be demonstrated by the “anomalous 
disproportion” between the rates of recognition of international 
protection and recognition of humanitarian protection. The Executive 
therefore seemed to find the cause of the aforementioned 
disproportion in what, in truth, was actually the consequence of 
following: an extremely restrictive visa policy; the absence of legal 
entry channels; the malfunctioning of the old Territorial Commissions 
prior to the reform, which had been composed of unskilled personnel 
disinclined to recognise international protection even where the 
requisites established by law existed; and the rigidity of the conditions 
attached to refugee status and subsidiary protection.  
We want to highlight that the Territorial Commissions often adopt 
unreasonably restrictive approaches, denying protection or 
recognizing the least guaranteed form of protection (before the reform 
put in place by the security decree of 2018, a residence permit for 
humanitarian reasons). This approach causes a large number of 
judicial appeals, and thus an overloading of the judicial system and 
further delays to asylum procedures, with detrimental consequences 
for applicants, and onerous additional costs to the State. 
 
2.2 The new residence permits 
 
The first new residence permit introduced by decree law No. 
113/2018, converted into Law No. 132/2018, is the permit “for special 
protection”, with an annual duration, which is renewable but not 
convertible into other types of residence permits. The Territorial 
Commission transmits the documents to the Questore for the issuance 




of this type of residence permit when it has not accepted the 
application for international protection but there is a risk of 
persecution pursuant to Article 19, para. 1, or the risk of torture 
pursuant to Article 19, para. 1.1, of Legislative Decree No. 286/98, in 
the case of expulsion of asylum seekers. 
Law No. 132/2018 then provides for a residence permit “for 
medical treatment”, issued by the Questore to the foreigner who is in a 
“particularly serious” health condition, assessed by suitable 
documentation from a hospital or a doctor affiliated with the national 
health system (Sistema sanitario nazionale, S.S.N). This is a different 
case from that provided for by Article 36 of the Law on immigration, 
which allows entry into Italian territory of a third country citizen who 
needs medical treatment. The residence permit “for medical 
treatment” has a duration equivalent to the time attested by the health 
certification, but not exceeding one year, and is renewable. The law 
does not specify whether it allows work or whether it is convertible.  
In addition to the residence permit for medical treatment, the new 
security decree introduces a residence permit “for disasters”, issued, 
again, by the Questore, to foreigners who would return to a country in 
which there is a situation of exceptional calamity – not defined by law 
– which makes return in safe conditions impossible.38  
Finally, we must mention the permit “for acts of particular civic 
value”, to be issued, upon authorization of the Minister of the Interior, 
as proposed by the Prefetto, to foreigners who have exposed 
themselves to a real risk to save people in imminent and serious 
danger, to prevent or diminish the damage of a serious public or 
private disaster, to restore public order, to participate in the arrest of 
criminals, to contribute to the progress of science or generally towards 
the good of humanity, or to honor the name and prestige of Italy.  
A critical note regarding the new residence permits concerns the 
precariousness of the legal status which comes from their issue, both 
with regard to the duration of the residence permit issued (six months 
for the permit for disasters, one year extendable in other cases), and 
with regard to the non-convertibility of some of these permits to other 
	  
38 See E. Fornalé, “Floating rights in times of environmental challenges”, in 
Giuseppe Cataldi, Michele Corleto, Marianna Pace (eds.), Migrations and 
Fundamental Rights: The Way Forward, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2019, p. 183 ff., 
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types, in particular to residence permits for work reasons. The shorter 
duration also affects the exercise of other rights, such as access, on 
equal terms with citizens, to social assistance benefits (when the 
residence permit lasts less than one year) and to public housing (in the 
case of a residence permit with a duration of less than 2 years). 
Furthermore, the security decree limits the right of the beneficiaries of 
the new types of residence permits to healthcare (this also having 
Constitutional recognition in Article 32), as it does not provide for 
automatic enrolment in the national health service, but only for access 
to urgent and essential medical care.39 
It is clear, therefore, that the new provisions limit the exercise of 
rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution, determining a different 
treatment for similar situations previously protected under the 
umbrella of humanitarian protection. Moreover, the competent body 
to issue the authorization to stay is no longer the Territorial 
Commission, with the decision left instead to the discretion of the 
Questore and the Prefetto. 
 
 
3. Reception of asylum seekers 
 
Decree law No. 113/2018 also affected the reception system, 
establishing that applicants for international protection are not 
allowed to receive accommodation within the SPRAR (System of 
Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees), renamed “System for 
holders of international protection and unaccompanied minors” 
(SIPROIMI), which is reserved only for beneficiaries of international 
protection, unaccompanied minors (even if they are not asylum 
seekers), and beneficiaries of residence permits for special cases (for 
reasons of health, domestic violence, violence and severe exploitation, 
labour exploitation, natural disaster, civic value) if they do not already 
receive accommodation in the protection systems dedicated to them. 
The applicants for international protection, on the other hand, can 
find accommodation exclusively in the Centres of First Reception 
(CPA) and in Extraordinary Reception Centres (CAS), a system with 
serious failures in terms: of the quality of the services offered, the 
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training of staff, the adequacy of the facilities (which are in most cases 
overcrowded, located in remote areas and distant from 
transportation), and support for asylum procedures. Moreover, there 
have been many episodes of speculation by private companies – and in 
some cases by criminal organizations – which do not have profiles 
compatible with the social activities implemented in the centres. 
The SPRAR, then SIPROIMI, is a system characterized by the 
provision of an “integrated reception”, that goes well beyond the mere 
provision of accommodation, but includes orientation measures, 
access to Italian languages courses, legal and social assistance as well as 
the development of personalised programmes for the social-economic 
integration of individuals. The involvement of the local authorities, 
which entrusted the implementation of the services to third sector 
entities with consolidated and proven experience in the asylum sector, 
guaranteed high quality standards of reception and transparency in the 
management of the public funds. These features made SPRAR an 
exemplary practice, studied and taken as a model by other European 
countries. 
The dismantling process had already begun with Law No. 
142/2015,40 which institutionalized the reception of asylum seekers in 
extraordinary centres (CASs), most often hotels, opened during the 
so-called “North Africa Emergency” of 2011, following the Tunisian 
“Jasmine Revolution”. However, the law at issue specified at least 
that the accommodation of asylum seekers in the CASs was to be 
temporary and exceptional. Despite the law, over time this type of 
accommodation became the norm, as demonstrated by the data from 
the Ministry of the Interior, according to which 80% of those who 
are currently hosted in Italy are accommodated in the extraordinary 
reception system. Law No. 132/2018, restricting the possibility of 
accommodation in the ordinary system, goes so far as to deny a 
dignified reception to applicants for international protection, in this 
manner denying them de facto any possibility of social inclusion. The 
reception standards guaranteed within the extraordinary system 
appear to be far below those, already minimal, established by 
Directive 2013/33/EU,41 especially when dealing with persons falling 
	  
40 Legislative decree 18 August 2015, No. 142. 
41 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and Council, of 26 June 
2013, laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international 
protection. 
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within the so-called “vulnerable” groups (minors, unaccompanied 
minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single 
parents with minor children, victims of human trafficking, people 
suffering from serious illness or mental disorders, or those who have 
been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence), in favour of whom the 
European Directive provides for specific support services (for 
example, psychological assistance). 
Even the decisionof the Government to reserve social inclusion 
projects (for example, access to training projects) exclusively for 
beneficiaries of international protection and special permits for 
unaccompanied minors interferes with the social inclusion of asylum 
seekers. As no social inclusion measures are provided for them, they 
will find themselves in a situation of social marginality, with the 
consequence of being more exposed to exploitation by employers and 
to episodes of racism and violence, such as have often been recorded 
in the last years in Italy.  
The latest data confirm that at the moment there are about 60,000 
people accommodated in the CPSA and CAS, and only about 20,000 
in SIPROIMI. This distribution, however, has resulted in severe 
consequences during the emergency period caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic, since in CASs it has been more difficult to guarantee 
physical distancing and the isolation of people who have tested 
positive for the disease, or who are suspected of being positive, and to 
provide healthcare, given the lack of government guidelines. The 
response has been improvised and there have been many difficulties in 
managing the situation. This is yet another demonstration of a system 
that does not work. 
 
 
4. Detention of asylum seekers 
 
Italian law provides for the detention of both irregular migrants 
pending expulsion and asylum seekers. Over time there has been an 
increasing use of administrative detention, which, it seems appropriate 
to recall, is not connected to the commission of a crime, but rather 
performs a deterrent function. There has been a growth in the number 
of cases of deprivation of the freedom of asylum seekers and an 
expansion of places and detention facilities for migrants pending 




expulsion, even though detention should constitute a measure of 
extrema ratio.  
An asylum seeker shall be detained in pre-removal detention 
centres (CPR), on the basis of a case by case evaluation, when he or 
she: 
(a) falls under the exclusion clauses laid down in Article 1F of the 
1951 Geneva Convention; 
(b) is issued an expulsion order because he or she constitutes a 
danger to public order or state security, or is suspected of being 
affiliated with a mafia-related organisation, has conducted or financed 
terrorist activities, has cooperated in selling or smuggling weapons, or 
habitually conducts any form of criminal activity, including with the 
intention of committing acts of terrorism;  
(c) may represent a danger for public order and security; 
(d) presents a risk of absconding.42 
Law No. 132/2018 provided a new option for the detention of 
asylum seekers: they may be detained in hotspots or first reception 
centres for the purpose of establishment of their identity or 
nationality. If the determination or verification of identity or 
nationality is not possible on those premises, they can be transferred to 
a CPR. The duration of detention is up to 210 days (an initial 30 in 
CPAs or hotspots, 110 plus 180 in CPR if identification is not 
possible). 
The hotspots were established in Italy and Greece pursuant to the 
2015 European Agenda on Migration. They are “structures of 
reception and first reception”, aimed at “ensuring prompt 
identification, registration and acquisition of migrants’ fingerprints 
(‘crisis points’)”, with the support of the following EU agencies: 
EASO, FRONTEX, and EUROPOL. It will thus be possible “to 
distinguish between those who are in need of international protection 
and those who are not”43 immediately after disembarkation, using 
standardized procedures, guiding the former group into procedures 
for relocation to other EU member states, one of the tools of 
European solidarity aimed at alleviating the pressure of migrants on 
Italy and Greece. The “hotspots” thus constitute “a device for the 
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43 European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions, EUCO 22/15, 
26 June 2015. 
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determination of differentiated juridical status”,44 which pose a series 
of problems regarding the effective exercise of asylum rights and 
fundamental human rights. The process of “sifting” asylum seekers 
from economic migrants, often based on little more than nationality, is 
problematic in itself, since, according to the international system of 
refugee protection, and to the EU law, only through prior and 
meticulous examination of the individual situation of each person it is 
possible to determine whether someone is at risk of persecution, of 
serious harm, or of violation of human rights in the event of 
repatriation, and thus whether someone may obtain a form of 
international or national protection. What is relevant is not simply 
nationality, but also a person’s general situation, and the fear he or she 
expresses. 
To these issues can be added the fact that neither the “Minniti 
decree”45 nor the 2018 security decree have provided hotspots with a 
precise legal basis within Italian law, which stipulates that asylum 
seekers may be held for up to thirty days in order to verify identity and 
citizenship, although it does not prescribe the procedure, and thus 
leaves room for discretional practices by the police without 
recognition of the procedural guarantees envisaged by Article 13 of 
the Constitution, for instance validation by a judge. 
In light of what has been stated above, it is not clear whether the 
hotspots constitute closed or open centres, from which people may 
leave freely, and therefore whether these are intended as centres for 
reception or detention. Practices vary widely, as has been reported by 
the National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Detained.46 The 
Chief of police himself admitted that the Lampedusa hotspot, for 
example, is not a detention centre, but a reception centre, which also 
functions as a detention centre.47 
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45 Article 14 Law on immigration. 
46 National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Detained, Rapporto sulle visite nei 
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The lack of legal regulation for hotspots is undoubtedly a point of 
concern, since, pursuant to Article 13 of the Constitution, the 
deprivation of liberty, a fundamental right, may only be ordered with a 
warrant from the judge and only in cases and according to the 
conditions provided by law. In the case of the hotspots, therefore, 
these terms are respected. People find themselves in legal limbo, often 
in a condition of de facto detention, in precarious hygienic 
conditions,48 in facilities that have not been planned as detention 
centres, and in which asylum seekers haven’t access to legal 
assistance.49 
Moreover, although the detention of asylum seekers is expressly 
permitted by Article 8 of Directive 2013/33/EU and by Article 5 of 
ECHR, both the Court of Justice of the European Union50 and the 
European Court of Human Rights51 established stringent conditions 
for the deprivation of liberty of asylum seekers; people, it should be 
pointed out, who have not committed any crime and with regard to 
whom the use of the detention instrument seems debatable at the very 
least. Furthermore, it should be noted that a lack of identity and travel 
documents is a typical and fairly general condition for those seeking 
international protection, since it is possible that the person is 
persecuted by the authorities of his own state of citizenship and has 
not been able to obtain the documents, or that he has lost them during 
the journey. In this regard, it is imperative to reiterate that one of the 
fundamental principles enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention is 
Article 31, which states that an asylum seeker cannot be penalized for 
having entered a State’s territory illegally.  
	  
48 The Ministry of the Interior ordered the temporary closure of the Lampedusa 
hotspot in March 2018 following an inspection. See: <https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-
protezione-internazionale/hotspot-lampedusa-diritti-minori/> (07/20). Then, in 
December 2019, following several urgent appeals put forward by the ASGI, the 
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living conditions within the Lampedusa hotspot, particularly with regard to minors. 
See <https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/lampedusa-migranti-
cedu/> (07/20). 
49  ASGI, podcast “I centri hotspot”, 2020, available at: 
<https://inlimine.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Audio-documentario-3-I-
centri-Hotspot.mp3> (07/20). 
50 Among others, EU Court of Justice, case C -601/15, J. N. c. Staatssecretaris van 
Veiligheid en Justitie, judgment of 15 February 2016. 
51 AIDA, The detention of asylum seekers in Europe Constructed on shaky ground?, 
2017; FRA, Guidance on detention of asylum seekers and migrants, 2017. 
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As stated previously, migrants pending expulsion may also be 
deprived of their freedom. The 2018 security decree has introduced 
somewhat problematic possibilities, having envisaged that a detention 
may not only take place in the CPR, which have been set up expressly 
for this purpose, but also in other places, such as hotspots and 
facilities at the border. The conditions of the centres vary 
considerably, access to legal assistance is not always guaranteed, and 
more generally police authority is characterized by a certain 
arbitrariness, which is also due to the lack of legislation regulating the 
detention of migrants.52 
The Law on immigration specifies that detention is excluded in the 
cases of unaccompanied minors and vulnerable people, including 
those with health problems. Nevertheless, there are cases in which 
unaccompanied minors, victims of torture and trafficking, and other 
vulnerable asylum seekers have been deprived of their liberty.  
 
 
5. Cooperation with Libya 
 
Another problematic chapter in Italian policies regarding 
immigration and asylum is the cooperation with third countries, and in 
particular with Libya.53 The European Court’s judgement in the case 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others vs. Italy, 54  which condemned Italy for 
returning migrants to Libya by sea, and the killing of Qadhafi and the 
accompanying civil war, had led to the suspension of relations between 
the two countries. These relations entered a new phase in 2016 with 
the establishment of the Fund for Africa, which provides for a budget 
of €200 million for measures “aimed at relaunching dialogue and 
cooperation with the African countries of priority importance for 
migration routes”, funds which are added to the €338 million of the 
Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), launched by the 
European Union in 2014. 55  The Italian Fund finances a joint 
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53 On this theme, see also: M. Veglio, “Amiche, nemiche, complici. L’Italia, la 
Libia e un secolo di caccia agli stranieri”, in Mariacristina Molfetta, Chiara Marchetti 
(eds.), Il diritto asilo. Report 2019, cit., p. 77 ff. 
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management system for borders and immigration, including the 
southern border of Libya. 
On 2 February 2017 the centre-left Italian government, following 
an initiative proposed by the Minister for the Interior, Marco Minniti, 
concluded with the President of the Council of the Libyan 
Government of National Accord, Fayez Mustafa Serraj, a 
Memorandum of Agreement 56  aimed at collaborating on the 
management of “illegal immigration”. In line with the new European 
Commission’s Migration partnerships framework with third countries 
launched in 2016, the goal of this agreement was “to guarantee the 
reduction of illegal migratory flows”, in other words to prevent 
departures towards Europe. One of the solutions identified in this 
document for the “issue of illegal migrants crossing Libya to reach 
Europe by sea” is the creation of temporary reception camps in Libya, 
locations under the exclusive control of the Libyan Ministry of the 
Interior, in which the de facto detention of “illegal migrants” is 
envisaged until repatriation to their countries of origin. In addition to 
this, the Italian government commits to supply technical and 
technological support to Libya, and in particular to the Libyan 
Coastguard, in order for the latter to collaborate in the fight against 
“illegal” immigration. 
On the basis of the Memorandum, Italy trained the Libyan 
Coastguard and provided resources to use in the fight against 
migration, and, in the absence of a Libyan Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre (MRCC), offered the coordination of the Italian 
operational centre, which ceded its place to the Libyan equivalent 
when the North African country informed the IMO of the 
establishment of its own SAR (search and rescue) zone, identifying its 
own coordination centre as well. 
According to the Italian Admiral Enrico Credendino, the 
Memorandum has enabled the creation of “a Libyan system capable of 
stopping migrants before they reach international waters, [and] as a 
result it will no longer be considered a push-back because it will be the 
	  
56  Italian text available at 
<http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Libia.pdf> (07/20); unofficial 
translation in English at <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation_finalversion.doc.pdf> (07/20). On this 
subject, see also: A. Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization of Border Controls, 
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Libyans who will be rescuing the migrants and doing whatever they 
consider appropriate with the migrants”.57 
What is questionable at this point is the fact that the Italian 
government, in a sector with significant repercussions for the rights of 
the people involved, has attempted to re-launch cooperation with a 
country whose adherence to International Law has been placed in 
doubt by the civil war underway between various armed militias, and 
its disastrous humanitarian consequences. Furthermore, the United 
Nations58 and Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court59 have 
denounced the violence, torture, rape, abuse, and exploitation that 
migrants suffer both in detention centres controlled by the 
government and those controlled by armed militias, as well as the 
return of migrants on boats directed from Libya to Europe, which are 
stopped by the Libyan Coastguard and carried out to detention 
centres. The Prosecutor of the ICC, in turn, has initiated an enquiry 
into the Libyan Coastguard, which includes members of the militias, 
among them people involved in human trafficking, and the violence 
perpetrated by the organization against migrants. Along with the UN 
and Council of Europe60, both the UNHCR and IMO have asked Italy 
and Europe to suspend cooperation with Libya in matters of 
immigration until the country has reached institutional stability61. 
Libya is not party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its Protocol, there is no asylum legislation. Libyan laws 
criminalize irregular entry, stay, or exit of all migrants, asylum-seekers 
and refugees, victims of trafficking. Violations are penalized with an 
undefined prison sentence with “hard labour”. UNHCR estimates that 
2,500 foreign nationals are held in the detention centres. 
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58 United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Report of the Secretary-General, 
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Currently there are various cases pending before the European 
Court of Human Rights regarding the cooperation between Italy and 
Libya, and there is no lack of initiatives from civil society aimed at 
convincing Italy and the EU to suspend this cooperation. 
From a theoretical perspective, there is debate as to whether it is 
possible to hold Italy responsible for violating migrant rights in its 
collaboration with Libya, in accordance with Article 16 of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States, which provides that a State that aids or assists 
another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act the 
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if that State does so 
with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
act; and the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by 
that State. In the case in question, there is no doubt that Italy was 
aware of the situation that migrants would encounter in Libyan 
detention centres, of the violence carried out by the Libyan 
Coastguard, and of the situation in Libya in general, since 
International Organizations, NGOs and various Agencies had 
documented it thoroughly.62 
There is also cause for concern regarding the procedures followed 
for the adoption of the Memorandum, which, despite its political 
nature and the onerous finances involved, was not ratified by the 
Italian Parliament, as is required by Article 80 of the Constitution.63 
In spite of these various issues, the agreement between Italy and 
Libya was renewed automatically on 2 February 2020,64 without any of 




6. The criminalization of NGOs and Italian case law 
 
Another aspect of Italian asylum policies that should be pointed 
out is the relationship between Italian authorities and the NGOs that 
	  
62 On the responsibility of Italy for collaboration with Libya, see A. Liguori, 
Migration Law and the Externalization, cit., p. 18 ff. 
63  See F. De Vittor, “Responsabilità degli Stati e dell’Unione europea nella 
conclusione e nell’esecuzione di ‘accordi’ per il controllo extraterritoriale della 
migrazione”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 1, 2018, p. 5 ff., pp. 9–10. 
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ADELE DEL GUERCIO 
	  
48 
have organized search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean65 
over the last few years to compensate for the lack of activity on the 
part of the coastal States. 
As is well known, and without wishing to expand too much on the 
subject,66 the last maritime operation in the Mediterranean aimed at 
protecting human life at sea was Mare Nostrum, initiated by the Italian 
government following the dramatic shipwreck on 3 October 2013, a 
few miles off Lampedusa, which cost the lives of 368 people. After the 
conclusion of the Mare Nostrum operation in October 2014, the 
European Union launched various maritime operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea, coordinated by Frontex, the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency, some of which are still underway at the time of 
writing; however, these were maritime operations aimed primarily at 
border control, and only marginally at search and rescue. 67 
Furthermore, the coastal States gradually withdrew from the 
obligations placed on them by International Maritime Law, and no 
longer helped vessels in difficulty in the Mediterranean, delegating the 
Libyan Coastguard to intervene in cases of boats in distress, and 
denying any ports of disembarkation on their own territories. 
The trajectory described above concerned the Italian government 
as well; the centre-left government, after having re-launched 
cooperation with Libya in 2017,68 supplying the country with patrol 
craft and training personnel, gradually withdrew from any sort of 
search and rescue activity in the Mediterranean. The centre-right 
government then endorsed a “closed ports” policy, accompanied by 
recognition of the competence of the Libyan Coastguard, to which the 
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Migration at Sea”, Italian Yearbook of International Law, 2018, p. 11 ss.; P. Cuttitta, 
“Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration 
Management in the Central Mediterranean”, GEOPOLITICS, 3, 2018, pp. 632-660; C. 
Heller, L. Pezzani, Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU’s Undeclared Operation to Stem 
Migration Across the Mediterranean. A Report by Forensic Oceanography, affiliated 
with the Forensic Architecture Agency, Goldsmiths, University of London, 7 May 
2018; V. Moreno-Lax, “The EU Humanitarian Border and the Securitization of 
Human Rights: The ‘Rescue-Through-Interdiction/Rescue-Without-Protection’ 
Paradigm”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 56, 2018, pp. 119-140.  
66 For more on this topic, see the article by G. Cataldi in this collection. 
67  <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/sea-
criminal-networks/> (07/20). 
68 See also A. Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization, cit., p. 9 ff. 




MMRC in Rome delegated the responsibility of identifying 
disembarkation ports in the event of rescues carried out by NGOs in 
the Libyan SAR zone. The centre-right government also initiated a 
process of criminalizing NGOs, accusing them of participating in 
human trafficking and violating immigration laws, and assisting the 
illegal entry of migrants to Italian territory.69 
Therefore, the centre-left government had tried to reduce NGOs’ 
margin of action by proposing adherence to a code of conduct (the so-
called Codice Minniti), the subsequent centre-right government 
initiated a media campaign aimed at discrediting the NGOs that 
undertook rescue operations for migrants at sea. 
On 14 June 2018 the Italian centre-right government adopted a 
second security decree,70 which gave the Ministry of the Interior, along 
with the Ministry for Infrastructure and the Justice Ministry, powers 
“to limit or deny the access, transit, or stopover of ships in territorial 
waters” for reasons related to public order and security, or rather 
when it is presumed that there has been a violation of the law on 
immigration, and in particular that a crime has been committed “that 
furthers illegal immigration”. The second security decree also includes 
financial penalties imposed on the shipmaster in the event of non-
compliance with the ban on entry to Italian territorial waters. It is 
quite evident that the measures in question, which follow the model of 
emergency security laws that have been a constant in Italian policies 
regarding immigration since law No. 189/2002 (the “Bossi-Fini” law), 
were adopted with the aim of targeting NGOs involved in search and 
rescue operations in the Mediterranean. It is no coincidence that the 
first punitive action, taken the day after adoption of the decree, was 
against the Sea Watch 3, a humanitarian ship flying under a Dutch flag, 
	  
69 The “war” against NGOs involved in assisting migrants is not a prerogative of 
the Italian government; as has been documented by the European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA), investigations and administrative or criminal proceedings 
against private entities involved in SAR operations have been opened in Germany, 
Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, and Spain. FRA, 2019 update – NGO ships involved 
in search and rescue in the Mediterranean and criminal investigations, 19 June 2019, 
available at: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2019/2019-update-ngo-ships-
involved-search-and-rescue-mediterranean-and-criminal> (07/20). 
70 Decree law 14 June 2019, No. 53, converted into Law 8 August 2019, No. 77. 
On this theme, see: G. Cataldi, “L’impossibile “interpretazione conforme” del decreto 
“sicurezza bis” alle norme internazionali sul soccorso in mare”, Questione Giustizia, 
2020. 
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which assisted a vessel in distress in the SAR zone off Libya, refused to 
disembark the survivors in Libya, since the country could not be 
considered safe, and sent a request to the MMRC in Rome for a 
disembarkation port in Italian territory, which was then refused. The 
shipmaster, Carola Rackete, took rescued migrants to an Italian port, 
in spite of the order forbidding entry to Italian territorial waters issued 
by the Ministry of the Interior in implementation of the second 
security decree. Moreover, following this episode, while the decree 
was being converted into law, the penalties for ships in violation of the 
measures were strengthened, with the stipulation of a fine between 
€150,000 and one million euros for any failure to observe the new 
rules, along with the confiscation of the vessel, and compulsory arrest 
of shipmaster, Carola Rackete, caught resisting or committing violence 
against Italian military ships. 
It should nonetheless be noted that, in spite of the process of 
criminalization being conducted by Italian institutions, Italian judges, 
rather than confirming the accusations directed at NGOs, in fact 
underlines the merits of these organizations, insofar as they are 
currently the only entities fulfilling the obligation of rescue at sea. A 
rescue can only be considered complete once the survivors have 
disembarked in a place of safety, which is hardly the case of Libya, 
given its civil war and reports of abuse of migrants. The rescuing vessel 
on which shipwreck survivors are taken on-board cannot be 
considered a place of safety either, given the temporary nature of its 
facilities. Indeed, a place of safety is a place where people’s basic needs 
may be met, but also where their safety may be guaranteed in a way 
that respects human rights, and in particular the principle of non-
refoulement. This view was shared by the Italian Supreme Court, 
which reiterated these principles in the judgment71 with which it 
rejected the appeal of the Public Ministry of Agrigento requesting the 
annulment of the order that the judge of preliminary investigations 
(GIP)72 had adopted to avoid validating the arrest of Carola Rackete, 
shipmaster of the aforementioned humanitarian ship Sea Watch 3.  
It should also be noted that the emergency health situation has 
prompted the Italian government to declare that Italy cannot provide a 
place of safety, at least not “for instances of rescues carried out by 
naval vessels under foreign flag outside the Italian SAR zone”, because 
	  
71 Corte di Cassazione, judgement of 6 January 2020, No. 6626. 
72 Court of Agrigento, Gip, order of 2 July 2019. 




it has to preserve the “performance of national health, logistics and 
security structures dedicated to the containment of the spread of 
contagion and the assistance of patients with COVID-19”. This is, 
once again, a measure whose only targets are the NGOs involved in 
rescue operations in the Mediterranean. It should be specified that the 
restriction of individual rights must comply with the limits provided 
for by the Italian Constitution, which, moreover, not only does not 
envisage a situation of extraordinary emergency, apart from a state of 
war, but in admitting a balance of rights – in this instance the right to 
health on one hand, and the right to life and right to asylum on the 
other – also makes clear that any restriction must happen with due 
regard for principles of legality and proportionality. What we are 
witnessing is instead a measure that impinges on fundamental and 
constitutionally protected rights, which are being restricted through an 
administrative action that is seriously flawed insofar as it lacks a legal 
basis, thus violating the principle of legal certainty. 73 
Afterwards, it was established that migrants rescued at sea and 
brought to Italian shores would have to spend a period of fourteen 
days in quarantine on board purpose-equipped ships, and not on 
land.74 In practice, this plan has been put into action, and raises 
doubts from the perspective of respect of fundamental rights of the 
individual, above all the right to personal freedom, since it may be 
construed as de facto detention, without the procedural guarantees 





This analysis has tried to give an overview of the Italian system of 
asylum, examining the relevant laws, case law, and praxis, highlighting 
the most noticeable aspects of the system, as well as those that are 
most problematic. As the preceding pages have shown, since the 1990s 
policies concerning asylum – and immigration in general – have been 
characterized by security measures that have restricted the right to 
asylum, making the exercise of this right more difficult as such they 
	  
73  Ministerial Decree R.0000150 of 7 April 2020. For commentary, see: A. 
Algostino, “Lo stato di emergenza sanitaria e la chiusura dei porti: sommersi e salvati”, 
Questione giustizia, 2020. 
74 Decree of the Head of Department, No. 1287, 12 April 2020. 
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have progressively limited the right to have one’s case examined on 
individual merits and limited access to judges. The cooperation with 
Libya and the “war” with NGOs carrying out search and rescue 
operations at sea have made it more difficult to enter Italian territory, 
an essential condition for one to be able to exercise the right to 
asylum. Finally, the measures adopted to confront the public health 
emergency have markedly impacted the subjective legal positions of 
asylum seekers. 
As we approach the date of publication of this book, the Italian 
government has adopted changes to the security decrees, which has 
not been abolished, as we hoped. Some changes are remarkable, 
including those relating to humanitarian protection, renamed “special 
protection”, which is extended to other cases in addition to those 
already envisaged by the security decree. The residence permit will be 
recognized by Territorial Commission, not by Police, and will last two 
years; upon expiry it will be converted into a residence permit for 
work reasons.  
Another positive element is the restoration of the former reception 
system (renamed “Reception and Integration System”) to be managed 
by the municipalities as the priority system for the accommodation not 
only of  the most vulnerable persons, minors and beneficiaries of 
international protection, but also of asylum seekers.  
Moreover, the prohibition of registration of asylum seekers in the 
municipal registers, declared  to be unconstitutional by Italian 
Constitutional Court in July 2020, is cancelled and the issue of an 
identity document valid for three years is provided.  
However, the provisions relating to NGOs carrying out search and 
rescue activities at sea remain problematic. The Minister of the 
Interior can still prohibit non-military vessels from entering the 
territorial waters unless the navy carrying out the rescue complied with 
international conventions and reported the operations to the 
competent authorities and to the flag State. Otherwise, NGOs can be 
criminally sanctioned by the judge with fines ranging from 10 
thousand to 50 thousand euros.  
It is necessary to wait for the implementing regulations to 
understand the consequences of these changes on the Italian asylum 
system. 
Anyway, while the situation has some welcome elements, as we 
have shown, it is hoped that Italian policies in this field change  




trajectory, and that any changes are rooted in the values protected by 
the Constitution and International human rights law. We have to be 
aware that refusing to asylum seekers rescue at sea and a safe port of 
disembarkation, sanctioning the shipmasters of the humanitarian ships 
who carry out the search and rescues operations in the Mediterranean 
Sea constitute violations of international and national law. Italy, other 
Member States and European Union are responsible of these 
violations. 
As scholars we call for a more appreciable coherence between the 
values that Italy and European Union affirm to be the basis of our 
society and the political and normative choices, which have severe 
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1. Introductory remarks: the connections between the economy, the 
labour market and migration policies  
 
The current pandemic crisis shows us that we must not add the vi-
rus of selfishness to the coronavirus. It is time to remove inequalities 
and heal social injustice, the plague of humanity. Inequality affects the 
most vulnerable people who are often immigrants.  
Some familiarity with statistical data allows us to understand the 
complexity of the migratory phenomenon of minors in Europe, con-
sidered not only in relation to the total number of migrants arriving in 
the EU, but above all in light of the extremely vulnerable condition of 
migrant minors. The United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) estimates that 535 million children1 - 1 out of 4 in the 
world - live in countries affected by conflicts or natural disasters and 
who are often forced to flee their homes to seek shelter elsewhere. Da-
ta from the European Migration Network (EMN) reveals that in 2020 
almost 40% of immigrants who arrived in Europe were minors, that’s 
30% of all immigration victims2. On 22 June, the Italian Directorate 
General for Immigration and Integration Policies published the data 
updated to 31 May 2020 of Unaccompanied Foreign Minors (hereinaf-
ter, UAM): 5,202 unaccompanied minors were registered: 4,966 male 
and 236 female3. These numbers tell us that EU child migration is an 
	  
* Università telematica Pegaso. 
1 UNICEF, Humanitarian action for children, 2017 overview.  
2 See the EMN Bulletin which provides policymakers and other practitioners with 
updates on recent migration and international protection policy developments at EU 
and national level. The 31st edition provides information from April to June 2020, in-
cluding the (latest) relevant published statistics: <https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/docs/pages/00_31st_emn_bulletin_updated_en.pdf>. 
3 Direzione Generale dell’Immigrazione e delle Politiche di integrazione, divisio-
ne II, Report mensile sui minori stranieri non accompagnati in Italia, May 2020; Caritas, 
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important component of the migratory phenomenon, a complex chal-
lenge for national and European legal systems4.  
The flow of migrants along dangerous roads and stormy seas 
brings with it not only statistical numbers, but moving stories of real 
life. Their journey does not begin by “taking that first step” toward a 
destination, but by focusing on a goal to be reached whether by sea or 
by land. Europe, with its large cities, is the ultimate goal and the only 
obstacle is the Mediterranean.  
An aspect that is indirectly linked to the migratory phenomenon, 
as a consequence of economic globalization, is the transformation of 
production processes, characterized by a progressive regress of protec-
tion, stability, salary and security levels. The flexibility of market or-
ganization and of the production of goods and services offers more 
and more options for productive arbitrage. In Italy, in particular, the 
policy decision-makers and Confindustria (the industries’ confedera-
tion), by conforming to the dictates of supranational organizations, 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, exert 
continuous pressure in favour of “flexibility” and “precariousness” 
that reduced the job security of abour relations5.  
In this context the workers who are most susceptible to threats yet 
are also the most harassed, are inevitably the immigrants. Commercial 
needs have therefore impacted the migration policies that have been 
disseminated since the nineteen-nineties, as well as internal legislation 
in EU Member States. The reform of Italian legislation on migrants, 
carried out through Law no. 40 of March 6, 19986 is attributable to 
this phase. 
In recent decades the legislator has operated on two levels: on the 
one hand, the progressive dismantling of constitutional guarantees, 
	  
Minori migranti, maggiori rischi, Pericoli e problematiche dei minori non accompagnati 
che migrano verso l’Ue, Dossier no.42, December 2018.  
4 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Migration to EU: five persis-
tent challenges, February 2018: 
<https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-february-migration-
report-focus-five-challenges_en.pdf>. 
5 See C. Amirante, Dalla forma Stato alla forma mercato, Giappichelli, Torino, 
2008. 
6 The so-called “Turco-Napolitano” Law, whose discipline flows into Legislative 
Decree 25 July 1998, n. 286, the so called “Consolidated” Act on Immigration - T.U.I., 
whose original structure is subject to constant redefinition by subsequent legislative 
interventions. 
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through the so-called reforms of labour law, which have imposed flex-
ibility and led to an increase in short term work contracts; and on the 
other, the cyclical re-proposal of emergency criminal legislation, as a 
form of normalization of the conflict resulting from the denial of 
needs.  
These two legislative trends have controlled and neutralized the 
rights of migrants for two decades, through their differentiation of mi-
grants into “regular” and “irregular”: “low cost” labour, offered by 
the former, and “undeclared work”, to which the latter are forced7. 
The Italian policies mentioned above resulted in a contained mi-
gratory phenomena: the progressive denial to foreigners of the status 
of regular – and, consequently, of the international protection system. 
The “Minniti-Orlando”8 decree and the “Salvini”9 decrees rede-
fine, among other measures, the discipline of international protection, 
restricting its procedures and the criteria to access such protection.  
Deferring any reflection on the innovations introduced in the field 
of political asylum by the above mentioned “security decrees”, in the 
following pages we will focus on the subject of UAM, defined by Ital-
ian law as a person with a “high vulnerability”, whose protection is the 
specific object of this work.  
 
 
2. The protection of UAM under the Italian constitution and Interna-
tional obligations 
 
The protection of UAM, provided for by the Italian legal system as 
we will see, is, first of all, facilitated by the extension of certain princi-
ples sanctioned at constitutional level. The degree of protection of a 
foreign child without a parent, – a status which the 2017 legislation 
	  
7 See M. Pascali, La “decolorazione” del lavoro nero nel processo di decostruzione 
del diritto penale del lavoro. Normalizzazione, migrazione ed eclissi del diritto, Editoria-
le Scientifica, Napoli, 2007; A. Caputo, “Diseguali, illegali, criminali”, Ques. giust., 
2009, p. 83 ff. 
8 Decree-Law no. 13 of 17 February 2017, converted, with amendments, into Law 
no. 46 of 13 April 2017. 
9 Decree-Law no. 113 of 4 October 2018, converted, with amendments, into Law 
no. 132 of 1 December 2018 and Decree Law of 14 June, no. 53, converted, with 
amendments, into Law no. 77 of 8 August 2019.      
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has not hesitated to define as one of “extreme vulnerability”10 – is also 
the result of the set of guarantee levels offered by both national and 
international sources. 
The Constitution refers to the norms in which – although there is 
no explicit reference to the status of migrants, to his or her minor age 
and to his or her entry into the territory of the Italian State without the 
presence of an adult – priority is given to the respect of human rights. 
Along with generic provisions focused on the protection of human 
dignity, equal consideration is given to the protection of minors. 
The consolidated exegesis, in literature as well as in jurisprudence, 
of Art. 2 of the Constitution, where “fundamental human rights” are 
recognized and guaranteed, and of Art. 3, where the statement of for-
mal equality must be interpreted in a broad sense11, would seem to 
lead to an expansion of the number of recipients of such guarantees, 
including persons in need of special protection. 
The reference, contained in Art. 10.2 of the Constitution, to the 
generally recognized rules of international law which regulate the legal 
condition of the foreigner, can also be extended to the minor migrant, 
against whom there would be much lower margins of “reasonable der-
ogation” than that proposed for adults12. 
The non-derogation of equal treatment between “citizens” and 
“non-citizens” meets with limitations, in light of constitutional juris-
prudence, where there is a shift from a mere statement of abstract 
principles, found under Art. 2 of the Constitution, to “positions com-
pared” in practice, “in relation to the specific cases covered by the 
disputed legislation”. This takes place in consideration of the affirma-
tion of the criterion of equality as a prohibition of unequal treatment, 
referred to in Art. 3 of the Constitution. 
	  
10 The status of “extreme vulnerability” of unaccompanied minors has been re-
peatedly recognised by the European Court of Human Rights, Mubilanzila Mayeka 
and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Application No. 13178/03, Judgment of 12 October 
2006, para. 55; Popov v. France, Applications No. 39472/07 and 39474/07, Judgment 
of 19 January 2012, para. 91; see also European Court of Justice, Case C-648/11, MA, 
BT and DA v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, 6 June 2013, para. 55. 
11 Going beyond the concept of citizenship tout court as originally intended by the 
Constitutions of 1948. 
12 See A. Patroni Griffi, “Lineamenti della tutela costituzionale dei minori stra-
nier”, in R. Bonito Oliva (ed.), Identità in dialogo. La liberté des mers, Mimesis. Qua-
derni di Bioetica, Milano - Udine, 2012, pp. 187 ff. 
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The Corte Costituzionale decision no. 62/199413 offers an eloquent 
example of the abstractness of the egalitarian statement stated in Art. 3 
of the Constitution. The questions that were referred to the judges 
concerned the heterogeneity of the positions of the citizen and the for-
eigner, especially if non-EU, in respect of the complex regime of pris-
on treatment and criminal sanction, and at the same time characterized 
by different issues related to public security, public order and state 
policies on immigration. In this context, preventive measures applica-
ble exclusively to the status of migrant, such as expulsion from the ter-
ritory of the State, take on importance, as regards the inevitable dis-
crimination generated by migration legislation. Considering the man-
datory nature of the constitutional principle of equality in general be-
tween the position of the citizen and the foreigner, the Court however 
only recognized to the former the right to reside in the territory of the 
State without time limits and not to be expelled for any reason, since 
the foreigner lacks “an ontological link with the national community”. 
For these reasons, the courts of law did not consider the legislator’s 
option to allow the suspension of the custodial regime or the execu-
tion of the sentence, at the same time as the definitive removal of the 
migrant from the territory of the State, to be either arbitrary or unrea-
sonable. 
On the basis of the criteria set forth in the Corte Costituzionale de-
cision, “the position of the foreigner proves to be quite peculiar and 
not comparable, for the aspect considered, with that of the citizen, 
since expulsion is a measure referable only” to the former and in no 
case extendable to the latter. 
The principle of reasonableness, according to which the legislator 
can legitimately distinguish the actual enjoyment of abstractly recog-
nized fundamental rights, should, however, have a peremptory limit 
regarding the protection of underage migrants and, in particular, those 
without assistance and representation by parents or other adults legally 
responsible for them. 
The current hermeneutical pathways – oriented toward the exten-
sion of constitutional guarantees to foreigners, especially if minors and 
unaccompanied – presuppose, in any case, an “open” reading of the 
provisions of the 1948 Charter, such as to allow for the transposition 
of fundamental rights of the person in continuous evolution. An exe-
gesis of the Constitution according to a dynamic vision, in conjunction 
	  
13 Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 62, filed February 24, 1994.  
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with social changes, would guarantee the affirmation of cultural plural-
ism, to whose institutionalization, however, is subject to inevitable lim-
its linked to the impossibility of accepting all claims to identity. Oth-
erwise there would be a situation of conflict, which is expressed in real 
“clashes between civilizations14”.   
Instead of inserting foreigners in a broader category of civitas, 
which can be described as “social citizenship”, we are witnessing the 
definition of a more restricted category of “economic citizenship15”. 
The new concept of citizen, in fact, takes into account immigrants as 
expression of highly qualified foreign labour (skilled migrations) or, 
however, inserted into the legal production cycle. 
The extension of the full enjoyment of fundamental rights - denied 
to “non-citizens”, especially if non-EU, - should however be guaran-
teed at least to minors without citizenship and not assisted by the 
presence of an adult legally responsible for them.  
An ad hoc discipline has therefore been defined over the years in 
Italy through the evolution of national and international legislation. 
With reference to the constitutional protection of the delicate position 
of unaccompanied foreign minors, further sources are to be found in 
Articles 30 et seq. of the Constitution.  Par. 1, Art. 30 of the Constitu-
tion guarantees the education and upbringing of children, entrusting 
this task first as a duty, then a right to parents, configuring them as a 
true “private munus”. The “paradigm of the promotion of the child”, 
declined through “a dialectical educational relationship”, appears in 
doctrinal exegesis as the only factor suitable to provide concrete appli-
cation of the “emancipatory charge of the constitutional project”16. 
An even greater protection for migrant children is offered by the 
second para. of Art. 30 of the Constitution: “In cases of incapacity of 
parents the law ensures that their duties are fulfilled”. For this reason, 
further obstacles to the guarantees set forth in par. 1 above are re-
moved. As a complement to the protection provided by art. 30, the 
following art. 31 of the Italian Constitution states that the Italian Re-
public is invested with the task of promoting, through “economic 
	  
14 See E. Grosso, “Multiculturalismo e diritti fondamentali nella Costituzione ita-
liana”, in A. Bernardi (ed.) Multiculturalismo, diritti umani, pena. Atti del convegno in 
occasione del conferimento della laurea h. c. a Mireille Delmas-Marty (Ferrara, 5-6 No-
vember 2004), Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, p. 109 ff. 
15 See C. Amirante, Dalla forma stato alla forma mercato, cit., p. 21.  
16 See E. Bilotti, “Diritti e interessi del minore”, L–JUS, 2019. 
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measures and other provisions”, the “formation of the family and the 
fulfilment of related tasks ...”. Thus, articles 34 and 37 of the Italian 
Constitution sanction the rights, respectively, to primary education for 
the child, and to working conditions for the “working woman”, equal 
to those of men, allowing for “the fulfilment of her essential family 
function” and ensure “to the mother and the child a special adequate 
protection”. 
As for the levels of guarantee offered to unaccompanied foreign 
minors by the extension of principles affirmed in international sources, 
the defence of the juvenile universe is based primarily on three treaties 
adopted over the last thirty years17. 
The priority of protecting of the child, whose interests must be 
“pre-eminent”18, has been sanctioned, first of all, through the “UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child”, approved by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations on November 20, 1989 and ratified by 
Italy with Law no. 176 of May 27, 1991. The Convention lists several 
principles that the adhering States undertake to observe, pertaining to 
different types of human rights, civil, cultural, economic, political and 
social. Fundamental rights include the right to non-discrimination, the 
best interests of the child and to listen to the child's opinions in rela-
tion to any decision, legislative action or legal measure, together with 
protection against abuse and exploitation, assistance, development, 
family unity and respect for cultural identity19. 
The right of custody and access in international situations is guar-
anteed by the “European Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on the 
Restoration of Custody of Children” (Luxembourg), opened for signa-
	  
17 A. Del Vecchio, “La protezione dei minori nell’evoluzione delle convenzioni in-
ternazionali in materia”, Rivista Internazionale dei diritti dell’uomo, 2000; C. Focarelli, 
“La Convenzione di New York sui diritti del fanciullo e il concetto di «best interest of 
the child»”, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2010, p.981 ff.; H. Gornik, “At the 
Croassroad of Power Relations: the Convention of the Rights of the Child and Unac-
compained Migrant Minors”, in M. Sedmak, B. Sauer, B. Gornik (eds.), Unaccompai-
ned Children in European Migration and Asylum Practicers: in Whose Best Interest, 
Routledge, 2017, p. 10 ff. 
18 See F. Morrone, “L’interesse superiore del minore straniero non accompagnato 
nella prassi internazionale”, in A. Annoni, P. Mori (eds.), I diritti delle famiglie mi-
granti fra interazione e tutela della diversità, Giappichelli, Torino, 2015, p. 103 ff. 
19 See M. Corleto, “A trent’anni dalla Convenzione sui diritti dell’infanzia e 
dell’adolescenza. Libertà religiosa, educazione e superiore interesse del minore”,  Di-
ritto e Religione, XIV - n. 2, 2019, p. 206 ff. 
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ture by the Member States and accession by non-EU Member States 
on 20 May 1980 and ratified in Italy by Law No. 64 of 15 January 
1994.  
Finally, we have the “European Convention on the exercise of 
children’s rights” (Strasbourg), open for signature by Member States 
and non-members of the EU on January 25, 1996 and ratified in Italy 
by Law no. 77 of March 20, 2003, providing for certain procedural 
measures, through which children can assert their claims. Family pro-
cedures encompass custody, residence, right of access, affirmation or 
contestation of paternity, legitimation, adoption, protection, admin-
istration of the assets of minors, loss or limitation of parental authori-
ty, protection of the persons concerned against cruel or degrading 
treatment and medical treatment. 
Following the preliminary overview on constitutional statements 
and o international sources, the basis for the protection of the unac-
companied minor migrant, it is now necessary to verify whether, in 
practice, the mere declaratory intentions are echoed by the actual for-
mulation of regulatory instruments aimed at the effective protection of 
minors, especially in the transition to adulthood20. 
 
 
3. General remarks on the discipline concerning the protection of 
foreign unaccompanied minors as redefined by Law no.47 of 7 April 
2017 (also called “Zampa Act”) 
 
The end point of  the course followed to strengthen the protection 
of UAM in compliance with  agreements in force for Italy is Law 47 of 
	  
20 On the protection of migrant minors, see: F. Lenzerini, “La protezione dei mi-
nori stranieri non accompagnati nel diritto internazionale”, in R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, P. 
Pustorino, A. Viviani (eds.), Diritti umani degli immigrati. Tutela della famiglia e dei 
minori, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2010, p. 271 ff. ; F. Mosconi, “La protezione dei 
minori”, in Salerno (eds.), Convenzioni internazionali e la legge di riforma del diritto 
internazionale privato, Cedam, Padova, 1997, p. 59 ff.; J.M. Pobjoy, The Child in In-
ternational Refugee Law, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 22 ff.; A. Saccucci, “Ri-
flessioni sulla tutela internazionale dei diritti del minore”, Giurisprudenza italiana, 
2000, p. 224 ff.; A. L. Sciacovelli, “Minori stranieri non accompagnati: criticità e nuovi 
sviluppi giurisprudenziali”, Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2018, p. 502 ff.; R. Virzo, 
“Coastal States and the Protection of Migrant Children at Sea”, in F. Ippolito, G. Bia-
gioni (eds.), Migrant Children: Challenges for Public and Private International Law, 
Naples, 2016.  
THE PROTECTION OF UNACCOMPANIED FOREIGN MINORS … 63 
April 7, 2017 21, which has as its main objective a complete redefini-
tion of the matter. The legislator’s declared intention is to protect 
people whose particular conditions of age and origin make them easy 
targets of trafficking by criminal organizations. The reasons for the 
regulatory intervention are explained in Art. 1 of the Law, where such 
minors are entitled to the same treatment as provided to Italians or EU 
minors. 
Borrowing the definition of UAM from the previous legislative in-
terventions on the subject, UAM are defined as minors who are not 
Italian or European citizens but who, for whatever reason, are in the 
Italian territory without the assistance or representation of parents or 
other adults responsible for them according to Italian legislation. 
The notion evolved in the light of subsequent legislative interven-
tions. Unaccompanied minors  means “citizens” of countries outside 
the European Union or stateless persons under the age of eighteen 
years who enter the national territory without being accompanied by 
an adult, or who have been abandoned, unless and until a person with 
authority to assume parental responsibility for them takes custody of 
them once they enter the national territory22”.  
More concise and generic is the definition that emerges from Art. 
2, para. 1, letter e), Legislative Decree no. 142/201523, where the legis-
lator defines “unaccompanied minor” “a foreigner under the age of 
eighteen years, who is, for any reason, in the national territory, without 
legal assistance and representation”. The measure introduces im-
portant novelties for minors seeking international protection or for 
minors who are children of applicants for international protection. It 
	  
21 Law No. 47 of 7 April  2017 (GU no. 93 of 21 April 2017) on “Disposizioni in 
materia di misure di protezione dei minori stranieri non accompagnati” was proposed 
by Save the Children in July and submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 4 October 
2013. The proposal was approved by the Senate with amendments on 1 March 2017 
and by the Chamber of Deputies on 29 March 2017. The Law passed almost unani-
mously with 375 votes in favour and 13 against. It entered into force on 6 April 2017. 
See C. Cipolletti, “Law No. 47 of 7 April 2017 (GU No. 93 of 21 April 2017) New 
Protective Measures for Unaccompanied Foreign Minors”, Italian Yearbook of Inter-
national Law, Vol. XXVII, 2017 p. 513 ff. 
22 According to Art. 2, para.1, letter f), D. Lgs. n. 85/2003, Implementation of Di-
rective 2001/55/EC on the granting of temporary protection in the event of a mass 
influx of displaced persons and cooperation within the Community. 
23 Implementation of Directive 2013/33/EU laying down standards for the recep-
tion of applicants for international protection and Directive 2013/32/EU on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection status.  
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provides, in fact, for compulsory schooling and access to courses and 
initiatives for learning the Italian language. 
In the wake of the above mentioned regulatory evolution  the defi-
nition contained in Art. 2 of Law no. 47/2017 further explains: “unac-
companied foreign minor present in the territory of the State means a 
minor not having Italian or European Union citizenship who is for any 
reason in the territory of the State or who is otherwise subject to Ital-
ian jurisdiction, without assistance and representation by parents or 
other adults legally responsible for him/her according to the laws in 
force in the Italian legal system”. 
This last formulation is very similar to the one provided under art. 
1, para. 2, D.P.C.M.(Ministerial Decree) of 9 December 1999, n. 535. 
Both definitions also include the minor who enters Italy with the mi-
gratory flows accompanied by relatives who are not their legal guardi-
ans. In this way protection is offered to those minors who, although 
not in a state of abandonment, have entered the national territory 
without legal parental representation. 
Further margins of protection are offered by the 2017 legislator, 
including, in addition to those who are within the borders of the State, 
also those who are otherwise subject to Italian jurisdiction. 
The 2017 legislator prefers family custody of unaccompanied for-
eign minors to their confinement in a reception structure.  Local au-
thorities are invested in promoting awareness raising and training of 
foster caregivers24. 
 Where reunification with their family members in the country of 
origin or in a third country corresponds to their superior interest, the 
measure of assisted and voluntary repatriation of unaccompanied for-
eign minors is adopted25.  
When ordering the prohibition of rejection or expulsion, the 
Questore (Police Commissioner) will issue a residence permit for mi-
nors, valid until the age of majority, or for family reasons26.  
A fundamental aspect of the 2017 reform is represented by Art. 12, 
which provides a system of protection for asylum seekers, refugees and 
unaccompanied minors, introducing changes to art. 19 of Legislative 
Decree no. 142 of August 18, 2015. According to the new para. 2, un-
accompanied minors are accepted within the “Protection system for 
	  
24 Art. 7 of Law n. 47/2017.  
25 Ibidem, Art. 8. 
26 Ibidem, Art. 10.  
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asylum seekers, refugees and unaccompanied foreign minors” and, in 
particular, in projects specifically designed for this category of vulner-
able persons. The capacity of the System is commensurate with the ac-
tual presence of unaccompanied minors in the national territory and 
according to the limits of the resources of the National Fund for Asy-
lum Policies and Services. 
In order to deal with each individual’s needs, para. 2 bis has been 
inserted after Art. 19, para. 2: “In choosing the place, among those 
available, in which to place the minor, you must take into account the 
needs and characteristics of same, such as those resulting from the in-
terview carried out, in relation to the type of services offered by the 
reception structure”. The interview with the minor migrant must be 
carried out by the qualified personnel of the first reception structure, 
with the help, where possible, of organizations, bodies or associations 
with proven experience in the protection of the juvenile universe, 
when the person concerned comes into contact or is reported to the 
police or judicial authorities, social services or other representatives of 
the local authority. The Reception Centres for foreign UAM must sat-
isfy legal requirements as per Art. 117 para. 2 letter m) of the Consti-
tution, the minimum standards of services of assistance provided by 
the residential facilities for minors, and must be authorised and ac-
credited in accordance to national legislation. Failure to conform with 
the declarations made in terms of the accreditation leads to the elimi-
nation of the Reception Centre from the system. 
From the moment the minor is admitted to the reception facilities 
in view of the new provisions27, the educational institutions of any level 
and the educational institutions accredited by the autonomous regions 
and provinces of Trento and Bolzano shall activate measures to pro-
mote the fulfilment of compulsory education and training of UAM, al-
so by means of specific projects that include, where possible, the use 
of or coordination with cultural mediators, as well as agreements 
aimed at promoting specific training programmes. 
In addition to the right to education, art. 14 also provides for the 
right to health. In this regard, it is provided that, in the case of unac-
companied minors, registration with the National Health Service is re-
quired by those who exercise, even temporarily, parental responsibility 
or by the person in charge of the first reception facility. 
The right to be heard in proceedings and the right to legal assis-
	  
27 Ibidem, Art. 14. 
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tance are also guaranteed through the following articles: 1528 and 16, 
respectively. According to the reformulated discipline, unaccompa-
nied foreign minors have the right to participate through their legal 
representative in all judicial and administrative proceedings concern-
ing them and to be heard on the merits. To this end, the presence of a 
cultural mediator is required. The amendments made to the discipline 
by the following Art. 16 of Law No. 47/2017 give the unaccompanied 
foreign minor, involved in any capacity in judicial proceedings, the 
right to be informed of the desirability of appointing a legal repre-
sentative, including through the appointed guardian or parental re-
sponsibility officer. 
Particular protection must be guaranteed, in accordance with Art. 
17 of Law no. 47/2017, to UAM who are victims of trafficking, 
through the provision of a specific assistance programme that ensures 
adequate reception conditions and psycho-social, health and legal as-
sistance, providing long-term solutions, even beyond the age of majori-
ty. 
The transition to adulthood represents one of the most painful 
moments and the most deficient aspects of the discipline on the sub-
ject. Not even the 2017 legislation has provided adequate answers to a 
complex problem, that of coming of age, which involves the definitive 
loss of fundamental guarantees. 
Art. 13, par. 2 of Law no. 47/2017 merely states that “when an un-
accompanied foreign minor, on reaching the age of majority, despite 
having embarked on a path of social integration, requires prolonged 
support aimed at the successful outcome of this path aimed at auton-
omy, the Juvenile Court may order, also at the request of the social 
services, by means of a reasoned decree, custody to the social services, 
in any case no later than the age of 21”. 
This custody is meant as a benefit to the person but relates to the 
field of criminal enforcement, and so can be characterized by punish-
ment. This example captures only one aspect of a complex range of 
guarantees reserved to subjects with “high vulnerability”. There is no 
mention of broader protection, especially in relation to education and 
international protection of the no longer minor subject, in the 2017 
legislative intervention.  
In conclusion, law n. 47/2017 constitutes the first general legal 
	  
28  Art. 15 of Law no. 47/2017 amended Art. 18 of Legislative Decree no. 
142/2015. 
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intervention in Europe in the field of the protection of UAM, and as 
such has been welcomed by different  organizations 29  for the 
protection of minority rights, as well as by scholars on the subject. 
UNICEF considered the Law not only a “historic law to boost 
support and protection for the record number of foreign unaccompa-
nied and separated children who arrived in Italy” but also as “a model 
for how other European countries could put in place a legislative 
framework that supports protection30”. 
Moving in the right direction as suggested by the Commission, this 
law, in fact, incorporates the fundamental principles of international 
law and the common European asylum system into Italian law and 
protects the obligation of non-refoulement and the centrality of the 
best interest of the child. In fact, it prohibits the return of 
unaccompanied minors at the border; provides that the “assisted and 
voluntary return” of unaccompanied minors can be decided by a 
Juvenile Court, when family reunification in the country of origin or in 
a third country is in the child’s best interests, after having listened to 
the child and guardian’s opinion and taking into consideration the 
results of social assessment of the family situation in the country of 
origin or third country and the situation of the minor in Italy.  
In 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
while noting the compliance of the Italian legal system to international 
and European law31, made some remarks concerning the lack of 
procedural guarantees during the age assessment phase and the 
fragmentation of the regulatory framework for the protection of 
minors. Although the new Law introduces additional procedural 
	  
29 The Italian association for immigration studies (ASGI) hailed the new Italian 
age assessment procedure as a model for Europe (although under the condition of its 
practical implementation): see E. Rozzi, “The new Italian law on unaccompanied mi-
nors: a model for the EU?”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 13 Novem-
ber 2017, available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu> (07/20). For a comparative 
approach to the regulation of unaccompanied minor status in other States see R. Ros-
skopf (ed.), Unaccompanied Minors in International, European and National Law, Ber-
lin, 2016; Save the Children noted that this new Law “encompasses all the basic ele-
ments for a good integration”, available at: 
http://legale.savethechildren.it/enUS/News/Details/3ad3b3bb82184a27a6f6a6f5b827
f666?container=generica-news (10/2020). 
30 Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/media/media_95485.html> (07/20). 
31 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, The protection of Children in Migration, 14 April 2017, 
COM (2017) 211. 
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guarantees for minors, such as the establishment of a list of “voluntary 
guardians” for unaccompanied minors, selected and trained by the 
Regional Ombudsperson for minors, to be established by the Juvenile 
Courts, some concerns remain regarding the implementation of these 
guarantees without allocating additional costs to public finances. 
There is the risk that the assistance granted in theory to 
unaccompanied minors may lack any real possibility of practical 
implementation. Other critical aspects concern the division of 
competences among the judicial authorities involved in the protection 
of unaccompanied minors, as well as the ability of this law to fill the 
gap in the Italian legal system and to harmonize the various rules 
applicable to the matter. 
Ultimately, progress has been made with this new law for the 
protection and identification of unaccompanied minors arriving in 
Italy, but there is still a long way to go.  
To complicate the permanence of the right of asylum of the young 
adult, there is the specific drastic general reduction of humanitarian 




4. The amendments on the subject of international protection in view 
to the “Minniti-Orlando” and “Salvini” decrees  
 
The disappearance of certain forms of protection in the transition 
from minor to adult, especially with regard to the right of asylum, 
leads us to dwell, albeit briefly, on the restrictions that the emergency 
immigration legislation has brought, in the period between 2017 and 
2019, to the regulation of international protection. 
The implementation of the right to asylum, which is recognised by 
the Constitution by virtue of Art. 10, para. 3, in the absence of consol-
idated legislation, has, in the course of the years given rise to classifica-
tion by EU Directives. Consequently, the subject has been defined 
through agreements and is subsequently destined to be redefined con-
stantly with the evolution of supranational sources. These include the 
Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 (laying 
down rules on the qualification of third country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, on a uniform sta-
tus for refugees or persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and on 
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the content of the protection granted); the Procedures Directive 
2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 (laying down common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection status).  
The Italian legislation on the matter was first amended - as part of 
the reform implemented between 2017 and 2019 - by Decree Law no. 
13 of 17 February 2017, converted into Law no. 46 of 13 April 2017 
(the so-called “Minniti-Orlando Decree”32).  
The merely declaratory intent of the legislator in 2017 to render ef-
fective requests for international protection, echoes the more pragmat-
ic objective  of ensuring the speed of the relative procedures to the 
detriment of the pondered examination of the necessary requisites. 
The abolishment of appeal as a possibility to counter the denial of asy-
lum status and the introduction of summary judicial proceedings 
without oral hearings represent, notwithstanding the unconvincing 
reprimand of the EU regulations in force, two weak points of the 2017 
reform. A balanced interpretation of the criteria which emerge from 
EU provisions, subsisting on a sincere will to conform the national leg-
islation with EU obligations, would have conversely lead to contrasting 
solutions. The introduction of Directive 2013/32/EU on the right of 
effective appeal, on the one hand, and the extensive interpretation of 
applicability of the principle of correct procedure, sanctioned by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms intended in favour of immigrants and asylum seekers, on 
the other, seem, in fact to contradict the choice made by the Italian 
legislator in 201733.  
One of the most questionable aspects of the amendments made to 
the matter by Law Decree no. 113 of 4 October 2018, converted, with 
	  
32 For a more detailed comment on the “Minniti-Orlando” decree of 2017, see M. 
C. Contini, “La riforma Orlando- Minniti a un anno dall’entrata in vigore. I molti 
dubbi e le poche certezze nelle prassi delle sezioni specializzate”,  Diritto, Immigrazio-
ne e Cittadinanza, n. 3, 2018; P. De Sena, F. De Vittor, “La “minaccia” italiana di 
“bloccare” gli sbarchi di migranti e il diritto internazionale”, SIDIBlog, 1.7.2017; A. 
Del Guercio, “Dal decreto Minniti-Orlando al decreto Salvini: decretazione 
d’urgenza, securitizzazione della politica d’asilo e compressione dei diritti fondamen-
tali. Quando la legge genera vulnerabilità”, in A. d’Angiò, M. Visconti (eds), Persone 
fragili. La vita psichica dei migranti forzati tra cura ed esclusione, Guida Editori, 2018. 
33 See C. Favilli, “Scompare l’appello contro il diniego di protezione”, Guida al 
diritto, 12, 2017, pp. 53 ff. 
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amendments, into Law no. 132 of 1 December 2018 (“Salvini decree”) 
is the abolition of the residence permit for humanitarian reasons34. 
Recognition of refugee status and the granting of subsidiary pro-
tection remain, now, the only prerequisites for a full reception,  one  
goes beyond mere assistance and goes as far as integration35. Both re-
quirements represent, following the abolition of the humanitarian res-
idence permit, the only conditions for access to the the Protection Sys-
tem for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR, Italian acronym of 
Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati). The Protection 
System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees can, following the 2018 re-
form, accommodate only the two categories of "asylum seekers" men-
tioned above. On the other hand, all other migrant persons will be 
granted first reception facilities of an exclusively welfare nature, in 
support of which, since the conditions for international protection are 
not met, there will no longer be any further humanitarian reasons to 
justify the granting of a residence permit.  
The refusal or revocation of this permit - adopted, in light of Art. 
5, para. 6, Legislative Decree no. 286 of 25 July 1998 (Consolidated 
Law on Immigration), on the basis of international conventions or 
	  
34 For a more accurate survey of the “Salvini” decrees of 2018 and 2019, see S. 
Fattorini, “Decree Law No. 113 of 4 October  - converted, with amendments, into 
Law No. 132 of 1 December 2018 (GU No. 281 of 3 December  2018) Reform of the 
Italian Regulatory Framework on Migration”, Italian Yearbook of International Law, 
Vol. XXVIII, 2018; M. Benvenuti, “Il dito e la luna. La protezione delle esigenze di 
carattere umanitario degli stranieri prima e dopo il decreto Salvini”, Diritto, Immigra-
zione e Cittadinanza, 1, 2019; M. Acierno, “La protezione umanitaria nel sistema dei 
diritti umani”, Questione giustizia, 2018, fasc. II, p. 100 ff.; S. Curreri, “Prime consi-
derazioni sui profili d’incostituzionalità del decreto legge n. 113/2018”, Federalismi.it, 
2018, fasc. XXII, pp. 2-3; M. Ruotolo, “Brevi note sui possibili vizi formali e sostanzia-
li del d.l. n. 113 del 2018”, Osservatorio costituzionale, 2018, fasc. III, p. 1 ff.; ASGI,  
“Il D.L. n. 53/2019, convertito, con modificazioni, nella L. n. 77 /2019. Analisi critica 
del c.d. “Decreto sicurezza bis” relativamente alle disposizioni inerenti il diritto 
dell’immigrazione”, September, 2019, <https://www.asgi.it/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/2019_Commento-decreto-sicurezza-bis_13_9_.pdf>(07/20). 
35 See E. Codini, “Immigrazione, non sempre il rigore porta a più legalità”, Guida 
al diritto, n. 4, 2019, pp. 23 ff..; C. Favilli, “La protezione umanitaria per motivi di in-
tegrazione sociale. Prime riflessioni a margine della sentenza della Corte di cassazione 
n 445/2018”, Questione giustizia, 1/2018; N. Zorzella, “La protezione umanitaria nel 
sistema giuridico italiano”, Diritto immigrazione e cittadinanza, 1, 2018; T. Scovazzi, 
“Il mare dei diritti umani. Gli aspetti peggiori della politica italiana in tema di migra-
zione irregolare via mare, Atti del Convegno di Milano - 4 ottobre 2019”, Giustizia 
Insieme.  
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agreements, made enforceable in Italy, when the foreigner does not 
meet the conditions applicable in one of the Contracting States - was 
subject to the particular reasons indicated in the second part of the 
same article. Under the terms of current legislation, if the conditions 
for a residence permit are no longer met, humanitarian reasons could 
lead the Questore to issue it in the manner foreseen in the implement-
ing regulation. The repeal of this form of protection is achieved 
through certain modifications made by the 2018 legislator to the text 
of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998, which concern, first of all, the re-
placement of para. 6 of Art. 5, which will eliminate the reference to 
other particular reasons legitimising the right to asylum.  
Humanitarian protection was not contemplated by any EU or su-
pranational source, unlike the international one, expressed through a 
double hypothesis, that of refugee status, defined according to Art. 1 
of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 (ratified by Italy with Law 
no. 722 of 24 July 1954), and subsidiary protection, sanctioned at Eu-
ropean level, in order to deal with the risks of serious harm, torture, 
death penalty and, in general, inhuman treatment that the repatriation 
of the foreigner would have entailed. Both forms of protection, how-
ever, provide a minimum percentage of asylum seekers, the majority of 
whom are now deprived of an important tool, with the opportunity to 
emerge from the condition of irregularity.  
The reference to “serious reasons, in particular of a humanitarian na-
ture or resulting from constitutional or international obligations of the 
Italian State”, contained in the above mentioned Art. 5, para. 6, ap-
pears, in the eyes of the 2018 legislator, to be an excessively general 
defining formula and is, therefore, deleted. In order to suppress the 
further hypothesis of asylum, originally provided under the Consoli-
dated Act on Immigration, Art. 1 of Law no. 132/2018 also intervenes 
on all the other articles of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998 containing 
a reference to the definition of protection subsequently repealed. Of 
the various modifications made, the phrase "for humanitarian reasons" 
has been replaced by reference to medical care in Art. 5, para. 2 ter of 
L.D. no. 286/1998, as well as to residency permits for reasons of social 
protection, for victims of domestic violence, for disasters, for fixed-
term and permanent employment (in the case of serious labour exploi-
tation), for acts of particular civic merit, and for special protection.  
These are exceptional protection hypotheses which, as such, ap-
pear to be largely limited, both because of the short duration of their 
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provision and because of the rigour of the conditions required for 
their granting, which make them residual. On the other hand, the lack 
of use of forms of protection already foreseen, before the 2018 reform, 
by the relevant regulations, confirms these considerations. The intro-
duction, in the Consolidated Law on Immigration, of Art. 20 bis, ac-
cording to which a temporary residency permit can be issued by the 
Questore, in the event that the country of destination of the foreigner 
is in a situation of contingent and exceptional calamity, which does not 
allow for him to return and remain in conditions of safety, is added, 
for example, to the pre-existing Art. 20, containing “extraordinary re-
ception measures for exceptional events”. The constant consolidation, 
in the last two decades, of migration policies based on the logic of ex-
clusion, beyond the succession of progressive or conservative govern-
ments, has led, however, to the failure to apply the above mentioned 
rule, despite the increase in humanitarian crises that the spread of con-
flicts produces in areas of geopolitical interest, such as Africa or the 
Middle East. 
As for the residency permit issued in the event of serious labour 
exploitation - according to Art. 22, para. 12 quater, D.Lgs. no. 
286/1998 - by the Questore, upon proposal and with the favourable 
opinion of the Public Prosecutor, to a foreigner who has filed a com-
plaint and cooperates in the criminal proceedings against the employ-
er, it is very unlikely that a migrant would be able to obtain a regular 
work contract, especially if it is pre-existing when he/she enters the 
national territory. Similar considerations apply to the protection de-
fined as “special”, granted in cases where international protection is 
refused and there are expulsion and rejection prohibitions against vul-
nerable categories, on the basis of documents sent by the Territorial 
Commission to the police headquarters. The residency permit - re-
ferred to in this para. 3, Art. 32 of Legislative Decree no. 25/2008 - is 
renewable and, while it allows for work activities, it cannot, however, 
be converted into a work permit. 
 
 
5. Humanitarian protection in the light of jurisprudence: the notion 
of “vulnerability” and “social integration” 
 
It is appropriate to focus on humanitarian protection because it is 
a status that in Italian practice has prevailed over the others, although 
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it consists, as is evident, in a residual form of protection36. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, one of the most contro-
versial aspects of the amendments made by the “Salvini Decree” is the 
abrogation of the residence permit for humanitarian reasons. Previous-
ly, in case of serious reasons of a humanitarian nature or resulting from 
international or constitutional obligations of the Italian State, our sys-
tem, as is the case in at least 20 of the 28 countries of the Union, had 
provided for the possibility of granting the status of “humanitarian 
protection”. The broad interpretative faculty can also be found with 
respect to “serious reasons”, both subjective (vulnerability for health 
reasons, age) and objective (in particular in relation to the country of 
origin).  
Before the entry into force of the “Salvini” decree, the Territorial 
Commissions, not finding the elements for recognition of international 
protection, but unwilling to expel the person for humanitarian rea-
sons, submitted the documents to the Questore so that he could issue 
the residence permit for humanitarian reasons37, with a duration fixed 
at two years. 
Reasons of a humanitarian nature seem to be based on the general 
clause of Art. 2 of the Constitution; we could define it as a protection 
clause intended to provide protection in situations that did not fall 
under any of the statuses that are ordinarily provided.  
It should be remembered that there are categories with statuses 
that are not well defined, but that nevertheless are in need of interna-
tional protection: among which are UAM, a category that cannot be 
expelled in application of the principle of non-refoulement and that 
can aspire to an autonomous form of international protection but for 
	  
36 According to official data published by the Ministry of Interior, as a result of 
the administrative procedure related to applications for international protection sub-
mitted in 2016, about 60% of the applications have been refused, only 5% of cases 
has been granted refugee status, 14% of cases has been granted subsidiary protection 
and 21% of cases humanitarian protection. These data to some extent raise doubts 
that the institution in question may also have been used to provide protection to the 
individual while maintaining a restrictive interpretation of refugee status and subsidi-
ary protection. 
37 Art. 5, par. 6, of Legislative Decree no. 6. 286/98: “The refusal or revocation of 
the residence permit may also be adopted on the basis of international conventions or 
agreements made enforceable in Italy, when the foreigner does not meet the condi-
tions of residence applicable in one of the Contracting States, unless there are serious 
reasons, in particular of a humanitarian nature or resulting from constitutional or in-
ternational obligations of the Italian State”. 
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which, despite the existence of ad hoc international standards, the in-
stitute of humanitarian protection has so far been used in our system.  
It should also be remembered that, in general, the judiciary in 
many cases has provided a different reading of the situations to be as-
sessed, transforming many denials of status into the attribution of hu-
manitarian protection. The Italian judiciary has used the institution in 
question to give concrete implementation to the constitutional provi-
sion of Art. 10, which opens the door to the recognition of fundamen-
tal rights to foreigners in a very broad way, both by requiring only 
proof of failure to “effectively exercise the democratic freedoms guar-
anteed by the Constitution” in their country, and not necessarily per-
secution (para. three), and, in para. two, by providing that the legal 
condition is regulated by law in accordance with international rules 
and treaties. In the absence of an organic law on the right of asylum, 
humanitarian protection has therefore played an essential role in the 
concrete implementation of fundamental norms of our system. 
Italian jurisprudence, therefore, has rightly, and in accordance 
with international practice, emphasized the criteria of “vulnerability” 
and “integration” of the person as crucial elements for the granting of 
a status that would legitimize the person to remain in the territory of 
the State38. Reference is made to a decisions made by the Court of Bo-
logna, on November 18, 2014, which defines humanitarian protection 
as a safeguard clause of the system, thus allowing for granting an au-
thorization to stay in situations that do not fall within the cases pro-
vided (refugee status, subsidiary protection), but which nevertheless 
meet the needs of protection of human rights provided by constitu-
tional or international provisions. In the case in question, it was a per-
son who had fled from the terrible flooding that occurred in the previ-
ous months in Pakistan. Very significant for our purposes is the order 
of the Court of Milan of 31 March 2016. The judge reminds us that 
our Constitution protects the right to a dignified existence, and that 
the right to health and food are constitutional principles. Faced with a 
serious situation of vulnerability arising from the socio-economic con-
	  
38 For an example, see the Court of Appeal of Trieste judgment no. 186 of 23 
March 2017. In reforming the decision made by the judge of first instance, this Court 
granted humanitarian protection to a citizen of Côte d'Ivoire because of his overall 
personal situation of extreme fragility, as an orphan, very young, and with a career al-
ready started. In the same sense, the Court of Rome, with an order dated May 4, 2017 
with reference to a young man from Gambia. 
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ditions of the State of origin (in this case Gambia), according to this 
decision, humanitarian protection cannot be denied, bearing in mind 
art. 32 of the Constitution, art. 25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and art. 11 of the United Nations Covenant on Eco-
nomic and Social Rights of 1966. The possibility that this interpreta-
tion could potentially open the doors of humanitarian protection to a 
considerable and indeterminate number of persons cannot condition 
the judge since “the recognition of a fundamental right cannot depend 
on the number of persons to whom that right is recognized. By its na-
ture, a universal right cannot be a restricted number”. 
All these decisions, in our opinion, have developed what has al-
ready been stated in general terms by the Court of Cassation, Civil 
Section VI, in judgment no. 26566 of 27 November 2013.  With this 
decision, in fact, the Supreme Court was able to reject the restrictive 
interpretation of the institution of humanitarian protection, an inter-
pretation according to which the status in question could be recog-
nized only when the circumstances of the case abstractly integrate the 
conditions required for typical measures (refugee status, subsidiary 
protection). On the contrary, the Court affirms that humanitarian pro-
tection has an “atypical and residual” character. This means that it is 
used precisely when the conditions for the application of the other 
measures are not met, not even hypothetically, and that, precisely be-
cause of this characteristic, the conditions for granting it must be as-
certained on a case-by-case basis. 
The Court also states, and it is an important concept, that these 
conditions are encountered “in so-called vulnerable situations that 
may have the most varied etiology and do not necessarily descend as a 
minus from the requirements of the typical measures of refuge and 
subsidiary protection”. So the idea of the crucial importance of the 
condition of vulnerability, and of constituting such a condition is “an 
open catalog not necessarily based on fumus persecutionis or on the 
danger of serious harm to life or psycho-physical safety”.  
Finally, with sentence no. 4455 of February 23, 2018, the Supreme 
Court, first civil section, elevated social integration as a relevant reason 
for the determination of individual vulnerability and recognition of 
humanitarian protection. Autonomous reason, but not independent 
from the applicant's condition of origin, which implies the verification 
of the fact that in his country he runs the risk of seeing his fundamen-
tal rights sacrificed even for reasons other than those for which inter-
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national protection with refugee status and subsidiary protection op-
erate. But it is up to the judge to verify whether this risk of prejudice is 
current. And this onerous function can and must benefit from the ob-
ligation of investigative cooperation and the benefit of doubt. 
The notion of vulnerability and persons with special needs finds, 
as mentioned above, a significant correspondence in norms and deci-
sions of international law. We refer first of all to Chapter IV of Di-
rective No. 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union, entitled “provisions in favor 
of vulnerable persons”. Art. 21 (“General principle”) states that “in 
national measures implementing this Directive, Member States shall 
take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons”. Below 
is a list (minors, disabled, elderly, etc.), which should not be consid-
ered exhaustive, also because it ends with the general mention of 
“other persons who have suffered torture, rape, or other serious forms 
of psychological, physical or sexual violence”. In this regard, it is 
worth mentioning that according to the 2016 report of the Interna-
tional Organization of Migrants (IOM), 75% of people in transit un-
dergo “practices similar to those of trafficking”. 
 Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has also used 
and emphasized the category of “vulnerability”. We refer in particular 
to the important and well-known ruling of the Grand Chamber of 21 
January 2011 in the case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. In this judg-
ment the Court attributes considerable importance to the vulnerability 
of the applicant, a situation leading, as a consequence, to a reduced 
probative obligation for the purposes of demonstrating the risk in-
curred. 
The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 11, 2016 
has the same provisions. In its three final points, it specifies its intent 
“To develop guidelines on the treatment of Migrants in vulnerable sit-
uations. These guidelines will be particularly important for the increas-
ing number of unaccompanied children on the move”. 
Also the implementation of the humanitarian corridors from Leb-
anon, arranged by some Italian religious bodies (Mediterranean 
Hope), is based on a selection of people on the basis of the sole crite-
rion of vulnerability, also confirming the transversality inherent in the 
notion. 
Finally, in the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
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case of the application of the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the concept of vulnera-
bility (Vulnerability Test) recurs in many points of the judgment39.   
In the light of what has been stated so far, it is of great concern 
that the institution in question has been suppressed without being re-
placed by another valid instrument of equal significance and effective-
ness.  
What are the consequences? First of all, our State will find itself in 
violation of international commitments it has assumed. It should be 
remembered that there are numerous legal norms interpreted by in-
ternational courts (in particular the European Court of Human Rights) 
that provide for the non-expulsion of persons who do not strictly meet 
the criteria for the granting of refugee status or subsidiary protection. 
From an international perspective, therefore, the institute of humani-
tarian protection serves to give a status and regularization to these per-
sons who would otherwise live in legal limbo, with immediate or inevi-
table violation of a number of human rights, such as the right to de-
cent living conditions, etc. This applies to adults but also to particular 
situations such as the condition of minors.  
Humanitarian protection provides legal coverage to all those situa-
tions of particular vulnerability that international norms at various lev-
els indicate as necessary in general and particular conventions (not on-
ly ECHR but also conventions on trafficking, against violence to wom-
en etc.).  
In conclusion, the effect of the repeal of Art. 5, par. 6, Legislative 
Decree 286/98 has aspects of manifest unconstitutionality, as it ap-
pears to be in contrast to Articles 2, 10 and 117 of the Constitution,  
since a rule, such as the one that currently regulates humanitarian pro-
tection, is intended to enforce a fundamental right of the person such 
as the right of asylum, which is much broader than the two notions of 
international protection40.  
	  
39  This is developed with extensive arguments in the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade (par. 145 - 166) in which he highlights how the Court should have 
gone beyond an evaluation stricto sensu of the issue, and therefore a traditional vision 
of international law, to the benefit of a more modern interpretation - and therefore 
application - of international law, nowadays “not at all insensitive to the fate of the 
population”. 
40 See ASGI opinion 15-10-2018 entitled “Manifeste illegittimità costituzionali 
delle norme del Decreto Legge 4.10.2018, No. 113 concernenti permessi di soggiorno 
per motivi umanitari, protezione internazionale e cittadinanza”.   
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The abrogation of the residence permit for humanitarian reasons, 
an entitlement deriving from constitutional and international obliga-
tions, combined with the introduction of new residence permits that 
on the whole do not completely replace the ones that are abrogated, 
violates Constitutional and international obligations, because the sys-
tem no longer provides for forms of protection appropriate to ensure 
compliance with such obligations. It will re-open opportunities for 
successful legal actions to ascertain the right of asylum guaranteed di-
rectly by Art. 10, para. 3 of the Constitution, no longer fully imple-
mented by the legislation.  
 
 
6. Final remarks: the objective of maintaining protection for minors 
in the transition to adulthood 
 
We have pointed out that there are categories with an undefined 
status, but that are undoubtedly in need of international protection, 
including unaccompanied minors, a category that cannot be expelled 
in application of the principle of non-refoulement and that can aim at 
an autonomous form of international protection but for which, despite 
the existence of ad hoc international standards, the institution of hu-
manitarian protection has so far been used in our system. One of the 
most controversial changes made by the “Salvini Decree” is the abro-
gation of the residence permit for humanitarian reasons. 
The regulation of UAM must therefore be contextualized in this 
normative framework, especially where the transition to adulthood 
deprives them of certain fundamental protections offered by the jux-
taposition of national and international sources examined so far. After 
their transition to adulthood, even though the situation of “high vul-
nerability” remains, forms of protection such as the right to education, 
reception and employment begin to disappear. At the age of twenty-
one they are no longer reflected in legislative sources, specifically in 
Law no. 47/2017.  
Although it is true that there are close relations between the econ-
omy, the labor market and migration policies, it becomes unreasonably 
uneconomic to have invested in reception and protection of rights, 
primarily for the training and integration of minors and then to deny 
them stability and asylum as young adults. 
 It can be reasonably concluded that the drafting of regulatory in-
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struments aimed at safeguarding a subject of  “high vulnerability41” is 
not accompanied by Italian and EU policies on migration flows, in-
tended to promote respect for human rights. 
The objective of protecting “individuals still vulnerable” cannot be 
separated from legislative policies that provide for their effective and 
stable social inclusion. A desirable starting point would be a radical 
reform of the discipline of the right of asylum, which, through a 
broader range of possibilities of access, can accommodate all those 
who are escaping from countries at war or from conditions of poverty, 
and also young adults, i.e. those who are “no longer minors”, who 
cannot suddenly see their psychophysical identity suddenly interrupt-
ed by the cessation of a training guaranteed to them until the age of 
18.  
With the denial even of registration in the registry office (bravely 
maintained by some mayors), they are transformed into “ghosts” and, 
what is worse, they are condemned to crime. Thus the State fails in 
promoting the respect and protection of the dignity of the individual, 
even if it had met such a challenge during the period of protection of 
minors. 
	  
41 See F. Ippolito, “(De)Constructing Children’s Vulnerability in European Law”, 
in F. Ippolito, S. Iglesias Sanchez (eds.), Protection of Vulnerable Group. The Europe-
an Human Rights Framework, Hart Publishing, 2015, London-Dublin, p. 23 ff. 
 
	  
ASYLUM AND MIGRATION LAW IN AUSTRIA1 
 







The asylum and migration in Austria is not regulated in one 
specific law or one coherent system of laws and regulations. It is rather 
a branch of law with uncertain contours, composed of a larger number 
of provisions that touch upon this subject. They are, at the same time, 
often not exclusively, or not even directly, aimed at regulating this 
field. 
A drawback of this situation lies in the fact that thereby the whole 
legal situation becomes highly blurry and intransparent. The 
applicable rules are often contradictory, while in other cases they leave 
lacunae. 
One might ask what the reasons for this situation are. They are 
manifold. First of all, historically, Austria’s position towards 
immigration has changed several times. And the same is true for the 
general attitude of the broader population towards the related 
questions. 
Austria has long been a country of immigration, both after WW I 
and after WW II, when German speaking minorities from Central and 
Eastern European countries fled to Austria. After WWII, more than 3 
million Sudetendeutsche where banned from Czechoslovakia, a country 
where this group had been living since the Middle Ages.2 They passed 
	  
* University of Innsbruck. 
** University of Innsbruck. 
1 This essay constitutes a preliminary study on the Austrian asylum and migration 
law. Work on this subject will continue and further, more detailed publications in this 
area are planned. 
2  On the lot ot the “Sudetendeutschen” see G. Gilbert, “Völkerrecht und 
Völkermord. Definition – Nachweis – Konsequenzen am Beispiel der 
Sudetendeutschen”, in Schriftenreihe Geschichte, Gegenwart und Zukunft der 
altösterreichischen deutschen Minderheiten in den Ländern der ehemaligen 
Donaumonarchie, Vienna, 2002, p. 92 ff. On the endeavours to protect this group in 
the interwar-period see P. Hilpold, “The League of Nations and the Protection of 
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through Austria and some of them remained there. During the Cold 
War, Austria has often been the first country of refuge for dissidents 
from the East. And again, many passed through to other countries, for 
example Germany, and some remained in Austria. Through this 
process Austria gained often highly qualified workers. At the same 
time, lesser qualified migrants where welcomed and needed in Austria 
during the long period of recovery and economic expansion after 
1945. They all contributed, in a decisive way, to wealth creation and to 
the high living standard that Austria has now been enjoying for 
decades.3 
It goes without saying, however, that there were also periods when 
the economy slowed down and further immigration was no longer 
needed. Similar to what happened in Germany, in Austria, for a long 
time, politics addressed immigration as a tool to regulate the need of 
manpower by a stop-and-go-policy, while in the long term this vision 
revealed to be utopian. 
Especially in the 1970s, the economic crisis following the oil 
boycott provoked increasing intolerance against migrants that 
diminished again when recovery set in anew. 
For the Austrian legislator, to take into regard all these different 
events, goals, sentiments and aspirations, was tantamount to squaring 
the circle. Notwithstanding the need of migrant workers, the fact that 
broad parts of the economy called for a facilitation of immigration and 
the further fact that these immigrants made remarkable contributions 
to the growth of the Austrian economy, the official position of the 
various governments over these periods was that Austria needed no or 
next to no immigration.4 
At the same time, international obligations set more limits to a 
strict prohibition of immigration. In this context, first of all, more 
	  
Minorities – Rediscovering a Great Experiment”, Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law, 17, 2013, pp. 87-124. 
3 On this period see P. Hilpold, “Österreichs Rolle in der Europäischen Union 
zwischen West und Ost”, in Gilbert Gornig, Peter Hilpold (Hrsg.), Europas 
Grundwerte und ihre Umsetzung. insbesondere in den Ländern Mittel- und 
Ostmitteleuropas (im Erscheinen). 
4 See B.C. Funk, J. Stern, “Die österreichische Einwanderungs- und Asylpolitik: 
völkerrechtliche, europarechtliche und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekt”e, in Peter 
Hilpold, Christoph Perathoner (eds.), Immigration und Integration: Völkerrechtliche 
und europarechtliche Antworten auf eine zentrale Herausforderung der Zeit, Peter Lang 
AG, Frankfurt am Main, 2010, p. 237. 
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extensive human rights obligations had to be considered. The 
ratification of the Refugee Convention 1951 by the Austrian 
government had as a consequence the need for internal executive 
measures. To this end, a law on the right of residence for refugees 
according to the Refugee Convention 1951 was adopted.5 
This law was in all its essence ambivalent as it showed, on the one 
hand, openness towards refugees in need of protection, while at the 
same time trying to restrict, as far as possible, the influx of asylum-
seekers.6 
This law remained widely unchanged until the breakdown of the 
“Iron Curtain” that led to endeavours for the introduction of further 
restrictions.7 Further, far-reaching restrictions were introduced in the 
following years, especially in the year 20058 and as a consequence of 
the refugee crisis starting in 2015. 
Austria’s accession to the European Union (EU) had, to a 
considerable extent, modified the law applicable in the field of asylum 
and migration. In part, this development was already anticipated by 
Austria’s membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), and 
had started one year before. The free circulation of persons (workers 
but also of EU citizens in general) was further promoted by the 
consolidation and further extension of Union citizenship.9 With regard 
to asylum law and the protection of refugees, the development of a 
Common European Asylum System10 had considerable influence on 
the law applicable in this field in Austria. 
The overall intention – at least at the EU level – is now not merely 
	  
5  Federal Law BGBl. 55/195 and BGBl. 1968/126, Bundesgesetz über die 
Aufentaltsberechtigung von Flüchtlingen im Sinne der Konvention über die 
Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge. 
6 See F. Merli, “Das Asylrecht als Experimentierfeld: Einführung“, in Franz 
Merli, Magdalena Pöschl (eds.), Das Asylrecht als Experimentierfeld: Eine Analyse 
seiner Besonderheiten aus vergleichender Sicht, MANZ, Vienna, 2017, p. 1. 
7 Ibid, p. 2, referring to the Federal Law 1990/190, Bundesgesetz BGBl. 1990/190 
mit Änderungen des Passgesetzes, des Grenzkontrollgesetzes und des Bundesgesetzes 
über die Aufenthaltsberechtigung von Flüchtlingen. 
8 See the Asylum Law 2005 as part of the “Foreigners Law Package” (AslyG 2005 
als Teil des Fremdenrechtspaketes 2005, BGBl I 2005/100). 
9  See on this subject P. Hilpold, “Nichtdiskriminierung und 
Unionsbürgerschaft“, in Matthias Niedobitek (ed.), Europarecht, 2. Edition, de 
Gruyter, Berlin, 2020, pp. 805-886. 
10 See now Articles 78 ff. TFEU. 
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to restrict migration but to manage it.11 At the same time, these 
management activities have to accommodate humanitarian concerns, 
i.e. to fully respect the obligations resulting from the Geneva Refugee 
Convention 1951 as well as from those from CEAS.12 
The resulting system is highly complex. Even at the highest level of 
EU politics it is often not clear which of the conflicting goals should 
be given preference. All the more, there are enormous hurdles and 
difficulties to explain this multi-layered management system at the 
national level. The refugee crisis of the years 2015 -2016 which has 
provoked considerable strain for Austria due to its geographical 
position at the end of the so-called “Balkan route” has stirred up 
protest and anti-immigration sentiments in this country. Eventually, 
this changed the national political landscape and the new government 
had a strong mandate by the electorate to engage in a more restrictive 
policy also at the EU level. This new approach fit well with other 
similar tendencies in the European Union so that, as a whole, the EU 
became more cautious and more restrictive in their migration and 
asylum policy.13 
This historical and international circumstances had direct 
repercussions on the legislative situation in Austria. It is not always 
clear how the diverse bodies of norms should be qualified and there is 
political and academic uncertainty as to the main aims of pivotal 
norms in this field. Often, the terminology chosen in normative acts 
carries a specific political message, be it that the terms attempt to 
sweeten the appearances of otherwise drastic measures, be it that they 
communicate in codified manner what is the ultimate aim of a 
measure, apparently neutral in nature.14 
The very assignment of asylum law to a legal area gives rise to 
	  
11 See D. Chalmers et al., European Union Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2014, p. 526. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See P. Hilpold, “Unilateralism in Refugee law – Austria’s Quota Approach 
Under Scrutiny”, Human Rights Review, 18, 2017, pp. 305-319. For the overall 
situation in Europe see P. Hilpold, “Quotas as an Instrument of Burden-Sharing in 
International Refugee Law – The Many Facets of an Instrument Still in the Making”, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 14, 2017, 4, 2017, pp. 1188-1205. 
14 This is, for example, the case with the term Ausreisezentren (Repatriation 
center) created by the former Interior Minister Herbert Kickl in order to rename the 
Erstaufnahmestellen (first registration point). While the latter signals the hope for an 
asylum procedure with positive result the term “repatriation center” should 
apparently convey the message that there is (next to) no hope.  
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discussions as to whether this body of norms makes part of the law of 
aliens or constitutes an independent legal area. Gerhard Muzak is 
probably right when he qualifies asylum law as part of the law of aliens 
and defines it rather comprehensively.15 However, asylum law shares 
common grounds and overlaps with other areas of law. For this 
reason, any inquiry into Austrian asylum and migration law is more 
complex than one might think at first sight. In the following paper, the 
relevant legal sources and their relation to asylum and migration law 
will be presented in more detail. As far as possible, it will be tried to 
evidence the complex and often contradicting aims of these norms. 
This article will conclude with a short summary and an outlook. Pre-
eminent attention will be paid here to asylum law. General migration 
law is mostly regulated by EU law and should more appropriately be 
treated in the context of the free circulation of persons.  
 
 
2. Legal sources 
 
(a) Asylum Act (Asylgesetz 2005) 
The reformed Asylum Act of 2005 deals with the issue of granting 
asylum and subsidiary protection as well as the rights and obligations 
of the asylum seeker, the asylum procedure itself, the relevant cards 
and residence permits. The Act of 2005 represents the fourth major 
reform of the Asylum Act, which was accompanied by numerous 
amendments. Amendments usually happen as a result of external 
influences, such as changes at EU level or developments at the 
international level. As already exposed, even the first Asylum Act of 
1968 was the direct consequence of an external impulse: the need to 
implement the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. 16  In the 
meantime, this act has become a highly sophisticated instrument for 
the granting of asylum and subsidiary protection according to 
international guidelines. At the same time, however, procedural 
provision evidence a series of Austrian particularities. 
Status 
Asylum seeker: § 3 para. 1 AsylG 2005 refers to the categories of 
	  
15  See G. Muzak, “Das Asylrecht und seine Wechselwirkungen mit dem 
Aufenthalts-, Fremdenpolizei – und Grenzkontrollrecht”, in Franz Merli, Magdalena 
Pöschl (eds.), cit., p. 29. 
16 See F. Merli, “Das Asylrecht als Experimentierfeld: Einführung”, cit., p. 1. 
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persons listed in Article 1 Section A Z 2 of the Convention under the 
scope of protection of the Refugee Convention and thus ensures their 
unrestricted right of application. If the conditions are given and 
recognized, a right of asylum has to be granted. This implies in Austria 
the permanent right of entry and residence for the respective 
foreigners.17 There are five elements characterizing the concept of 
refugee:18 
• well-founded fear of 
• persecution 
• for one or more of the following reasons: race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group and/or political 
opinion,  
• being outside the country of nationality or habitual residence 
of the person concerned,19 and 
• being unable or, owing to such fear, being unwilling to return 
to take recourse to the protection in the State of that country. 
Exclusion: However, there is the possibility to exclude the granting 
of status for certain reasons according to Art 1 Section F GFK, which 
are implemented in § 6 AsylG 2005.20 Reasons for exclusion exist 
regarding persons who already enjoy protection or assistance by the 
United Nations or who are excluded from refugee protection due to 
war crimes, criminal offences or other serious acts.21 If one of these 
reasons apply, the application can be rejected without further 
examination. Furthermore, § 6 also specifies national reasons according 
to which an exclusion is possible on the grounds of danger to the 
security of the Republic and against persons who have been convicted 
by a domestic court of law for a particularly serious crime. 22  A 
distinction must be made between exclusion and termination of asylum, 
the latter meaning the revocation of the asylum status formerly given. 
	  
17 See J. Putzer, “Asylrecht und Schutz bei Abschiebung und Ausweisung”, in 
Gregor Heißl (ed.), Handbuch Menschenrechte: allgemeine Grundlagen – Grundrechte 
in Österreich – Entwicklungen – Rechtsschutz, Facultas.WUV, Vienna, 2009, p. 446. 
18 Ibid., pp. 448 - 451. 
19 § 2 para 1 Z 12 AsylG 2005; Art 10 StatusRL. 
20 See J. Putzer, “Asylrecht und Schutz bei Abschiebung und Ausweisung”, cit., 
p. 451. 
21 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2017.  
22 See J. Putzer, “Asylrecht und Schutz bei Abschiebung und Ausweisung”, cit., 
p. 452. 
ASYLUM AND MIGRATION LAW IN AUSTRIA 87 
Subsidiary protection: If no status for international protection can 
be granted, it must be examined whether a case of subsidiary 
protection under Section 8 of the Asylum Act 2005 exists, also known 
as the refoulement ban. This is the case if the person concerned faces a 
real risk of a serious violation of some fundamental rights, 23  in 
particular if a rejection, removal or deportation of the foreigner to his 
country of origin would pose a real risk of a violation of Art. 2 ECHR, 
Art. 3 ECHR or Protocols 6 or 13 to the Convention or pose a serious 
threat to him as to his life or integrity as a result of arbitrary violence 
in the context of an international or domestic conflict. 
When examining whether subsidiary protection is to be granted, 
an individual case examination must be carried out.24 
If an application for international protection or subsidiary 
protection is rejected or dismissed, (for example if the applicant 
represents a security threat), a deportation must be carried out 
according to § 10 AsylG 2005. This must be distinguished from 
measures terminating the stay under the Foreign Police Act. 
Deportation under the asylum law means carrying back of the 
applicant to the country of origin and is inadmissible if this would 
cause a violation of Article 8 ECHR.25 Neither can it be carried out 
even if the foreigner has a right of residence outside the Asylum Act.26 
According to § 34 AsylG 2005, residence titles can also be 
obtained on the basis of family relations, or according to § 62 AsylG 
2005 by displaced persons fleeing from civil wars and similar 
circumstances, by persons who have been granted asylum according to 
§ 55f AsylG 2005 in order to protect their private and family life or in 
special cases worthy of consideration on humanitarian grounds27 or for 
reasons of protection under Article 8 ECHR.28 These residence titles 
	  
23 Ibid., p. 453. 
24 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, cit.  
25 See J. Putzer, “Asylrecht und Schutz bei Abschiebung und Ausweisung”, cit., 
p. 458. 
26 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, in Susanne Bachmann et al. (eds.), Besondere 
Verwaltungsrecht, 12. Edition, Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2018, p. 201. 
27  See D. Kolonovits, “Neuer Asylgerichtshof in Österreich – 
Verfassungsrechtliche und verfassungspolitische Aspekte der Neuregelung des 
Rechtsschutzes in Asylsachen”, in P. Hilpold, C. Perathoner (eds.), cit., pp. 261-292. 
28  See G. Muzak, “Das Asylrecht und seine Wechselwirkungen mit dem 
Aufenthalts-, Fremdenpolizei- und Grenzkontrollrecht”, cit., p. 34. 
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usually follow a negative asylum procedure and they do not fall under 
the purview of he Asylum Act in the stricter sense. However, in order 
to avoid additional procedures according to the Settlement and 




In Austria, a distinction is made between the application, which 
can be made in any way, and the submission of the application, with 
which all deadlines begin to run. The submission of the application 
triggers the de facto protection against deportation according to § 12 
AsylG and is initially entitled to stay. (Here a procedure card is issued 
to confirm this). 29  In the case of an application or admission 
procedure, an initial interview and identification procedures must be 
carried out. 
Approval: The approval procedure is conducted by the Federal 
Office for Foreigners and Asylum to deal with the question of whether 
Austria is competent at all30. In no other procedure does the question 
of competence play such an important role31. There are many situation 
in which Austrian authorities lack competence for the procedure. The 
following situations can be distinguished: 
i) a “Dublin case” may be given; 
ii) the application may come from a safe third country, 
iii) the application may follow a decided case; 
iv) a material examination of the case following the procedural 
admission of the application. 
In the first situation, the Dublin case, one of the other Member 
States is responsible on the basis of the Dublin III Regulation. 
In case the application is made by a person coming from a country 
in which the Dublin III Regulation does not apply, Austria can reject it 
if the state is a so – called safe third country – the second possibility. 
The decided cases are applications which have already been 
rejected or dismissed once with legal effect and no new grounds have 
	  
29 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, cit.  
30 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, cit., p. 199. 
31  See F. Merli, M. Pöschl, “Das Asylrecht als Experimentierfeld: 
Schlussfolgerung”, in Franz Merli, Magdalena Pöschl (eds.), cit., p. 206. 
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been added to the new applications32. The Asylum Act 2005 follows in 
principle the Dublin III-rules according to which Austria has to 
examine the substance of the case only if someone enters Austria 
directly from the country of persecution. At first sight, one might 
think that on this basis Austria, due to the geographical location of 
this country, will never be responsible for an asylum procedure. In 
practice, however, this leads to the escape routes being concealed33. 
Material examination of the application: If the application is not 
likely to be rejected, it must be admitted. If a person is admitted to the 
procedure, he or she will receive a right of residence together with a 
residence entitlement card 34 . As mentioned above, a material 
examination is carried out in the second stage of the procedure35. The 
asylum procedure is a procedure in which the decision can only be 
made on the basis of external information. In order to do justice to 
this, country information is available from the Federal Office's country 
information sheet. In practice, however, sufficient and up-to-date 
country information as a basis for decision-making is a difficult 
problem to solve36. The procedure is terminated by granting asylum, 
rejection or dismissal, discontinuation or filing as irrelevant. There are 
other procedures with special regulations as the airport procedure, 
when the applicant arrives via an airport, and the family procedure, 
which enables all family members to conduct the procedure together37.  
Legal consequences: Initially, a three-year residence permit is 
granted, which becomes permanent if there are no grounds for 
withdrawal38. A further consequence is the right to basic care during 
the procedure or other financial support after a decision has been 
taken, the right of residence, identification and integration measures39. 
	  
32 See N. Kittenberger, Asylrecht kompakt, LexisNexis, Vienna, 2016. 
33  See S. Schuhmacher et al., Fremdenrecht: Asyl, Ausländerbeschäftigung, 
Einbürgerung, Einwanderung, Verwaltungsverfahren, 4. Edition, ÖGB Verlag, Vienna, 
2012.  
34 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, cit. 
35 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, cit., p. 199. 
36 See N. Bracher, “Kritische Bemerkungen zum österreichischen Asylsystem am 
Beispiel des (Herkunftsstaats) Irak”, in Christian Filzwieser and Isabella Taucher 
(eds.), Asyl- und Fremdenrecht: Jahrbuch 2019, NWV, Vienna & Graz, 2019, p. 174. 
37 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, cit. 
38 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, cit., p. 194. 
39 For details, see the relevant laws. 
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In parallel to acquiring numerous rights, the asylum seeker must also 
fulfil duties in the form of obligations to cooperate and report40. 
 
(b) Asylum Act Implementing Regulation 2005 (Asylgesetz-
Durchführungsverordnung 2005) 
This is the ordinance for the implementation of the Asylum Act 
2005. It provides how cards are to be issued and how they have to 
look. 
 
(c) Federal Office for Foreigners and Asylum – Procedure Act 
(Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl-Verfahrensgesetz; BFA-VG) 
The BFA-VG contains the general provisions on the procedure 
before the Federal Office for Foreigners and Asylum, BFA41, for 
granting international protection, granting residence titles for reasons 
worthy of consideration, deportation, toleration and the issuance of 
measures terminating residence, as well as for issuing Austrian 
documents to foreigners. Generally, the BFA is responsible for the 
implementation of the Asylum Act42. 
Legal protection: Legal protection is provided by the revision 
procedure before the Federal Administrative Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht; BVwG), into which the Asylum Court was 
incorporated in 201343. Special features of this appeal procedure are 
the lack of suspensive effect and the prevailing prohibition of 
innovation; verbal proceedings may also be omitted. 44  As a 
consequence, innovation is prohibited under the terms of § 20 para. 1 
BFA-VG. This means that innovation is only permitted in case of a 
decisive change of the facts, if the proceedings before the BFA were 
deficient, if the new facts and the new evidence were not accessible to 
the foreigner until the decision was made, or if the foreigner was not 
able to present them.45 
In case, an application is decided negatively, a suspension of the 
	  
40 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, cit. 
41 BFA is the Austrian short form for the Federal Office for Foreigners and 
Asylum. 
42 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, cit., p. 163. 
43 Ibid., p. 206. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, cit. 
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effects of such a decision is nevertheless to be granted according to § 
17 BFA-VG if a rejection, removal or deportation of the foreigner to 
his country of origin would pose a real risk of a violation of Art. 2 
ECHR, Art. 3 ECHR or Protocols 6 or 13 to the Convention or pose a 
serious threat to him as a civilian Life or integrity as a result of 
arbitrary violence in the context of an international or domestic 
conflict.46 If a suspensive effect is denied, this is associated with 
essential legal consequences:  
- there is no time limit for voluntary departure, 
- the imposition of a residence requirement in a certain quarter 
of the Federal Republic is possible 
- the loss of the previous right of residence as an asylum seeker 
- entitlement to basic care ends. 
A review of this decision by the Austrian Administrative Court 
(Verwaltungsgerichtshof; VwGH) has become possible again; it had 
been ruled out during the jurisdiction of the Asylum Court47. 
A Fast-track procedure is possible under certain conditions 
provided for in § 18 para. 1 BFA-VG: 
(i) if the asylum seeker comes from a safe country of origin,  
(ii) if he poses a threat to public order and security, 
(iii) if the asylum seeker deceives about his true identity, 
nationality or the authenticity of his documents, 
(iv)  if there are no grounds for persecution, 
(v) if the allegations do not correspond to the facts, 
(vi)  in case of an enforceable return decision, 
(vii) in case an enforceable expulsion order or an enforceable 
residence ban has already been issued prior to the application, 
(viii) in case the asylum seeker refuses to give fingerprints.48 
 
(d) Foreign Police Act (Fremdenpolizeigesetz; FPG) 
The Foreign Police Act is the main body of foreigners’ law. 
Foreigners’ law in general regulates the police supervision of the 
arrival and the residence of foreigners. More in particular, it deals with 
the exercise of the foreign police force, the granting of entry permits, 
	  
46 See D. Urban, “Die aufschiebende Wirkung im Asylverfahren”, in Christian 
Filzwieser and Isabella Taucher (eds.), cit., pp. 129-146. 
47 See F. Merli, “Das Asylrecht als Experimentierfeld: Einführung”, cit., p. 5. 
48 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, cit. 
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their rejection, the adoption of measures terminating residence, 
deportation, toleration and enforcement of repatriation decisions and 
the issuing of Austrian documents. The FPG regulates the powers and 
measures of the foreign police, whereas the NAG controls 
immigration and migration. As defined in the Act, foreigners are 
persons who are not Austrian citizens. In this case a further distinction 
as to whether this person is a third-country citizen or a citizen of the 
European Union has to be made. A third-country citizen only becomes 
an asylum seeker once he or she has submitted an asylum application, 
whereas a refugee only becomes a refugee once his or her status has 
been recognised as asylum seeker or as a person entitled to subsidiary 
protection.49 
The Foreign Police Act and the Asylum Act 2005 show overlaps 
and interactions. They are also linked by the BFA joint authority and 
its Special Procedures Act. Nevertheless both pursue different 
objectives. The Asylum Act is concerned with the acquisition of a right 
of residence, whereas the FPG is intended to ward off dangers. Again, 
it could be stated that these differences evidence again many 
reciprocal links.50 
Deportation: As in the Asylum Act, the FPG also offers the 
possibility to take measures to end the stay. There are return decisions 
under the FPG for different groups of persons, those with unlawful 
residence (this is the case with rejected applications for international 
protection) under § 52 para. 3 FPG and for persons with lawful 
residence (for reasons of the Settlement and Residence Act). In the 
cases of § 46b para. 1 FPG, this also corresponds to an enforceable 
return decision, otherwise this becomes enforceable upon the entry 
into force of the law. In this case again it has to be examined, whether 
this does not contradict the prohibition of refoulement resulting from 
the human rights obligations cited above. With the return decision, it 
must be determined at the same time whether a deportation is 
permissible.51  
Refoulement ban: Care must be taken, that the ECHR is neither be 
infringed in the case of foreign police measures. This would happen in 
	  
49 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, cit., pp. 147-206. 
50 See, comprehensively, G. Muzak, “Das Asylrecht und seine Wechselwirkungen 
mit dem Aufenthalts-, Fremdenpolizei- und Grenzkontrollrecht”, cit., p. 28. 
51 See I. Gachowetz et al., Asyl- und Fremdenrecht im Rahmen der Zuständigkeit 
des BFA, cit. 
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case of a violation of the prohibition of torture and degrading 
treatment, which is particularly relevant in the deportation procedure, 
the protection of private and family life in the granting of entry and 
residence permits and the protection of personal freedom in detention 
pending deportation procedures52, All of these cases find expression in 
the refoulement ban. A return decision can also be made regarding 
asylum seekers according to § 52 para. 2 and 3 FPG.53 In these cases, 
the “Boultif criteria” have to observed: seriousness of the violation of 
law, duration of stay, behaviour after violation of law, nationality of 
the persons involved, family situation, knowledge of the partner of the 
violation of law at the beginning of the relationship, age of the 
children, obstacles to resettlement in the home country. The decision 
is implemented by measures of deportation.54   
Detention pending deportation: A special form of arrest and 
detention of strangers is detention pending deportation according to § 
76 FPG. This is a procedural detention and is only to be used if no less 
severe means are to be applied.55 Such a deportation can be imposed 
to secure the effectiveness of a return decision, of an order for removal 
from the country, of a measure expulsion or a ban of residence 
pursuant to § 76 para. 1 FPG, or also, under certain conditions 
	  
52 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, cit., p. 176. 
53 (2) Gegen einen Drittstaatsangehörigen hat das Bundesamt unter einem (§ 10 
AsylG 2005) mit Bescheid eine Rückkehrentscheidung zu erlassen, wenn: 
1.dessen Antrag auf internationalen Schutz wegen Drittstaatsicherheit 
zurückgewiesen wird, 
2. dessen Antrag auf internationalen Schutz sowohl bezüglich der Zuerkennung des 
Status des Asylberechtigten als auch der Zuerkennung des Status des subsidiär 
Schutzberechtigten abgewiesen wird, 
3.ihm der Status des Asylberechtigten aberkannt wird, ohne dass es zur 
Zuerkennung des Status des subsidiär Schutzberechtigten kommt oder 
4. ihm der Status des subsidiär Schutzberechtigten aberkannt wird und ihm kein 
Aufenthaltsrecht nach anderen Bundesgesetzen zukommt. Dies gilt nicht für begünstigte 
Drittstaatsangehörige. 
“(3) Gegen einen Drittstaatsangehörigen hat das Bundesamt unter einem mit 
Bescheid eine Rückkehrentscheidung zu erlassen, wenn dessen Antrag auf Erteilung 
eines Aufenthaltstitels gemäß §§ 55, 56 oder 57 AsylG 2005 zurück- oder abgewiesen 
wird.” 
54 Ibid., p. 171. 
55  See D. Kolonovits, “Neuer Asylgerichtshof in Österreich – 
Verfassungsrechtliche und verfassungspolitische Aspekte der Neuregelung des 
Rechtsschutzes in Asylsachen”, cit., pp. 261-292. 
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regulated in asylum law, § 76 para. 2 and 2a FPG56, if there is a risk of 
escape pursuant to § 76 para. 2 no. 1 FPG. This is the case if certain 
facts justify the assumption that the foreigner will evade either the 
proceedings or the deportation, or that the foreigner will make 
deportation considerably more difficult. If a deportation or return 
decision is not admissible, the stay must be tolerated and further 
actions must be taken in accordance with the Asylum Act.   
 
(e) Basic Service Agreement due to article 15a Austrian 
Constitution (Grundversorgungsvereinbarung Art. 15a B-VG (Bund – 
Länder))  
These agreements are concluded between the Federal Government 
and states pursuant to Article 15a of the Federal Constitution on joint 
measures for the temporary provision of basic care for foreigners in 
need of assistance and protection (asylum seekers, persons entitled to 
asylum, displaced persons and other persons who cannot be deported 
for legal or factual reasons) in Austria. 
During the procedure, asylum seekers are provided with the most 
basic necessities, including accommodation in decent housing, 
adequate food or board and health insurance. In addition, there are 
special benefits in kind and in cash to obtain necessary clothing (max. 
150€/year/person), to cover costs incurred by school attendance (max. 
200€), reimbursement of travel expenses for cargo and a small pocket 
money of 40€/person/month. In Austria, this right exists from the 
point of submission and not from the moment the application is made, 
although in most cases these moments coincide. The agreement 
regulates the division of competence between the Federal Government 
and the states. The Federal Government is responsible as long as the 
admission procedure is ongoing. Only subsequently, i.e. after 
admission, the responsibility falls to the states. The agreement 
therefore regulates who is in charge of the mentioned services and 
costs.57  
 
(f) Basic Services Act - Federal Government 2005 
(Grundversorgungsgesetz – Bund 2005) 
The Basic Service Act regulates the provision of basic services for 
asylum seekers in the admission procedure and for certain other 
	  
56 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, cit., p. 176. 
57 See N. Kittenberger, Asylrecht kompakt, 2. Edition, LexisNexis, Vienna, 2017. 
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foreigners. Care during the admission procedure is provided in a 
federal care facility. After admission, the responsibility falls to the 
states which provide with their own laws and regulations.58  
Basic care and social benefits after a positive outcome of the 
procedure differ between the states. Basically, all persons entitled to 
asylum are under the protection of the minimum benefit system. 
Nevertheless, further limits may apply and only in Vienna, Salzburg 
and Carinthia applicants receive the full amount.59 With the new 
amendments of the last couple of years the minimum protection for 
persons receiving subsidiary protection is no longer applicable. It was 
lowered step-by-step for those entitled to asylum.60 
 
(g) Integration Act (Integrationsgesetz; IntG) 
This Act contains provisions on the integration of persons legally 
residing in Austria without Austrian citizenship. Nonetheless 
privileged asylum seekers, those with a particularly high chance of 
receiving protection, will have the opportunity to take advantage of 
integration measures or to participate in the integration year since 1 
January 2018. In this case, the requirements are higher and consist of a 
package of measures by the AMS (Public Employment Service 
Austria). Non-participation in such courses may result in a reduction 
of social benefits.61 
The IntG provides German language courses, as well as value- and 
orientation courses for persons entitled to asylum and subsidiary 
protection. Legally settled third-country nationals must enter into an 
integration agreement beforehand.62 
 
(h) Integration Agreement Regulation (Integrationsvereinbarungs-
Verordnung) 
This regulation stipulates who can offer these courses and how the 
quality should be like, regarding the lecturing personnel, quality 




60  See Mindestsicherung neu kostet mehr, nicht weniger, 
<https://www.diepresse.com/5539366/mindestsicherung-neu-kostet-mehr-nicht-
weniger> (02/20).  
61 See N. Kittenberger, Asylrecht kompakt, cit. 
62 See R. Feik, “Fremdenrecht”, cit., p. 190. 
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(i) Settlement and Residence Act (Niederlassungs- und 
Aufenthaltsgesetz; NAG) 
The NAG regulates the granting, refusal and withdrawal of 
residence permits (> 6 months' stay), with the exception of foreigners 
who are privileged to stay under the Asylum Act.63 These residence 
titles are limited in time, differently as provided for in the Asylum Act. 
In contrast to the two titles from the Asylum Act, here a larger number 
of different titles can be found.64 
 
(j) Citizenship Act (Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz) 
The Citizenship Act is subject to changes with the current 
amendments.65 With regard to the right of asylum, asylum seekers 
acquire citizenship after a stay of 10 years. Up to the current 
amendments, this was possible after only 6 years of residence and was 
therefore equal to the other EEA states.  
 
 
3. Short summary of the acts presented so far 
 
• The Asylum Act deals with the recognition of status in general 
and, in addition to this main task, also regulates the procedure; in 
special cases, deportation under asylum law can also occur. 
• The Asylum Act Implementing Regulation is an extension of 
the Asylum Act. 
• The BFA-VG contains procedural provisions of the Federal 
Office for Foreign Affairs and Asylum, which is responsible for asylum 
procedures. These are therefore the procedural provisions for the 
procedure specified in the Asylum Act. Legal protection goes hand in 
hand with procedural regulations and can also be found there. 
• The FPG is in part closely related to asylum law, but 
nevertheless pursues other goal. One of its main aims is to avert 
danger and therefore deportations can take place for more extensive 
reasons than those recognised in asylum law. Nevertheless, the 
	  
63 Ibid., p. 180. 
64  See G. Muzak, “Das Asylrecht und seine Wechselwirkungen mit dem 
Aufenthalts-, Fremdenpolizei- und Grenzkontrollrecht”, cit., p. 33. 
65  See D. Kolonovits, “Neuer Asylgerichtshof in Österreich – 
Verfassungsrechtliche und verfassungspolitische Aspekte der Neuregelung des 
Rechtsschutzes in Asylsachen”, cit., pp. 261-292.  
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prohibition of refoulement must be observed like in all areas of asylum 
law and can be found in the FPG. It also regulates the possibility of a 
detention pending deportation. 
• The burden of care-taking for the applicants during the 
procedure has been divided between the federal and states 
governments as we can see in the Basic Provision Agreement Art. 15a 
B-VG and Basic Provision Act. 
• For a better integration of those entitled to asylum, an 
Integration Act and an Integration Agreement Act have been adopted.  
• If the Asylum Act does not apply, the NAG may become 
relevant. Normally this law is applicable for longer residence permits. 
There are, however, exceptions according to which even in the case of 
negative asylum procedures, a residence title might be granted 
according to the Asylum Act instead of the NAG.  
• Finally, there is a possibility for persons entitled to asylum to 





As already explained, the movement of persons due to reasons of 
(economic) migration and flight from persecution, while conceptually 
distinct, are often difficult to distinguish. Sometimes they even overlap 
and so it becomes very hard to adopt coherent policies in this field. 
Nonetheless, governments, and in particular also the Austrian one, are 
trying hard to achieve this goal. 
As is well-known, the EU introduced in 2009 the so-called “Blue 
Card” scheme, according to which access to the EU labour market is 
opened up to non-EU nationals who hold higher education 
qualifications or at least five years of equivalent professional 
experience and have been offered a contract of employment of at least 
one year’s length by an EU employer.66 
Along these lines, Austria has introduced the “red-white-red”-card 
granting access to highly qualified non-EU nationals (for example “key 
professionals” or also “start-up founders”) for 24 months. They must 
evidence to earn a certain minimum salary, to have a sickness 
	  
66 See D. Chalmers et al., European Union Law, cit., p. 527, referring to Directive 
2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment (2009) OJ L 155/17. 
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insurance and to be granted housing according to the usual local 
conditions. At present, political talks are under way to extent the 
category of eligible candidates in order to comprehend also lesser 





Migration and asylum law provisions closely interact. There is, and 
it is needless to deny it, considerable resistance against further 
immigration in Austria but at the same time there is also the need for 
immigration for economic reasons. Immigration is both seen as a 
threat to the high living standards in this country and as a prerequisite 
to preserve this high standard. Foreigners are both welcome and 
unwelcome and in addition there is also a strong humanitarian 
sentiment in favour of the protection of those in need. And this 
sentiment is well-grounded in specific international obligations. These 
manifold ambitions, aims and sentiments are mirrored in the relevant 
legislation. The lack of coherence in this legislative mass is a direct 
consequence of the contradiction on the factual level. Nonetheless, 
more coherence can at least be reached for. And the same holds true 
for respect of international obligations in this field which at the same 
time, however, are also shaped by the Austrian government. And 
perhaps there are few fields of politics where the sentiments of the 
population are so strong as in that of asylum and migration. 
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1. French Asylum Law System 
 
In France, there are four sources of protection of the right of 
asylum. 
1. The oldest derives from the Geneva Convention of July 28, 
1951. It is the major source of the right of asylum and is generally 
qualified of conventional right of asylum. 
2. Since 1998, the refugee status can also be recognized on the 
basis of the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution 
(to which the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution directly refers), 
which states that “4. Anyone who is persecuted because of his or her 
action for freedom has the right to asylum in the territories of the 
Republic”.  
The hypothesis covered by the preamble is very narrow, so it has 
contributed to relativizing the interest of the constitutional asylum. In 
fact, no application has been made on behalf of the constitutional right 
to asylum since 2009. 
3. Since 2003, a "subsidiary protection" (formerly known as 
territorial asylum) is granted to any persecuted person who does not 
meet the requirements for the refugee status, but faces a risk of being 
persecuted if he or she is returning in his or her country of origin. 
4. Lastly, since the French law n ° 2003-1119 of November 26, 
2003, a “temporary protection” is granted, “in case of a massive influx 
of displaced persons”. This protection is not granted on the basis of an 
individual persecution but in the event of a collective persecution, 
established by a decision of the Council of the European Union. It has 
never been implemented. 
Asylum Law was governed between 1952-2005 by a specific law 
adopted in application of the Geneva Convention. This specificity has 
come to an end. Since 2005, legislative and regulatory sources of 
	  
∗ Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3. 
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asylum law have been fully integrated in the Code on the Entry and 
Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum.  
This codification is beneficial for its intelligibility and access to the 
law; but it maintains a confusion between an administrative policy 
applicable to all foreigners (“the right of entry and stay in France”) 
and the individual right of asylum. 
The French code specifies the grounds for protection by referring 
to the European Directive of December 13, 2011.  
French law has for a long period refused to overcome the 
imprecision of the Geneva Convention and simply stated that refugee 
status must be granted to any person, "who meets the definitions of 
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention.” 
This situation came to an end recently. The Law of 29 July 20151 
breaks with this logic by referring to the European Directive2 for the 
assessment of acts of persecution and grounds for persecution.3 It also 
specifies that “aspects related to sex, gender identity and sexual 
orientation are duly taken into consideration for the purpose of 
recognizing membership of a certain social group”.4  
 
 
2. French Asylum Procedure 
 
The French migration procedure is different if the application is 
requested from abroad, at the border or if the person is already on the 
French territory.  
 
1. From abroad 
In theory, a foreign national can apply for asylum visas to the 
French authorities at his or her place of residence. For this, he or she 
must apply to the French Embassy or the nearest consulate. These 
visas for asylum are very rarely granted and the French State Council 




1 Law 2015-925 on the reform of the right of asylum. 
2 Directive 2011/95 of 13 December 2011. 
3 L711-2§1. 
4 art. L711-2 §2. 
5 CE, ord., 16 oct. 2017, n° 408374, Khodadad. 
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2. At the border 
Foreigners who do not meet the conditions to enter the French 
territory are placed in a waiting zone (for a maximum period of 20 
days). It is possible to apply for an authorization to enter the territory 
in order to apply for asylum. 
The Ministry of the Interior has the authority to take the decision 
to admit or not the applicant to enter the territory, after consulting the 
Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA). 
In case of admission the foreigner has 8 days to file his or her 
application for asylum. 
If the foreigner is not admitted to the territory, he or she must 
return to his or her country of origin or provenance. This referral 
decision may be appealed in front of the administrative tribunal. 
Many asylum seekers reach the French territory by taking flights 
with a stopover in France to other destinations. The French 
government took the decision to introduce airport transit visas, 
making it impossible to stop in France without a visa for the 
nationalities of very unstable countries from which the largest number 
of asylum seekers originate. This has had the effect of reducing or even 
eliminating asylum applications at the border for these nationalities as 
well as increasing the number of illegal immigrants from these 
countries. 
 
3. On the French territory  
If the person is already on the French territory, the application 
must be made within 90 days from arrival at the Prefecture 
(administrative structure which represents the government in French 
regions). 
During the evaluation of this application, the foreigner has in 
principle a right of residence in the French territory. He or she is also 
entitled to the material reception conditions and financial assistance 
provided for in the “reception” Directive 2013/33 / EU of 26 June 
2013. 
The Prefecture decides whether the asylum seeker is placed under 
the Dublin procedure, or if the application will be processed under 
the accelerated or normal procedure.  
a. Under the Dublin procedure, the authorities need to identify the 
State responsible for the examination of the application for 
international protection. The asylum seeker can be placed under house 
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arrest or put in administrative retention, especially in case of 
“significant risk of absconding”. 
b. Under the Priority procedure, a shorter response is requested. 
OFPRA has to take a decision within 15 days, but the examination of 
the situation is more superficial.  
Moreover, the decision of the OFPRA can be challenged before 
the National Court of the right of Asylum (CNDA) but it is a single 
judge who rules on the appeal, which is suspensive. 
The accelerated procedure occurs in different 
circumstances/hypotheses:  
 
- If the application wasn’t made within 90 days of arrival 
- In case of fraudulent application or abuse of the asylum 
procedure  
- If the asylum seeker is under an obligation to leave the 
territory 
- If the applicant constitutes a serious threat to the public order 
- If he requested a reconsideration of his application (2nd 
application) 
- In case of a safe country of origin  
 
NB: the OFPRA now establishes a list of allegedly “safe countries” 
which respect political rights and principles of freedom. The first list 
was enacted in July 2005. Since 2015 it now includes 15 countries.6 
c. Under the normal procedure, the OFPRA is competent to 
decide if the asylum seeker has to be granted refugee status of 
subsidiary protection. The decision is taken after an individual 
interview in the presence of an interpreter and possibly a lawyer. The 
OFPRA has 3 months to rule on the application. 
In case of rejection, an appeal before the CNDA within one month 
is possible.  
In principle, this appeal is suspensive but there are exceptions, 
especially if the asylum seeker has lost the right to stay in the territory 
(and the law of September 10, 2018, added new cases of loss of the 
right to stay in the territory, see infra). 
In case of rejection of the appeal, there is a possibility to refer to 
	  
6 Albania, Armenia, Benin, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cabo Verde, Georgia, Ghana, 
India, Macedonia, Mauritius, Moldavia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Senegal, Serbia, 
Kosovo. 
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the State Council within 2 months (no examination on the merits of 
the application, only right / procedure, non-suspensive appeal). 
It is also possible to submit a request for reconsideration in the 
event of a new fact. 
If the CNDA rejects the request, the prefecture automatically takes 
an order to leave the territory (OQTF). It can be challenged within 15 
days. 
After a negative decision, the alien will have the obligation to leave 
the French territory with or without a period of voluntary departure. 
This measure can be completed by a ban on return to the French 
territory which means a deportation to the border. If the Prefet 
decides that the foreigner represent a threat to the public order, he or 
she will be expelled immediately.  
 
 
3. French Asylum Reforms 
 
1. The first one derives from the law n°2018-187 of March 20, 
2018, enabling the appropriate application of the European asylum 
system. 
This law was adopted to counter the effects of a jurisprudence of 
the Court of Cassation. The latter had in fact ruled, in a judgment of 
27 September 20177 repeating the ECJ Al Chodor decision,8 that the 
detention of “Dublin” persons was not possible, in the absence of a 
definition by law of the “risk of significant absconding/leakage” of the 
asylum seekers concerned. 
The French Council of State followed this reasoning,9 that’s why 
the Parliament modified article L. 551-1 of the CESEDA in order to 
specify the cases in which a significant risk of leakage should be, 
except in special circumstances, regarded as established. 
The law defines a presumed “risk of leakage”, through twelve 
extremely broad situations, allowing people, including children, to be 
held in detention almost systematically. A red line is crossed: it allows 
for the first time to lock up people even before a decision of expulsion 
	  
7 Pourvoi n° 17-15.160, arrêt n° 1130. 
8 CJUE, 15 mars 2017, 518/15. 
9 EC, 5 March 2018, La Cimade, n ° 405474, to the conclusions of Aurélie 
Bretonneau. 
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has been issued. It also reduced the time limit for challenging these 
decisions by fifteen to seven days. 
The constitutional council declared this law was in conformity 
with the constitution.10 
2. The second law, which also was highly controversial, is the law 
No. 2018-778 of September 10, 2018, for controlled immigration, 
effective right of asylum and successful integration. 
One of the goals of this law was to reduce the average processing 
time for asylum applications from eleven to six months. To reach it, 
the text reduces various delays in the administrative procedure (for 
instance, as I said, the asylum seeker now has to file his application 
within 90 days – instead of 120 days – otherwise his application will be 
processed under the accelerated procedure). 
Other measures concern the procedure. The language of exchange 
can be chosen by the administration and the notification of the 
decisions can be made on any support including by sms or by email. 
Moreover, the video-hearing becomes the principle without the 
possibility for the applicants to oppose it. 
The law also provides for a distribution of asylum seekers in the 
regions. Asylum seekers are no longer free to set their homes or move 
without the permission of the Office of Immigration and Integration 
(OFII). In the event of failure to comply with this obligation, the 
material reception conditions are automatically interrupted and the 
investigation of the asylum application may be terminated. 
The law also allows the administration to refuse refugee status or 
to terminate it in case of convictions for serious crimes in another EU 
country.  
It also makes it possible to place under house arrest or to detain 
asylum seekers who pose a threat to the public order. 
It reinforces the sanction for the refusal of fingerprinting and 
photography, already punishable by imprisonment and fine, by 
allowing the criminal judge to impose a prohibition of the territory up 
to three years. 
The offense of solidarity remains with some adjustments to take 
into account the decision of the Constitutional Council of July 6, 2018, 
which elevates the fraternity to the rank of constitutional value. The 
exemption from prosecution was already provided for in cases of 
relationship or marital relationship. Nor was there any prosecution 
	  
10 Décision n° 2018-762 DC du 15 mars 2018. 
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where the act of solidarity (legal advice, catering, accommodation or 
medical care) “did not give rise to any direct or indirect 
compensation.” The new text extends the exemption to traffic aid 
(transportation of illegal aliens by volunteers and associations). 
Some progress nevertheless exist in the new legislation. First, 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (a supplementary protection to 
refugee status which represents 42% of OFPRA and CNDA 
agreement decisions in 2017) and stateless persons are granted a four-
year multi-year residence permit and no longer a title of one year 
renewable for periods of two years. 
Second, unaccompanied minor children who had been granted 
protection could already apply for “family reunification” by bringing 
their parents. The law extends this possibility to brothers and sisters. 
In 2017, 381 unaccompanied minors were granted protection. 
Finally, since 10 September 2018, minors living in France with 
parents who have obtained refugee status, will automatically be 




MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICY SYSTEM:  
THE CASE OF REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA 
 







The EU integration process is a clear and unambiguous strategic 
interest and priority for North Macedonia. One of the basic requirements 
for the integration is the harmonization of the national legislation with 
the EU legislation. In 2015 and 2016 North Macedonia was witnessing 
the largest migrant crisis1 which shook the already fragile legal and 
political system2 and put the State on test for respecting the rule of law, 
human rights, international conventions, the principles of humanity and 
solidarity. At that time, North Macedonia’s migration and asylum policy 
similarly to the EU’s policy on migration and asylum, lacked solidarity 
and consistency to deal with the migration influx.3 The legislation 
concerning asylum policy was amended consequently to the increase of 
the number of migrants. In fact, the solutions reached at that time 
seemed not to be so appropriate, however bearing in mind the urgency 
of the crisis situation that the country coped with, that legislative 
solution was thought to be the most suitable to solve the migration 
challenge at least temporarily. Following the crisis, the Law on asylum 
	  
* University Goce Delcev – Stip. 
** University Goce Delcev – Stip.  
1 Until September 2016, more than 800,000 transited through Macedonia, which 
is almost half of the country’s population. Actually, the total population of the country 
according to the last census from 2001 amounts to 2.022.547 citizens (State Statistical 
Office 2019). 
2 See RadioFreeEurope RadioLibrery, <https://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-crisis-in-
macedonia-leads-to-violent-protests/27675969.html> [08/2019]. 
3  See Asylum in Europe, <http://www.asylumineurope.org/annual-report-
20142015#sthash.ejTDhelJ.dpuf> (09/2019): Annual Asylum Information Database 
Report 2014/2015: Common asylum system at a turning point: Refugees caught in 
Europe’s solidarity crisis. The report covers research for 18 countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and 
Turkey. 
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and temporary protection4 was amended a couple of times. This was due 
to the many gaps that turned out to be a ground for opening numerous 
questions related to the right of asylum and proper protection. Since the 
Law was supposed to be in line with the European acquis in matter of 
migration and asylum, because of the country’s European integration 
process, North Macedonia opted for passing a new Law for international 
and temporary protection that came in force in the first quarter of 20185, 
replacing the Law on asylum and temporary protection. In parallel a 
new Law for foreigners6 came into effect in June 2018 and replaced the 
old one. Therefore, some of the aspects of this work are to evaluate the 
key features of the Macedonian asylum system and their conformity 
with international standards and to point out the ongoing changes in the 




2. Start at the beginning 
 
Migrant crisis is not news to North Macedonia. In the last 25 years, 
the country has coped five times with a refugee crisis. Hence, in 1991 
when, following the events in the Republic of Albania,7 1,180 persons 
from the border regions towards the Republic of North Macedonia 
sought and received protection in the regions of Prespa-Oteshevo, 
Struga and Ohrid. During 1992, the country offered protection to 35,000 
people fleeing from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina whereby 
refugees were accommodated in seven collective centers throughout the 
country. These persons were under the protection of State until 1997.8 In 
	  
4 Amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, published in the 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 49/2003, 66/2007, 142/2008, 
146/2009, 166/2012, 101/2015, 152/2015, 55/2016 и 71/2016. 
5 Law for International and temporary protection, Official Gazette No.64/2018. 
6 Law for Foreigners, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia no. 97/2018 
and “Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia” no. 108/2019. 
7 See New Protests in Albania; Crisis Mounts, by <David Binder, Special To the 
New York Times>, (02/1991), Section A, Page 3, New York Times 
<https://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/22/world/new-protests-in-albania-crisis-
mounts.html> (09/2019). 
8 See J. Kekenovski, “Republic of Macedonia and refugee crisis - between the 
hammer and the anvil”, Horizonti, 2017, available at 
<https://www.uklo.edu.mk/filemanager/HORIZONTI%202017/H-
orizonti%20serija%20A%-
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the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis in the spring of 1999, 360,000 people 
– mainly ethnic Albanians – sought and received international 
protection in Macedonia. After the Government Act on Providing 
Temporary Humanitarian Protection, 126,000 persons were placed in 
eight collective centers,9 built for that purpose on the territory of the 
Republic of Macedonia, and 234,000 persons were accommodated in 
family homes of citizens throughout the country.10 During the escalation 
of the internal state crisis in North Macedonia during 2001, as a result of 
the armed violence, 86,954 internally displaced persons were registered, 
and according to the UNHCR data about 20,000 people left the Republic 
of North Macedonia and headed for Kosovo.11   
Lastly, the country coped with un unprecedented migration crisis in 
2015, over 850.000 as observed by local NGOs (Legis, 2005), most of 
them coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Starting from June 19th, 
2015 at 00:00 hours, the first day after the Law for asylum and 
temporary protection was amended)12 until March 7th, 2016 at 24:00 
hours, the day of closing the so called ‘Balkan route”, the total number 
of migrants that were registered on Macedonia’s border according to the 
relevant domestic laws was 477.876,13 which did not correspond to the 
observed number of migrants that have transited through the country’s 
territory.14 On one hand, this gap was generally due to the big number of 
daily entrances in the country that varied from 5.000 up to 15.000 
entries per day, and on the other hand because of the poor capacity of 
the State in terms of technical and human resources, in order to answer 





9 With 91,476 persons accomodated, Stenkovec was the largest collective center. 
Temporary humanitarian protection for refugees from Kosovo lasted until September 
22, 2003, although by the end of 2000 the number of refugees was reduced to 5,416. 
10  B. Markovski, Evropksata begalska kriza – predizvik od globalni razmeri 
[European refugee crisis – a challenge with global proportion], available at 
<http://respublica.edu.mk/blog/2016-02-25-10-02-17> (09/2019). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Amendments of the LATP see Official Gazette No. 152/2015. 
13  Parlamentaren Institut, Sobranie na Republika Makedonija, Efektite od 
Migrantskata kriza vo zemjite od Jugoistocna Evropa – Studija [The effects of the 
Migrant crisis in the countries of Southeast Europe – A Study], Skopje, July 2016, p. 
24. 
14 Parlamentaren Institut, cit., p. 24. 
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have been in a much smaller number if it wasn’t for the help offered by 
the local and international non-governmental organizations that they 
offered in the transit camps near the border.15 
In this context, the table given bellow gives an illustration about the 
different migrant nationalities that were officially registered by the state 




Number of officially registered migrants that transited trough North 
Macedonia on the Balkan route (2015 and 2016) according to the state 
of origin  
 
Year  2015 2016 Total  
Syria  216,157 44,734 260,891 
Afghanistan 95,691 26,546 122.237 
Iraq 54.944 18,337 73,281 
Iran 6,231 N/A 6,231 
Pakistan  5,416  5,416 
Palestine  2,158  2,158 
Somalia  1,276  1,276 
Bangladesh  1,253  1,253 
Morocco 1,317  1,317 
Congo  514  514 
Alger  453  453 
Laban  434  434 
Nigeria  279  279 
Other  2,110 6 2,116 
Total  388,233 89,623 477,856 
 
Source: Institute of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia  
[Parlamentaren Institut na Republika Makedonija], 2016  
 
	  
15 Z. Drangovski, Analytical report Lessons learned from the 2015-2016 migration 
situation in the Western Balkan region, Prague Process: Dialogue, Analyses and 
Training in Action Initiative, International Center for Migration Policy Development, 
2019, <https://www.pragueprocess.eu/en/migration-observatory/publications/d-
ocument?id=180> (09/2019). 
16 Parlamentaren Institut, cit., p. 26. 
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North Macedonia was not a priority country for the asylum 
seekers,17 neither it was the country of last resort. Studies have shown 
that if the asylum seekers were to stay in this region they would choose 
Serbia or Greece, because from Serbia they are closer to the EU, and 
being in Greece is better because they have access to European funds 
and possible relocation schemes.18 This brings to the conclusion that the 
migrant influx was of a transitory character for Macedonia. This 
observation is also confirmed by the low number of asylum requests 
registered in the country (Amet, 2018:140). However, despite its 
transitory character the migration flow had repercussions upon the 




3. Macedonian asylum policy and its shortcomings 
 
3.1. Existing legislation in the time of the migrant crisis 2015 – 2018 
 
According to Stojanoski, T.,20 the migrant crisis can be divided into 
three periods in base of the intensity of the migrant influx and the type 
of entry.21 The first period is the period of illegal entry until the 
	  
17 S. Amet, Help on the route, Annual report for 2018, The rights of refugees, 
migrants and asylum seekers in the Republic of Macedonia, Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia, 2018, <https://mhc.org.mk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Help-On-Route-ANG-2018-final.pdf> (19/2019). 
18 See E. Brmbevska, Help on the route” Yearly report 2017 – Right of migrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers in Macedonia, Helsinki Committee, Skopje, 2017 available 
at <https://mhc.org.mk/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/Help_On_Route_-
_MK__3_.pdf> (09/2019)]. 
19 B. Weber, Time for a Plan B: The European Refugee Crisis, the Balkan Route 
and the EU – Turkey Deal, A DPC Policy Paper, Berlin: Democratization Policy 
Council, 2016. 
20 T. Stojanovski, Prava na begalcite, migrantite I baratelite na azil vo Republika 
Makedonija [The rights of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers in Republic of 
Macedonia], Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia, 
2016 available at <https://nkeu.mk/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Izvestaj_Trpe-Stoja-
novski.pdf > (09/2019)]. (hereafter T. Stojanovski, Prava na begalcite, migrantite I 
baratelite na azil vo Republika Makedonija). 
21  Also B. Beznec, M.Speer, M. S. Mitrović, Governing the Balkan route: 
Macedonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime, Research Paper Series of Rosa 
Luxemburg, Stiftung Southeast Europe n. 5, 2016, <https://bordermonitoring.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/5-Governing-the-Balkan-Route-web.pdf> (09/2019) (here-
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amendments of the legislation in June 2015; the second period of 
legislative amendments and formalization of the corridor – introducing 
the 72 hours rule (from June 2015 until March 2016) and the period of 
closure of the Balkan route and the return to illegality (from March 2016 
– ongoing).  
The first period is the period when North Macedonia was in the 
center of the attention of the international public for the detained 1003 
migrants at Gazi Baba ‘Reception Centre for Foreigners’ from January 1st, 
until June 15th, 2015.22 These cases of arbitrary detention refer to those 
migrants and refugees that were ‘detained’ together with their smugglers 
in order to serve as witnesses in the subsequent criminal proceedings of 
their smugglers.23 This practice was contrary to the Law on asylum and 
temporary protection (LATP) and the Criminal Procedure Code, 24 
(hereafter CPC), because it resulted in deprivation of liberty of the 
migrants for the entire criminal process that could last three months or 
even longer. The UNHCR,25 Human Rights Watch (HRW),26 Amnesty 
	  
after B. Beznec et.al., Governing the Balkan route: Macedonia, Serbia and the European 
Border Regime). 
22 See C. Veigel, O. Koshevaliska, B. Tushevska, A. Nikodinovska Krstevska. 
“The ‘Gazi Baba’ Reception Center for Foreigners in Macedonia: migrants caught at 
the crossroad between hypocrisy and complying with the rule of law”, The 
International Journal of Human Rights, 21, 2, 2016, p.103-119.   
23  The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a Country of Asylum: 
Observations on the Situation of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 2015. The UNHCR – the UN Refugee Agency, p. 10. 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/55c9c70e4.html> (09/2019). 
24 Criminal Procedure Code, published in the Official gazette No. 150 on 18 
November 2010, entered into force on 01.12.2013. 
25  The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a Country of Asylum: 
Observations on the Situation of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 2015. The UNHCR – the UN Refugee Agency, p. 3. < 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/55c9c70e4.html> (09/2019). 
26 Human Rights Watch, As Though We Are Not Human Beings: Police Brutality 
against Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Macedonia, September 2015, p. 47. Available 
from Human Rights Watch. The Macedonian Ministry of Interior has urged HRW to 
file a detailed report with the police so that the alleged reports of abuses could be 
investigated, raising questions as to whether the accusations would be treated as 
biased and unserious, see <http://english.republika.mk/interior-ministry-asks-human-
rights-watch-for-help-in-dealing-with-allegations-raised-by-their-refugees-report/> 
(08/2018). Meanwhile, Macedonia’s Sector on Internal Control and Professional 
Standards issued disciplinary sanctions against five police officers at Gazi Baba, 
including the discharge of one, and, despite statements by Macedonia’s government to 
the contrary, there is evidence that Gazi Baba remains operational. Human Rights 
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International27 and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the 
Republic of North Macedonia have issued reports detailing the 
‘conditions of’ and the ‘reasons for’ the detention at Gazi Baba. In 
general, the reports suggest that the refugees and migrants at Gazi Baba 
were arbitrarily detained and subjected to degrading treatment. 
Despite these indictments, the Macedonian government claimed it 
was merely ‘accommodating’ the refugees and migrants in accordance 
with Macedonia’s Law of Foreigners and the Reception Centre’s 
Rulebook for House Order and that it had fully comply with its 
obligations under international and domestic law.28 Concerning this it 
can be assumed that relevant Macedonian domestic laws were in 
compliance with international and regional human rights laws and 
obligations, however they were applied arbitrarily. According to the 
domestic legislation at that time anyone who is deprived of his liberty 
by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a 
court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness 
of his detention and order his release if the detention is unlawful. Under 
very narrow circumstances witnesses can be deprived of their liberty 
under CPC.29 As a part of its investigative power, the public prosecutor 
may summon persons who may provide evidence in connection with a 
criminal investigation.30 It is important to note that imprisonment here 
refers to incarceration in a Macedonian prison, not “accommodation” in 
a “Reception Centre for Foreigners”, and that victims who act as 
	  
Watch (2015), p. 66; See also the press statement of I. Kotevski, Public Relations for 
the Macedonian Ministry of Interior Affairs, 
<http://alsat.mk/News/211854/disciplinski-vo-mvr-protiv-nasilstvoto-vrz-begalci last 
access on 13.11.2015> (08/2019); Interview with Mersiha Smailovic, Lawyer and 
General Secretary for LEGIS, on October, 2015. LEGIS is a non-governmental 
organization located in Skopje, Macedonia, <http://www.legis.mk/what-we-are/> 
(08/2019). 
27 Europe’s Borderlands Violations against Refugees and Migrants in Macedonia, 
Serbia and Hungary, Amnesty International, July 2015, p. 6. Available from Amnesty 
International; Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia 
(MHC), Submission to United Nations Committee Against Torture, 54th session in 
Geneva, 20 April to 15 May 2015. Submitted: 6 April 2015. 
28 Human Rights Watch (2015), cit., p. 46. 
29  Macedonia Code of Criminal Procedure, Official Gazette No. 150/2010, 
unofficial translation. Available from 
<https://www.unodc.org/cld/document/mkd/1997/criminal_procedure_code_of_the
_republic_of_macedonia_as_of_2010.html> (09/2019) (hereafter CPC).  
30 CPC, at Article 285 ph.1. 
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witnesses are subject to witness protection procedures, not incarceration 
or detention.31 Under the CPC, witnesses are to be protected and treated 
with dignity and respect, not detention under the conditions found at 
Gazi Baba. Additionally, it is unlikely that the testimony of the 
witnesses could have been used at all given that their testimony was 
conditioned by force and threats.  
The so called “immigration custody” continue to be a practice 
among the authorities in the next several years and to this very day,32 
even though there is no legal ground for deprivation of liberty to be a 
witness in a criminal procedure.33  
With the amendments of the LATP on June the 16th 2015 starts the 
second period characterized by the legalization of transit through 
Macedonia, allowing migrants to register an intention to apply for 
asylum on the border points and to get a 72-hour travel permit for legal 
transit throughout the country.34 Additionally, with this travel permit, 
migrants could legally use public or private transport and housing, and 
get free medical aid in state facilities.35  With the amendment, the 
number of detainees in Gazi Baba decreased, probably because 
newcomers could legally travel through the country. Also, the Ministry 
	  
31 CPC, at Articles 226-232; See also Law for the Protection of Witnesses (Official 
Gazette No. 38/2005 and 58/2005). See N. Matovski, G. Buzarovska-Lazetik, G. 
Kalajdziev, Criminal procedure law, Faculty of Law, Skopje, 2011, p.194-205, G. 
Buzarovska-Lazetik, G., Kaladziev, B. Misoski, D. Ilik, Criminal procedure law, 
Faculty of Law, Skopje, 2015, p. 144-146. 
32 See Report on Immigration custody in North Macedonia for January to September 
2019, MYLA and UNHCR, and see Ombudsman of North Macedonia, Special report 
on the conditions of the Shelter Centers for accommodation and detention on migrants 
and refugees, available at <http://ombud-
sman.mk/upload/NPMdokumenti/Izvestai/Poseben%20izvestaj-januari-
avgust%202019.pdf> (09/2019). 
33 See Yearly Report on the efficiency of the protection on human rights in North 






34 Article 16 of the Amended LATP, Official Gazette No.152/2015. 
35 Before legalizing the transit of migrants, humanitarian medical assistance was 
offered by local NGO’s. However, it was hard to deliver due to the irregular and 
hidden nature of the transit through the country, in particular in the first half of 2015, 
Legis, 2015 Annual Report Legis, Skopje, 2016. 
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of Interior and the Public Prosecution Office have also speeded their 
processing of refugees held in detention in order to serve as witnesses in 
criminal cases, as a result of which almost all asylum-seekers held in 
detention (some 350 individuals as of June 2015) have been referred to 
the open Vizbegovo RC.36  
In accordance with the previous LATP, in force in that time, 
asylum-seekers could register an intention to apply for asylum at the 
border entry points, in which case the asylum-seeker is provided with a 
travel permit valid for 72 hours, for the purpose of travelling to a police 
station to formally register the asylum claim.37 If already inside the 
country, the asylum-seeker must register his or her asylum application at 
the nearest police station. These amendments formalized in a way the 
transit through the country, allowing migrants to gain access to two 
transit centers situated on the south and north border of the country 
(Vinojug and Tabanovce). Here migrants were registered and they 
received different kind of assistance and medical help. In this period 
477,876 migrants were registered at the border points or in transit 
centres. But still, the massive influx and the high number of daily 
arrivals that varied from 5000 to 10000 people,38 brought the country to 
declare the state of emergency on 21 August 2015 39  and close 
temporarily its southern border. The closure of the border left stranded 
almost 4000 migrants on the Greek side that resulted in violent clashes 
between migrants and police. Three days later Macedonian authorities 
reconsidered opening the border again.40  
With the state of emergency, the Army of the Republic took control 
over the management of the borders and the Center for Crisis 
Management (a special government body), was appointed to manage the 
	  
36 See UNHCR Observations: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a 
Country of Asylum, UNHCR, the Un Asylum Agency, August, 2015, p.16. UNHCR 
continues to advocate with the authorities for the Criminal Code to be amended in 
order to ensure that asylum-seekers are not detained if summoned to act as witnesses 
in court cases. 
37  Article 16 from the Amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary 
Protection, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 
101/15; 
38 Z. Drangovski, Analytical report Lessons learned from the 2015-2016 migration 
situation in the Western Balkan region, cit., p.5. 
39 S. Senada, S. Sabić, S. Borić, At the Gate of Europe: A Report on Refugees on 
the Western Balkan Route, Fridrich Ebert Stiftug, Zagreb, 2016, p. 6. 
40 B. Beznec, M. Speer, M. S. Mitrović, Governing the Balkan route: Macedonia, 
Serbia and the European Border Regime, cit., p.19. 
OLGA KOSHEVALISKA - ANA NIKODINOVSKA KRSTEVSKA 
	  
118 
crisis. Not only that, but the country raised a wired fence along the 
border with Greece on which, the state authorities together with foreign 
police officers (mostly from the Visegràd countries but also other 
states), conduct border control activities in order to prevent smuggling 
of migrants.41 In the meantime the Western Balkan states and the leaders 
of the EU in November 2015 held a meeting where they drafted a 17-
point Action Plan, after which the country introduced restrictive 
admission policy for migrants. In base of that only Syrian, Iraqi and 
Afghan migrants were permitted to enter the border, whilst migrants 
coming from other countries were denied entrance. Soon these 
restrictive measures were extended also to migrants coming from 
Afghanistan.42  
Finally, the third period was characterized with the closing of the 
Balkan route and return to illegality. The agreement between the EU and 
Turkey which foresaw a special arrangement for tackling the crisis, 
affected also North Macedonia, and consequently the country closed its 
borders on March 8, 2016. The same day of the closure of the border, 
the Government abolished the 72-hour rule for transiting the country 
and started to apply the previous provisions that did not allow free 
movement of migrants through the country at all, except in case of 
application for asylum. In addition, it introduced the new safe third 
country clause whereby all neighbouring countries were to be 
considered as safe countries.43 In base of this clause and in base of the 
readmission agreements that the country has signed with neighbouring 
states, North Macedonia could legally proceed towards deportation of 
migrants to the country of their first entry. 44  Besides the regular 
deportation of migrants which was practiced by the authorities, non-
governmental organizations have observed that also illegal push-backs 
were taking place.45 However, in spite of these restrictions migrants 
continued to illegally cross the border, turning to smugglers and 
traffickers in order to follow their journey to the EU.  
	  
41 T. Stojanovski, Prava na begalcite, migrantite I baratelite na azil vo Republika 
Makedonija, cit., p. 5-6. 
42 Annual Report of Legis 2016, cit., p. 6-8. 
43 This was introduced in article 10-1 that foresees that states coming from the 
EU, EFTA and NATO were to be considered as safe countries. 
44 B. Beznec, M.Speer, M. S. Mitrović, Governing the Balkan route: Macedonia, 
Serbia and the European Border Regime, cit., p. 24. 
45 Annual Report of Legis 2016, cit. p. 24-6; Annual Report of Legis, 2018, cit., p. 
15-17. 
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3.2.The renewed legislation for asylum – 2018 and ongoing  
 
The EU integration process is a clear and unambiguous strategic 
interest and priority for Macedonia. One of the basic requirements for 
the integration is the harmonization of the national legislation with the 
EU legislation. Since the national legislation concerning asylum 
reported to have many gaps for which it failed to meet the challenges 
from the migration crisis, the latter needed to be changed. Therefore, a 
new Law for International and Temporary protection was passed in 
April 2018 (hereafter LITP).46 This Law is a successor of the Law for 
asylum and temporary protection. The first purpose of this law was to 
harmonize the Macedonian legislative with the relevant EU concerning 
asylum and temporary protection. This law is in full consistency with 
several Directives of the EU Parliament and the Council: 
1. The Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted;  
2. The Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection; 
3. The Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of 
applicants for international protection;  
4. Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum 
standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx 
of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the 
consequences thereof. 
The LITP regulates the terms and the procedure for obtaining the 
right to international protection (right of asylum), as well as cessation, 
abolishment and annulment of the right of asylum of a foreign national 
or a stateless person (foreign national), as well as the rights and duties of 
asylum seekers and persons to whom the right of asylum has been 
recognized in the Republic of North Macedonia. This Law also 
regulates the conditions under which the country may give temporary 
	  
46 Law for International and temporary protection, Official Gazette No. 64/2018. 
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protection, as well as the rights and duties of persons under temporary 
protection. 
The LITP overcomes the concerns that have risen from its 
predecessor as a result of the disputed legal solutions concerning the 
right of family reunion and the access to efficient asylum procedure. For 
the first time, the law encompasses and recognizes “sexual orientation”, 
as the basis for persecution and for seeking asylum in Macedonia. 
Namely, in Article 7, paragraph 5 of the new law,47 for the first time, 
sexual orientation and gender identity have been indicated as 
characteristics of a particular social group that could face persecution 
and would have the possibility to seek international protection. In the 
same paragraph, it is noted that sexual orientation is not considered a 
punishable offense and that gender and gender identity will be taken 
into account when determining the belonging to a particular social 
group. Bearing in mind that very few laws in Macedonian legislation 
explicitly mention sexual orientation and gender identity as grounds for 
protection, the introduction of this change in the law can be considered a 
major step. 
However, the NGO’s,48 the civil society and relevant institutions,49 
turn the red alert about one of the major changes introduced by the new 
law, and that is the possibility of restricting the freedom of movement of 
asylum seekers. According to the new measure, asylum seekers in the 
Republic of North Macedonia who are currently undergoing through the 
asylum procedure, in certain cases provided by law, may be restricted 
by a decision of the Ministry of Interior. Namely, Article 63 stipulates 
that, in exceptional cases, “the freedom of movement may be restricted 
in order to establish the identity and citizenship, to establish the facts 
and circumstances of the asylum application, especially if it is 
	  
47 In accordance with the Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-
country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for 
the content of the protection granted, available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32011L0095> (09/2019). 
48  See Commentary of the Young Lawyer Association on the new Law for 
international and temporary protection, MYLA, 2019, available at <www.myla.org.mk> 
(09/2019). 
49 See UNHCR, Commentary on the LITP of North Macedonia, available at: 
<https://www.refworld.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf? 
reldoc=y&docid=5b066b354> (02/2019). 
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established that there is a flight risk, for protection of the public order 
and national security, or when a foreigner is detained in order to prepare 
for a return or removal procedure.” The exceptional cases of restriction 
on freedom of movement defined in such a way may lead to arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty in several respects, particularly when considering 
the assessment of the flight risk as a condition for restricting freedom of 
movement. Considering the larger wave of refugees in the past three 
years, the use of the possibility of restricting the freedom of movement 
of asylum seekers can cause significant burdens on the state in terms of 
the capacities of the reception centers for asylum seekers and foreigners. 
This would lead to a greater and more serious violation of their 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, especially the absolute 
prohibition of torture, depriving and degrading treatment, which, as 
demonstrated by the experience, is not inevitable. Moreover, the Law 
provides for the initial possibility of limiting freedom for a maximum of 
three months, with the possibility of extension for another three 
months.50 In addition, the procedure for detaining an asylum seeker is 
unspecific and problematic, especially considering that the decision is 
not passed by a competent court, but by the Ministry of Interior, thus 
challenging the constitutionality of this law. 
Although this new legal possibility is in line with European law, 
especially the Directive 2013/33/EU, still there are no guarantees for the 
rights of asylum seekers in these cases as regards the duration and 
conditions of restriction of freedom of movement, especially in cases 
regarding children, families and women asylum seekers. The Helsinki 
Committee in North Macedonia also stresses that there are few 
terminological misunderstandings, probably due to bad translation, but 
these misunderstandings could generate future problems and leave space 





The conclusions that can be drawn from this paper is that 
Macedonia’s asylum and migration policy system demonstrated that it 
	  
50 Articles 64 and 65 of the LITP. 
51  See Opinion of the Helsinki Committee on the Law for international and 
temporary protection, available at  <https://meta.mk/helsinshki-komitet-noviot-zakon-
za-azil-ima-nedostatotsi-vo-primenata-na-eu-direktivite/> (09/2019). 
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has loopholes and shortcomings which have emerged throughout the 
various refugee crisis that have stroke the country over the years. The 
migration crisis from 2015/2016 revealed that the country was not in the 
position to cope with such an outnumbered migration influx and that it 
had to proceed towards adopting legislative changes. This has proven to 
be quite a difficult task. However, having in mind that the country is in 
the process of European integration, steadily the country had 
strengthened its asylum system and it harmonized the national 
legislation with the EU acquis but also with international standards in 
matter of asylum and migration. However, North Macedonia still has 
not proceeded towards ensuring that asylum-seekers have access to a 
fair and efficient asylum procedure. This is reflected, amongst others, by 
the fact that the North Macedonia has not yet put in place sensitive 
screening mechanisms at the border in order to identify those who may 
need protection and to refer the individuals concerned to appropriate 
procedures. But still, this shortcoming represents an issue that should be 
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Coming from the University of a country which is in the 
geometrical centre of the Mediterranean, the southernmost and 
smallest sovereign state of the European Union, the problem of 
migration, mostly irregular, has exhibited certain traits ever since it 
started constituting a problem for the Maltese Islands since 20021. 
First of all, for Malta, but also for Italy, the problem of irregular 
migration equals Libya. A quick look at the map of the Mediterranean 
shows that the closest route to reach Lampedusa, Malta and Sicily is to 
depart from two Libyan ports one on each side of Tripoli: Zitana and 
Zouara; a veritable suq market of illegal migration exists; prices vary 
according to the weather, chance of success, availability of sea vessels, 
and other general circumstances. This is indeed an irregular business 
netting an average of $500 per person carried, a real business of 
human trafficking for migration purposes. The Libyan authorities  pre- 
and post – revolution  have always taken the stand that once a migrant 
leaves Libya’s shores it is not Libya’s responsibility any more – even 
because all migrants leaving Libyan shores are not Libyans but mostly 
nationals of sub-Saharan countries. For the Libyan authorities 
migrants leaving Libya are a problem less. The only time they really 
tried to control the problem – a proof therefore that this is possible – 
was when the Italian Government of Berlusconi signed the multi-
billion euro treaty and deal with the Gaddafi Government in 
Benghazi. Immediately from thousands of arrivals, the numbers were 
reduced to a few hundreds. Proof that the problem can be controlled. 
I am stating these facts from a vantage point; since I am an 
academician but also was Minister responsible for amongst other 
things Migration between 1998-2008. One of the utopian dreams 
which every now and then features in the conclusions of the European 
Council or European Institutions, is the call for he setting up of an 
asylum centre in Libya which would sift asylum applications and then 
	  
* University of Malta. 
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the selected few will be granted access to Europe without the need of 
crossing  the Central Mediterranean sea in unseaworthy vessels. 
Sounds nice; but the proposal is a non-starter, and has been 
proven to be so. What interest can Libya have in creating an attractive 
catchment area within its own territory, constituting a veritable Gate 
to Europe! This would attract hundreds of thousands of migrants and 
refugees from its Southern borders. Libya has not signed or ratified 
the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951. Why should it? It would 
then become a country of first asylum and would have no reason or 
justification to expel or allow migrants to proceed North once they 
acquire a protected status in Libya. Besides, even if the utopian idea of 
a European Centre for Asylum in Libya were to be set up, there would 
be still nothing to stop rejected asylums seekers from seeking to reach 
European Shores. I would like to apologize for sounding so pessimistic 
this morning but it is a sheer waste of time to continue considering this 
proposal.  
So what other alternatives are there? In recent times both Italy and 
Malta have refused to be the frontier guards of Europe absorbing 
migrants, shackled by a Dublin Convention which sends back 
migrants to the first country of asylum where they landed. For what 
incentive do the southern Mediterranean states have in controlling the 
migration problem when the latter is treated as an Italian or Maltese 
problem rather than a European one? 
Burden-sharing for a long time was rejected by most EU member 
states. The reasons for so doing are interesting. One country stated 
that it has no experience of the migration problem. Others submitted 
that were a burden sharing agreement to be established, this would 
attract even more migrants to Europe. All pretexts to justify doing 
nothing. When the littoral states of the South could take it no longer 
and the problems started spreading throughout Europe particularly in 
the North, all of a sudden one discovered the utility of sharing the 
burden. But even the modest, attempts at distributing migrants 
landing in the South have either have met stiff resistance form Eastern 
European states, or else depend on ad hoc arrangements each time a 
rescue ship is not allowed to enter EU territorial waters . 
The meeting which will take place in Malta led by Germany 
France and Italy may led to a more permanent structure of migrants’ 
distribution.  
I must state that I am against this hard-line approach. But I 
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understand it. The populist but convincing argument that while Dutch 
and German – registered ships save migrants at sea, then they shift 
responsibility to receive them to the littoral states, is not only populist. 
What purpose is there for the Southern EU states to participate in 
rescue missions to aggravate their own problem once there is no 
burden sharing arrangement beforehand?  
The problem is further aggravated by the question of repatriation 
of rejected asylum seekers. The populist argument is: send them back! 
But how do you send back people arriving at sea in rickety 
unseaworthy sea vessels! Do you send them back at sea, risking their 
lives? Repatriation is rendered very difficult because of the blatant 
non-co operation of the countries of origin. Even repatriation to 
moderate states such as Morocco or Algeria sometimes presents 
difficulties. You can imagine the resistance when it comes to Sudan, 
Ethiopia or Eritrea. The problem is not the lack of provision of aircraft 
but the lack of travel documents to send back rejected asylum seekers, 
and non-co operation of states of origin. Coupled with the non-
cooperation of Libya as a state of transit, the problem becomes serious 
and apparently insurmountable.  
A solution could be that when the EU signs co-operation 
agreements regarding development (not humanitarian) it could attach 
a condition to the effect that the country receiving development aid, 
must accept back its own nationals on the basis of a travel document 
issued by the EU which will be accepted by such country. This 
principle is after all enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement signed in 
2000 between EU and ACP  amongst others which states in article 
13(5) that: 
 
The Parties agree that: each of the ACP States shall accept the return of 
and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the 
territory of a Member State of the European Union, at that Member State’s 
request and without further formalities. 
 
The Member States and the ACP States will provide their nationals 
with appropriate identity documents for such purposes 
Pacta sunt servanda. If they receive money for development 
purposes, there is a price to pay. As to humanitarian aid, this should 
not have any conditions attached to it.  
I pass on now to examine the situation of asylum policy today in 
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the EU as described in the 2018 EASO report. By the way the Asylum 
Support Office was established in Valletta in 2009 and amongst its 
functions there is that of assisting member states in managing asylum 
polices.  
On 4 May 2016, the Commission presented a first package of 
reform proposals, including: a reform of the Dublin System to better 
allocate asylum applications among EU+ countries; steps toward 
reinforcing the Eurodac regulation, including to increase the efficiency 
of the EU fingerprint database for asylum seekers; and the 
strengthening of the mandate of the European Asylum Support Office 
toward a fully-fledged agency for asylum.  
This was followed, on 13 July 2016, by a second package of proposals 
to reform the Common European Asylum System CEAS, which included: 
replacing the Asylum Procedures Directive with a regulation, directly 
applicable in the national asylum systems, to harmonize asylum 
procedures across EU+ countries and achieve convergence in recognition 
rates; replacing the Qualification Directive with a regulation, directly 
applicable in the national asylum systems to harmonize protection 
standards and rights for asylum seekers; and reforming the Reception 
Conditions Directive to ensure that applicants for international protection 
benefit from harmonized and dignified reception standards and prevent 
secondary movements and abuse.  
Finally, as part of this ongoing round of proposals toward 
reforming the CEAS, the Commission put forth a proposal for the 
establishment of a permanent EU resettlement framework to replace 
existing ad hoc resettlement schemes. The Union Resettlement 
Framework Regulation will provide for legal and safe pathways to the 
E.U., complementing ongoing resettlement and humanitarian 
admission initiatives in the E.U. framework and contributing to 
international resettlement initiatives. It will also assist in relieving 
pressure for countries hosting large numbers of people in need of 
international protection, while reducing the risk of irregular arrivals.   
These proposals have not been concluded owing to the 
controversy relating to changing the amendment of the Dublin 
Regulation. This lack of progress is granting governments the pretext 
of adopting populist attitudes and measures, such as closing territorial 
waters and ports, thus preventing even genuine asylum claims from 
being made on EU territory.  
In March 2016, EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey 
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agreed on the EU‐Turkey Statement with a three-fold aim: a) to end 
irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU; b) to enhance 
reception conditions for refugees in Turkey; and c) to offer safe and 
legal paths for Syrian refugees from Turkey to the EU. To achieve 
these ends, the Statement included, inter alia, an agreement that all 
new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands, as 
from 20 March 2016, would be returned to Turkey, and a resettlement 
scheme would be implemented. According to this scheme for every 
Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands another Syrian 
would be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN 
Vulnerability Criteria. 
A similar Statement should be adopted in relation to the Central 
Mediterranean with agreements with the North Africa littoral states, at 
least with those which have stable governments and where there is no 
danger of refoulement. Of course, these States do not form a 
homogenous entity. But gradually starting from Libya one could begin 
to negotiate. There is no other alternative for EU countries affected by 
the central Mediterranean flows, however difficult it is to negotiate 
with a Government in Libya which does not have complete control 
over its entire national territory. Progress in this direction can perhaps 
be more easily achieved with Tunisia which, although not free from 
internal trouble, is in a better position to strike a deal with. 
The 2018 European Asylum Support Office EASO Report states 
that: 
 
The disembarkation of migrants and refugees rescued at sea in the 
Mediterranean became an issue of debate in 2018, underlining the need for 
the development of a more systematic and coordinated EU approach on 
disembarkation. In January 2019, the need to find a solution in the rescue of 
the vessel Sea Watch 3 instigated a first practical effort of coordination 
between the European Commission, a number of Member States, and 
relevant agencies. This practical experience stood as a testament to a 
willingness to work toward a more effective, systematic EU framework for 
cooperation in the areas of disembarkation, first reception, registration and 
relocation. This may take the form of temporary arrangements, which could 
serve as a bridge solution until the new Dublin  Regulation becomes 
applicable. Temporary arrangements could be developed in a transparent 
step‐by‐step work plan, based on a mutual understanding of shared 
interests, which would ensure the delivery of operational and effective 
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assistance from the Commission, EU agencies, and other Member States to 
the Member State concerned.  
 
The core elements of these temporary arrangements could include: 
 
(a) a request by a Member State, which has found itself under pressure 
or in need of immediate assistance regarding disembarkation after a search 
and rescue operation. 
(b) identification of specific solidarity measures by other Member States, 
in response to the request. Solidarity measures provided by other Member 
States need to be balanced by responsibility measures taken by the Member 
State receiving the support indicating that it has taken the appropriate steps 
for the management of arrivals. 
(c) putting in place a coordination mechanism for following up on such 
requests, involving key stakeholders, such as the Commission and relevant 
EU agencies.  
(d) EU agencies are prepared and well equipped to provide their 
assistance in the process. 
(e)  financial support will be made available from the EU budget for 
Member States volunteering to relocate migrants, for return operations, and 
for the Member State under pressure”. 
 
 The pressure and burdens brought about by recent migration 
trends in Italy, Malta and Greece, as well as Cyprus, are significant. In 
2017, 176,452 irregular migrants had arrived in Europe by land and 
sea, almost all of them travelling along the Central route2. Irregular 
arrivals to Greece by land and sea surpassed 900,000 in 2015, eleven 
times higher than in 2014.  
IOM, the UN Migration Agency, reports that 67,122 migrants and 
refugees entered Europe by sea in 2018 through 26 August, with 








2  For the most up to date figures, see 
https://migration.iom.int/europe?type=arrivals (10/20). 
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The following figures cover two weeks: last week of July 2019 and 







25 Jul - 31 Jul 
Current week 
01 Aug - 07 Aug 
Cyprus 
122 129 5% 
Greece 1,210 849 -29% 
Italy 328 175 -46% 
Malta 140 40 -71% 
Spain 1,143 650 -43% 
Total first arrival 
countries* 2,943 1,843 
-37% 
Registered Migrants in Other countries* 
  
A conservative estimate is that in 2017 over 3000 migrants died in 
the Mediterranean trying to cross over. Of course, these figures are not 





To expect the littoral states to carry the burden alone is an illusion. 
In fact owing to the Schengen system, it is not that difficult for 
irregular migrants  to move within the Schengen area especially where 
there are only land and not sea borders. 
So unless there is a proper system of solidarity in emergencies- 
which now we have started rather belatedly and perhaps haphazardly 
to adopt – the burden sharing will be forced on EU states in a 
disorganized manner. 
 This should not be allowed to happen. Asylum policies of course 
are aimed at protection of the rights of protected persons; but they 
should take into account the pressures, in material terms of migratory 
flows and the pressure of public opinion exerted on the littoral 
Mediterranean States. Living in a utopia of rights without recognizing 
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the duties of all EU members states to contribute to a solution, will 
only lead to an increase in vote-catching popular and populist moves 
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To be prepared for what may come is to be aware what the world 
undergoes changes and challenges. These days one of the biggest 
challenges in the world is migration. People have been migrating since 
the beginning of history and the issues, causes and reasons vary 
according to what is happening in the world, in the past as in the 
present. Migration itself is a natural part of human existence; it is 
neither a crime nor a problem. 1  We are witnessing today an 
unprecedented level of human mobility. More people than ever before 
live in a country other than the one in which they were born. Migrants 
are present in all countries in the world. In 2015, their number 
surpassed 244 million, growing at a rate faster than the world’s 
population. However, there are roughly 65 million forcibly displaced 
persons, including over 21 million refugees, 3 million asylum seekers 
and over 40 million internally displaced persons.2 On 19 September 
2016 the UN General Assembly in its New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants summed up the global phenomenon of 
migration, stating that  
 
Since earliest times, humanity has been on the move. Some people move 
	  
* University “Goce Delcev”, Stip. 
∗∗ Frontex Fundamental Rights Specialist and Trainer from Republic of North 
Macedonia. 
1 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants on agenda for facilitating human mobility, Thirty-fifth session, 6- 2035, 23 
June 2017, Agenda item 3, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. 
2 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants on a 2035 agenda for facilitating human mobility, Thirty-fifth session, 23 June 
2017, Agenda item 3, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. 
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in search of new economic opportunities and horizons. Others move to 
escape armed conflict, poverty, food insecurity, persecution, terrorism, or 
human rights violations and abuses. Still others do so in response to the 
adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters (some of which may be 
linked to climate change), or other environmental factors. Many migrants 
move, indeed, for a combination of these reasons.  
The latter category was forced to move as a result of persecution, conflict, 
violence or human rights violations.3  
 
According to the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs/Population Division, in 2017 the migrant population 
worldwide peaked at 257.7 million. Asia and Europe combined hosted 
over 60 per cent of all international migrants worldwide in 2017, with 
nearly 80 million international migrants living in Asia and 78 million in 
Europe.4 
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe stated 
that migration itself is caused by:  
 
Widespread unemployment and a lack of viable economic opportunities 
leave countless numbers of people without jobs or sustainable livelihoods. At 
the same time, a growing demand for cheap labour, combined with often 
pervasive corrupt practices, have led to an increasing tolerance towards the 
exploitation of economically vulnerable people in dangerous and degrading 
work in the OSCE region. This demand, against the backdrop of the evolving 
crises, contributes to migration flows, thereby heightening the vulnerability of 
the affected populations, providing new, lucrative opportunities for criminal 
networks and ensuring an unbroken cycle of exploitation.5  
If we consider the numbers and put the accent on the statistics 
referring to the period when the world witnessed the biggest mixed 
migration flow in recent history we can say that:  
 
In 2015, the number of people applying for asylum in the EU peaked at 
	  
3 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, 2016.  
4  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population 
Division, International Migration Report 2017, pp. 2-3. 
5  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, From Reception to 
Recognition: Identifying and Protecting Human Trafficking Victims in Mixed Migration 
Flows: A Focus on First Identification and Reception Facilities for Refugees and 
Migrants in the OSCE Region, p.15. 
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1.26 million, while in total in 2015 and 2016 alone, more than 2.5 million 
people applied for asylum in the EU. Authorities in the member states issued 
593,000 first instance asylum decisions in 2015 - over half of them positive. 
Most people who applied for protection at the height of the refugee crisis in 
2015 had to wait until 2016 to receive their ruling. That year 1.1 million 
asylum decisions were made. 61% of those were positive with one third of 
applicants granted refugee status, the highest level of international 
protection.6  
 
In 2016, 388,000 people were denied entry at the EU's external borders. 
According to the Frontex data in 2015 and 2016, more than 2.3 million 
irregular crossings of the EU’s external borders were registered by national 
authorities.7  
 
In such circumstances, it is also crucial to recognise that while 
human smuggling and trafficking in human beings are distinct 
concepts, they overlap significantly in practice. When refugees and 
migrants are forced to use smugglers to take irregular, covert and more 
expensive routes to reach their destinations, they are simultaneously 
exposed to higher risks of exploitation, which can result in situations 
of trafficking.8  
Along the Central Mediterranean route alone, considered to be the 
deadliest known route according to the IOM, between January 2014-
July 2017 more than 14,500 deaths were recorded. During 2017, 1 in 
36 migrants attempting to cross the Central Mediterranean route 
perished. This is a significant increase compared to 2016 when 1 in 88 
was reported missing or dead.9 UNHCR estimates that there are over 
half a million stateless persons in Europe, including a large group are 
migrants originating from both European and non-European 
	  
6  European Parliament, EU migrant crisis: facts and figures, 30 June 2017, 
available at  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eu-
migrant-crisis-facts-and-figures>(06/20).    
7 Ibid. 
8 Mixed Migration Platform, Trafficking in mixed migration flows. Exploitation of 
refugees and other migrants in the Middle East and Europe, briefing paper no. 4., 2017, 
p.1. 
9  IOM Missing Persons Project, data available at 
<https://missingmigrants.iom.int/sites/default/files/c-med-fatalities-briefing-july-
2017.pdf> (06/20).    
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countries. From their collected data and evidence, we can conclude 
that amongst the incoming flow of migrants and refugees, some of 
them are stateless. As such, they should be identified and protected, 
and most of the migrants/refugees registered, the majority originating 
from countries with known stateless populations (Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Eritrea, Afghanistan, etc.). In addition, the influx includes 
Palestinians, who are recorded as stateless in some EU Member States. 
Migration can be both a cause and a consequence of statelessness. 
Migration involves a risk of statelessness when migrants break their 
bond with their countries of origin. These persons can lose their 
records or proof of nationality or their country of origin may withdraw 
their nationality because they went abroad. Because these persons are 
deprived of their fundamental rights and are marginalised in their own 
countries, they may begin a search for a new life, new opportunities 
and their movement becomes a reason for migration. According to the 
European Commission, the number of children migrating to the 
European Union, many of whom are unaccompanied, has also 
increased dramatically over the past few years. In 2015 and 2016, 
around thirty per cent of asylum applicants in the European Union 
were children, and there has been a six-fold increase in the total 
number of child asylum applicants in the past six years.10 Based on the 
data of UNHCR, UNICEF and IOM, over a fifth of the nearly 800,000 
children who applied for asylum in Europe in 2015 and 2016 were 
considered unaccompanied.11 
Whatever the reasons may be for an individual, a family or group 
of people to migrate, they all share to a lesser or greater extent the 
same experience of embarking on an unfamiliar and at times 
dangerous journey. Both adults and children, men and women, may be 
asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, or undocumented migrants or 
they may even fall under all these categories at the same time. The 
immigration status for people on the move may also differ at various 
stages on their journey through the various countries. Those migrants 
	  
10 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
parliament and the Council, The protection of children in migration, Brussels, 
12.4.2017, COM (2017) 211 final). 
11  UNICEF, IOM, UNHCR, Refugee and Migrant Children in Europe, 
Accompanied, Unaccompanied and Separated, Quarterly Overview of Trends, January-
March 2017. 
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may encounter many different situations of vulnerability.12 In addition, 
as a result of gender norms, roles and relations, men and women are 
exposed to different types of risk and vulnerability during the forced 
migration. Due to their status in society and their sex, women and girls 
are particularly vulnerable to discrimination and sexual and gender-
based violence – which may in itself be grounds for flight – and have 
other specific protection risks.13 Undocumented migrants have limited 
access to their rights and are vulnerable to abuse and slavery, and are 
always on the move for fear of detection. In many cases, people are 
reluctant to be sent back because they have such a fear of persecution 
or risk of harm in returning to their place of origin that they will risk 
their lives and undergo severe adversity, rather than return to their 
country of origin. 
States, on the other hand, have a vested interest in controlling 
migration, but people’s motivations can change as migratory routes are 
advancing, and refugees/migrants can assume different categories of 
illegality/legality as they move from their country of origin to the 
destination country, even if they decide to return to their own country.  
As fundamental rights are closely connected with migration and 
migration is mostly handled by border guard authorities in every state, 
we can say that fundamental rights are the most important in terms of 
border control, not just because border guards are the first to establish 
contact with refugees/migrants in mixed migration flows, but because 
they are the first ones to either respect or violate fundamental rights. 
Taking into consideration that border control has several 
stages/procedures, we can divide them into first line and second line 
stages/procedures. If we are talking about border crossing points, 
passport control/profiling is a first line procedure and every border 
guard action performed after the passport control is a second line 
procedure. But when we are talking in the context of today’s migration 
border guard actions mainly begin at the “green line” of the border 
and as a first line control we can consider detection and interception 
	  
12 For example, see the Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the human rights of migrants on agenda for facilitating human mobility, Thirty-fifth 
session, 6- 2035, 23 June 2017, Agenda item 3, Promotion and protection of all human 
rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to 
development. 
13 European Parliament, Gender aspects of migration and asylum in the EU: An 
overview, briefing, the European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p.3. 
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as border guard activities. The second line border activities are 
screening (nationality assumption), reception, registration, debriefing 
and return. Depending on the situation in the area of mixed migration 
(land border, sea border) some of the border guard activities can be 
carried out together (screening and reception, reception and 
registration, etc.). All these border activities are closely connected to 
respect of fundamental rights, but there are also situations where some 
of the fundamental rights can be breached. At this time, we will focus 
on the registration procedure, what it is, what is required to register 
persons in full compliance with fundamental rights and which rights in 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights apply to the procedure for 





Every country has a special unit or organization that is part of the 
national authority responsible for registering any undocumented 
person (refugee/migrant) intercepted in an illegal border crossing or 
staying illegally in the territory of the country, as well as all persons 
applying for international protection. During the process of 
registration, it is a generally accepted rule for all countries to take the 
fingerprints of all fingers of the above mentioned category of 
refugees/migrants who are at least 14 years of age. These prints are 
then stored in the EURODAC database for EU Member States and in 
national data bases for the other countries, to allow for computerized 
exchange of fingerprints solely in order to identify applicants already 
registered in other EU Member State and to see whether the 
individual person may fall under the scope of Regulation (EU) No 
604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person (Dublin III Regulation).  
The Dublin III Regulation, which is mostly used in EU member 
states, contains sound procedures for the protection of asylum 
applicants and improves the system’s efficiency through: 
• an early warning, preparedness and crisis management 
mechanism, geared to addressing the dysfunctional causes of national 
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asylum systems or problems stemming from particular pressures; 
• a series of provisions on the protection of applicants, such as 
compulsory personal interview, guarantees for minors (including a 
detailed description of the factors that should lay at the basis of 
assessing a child's best interests) and extended possibilities of 
reunifying them with relatives; 
• the possibility for appeals to suspend the execution of the 
transfer for the period when the appeal is judged, together with the 
guarantee of the right for a person to remain on the territory pending 
the decision of a court on the suspension of the transfer pending the 
appeal; 
• an obligation to ensure legal assistance free of charge upon 
request; 
• a single ground for detention in case of risk of absconding; a 
strict limitation of the duration of detention. 
• the possibility for asylum seekers that could in some cases be 
considered irregular migrants and returned under the Return 
Directive, to be treated under the Dublin procedure - thus giving these 
persons more protection than the Return Directive; 
• an obligation to guarantee the right to appeal against transfer 
decision; 
• more legal clarity of procedures between the Member States - 
e.g. exhaustive and clearer deadlines. The entire Dublin procedure 
cannot last longer than 11 months to take charge of a person, or 9 
months to take him/her back (except for absconding or where the 
person is imprisoned).14 
Eurodac Regulations indicate specially designated authorities of 
EU Member States responsible for the prevention, detection or 
investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences, 
who have access to the Eurodac database. However, they also state 
that the database cannot be used by the national authorities to support 
persecution. The most important aspect is that in the process of 
registration and fingerprinting the border control authorities should 
respect and safeguard EU and international legislation on human 
rights, e.g. ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
European Union is aware that, in order to have better control on the 
	  
14  Country responsible for asylum application (Dublin), available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-
applicants_en>. (06/20). 
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migration routes, it must cooperate with the third countries along the 
migration routes, for example the Balkan route, so it could best 
manage and control the movement of refugees/migrants during their 
transit to destination counties. The EU has been signing agreements 
with third countries for the purpose of developing reasonable 
solutions so that these countries could have access to the EURODAC 
system or at least share the data base of applicants for international 
protection and/or persons who have committed serious offences in the 
third countries that are part of the migration route.   
In order to ensure a registration process complies fully with 
fundamental rights and is conducted without breach or violation of 
the rights of migrants or refugees, all border control authorities should 
prepare the process of registration (including fingerprinting) in full 
respect of the fundamental rights of the persons undergoing this 
process. The registration process in every country must be conducted 
promptly upon interception or arrival of the refugees/migrants and in 
full compliance with the EURODAC Regulation (EU member states) 
or national law (third countries). However, if such is not possible due 
to the lack of trained staff or proper equipment, the initial registration 
should, at the very least, be performed by the border guards. 
All countries should have appropriate facilities where this process 
of registration can be accomplished in compliance with human rights 
requirements. The facilities where the process takes place must ensure 
that waiting and registration areas can accommodate the necessary 
equipment, border guards and refugees/migrants to be registered. 
Whenever a disabled persons or vulnerable group come along, their 
special needs should be taken into consideration. Depending on the 
numbers and categories of person registered, proper registration and 
fingerprinting equipment, which can ensure efficient registration, 
should be present. All border guards tasked with performing the 
registration must to know how to use that registration and 
fingerprinting equipment in respect of the fundamental rights of the 
persons registered. 
Concerning the respect of fundamental rights of refugees/migrants 
according to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, which is the legal cornerstone for respect and protection of 
fundamental rights within the EU, we will now examine the various 
rights of migrants/refugees that are most likely to be breached during 
the process of registration.  




2.1. Right to human dignity 
 
The process of registration consists in fingerprinting and collecting 
personal data from the refugees/migrants. During registration border 
guards need to take into consideration the sensitivity of migrants as 
regards age, gender and cultures, and they should also always respect 
the dignity of all persons being registered. 
Article 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states that 
“Human dignity is inviolable.15 It must be respected and protected”. 
Informing refugees/migrants on the registration process and the 
different procedures, but also on their rights, obligations and 
consequences in case they do not comply, represents an outcome of 
respecting human dignity at any stage of the registration process. 
During the registration process the border guards should have a 
cultural awareness of the persons with whom they are dealing and 
awareness of the condition of persons who may be suffering a possible 
trauma, or fear of the authorities. It is highly desirable to have cultural 
mediators/interpreters present who can ease possible cultural and 
language barriers. Because of different religious and cultural 
backgrounds, it is recommended to always have a female border guard 
present constantly on every shift in order to avoid possible biases. 
Also, if there are no interpreters or members of non-police services 
who generally help to explain the fingerprinting procedure, then there 
should be leaflets written in their language in order for the 
migrants/refugees to become acquainted with the procedure. If they 
still refuse to cooperate, then border guards should apply legitimate 
coercive measures, with full respect of the integrity and dignity of the 
person. But, in the case of a vulnerable person, the border guards 
should apply the coercive measures only in exceptional cases. 
According to the FRA focus paper "Fundamental rights implications 
of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac"16 before using 
coercive measures as a last resort, persons need to be provided with an 
effective opportunity to comply voluntarily with the fingerprinting 
requirements, including by asking them to appear for fingerprinting a 
second time. All persons who are properly informed and continue not 
	  
15 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf> (06/20). 
16  The EU Fundamental Rights Agency focus paper, Fundamental rights 
implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac, October 2014. 
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to cooperate and refuse to give their fingerprints, should be counselled 
with a view to addressing their fears and expectations. If there is a 
possibility to temporally postpone the fingerprinting, then it is 
advisable to explain once again the reasons for fingerprinting, relying 
on specialized agency personnel who are trained to give assistance to 
vulnerable persons. 
 
2.2. Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment  
 
 No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 17  In the process of registration of 
refugees/migrants, in cases where the legal coercive measures as a last 
resort are applied because of non-cooperation of the person, none of 
the measures taken should expose the refugee/migrant to torture or 
other inhuman treatment.  
As mentioned in the FRA publication “Fundamental rights 
implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac”, 
the use of force that does not inflict inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. However, it still raises some fundamental rights 
concerns, particularly as regards to Article 3 of EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, relative to the right of everyone to respect his or 
her physical and mental integrity. When force is used to compel a 
person to do something, the circumstances of each individual case 
must be assessed to determine whether the use of force was necessary 
and proportionate, and would thus constitute lawful interference in 
light of the standards set forth in Article 52 (1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
In the above-mentioned FRA publication, it is recommended that 
before resorting to coercive measures, a person must always be 
provided with an opportunity to agree voluntarily with the 
fingerprinting requirements. That is why giving proper information 
about the procedure and its consequences is an important step of this 
process and having and using interpreters or other non-police 
personnel to explain the necessity of fingerprinting to the 
refugees/migrants is highly recommended. 
 
	  
17 Article 4 of the of the Charter of the fundamental rights of the European 
Union. 
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 2.3. Principle of non-discrimination 
 
Any discrimination based on any grounds such as sex, race, color, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited. Within the scope of application of the Treaties and 
without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.18 
Mixed migration flows can be a big challenge with regard to the 
principle of non-discrimination. Tensions between different ethnic or 
religious groups among refugees/migrants occur, as witnessed by 
border guards since the very beginning of the registration process. In 
these cases, it is crucial not to abet or take sides with a specific group, 
but rather to be impartial and implement equal treatment for 
everyone. All measures taken in this process should follow the 
principle of non-discrimination in a way that no person or group of 
persons is subject to discrimination. When we speak of non-
discrimination, prioritising vulnerable groups of refugees/migrants is 
not considered to be discriminatory because of their sensitivity profile.  
 
2.4. Right to personal data protection 
 
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data. Such 
data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and based on the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority.19 
As mentioned earlier, the registration process consists of two main 
parts, and the second part is collection of personal data. All personal 
data collected and stored must be used in full compliance with the 
EURODAC or national rules. We should always bear in mind that all 
personal data must be protected from unauthorized access, even in 
cases when they are stored only in national databases.  
	  
18 Article 21 of the of the Charter of the fundamental rights of the European 
Union. 
19 Ibid.., Article 8. 
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It should be noted that Article 35 relating to “Prohibition of 
transfers of data to third countries, international organisations or 
private entities” stipulates detailed rules regarding data transfer to 
third countries:  
• personal data obtained by a Member State or Europol 
pursuant to this Regulation from the Central System shall not be 
transferred or made available to any third country, international 
organisation or private entity established in or outside the Union. This 
prohibition shall also apply if those data are further processed at the 
national level or between Member States within the meaning of Article 
2(b) of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. Since 6 May 2018 EU 
Member States should apply new legislation, which transposed the 
provision of the Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection 
or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA], and rendered invalid 
the previous legislation, which was based on the above-mentioned 
Framework Decision. 
• Personal data which originated in an EU Member State and 
are exchanged between Member States following a hit in the 
EURODAC system, obtained for the purposes laid down in Article 
1(2) of the EURODAC regulation, shall not be transferred to third 
countries if there is a serious risk that as a result of such transfer the 
data subject may be subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment or any other violation of his or her 
fundamental rights. 
• The above-mentioned prohibition to transfer shall be 
without prejudice to the right of EU Member States to transfer such 
data to third countries to which Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 
[Dublin III Regulation] applies.  
Collective registration of refugees/migrants should be avoided, 
because it is unreliable and impractical. This kind of collection 
compromises confidence in the process, and if a member of a family 
wishes to be registered individually, his wishes should be respected. If 
it is intended to protect personal data from unauthorised access, the 
process should be organised in a way that one person, or one family, is 
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registered at one time at one registration point. The border control 
authorities in every country should ensure that all collected personal 
data is stored for no longer than allowed by the EU and/or relevant 
national legislation. 
 
2.4.1 Rights of vulnerable groups 
 
We must differentiate between vulnerable groups of persons 
mentioned in the il Cambridge Dictionary lo da "above-mentioned" 
ECER articles and persons who are in vulnerable situations usually 
found in the interception phase (during search and rescue operations 
or based on a call for help regarding persons in danger). When we 
discussed the principle of non-discrimination we said that the border 
control authorities should ensure that priority is given to vulnerable 
categories of migrants, especially unaccompanied minors, families with 
small children, pregnant women, disabled persons or other vulnerable 
groups so that their waiting time is reduced to a minimum, and all 
members of vulnerable groups should be dealt with special care, 
involving services and agencies specialised in dealing with that 
category of persons to prevent their traumatization. As we said before 
reception facilities, should be easily accessible (e.g. for elderly, or 
disabled persons), ensure privacy and prioritisation of the vulnerable 
persons in the procedures, and if possible, should provide a special 
area where such persons can be registered. During the registration 
process if there are doubts about the declared age of any 
refugee/migrant, the principle of presumption of minority should 
prevail, and the situation should be immediately notified to the 
responsible authorities which can activate the procedure for age 
determination.  
Properly trained staff and instruction should be provided to the 
border guards in order to recognize vulnerable persons, even if the 
person is not asking for protection. Following registration, such 
persons should be directed to the border guard units and specialised 
agencies which will provide them with further assistance.  
 
2.4.2 Right to asylum 
 
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the 
rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 
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January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (hereinafter referred to as “the Treaties”).20 
All persons have a right to asylum or international protection but 
in practice and from experience most of them do not have the 
knowledge to understand how he/she can use this right. In this 
manner the proactive approach of border guards, combined with 
proper delivery of information in a language understandable to the 
refugee/migrant or stateless person is essential. Border guards should 
be aware that refugees/migrants are mostly coming from countries 
where legal provisions do not exist or are not functional, or the person 
is not aware of his stateless status or the possibility to be protected. 
For this reason, providing information regarding the right to asylum is 
mandatory and essential during the registration process. The barrier 
between the border guard and the refugee/migrant which could rise as 
a result of cultural or language reasons can be an even bigger obstacle 
in this sense. The border guards should be aware that a 
refugee/migrant or stateless person has the right to access international 
protection at any time and in any manner, as well as during the 
registration process. Furthermore, the border guard should be able to 
identify a person in need of international protection even when the 
person does not ask for it. The border guard is obliged to inform a 
person of his/her rights.  
 
2.4.3 Right to privacy and family life 
 
We have stated several times that collection of personal data is a 
primary objective of the registration process, therefore a minimal 
privacy condition shall be provided for the refugees/migrants in the 
facilities where this process is ongoing. The conditions in these 
facilities should ensure a private conversation between the border 
guard and the refugee/migrant, which cannot be heard by others in 
consideration of confidentiality and privacy. With reference to this 
matter we can say that the use of interpreters does not violate the right 
to privacy, but they should be present only if there is a need. The 
registration premises should be spacious, in case of family registrations 
at one booth, however if migrants/refugees want to be registered 
individually they should be informed that they are entitled to demand 
	  
20 Ibid., Article 18. 
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to be registered individually. 
 
2.4.4 Right to liberty and security 
 
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.”21 All of 
the actions taken by the border guards from the moment of initial 
reception are done to ensure this right. In some specific cases this right 
can be restricted or limited but this does not mean that border guards 
should postpone the respect of this right. All persons undergoing the 
registration process should be granted security by the border 
authorities at all times and in all areas where refugees/migrants are 
waiting to be registered or are being registered. In cases where there is 
a large number of refugees/migrants waiting to be registered, security 
measures must be taken by border guards in the waiting areas in order 
to preserve order during the registration process. In such case 
separating conflicting parties, different groups of refuges/migrants but 
in full respect of the principle of non-discrimination can help alleviate 
the tense atmosphere in the waiting area during this process. The 
primary objective of such measures is to ensure full security of all 
persons in all stages of registration, with special consideration for 
vulnerable persons. 
 
2.5. Other fundamental rights connected to registration 
 
Principle of non-refoulement 
During the process of registration, all refugees/migrants should be 
registered in accordance with the EURODAC or national regulation. 
If someone is not registered, because of his undefined legal status, in 
some cases such person may later be returned to his/her country of 
origin, where he/she was previously persecuted. This kind of situation 
will lead to violation of the non-refoulement principle. According to 
EURODAC Regulation registration and/or subsequent search and 
data processing is related to the following categories of persons: 
• applicants for international protection, who are third-country 
nationals or stateless persons and who are at least 14 years old;  
• third-country nationals or stateless persons of at least 14 years 
of age who are apprehended by the competent control authorities in 
connection with the irregular crossing of the border of that Member 
	  
21 Article 6 of the Charter of the fundamental rights of the European Union.  
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State by land, sea or air, having come from a third country and who 
are not turned back or who remain physically on the territory of the 
Member States and who are not kept in custody, confinement or 
detention during the entirety of the period between apprehension and 
removal on the basis of the decision to turn him or her back; 
• third-country nationals or stateless persons - beneficiaries of 
international protection; 
Third-country nationals or stateless persons of at least 14 years of 
age, found residing irregularly in the EU Member State and, as a rule:  
• this third-country national or stateless person declares that he 
or she has lodged an application for international protection but 
without indicating the Member State in which he or she lodged the 
application for asylum; 
• he or she does not request international protection but objects 
to being returned to his or her country of origin by claiming that he or 
she would be in danger, or, 
• this third-country national or stateless person otherwise who 
seeks to prevent his or her removal by refusing to cooperate in 
establishing his or her identity, by showing no document or false 
identity papers. 
 
2.5.1 Right to healthcare 
 
 “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the 
right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions 
established by national laws and practices. A high level of human 
health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all the Union’s policies and activities.”22 This right 
shall be respected in every phase of the processes and should be 
respected even if the refugee/migrant is not yet registered.   
 
 
2.5.2 Right to property 
 
Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or 
her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or 
her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and 
under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation 
	  
22Article 35 of the Charter of the fundamental rights of the European Union.  
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being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be 
regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.23 
The right to property of a refugee/migrant shall be respected and 
at any point of the registration process all refugee/migrant lawfully 
acquired possessions may not be confiscated by the authorities. In 
cases where a refugee/migrant possesses an object which is not legally 
allowed to be detained in the country where he/she is registered, such 
possessions can be confiscated through a legally determined procedure 
followed by a written confirmation issued to the refugee/migrant.  
 
2.5.3 Prohibition of slavery and forced labour 
 
“1.  No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
 2.  No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory 
labor. 
 3.  Trafficking in human beings is prohibited.”24 
Border guards should be well trained staff, not only in the 
acknowledgment of fundamental rights but also in recognizing the 
indicators of victims of trafficking in human beings and all others 
forms of cross border crime present in the migration influx. If such 
persons are recognized during the registration process, border guards 
shall refer them to institutions specialized in those kinds of cases in 





3. Conclusion  
 
Registration of undocumented persons (refugees, migrants or 
asylum-seekers) remains the responsibility of each country. In most 
emergency migration situations international organizations such as 
UNHCR/IOM provide operational assistance for registration only if 
needed. In such cases, this assistance should be assumed jointly with 
the authorities of the host country, and/or the host country should be 
trained in order to enable it to assume this responsibility at a later 
stage.  
	  
23 Article 17 of the Charter of the fundamental rights of the European Union. 
24 Ibid., Article 5. 
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In simple words the process of registration consists in recording, 
verifying and updating information on persons of concern with the 
aim of protecting and documenting them and to implementing 
sustainable solutions. While this document uses only the term 
“refugees” on some occasions, all undocumented persons/persons of 
concern are covered by the standards and procedures detailed in the 
document, unless indicated otherwise. This includes asylum seekers, 
returning refugees, returnees, resettled refugees, migrants, stateless 
and internally displaced persons.  
Registration is a fundamental component of international 
protection and it is the right of the persons who may be of concern to 
be registered. Registration recognizes that an individual is someone of 
concern, or potentially of concern, and that he/she needs continued 
protection. Registration helps protect against refoulement, arbitrary 
arrest and detention by making people known to UNHCR and the 
host government as persons of concern. It helps individuals, families 
and other groups of refugees/migrants to get basic access to the rights, 
services, and assistance they need. Accurately registering children 
helps to prevent military recruitment and to ensure family unity, and, 
in the case of separated children, to reunite families. Registration also 
helps to ensure that decisions regarding sustainable solutions are 
voluntary by recording an individual’s agreement to a solution. 
Accurate registration is also essential in identifying cases for which 
resettlement and local integration are the most appropriate solutions. 
Registration can foster freedom of movement and minimize 
dependence. Registration should not mean that persons are confined 
to the place in which they registered. Nomads, for example, should 
not be forced to stay where they are registered, or they will lose their 
livelihoods.  
Registration is crucial in identifying those who are at risk and those 
who have special needs. These people are often the least likely to come 
forward and make their needs known. Information on where people 
come from helps to prepare voluntary repatriation programmes and in 
assessing whether an area can absorb large numbers of returnees. 
Registration in countries of asylum can help to rebuild national civil 
registries in the event of return when the data can be made available to 
local and central authorities in the country of origin.  
Registration of refugees/migrants is also crucial for security 
purposes and in determining the pattern of migration which can 
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ensure a slightly more real and correct number of persons on the 
move, but we will elaborate this issue in another scientific report.  
De-registration of all these persons ensures that registers are 
updated with information about progress towards the achievement of 
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1. Introduction  
 
Recently both the European Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights have been called upon to decide, respectively, 
in cases X and X v. Belgium1 and M.N. and others v. Belgium2, whether 
an obligation to issue humanitarian visas at embassies could be derived 
from the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatments under 
particular circumstances. 
The topic of humanitarian visas, as legal and safe entry channels 
for people in need of international protection, is very complex and has 
been long debated in literature over the past years3. Also, the New 
York Declaration4  and the Global Compact on Refugees5  refer to 
humanitarian visas within the topic “Legal pathways”. 
	  
* University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
1 CJEU, judgment of 7 March 2017, X and X [GC], case C-638/16 PPU. 
2 ECtHR, decision of 5 May 2020 [GC], M.N. and others v. Belgium, App. No. 
3599/18. 
3 See, ex multis, G. Noll, “Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under 
International Law?”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2005, p. 542 ff; V. Moreno-
Lax, “Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of Schengen 
Visas and Carriers’ Sanctions with EU Member States’ Obligations to Provide 
International Protection to Refugees?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2008, 
p. 315 ff.; T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and 
the Globalization of Migration Control, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, 
in particular p. 135 ff.; U.I. Jensen, Humanitarian visas: option or obligation?, 
European Parliament, September 2014, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509986/IPOL_STU(2
014)509986_EN.pdf>(07/20); M-C. Foblets, L. Leboeuf (eds), Humanitarian 
Admission to Europe The Law Between Promises and Constraints, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2020.  
4 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1. 




As pointed out6, “visa rules in general, and humanitarian visas in 
particular, lie at the core of a paradox: under international migration 
law, the human right to leave any country, including one’s own, is not 
accompanied by the corollary right of entering any other country”. 
The practice is indeed based on different national frameworks, 
characterized by discretionary powers which often result in 
arbitrariness and lack of transparence. What is worse is that in most 
cases domestic procedures and judicial controls are completely absent 
or inefficient.  
This is why it could be particularly useful – even in the presence of 
a domestic legislation providing for the possibility of humanitarian visa 
– to recur to supranational courts. And this is why great expectations 
had been placed first on the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter CJEU), thanks also to an admirable Opinion of Advocate 
General Mengozzi7; and later on the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereinafter ECtHR), thanks also to the position adopted by 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in a previous case8.  
Indeed, claims before the two European Courts concerned in both 
cases a family coming from Syria with minor children: because of the 
situation in their country of origin, if the applicants had managed to 
reach the European Union, they would have certainly benefited from 
international protection under the EU qualification directive. In 
addition, the request for visas had been addressed to a country - 
Belgium - that in those same days was carrying out opérations de 
sauvetage 9  in favour of Syrian people of Christian religion from 
Aleppo, delivering visas to allow their entry to Belgium in order to 
apply for asylum. The operations, even if conducted in a secret and 
discretionary manner, might have encouraged people - in situations 
	  
6 See J.Y. Carlier, L. Cools, E. Frasca, F. Gatta, S. Sarolea, “Humanitarian visa: 





7 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 7 February 2017, case C-
638/16 PPU X and X. 
8 Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, judgment of 23 February 2012 [GC], Applic. No. 
27765/09, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Alburquerque, p. 70. 
9  See Focus: Visas humanitaires, 
<https://www.myria.be/files/FOCUS_visa_humanitaire.pdf > (07/20). 
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similar to those that fell within the above-mentioned program - to file 
a request for a visa at Belgium embassies. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
existing practice and the fulfilment of eligibility conditions (not only 
for international protection in Belgium but also for the above 
mentioned governmental program, since all the applicants were Syrian 
and Christian), the Syrian families’ requests had been rejected by the 
Administrative authorities in both cases. 
Unfortunately, both the CJEU and the ECtHR dismissed the 
claims, despite the fact that there were possible alternative solutions, 
as demonstrated by Advocate General Mengozzi with respect to the 
European Union and suggested by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque with 
respect to the ECHR system. 
 
 
2. The X and X v. Belgium Judgment of the European Court of 
Justice of 7 March 2017 
 
The first of the two European Courts called upon to decide on the 
issue of humanitarian visas was the Court of Justice, which delivered 
its ruling on 7 March 201710. 
	  
10 This part of the paper is based on a previous paragraph already published in A. 
Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization of Border Controls-European State 
Responsibility, Routledge, London and New York, 2019, p. 80 ff. On the X and X v. 
Belgium judgment see also E. Brouwer, “The European Court of Justice on 
Humanitarian Visas: Legal integrity vs. political opportunism?”, CEPS Commentary, 
16 March 2017, 
<https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Visa%20Code%20CJEU%20E%20Brouwer%20
CEPS%20Commentary_0.pdf >(07/20); H. De Vylder, “X and X v. Belgium: a 
missed opportunity for the CJEU to rule on the state’s obligations to issue 
humanitarian visa for those in need of protection”, Strasbourg Observer, 14 April 2017, 
<https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/04/14/x-and-x-v-belgium-a-missed-
opportunity-for-the-cjeu-to-rule-on-the-states-obligations-to-issue-humanitarian-visa-
for-those-in-need-of-protection/ >(07/20); G. Raimondo, “Visti umanitari: il caso X e 
X contro Belgio, C‑638/16 PPU”, Sidiblog, 1 May 2017, 
<http://www.sidiblog.org/2017/05/01/visti-umanitari-il-caso-x-e-x-contro-belgio-
c%E2%80%9163816-ppu/>(07/20); A. Del Guercio, “La sentenza X. e X. della 
Corte di giustizia sul rilascio del visto umanitario: analisi critica di un’occasione 
persa”, European Papers, Vol. 2, 2017, p. 271 ff., 
<http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/europeanforum/la-sentenza-x-e-x-della-corte-di-
giustizia-sul-rilascio-del-visto-umanitario>(07/20); C. Favilli, “Visti umanitari e 
protezione internazionale: così vicini così lontani”, Diritti umani e Diritto 




The case concerned a Syrian family who had come to Beirut 
(Lebanon) to apply at the Belgian Embassy for a territorially limited 
Schengen visa (LTV visa) on account of humanitarian considerations, 
in order to reach Belgium and request international protection there. 
Judgment was delivered on the issue of preliminary ruling from the 
Conseil du Contentieux des Étrangers (Belgium) concerning the 
interpretation of Article 25(1)(a) of ‘the Visa Code’ and of Articles 4 
and 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
asking in substance whether, under the Visa Code Member, States 
have the duty to issue a territorially limited Schengen visa, where there 
are substantial grounds to believe that the refusal to issue that 
document will have the direct consequence of exposing persons to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.  
In its judgment the Court, although it acknowledged that the 
applicants in the main proceedings were facing a real risk of being 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment11, does not pronounce 
on the merits, but states that the application falls outside the scope of 
the Visa Code. This because, in the Court’s view, even if formally 
grounded on Article 25 of the Visa Code (concerning visas for 
intended stays of no more than three months), the application in 
reality was submitted “with a view to applying for asylum in Belgium 
immediately upon their arrival in that Member State and, thereafter, to 
being granted a residence permit with a period of validity not limited 
to 90 days”12.  
As a consequence, the Court inferred that the provisions of the 
Charter, in particular Articles 4 and 18 thereof, referred to in the 
questions of the Belgian court, do not apply13, thus concluding that: 
  
an application for a visa with limited territorial validity made on 
humanitarian grounds by a third-country national, on the basis of Article 25 
of the code, to the representation of the Member State of destination that is 
	  
content/uploads/2017/04/Osservatorio-Favilli-per-SIDI.pdf>(07/20); G. Cellamare, 
“Sul rilascio di visti di breve durata (VTL) per ragioni umanitarie”, Studi 
sull’integrazione europea, N. 3/2017, p. 527 ff.; F. Calzavara, “La sentenza della Corte 
di giustizia in tema di visti umanitari: quando la stretta interpretazione rischia di svilire 
la dignità umana”, Ordine internazionale e diritti umani, 2017, p. 546 ff., 
<http://www.rivistaoidu.net/sites/default/files/5_Calzavara_0.pdf >(07/20). 
11 Para. 33. 
12 Para. 42. 
13 Para. 45. 
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within the territory of a third country, with a view to lodging, immediately 
upon his or her arrival in that Member State, an application for international 
protection and, thereafter, to staying in that Member State for more than 90 
days in a 180-day period, does not fall within the scope of that code but, as 
European Union law currently stands, solely within that of national law14. 
 
One of principal shortfalls of the decision is that it puts the 
applicants outside the scope of EU law on the basis of the real 
intention of their application, which was to reach Belgium in order to 
apply for asylum. However, as convincingly argued by the Advocate 
General Mengozzi15 in its Opinion of 7 February 2017: 
 
The intention of the applicants in the main proceedings to apply for 
refugee status once they had entered Belgium cannot alter the nature or 
purpose of their applications ... [S]uch an intention could at the very most 
constitute a ground for refusal of the applications of the applicants in the 
main proceedings, pursuant to the rules of that code, but certainly not a 
ground for not applying that code16.  
 
The Opinion of the Advocate General, a long and rich exposition 
– if we compare it with the brief reasoning of the Court – deserves 
attention under a number of aspects, and seems worthwhile to review 
it, even if synthetically. It is true that the possibility of applying for 
humanitarian visa has not been codified yet at European level, despite 
	  
14 Italics added. 
15 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 7 February 2017, case C-
638/16 PPU X and X. 
16 On this point see also V. Moreno-Lax, “Asylum Visas as an Obligation under 
EU Law: Case PPU C-638/16 X, X v État belge” (Part. I-II), EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law and Policy, 16 and 21 February 2017, 
<http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/asylum-visas-as-an-obligation-under-eu-law-case-ppu-
c-63816-x-x-v-etat-belge/> (07/20): “This would be tantamount to accepting, for 
instance, that failed asylum seekers were ab initio excluded from the remit of the 
Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive because ex post, upon 
determination of their claims, it has been concluded that they did not qualify for 
refugee status or subsidiary protection. The fact that an application for either a visa or 
for international protection under EU law is dismissed on the merits (or even at the 
admissibility stage) cannot be confounded with the determination of whether the rules 
of the relevant instruments (i.e. the CCV or the QD+APD) apply to and govern the 




proposals in this direction17. However, the Opinion of the Advocate 
General shows that another interpretation, one that might have 
allowed a solution more in conformity with human rights18, was 
possible. Indeed, after having illustrated that the intention of the 
applicants was irrelevant, the Advocate General adds that: 
 
by issuing or refusing to issue a visa with limited territorial validity on the 
basis of Article 25 of the Visa Code, the authorities of the Member States 
adopt a decision concerning a document authorising the crossing of the 
external borders of the Member States, which is subject to a harmonised set of 
rules and act, therefore, in the framework of and pursuant to EU law19. 
 
He goes on to say that such a conclusion cannot be called in 
question by the circumstance that the Member State enjoyed 
discretion in applying Article 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code, because the 
Court of Justice has stated in a number of cases that acts adopted in 
the exercise of discretion fall within the scope of EU law20. He then 
concludes that by adopting a decision under Article 25 of the Visa 
Code, Member States implemented EU law and therefore were 
required to respect the rights guaranteed by the Charter. He then goes 
on to analyse the merits of whether the discretion of the Member State 
had been exercised in conformity with the Charter. To this end, first 
of all he recalls that in the judgment of 21 December 2011, N. S. and 
Others21, concerning the determination of the Member State respon-
sible for processing an application for asylum, the Court stated that a 
mere option for a Member State may turn into an actual obligation on 
that Member State in order to ensure compliance with Article 4 of the 
	  
17 The recent recast of the Visa Code [Regulation (EU) 2019/1155 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code)] 
does not introduce rules concerning the issue of humanitarian visas. On the position 
of the European Parliament see ultra in the Conclusions. 
18 In literature the possibility to recognize a legal access route under article 25 of 
the Visa Code has been extensively discussed: see U. I. Jensen, cit; S. Peers, “Do 
Potential Asylum-Seekers Have the Right to a Schengen Visa?”, EU Law Analysis, 20 
January 2014, <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/01/do-potential-asylum-
seekers-have-right.html >(07/20); Moreno-Lax, “Asylum Visas”, cit.  
19 Para. 80. Italics is in the Opinion. 
20 See CJEU, N. S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411-10 and C-493-10, para. 
68 and 69. 
21 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi., para. 94-98. 
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Charter22. He also stresses that this right corresponds to the right 
guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR, and affirms that 
 
By analogy with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on 
Article 3 of the ECHR, Article 4 of the Charter imposes on the Member 
States, when implementing EU law, not only a negative obligation with 
respect to individuals, that is to say that it prohibits the Member States from 
using torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, but also a positive 
obligation, that is to say that it requires them to take measures designed to 
ensure that those individuals are not subjected to torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment, in particular in the case of vulnerable individuals, 
including where such ill-treatment is administered by private individuals23... 
In examining whether a State has failed to fulfil its positive obligation to 
adopt reasonable steps to avoid exposing a person to a genuine risk of 
treatment prohibited by Article 4 of the Charter, it is necessary, in my view, to 
ascertain, by analogy with the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights relating to Article 3 of the ECHR, what the foreseeable consequences 
of that omission or that refusal to act with regard to the person concerned 
are24.  
 
Since the risks for the Syrian family were known or should have 
been known to the Belgian authorities, in light of the numerous 
reports attesting to the situation in Syria25, the Advocate General 
concludes that Article 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code must be interpreted as 
meaning that the Member State shall issue a LTV visa on humanitarian 
grounds if there are substantial grounds to believe that the refusal to 
issue that document will have the direct consequence of exposing that 
national to treatment prohibited by Article 4 of the Charter26. 
	  
22 Ibidem, para. 137. 
23 Ibidem, para. 139. Italics is in the text. To this end the advocate General 
reminds that “in its judgments of 21 December 2011, N. S. and Others ... (para. 106 
and 113), and of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru (C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, 
... para. 90 and 94), the Court already held that, like Article 3 of the ECHR, Article 4 
of the Charter imposes a positive obligation on the Member States under certain 
circumstances”. 
24 Ibidem, para. 140. 
25 Ibidem, para. 142-147. 
26 Ibidem, para. 163. The Opinion of the Advocate General is remarkable also 
with respect to the explicit statement that “the fundamental rights recognized by the 




Finally, it is worthwhile to compare the statement of the 
Luxembourg Court, affirming that “to conclude otherwise ... would 
undermine the general structure of the system established by 
Regulation No 604/201327“ (the Dublin regulation), and the premise 
enounced by the Advocate General at the beginning of his opinion, i.e. 
that “It is ... crucial that, at a time when borders are closing and walls 
are being built, the Member States do not escape their responsibilities, 
as they follow from EU law”28. In the first case, the Court is concerned 
with the consequences that would result from a different 
interpretation of article 25 of the Visa Code, because this might entail 
legal access irrespective of the rules established under the Dublin 
system; on the other hand, the Advocate General explicitly affirms that 
 
It is, on the contrary, the refusal to recognize a legal access route to the 
right to international protection on the territory of the Member States − 
which unfortunately often forces nationals of third countries seeking such 
protection to join, risking their lives in doing so, the current flow of illegal 
immigrants to EU’s borders – which seems to me to be particularly worrying, 
	  
the framework of EU law, are guaranteed to the addressees of the acts adopted by 
such an authority irrespective of any territorial criterion” (para. 89). This position is 
very important because it denotes a broader scope of application of the EU Charter in 
comparison to the ECHR. While the dominant case law of the Strasbourg Court sets 
“effective control” as a threshold for triggering jurisdiction under the ECHR 
(although, as we will analyse in the next paragraph, there are cases which point to a 
different approach), according to such interpretation, both EU institutions and the 
Member States, whenever they act within the scope of EU law, even outside the EU’s 
borders, are bound by the Charter. In other words, as already convincingly upheld in 
literature, the European Union has the duty to respect the rights guaranteed by the 
Charter “whenever it exercises its competences, both internally and externally, either 
directly or through the intermediation of the Member States ‘implementing EU law”: 
see V. Moreno-Lax, C. Costello, Cathryn, “The Extraterritorial Application of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness 
Model”, in Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner, Angela Ward (eds.), The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014, p. 
1682. See also J. Rijpma, “External Migration and Asylum Management: 
Accountability for Executive Action Outside EU-territory”, European Papers, 2017, p. 
79, 
<http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/system/files/pdf_version/EP_eJ_2017_2_7_Artic
le_Jorrit_J_Rijpma.pdf > (07/20). 
27 Judgement of 7 March 2017, cit., para. 48.  
28 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, cit., para. 4. 
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in the light, inter alia, of the humanitarian values and respect for human 
rights on which European construction is founded29. 
 
From this comparison it is clear that the Court probably made a 
self-restraint because of the concern – expressed by the fourteen 
intervening Member States – regarding an excessive augmentation of 
requests for visas at MS embassies in third countries30. The best 
answer to such fear, however, lies once again in Advocate Mengozzi’s 
words: 
 
Admittedly, the circle of persons concerned may prove to be wider than 
that which is currently the case in the practice of the Member States. That 
argument is however irrelevant in the light of the obligation to respect, in all 
circumstances, fundamental rights of an absolute nature, including the right 
enshrined in Article 4 of the Charter31. 
 
 
3. The M.N. and others v. Belgium decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights of 5 May 2020. 
 
Recently, on 5 May 2020, the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights dismissed an almost identical claim in the 
M.N. and others v. Belgium case32. The decision, characterised by a 
	  
29 Ibidem, para. 6. 
30 See A. Del Guercio, “La sentenza X. e X. della Corte di giustizia sul rilascio del 
visto umanitario: analisi critica di un’occasione persa”, cit., p. 285. 
31 Ibidem, para. 171. 
32 On this decision see M. Baumgärtel, ”Reaching the dead-end: M.N. and others 
and the question of humanitarian visas”, Strasbourg Observers, 7 May 2020, 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2020/05/07/reaching-the-dead-end-m-n-and-others-
and-the-question-of-humanitarian-visas/; J.Y. Carlier, L. Cools, E. Frasca, F. Gatta, 
S. Sarolea, “Humanitarian visa: does the suspended step of the stork become a 
hunting permit?”, cit; F. Camplone, “La decisione M.N. e al. c. Belgio alla luce della 
sentenza X e X: la conferma della prudenza delle Corti o un impulso allo sviluppo di 
canali di ingresso legali europei?”, Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, forthcoming; 
C. Danisi, “A “formalistic” approach to jurisdiction in the European Court of Human 
Rights’ decision on humanitarian visas: Was another interpretation possible?”, 
Sidiblog, 27 May 2020, <http://www.sidiblog.org/2020/05/27/a-formalistic-approach-
to-jurisdiction-in-the-european-court-of-human-rights-decision-on-humanitarian-
visas-was-another-interpretation-possible/>(07/20); T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, N. F. 




“prudent and yet conservative approach towards the conditions to 
trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction”33, is very deceiving, because “cette 
affaire représentait l’un des derniers remparts contre la politique de 
non-entrée menée par l’Union européenne à l’égard des personnes en 
besoin de protection international”34. 
After a short analysis of the reasoning of the Court, with specific 
reference to the claim similar to the one brought before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, concerning the risk of torture or 
inhuman treatment in case of refusal of a humanitarian visa35, the 
	  
limits of extraterritorial refoulement”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 26 
May 2020, <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/adjudicating-old-questions-in-refugee-law-
mn-and-others-v-belgium-and-the-limits-of-extraterritorial-
refoulement/>(07/20); E. Lenain, “Il était une fois, un visa obligatoire qui n’existait 
pas. Quand les Cours européennes dansent la polka autour des lacunes du droit”, La 
Revue des droits de l’homme, 2020, n. 17, 
<https://journals.openedition.org/revdh/9913>(07/20), p. 1 ff; A. Reyhani, ”Expelled 
from Humanity – Reflections on M.N and Other v. Belgium”, Verfassungsblog, 6 May 
2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/expelled-from-humanity/; V. Stoyanova, ”M.N. and 
Others v Belgium: no ECHR protection from refoulement by issuing visas”, European 
Journal of International Law: Talk!, 12 May 2020, <https://www.ejiltalk.org/m-n-and-
others-v-belgium-no-echr-protection-from-refoulement-by-issuing-visas/. For 
comments on the MN case before the ECtHR decision see D.Schmalz, “Will the 
ECtHR Shake up the European Asylum System?”, Verfassungsblog, 30 November 
2018, <https://verfassungsblog.de/will-the-ecthr-shake-up-the-european-asylum-
system/>(07/20); E. Delval, “La CEDH appelée à trancher la question des “visas 
asile” laissée en suspens par la CJUE: Lueur d’espoir ou nouvelle déception?”, EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 12 February 2019, 
<https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/la-cedh-appelee-a-trancher-la-question-des-visas-
asile-laissee-en-suspens-par-la-cjue-lueur-despoir-ou-nouvelle-deception/>(07/20);  
F.L. Gatta, ”La ‘saga’ dei visti umanitari tra le Corti di Lussemburgo e Strasburgo, 
passando per il legislatore dell’Unione europea e le prassi degli Stati membri”, 
Dirittifondamentali.it, 1/2019, <https://dirittifondamentali.it/2019/06/12/la-saga-dei-
visti-umanitari-tra-le-corti-di-lussemburgo-e-strasburgo-passando-per-il-legislatore-
dellunione-europea-e-le-prassi-degli-stati-membri/> (07/20), p. 35 ff. 
33 J.Y. Carlier, L. Cools, E. Frasca, F. Gatta, S. Sarolea, “Humanitarian visa: does 
the suspended step of the stork become a hunting permit?”, cit. 
34 E. Lenain, “Il était une fois, un visa obligatoire qui n’existait pas. Quand les 
Cours européennes dansent la polka autour des lacunes du droit”, cit., p. 6. 
35 The applicants also lodged a complaint under art. 6 ECHR, which will not be 
the object of our analysis. On this point see TJ.-Y. Carlier, L. Cools, E. Frasca, 
F. Gatta, S. Sarolea, “Humanitarian visa: does the suspended step of the stork become 
a hunting permit?”; F. Camplone, “La sentenza M.N. e al. c. Belgio alla luce della 
sentenza X e X”, cit. 
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present paper intends also in this case to propose a possible different 
interpretation that the Strasbourg Court might have followed. 
The facts upon which the Strasbourg decision and the 
Luxembourg judgment are based are very similar: a married couple 
with minor children from Syria had come to Beirut (Lebanon) to apply 
at the Belgian Embassy for a territorially limited Schengen visa (LTV 
visa) grounded on humanitarian considerations, in order to reach 
Belgium and there to request international protection.  
The national proceedings in the MN case began in August 2016 
and were particularly complex. At the end of “Kafkian proceedings”36, 
the Belgium Alien Office categorically refused to grant a visa despite 
judiciary decisions to the contrary. In the view of the Aliens Office, the 
LTV visas were only for persons wishing to reach a Schengen State for 
a short period for reasons such as the illness or death of a relative, 
whereas granting a visa on humanitarian grounds to people who 
intended to apply for asylum would “create a precedent which would 
derogate dangerously from the exceptional nature of the procedure for 
short-stay visas”37. It is important to add, however, that the Aliens 
Office invited the applicants to apply for another type of visa, for more 
than 90 days, based on Belgian legislation, but that this application 
was rejected by the Belgian authorities too.  
The applicants lodged a claim before the Strasbourg Court on 10 
January 2018, alleging that the Belgian authorities’ refusal to issue a 
humanitarian visa had exposed them to a situation incompatible with 
Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading 
treatment) with no possibility of an effective remedy, as required by 
Article 13 ECHR. 
In addition, with respect to the internal proceedings, they 
complained that the impossibility of having the favourable judicial 
decision executed was in breach of article 6 ECHR (right to a fair 
trial)38.  
	  
36 E. Lenain, “Il était une fois, un visa obligatoire qui n’existait pas. Quand les 
Cours européennes dansent la polka autour des lacunes du droit”, cit., p. 2. 
37 Para. 12. 
38 The Court stated that the case fell outside the scope of art. 6 ECHR, referring 
to its settled case-law (see judgment of 5 October 2000, Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 
39652/98, § 40). For criticisms to such an approach in this case see J.-Y. Carlier, 
L. Cools, E. Frasca, F. Gatta, S. Sarolea, “Humanitarian visa: does the suspended step 




This paper will deal exclusively with the first complaint, which 
corresponds in substance to the object of the preliminary ruling before 
the EU Court of Justice. As we have seen, the CJEU avoided issuing a 
ruling on the merits through a formalistic reasoning, although a 
different interpretation was possible - as shown by Advocate General 
Mengozzi in his meritorious opinion. Similarly, the ECHR Court also 
decided not to examine the case on the merits, declaring the complaint 
inadmissible by reason of jurisdiction. In this case too, however, 
another conclusion was possible, had the Court chosen to apply a 
different notion of jurisdiction, based on some of its own precedents. 
In the present decision the Court first of all reiterates that Article 1 
ECHR limits its scope to persons within the “jurisdiction” of the 
States Parties to the Convention, stating that “jurisdiction is a 
condition sine qua non in order for that State to be held responsible 
for acts or omissions attributable to it” (para. 97). 
The problem however is the particularly restrictive interpretation 
of jurisdiction delivered in this case, compared to previous case-law.  
Traditionally a State’s jurisdiction, for purposes of its human rights 
obligations, was assumed to be limited primarily, if not exclusively, to 
its territory. As international human rights law has evolved, it is now 
accepted that a State’s jurisdiction for human rights purposes can 
extend to persons outside its territorial limits, whenever the State 
exercises “effective control” over them, or over the territory in which 
they are located.  
With respect to the European Court of Human Rights case-law39, 
	  
procedurali avverso l’espulsione, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2008, p. 12 ff. and 
literature quoted therein.  
39 See, ex multis, G. Gaja, “Art. 1”, in Sergio Bartole, Benedetto Conforti, Guido 
Raimondi (eds.), Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti 
dell’uomo, CEDAM, Padova, 2001, p. 28; P. De Sena, La nozione di giurisdizione 
statale nei trattati sui diritti dell’uomo, Giappichelli editore, Torino, 2002; M. O’Boyle, 
“The European Convention on Human Rights and extraterritorial jurisdiction: a 
comment on ‘life after Bankovic’”, in Fons Coomans, Menno T. Kamminga, 
Extraterritorial Application of human rights treaties, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2004; E. 
Lagrange, “L’application de la Convention de Rome à des actes accomplis par les 
Etats parties en dehors du territoire national”, Revue générale de droit international 
public, 2008, p. 521 ff.; M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; R. 
Sapienza, “Art. 1”, in Sergio Bartole, Pasquale De Sena, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky (eds.), 
Commentario breve alla Convenzione europea (eds), Cedam, Padova, 2012, p. 13 ff.; S. 
Besson, “The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why 
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it is worthwhile to recall an extremely relevant statement in Issa v. 
Turkey40: “Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to 
allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the 
territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory”. A consistent implementation of this principle could have 
led to a functional approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
However, the ECtHR jurisprudence on jurisdiction is quite 
puzzling. In Banković v. Belgium 41 the Court held that the text of 
“Article 1 does not accommodate” an approach to a “cause-and-
effect” notion of jurisdiction (vigorously denying a functional 
approach); at the same time in Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom42, after 
reiterating that “A State’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is 
primarily territorial”, affirmed nonetheless the existence of jurisdiction 
“whenever the State, through its agents, exercises control and 
authority over an individual” (personal model) and “when, as a 
consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State 
exercises effective control of an area outside that national territory” 
(spatial model). In the Hirsi case the Court recalls both judgments, 
and also the Medvedyev case, which considered that de facto control 
over a ship suffices to establish the State party’s jurisdiction (even if 
the people on board were not transported on the French warship)43.  
A more ʻfunctional testʼ has been applied so far in only a few 
	  
Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2012, p. 857 ff.; S. Vezzani “Considerazioni sulla 
giurisdizione extraterritoriale ai sensi dei trattati sui diritti umani”, Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale, 2018, p. 1086 ff.. See also, with specific reference to migration cases, V. 
Moreno-Lax, “The Architecture of Functional Jurisdiction: Unpacking Contactless 
Control—On Public Powers, S.S. and Others v. Italy, and the “Operational Model” in 
this volume. 
40 ECtHR, Issa and others v. Turkey, judgment of 16 November 2004, Applic. No. 
31821/96, para. 71. See in similar terms the UN Human Rights Committee in the case 
Lopes Burgos v. Uruguay, Par. 12.3 (UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981). 
41 ECtHR, Banković and others v. Belgium, decision of 12 December 2001 [GC], 
Applic. No. 52207/99. 
42 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 2011 
[GC], Applic. No.55721/07. 
43 For more details see A. Liguori, “Some observations on the legal responsibility 
of States and International Organizations in the Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum 
Claims”, The Italian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 25, 2016, in particular p. 




cases, i.e. Xhavara v. Albania and Italy44. In this decision the Court 
seems to have adopted a “cause-and-effect” approach since, with 
reference to a collision which took place on the high seas, it admitted 
implicitly the existence of Italian jurisdiction (and excluded that of 
Albania) apparently because an Italian warship caused the sinking of a 
vessel carrying Albanian migrants: “La Cour note d’emblée que le 
naufrage du Kater I Rades a été directement provoqué par le navire de 
guerre italien Sibilla. Par conséquent, toute doléance sur ce point doit 
être considérée comme étant dirigée exclusivement contre l’Italie”. 
The same approach emerges in PAD v. Turkey45, concerning the killing 
of Iranian citizens by a Turkish helicopter, where the Court affirmed 
that “it is not required to determine the exact location of the 
impugned events, given that the Government had already admitted 
that the fire discharged from the helicopters had caused the killing of 
the applicants’ relatives” (italics added). Likewise, in the decision of 3 
June 2008, Andreou v. Turkey 46 , concerning Turkish authorities 
positioned behind the border killing a demonstrator inside the UN-
controlled area, the Court stated that “even though the applicant 
sustained her injuries in territory over which Turkey exercised no 
control, the opening of fire on the crowd from close range, which was 
the direct and immediate cause of those injuries, was such that the 
applicant must be regarded as within the jurisdiction of Turkey”.  
More recently, in Jaloud v. The Netherlands47, the Court declared 
that the applicant fell within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands 
because he passed through a checkpoint “manned by personnel under 
the command and direct supervision of a Netherlands Royal Army 
officer”. However, this last case confirms that the Court is probably 
not yet ready for a notion of “cause and effect” jurisdiction; otherwise, 
as pointed out48, “[a]ll the talk [in Jaloud] about occupation, exercise 
	  
44 ECtHR, Xhavara and others v. Albania and Italy, decision of 11 January 2001, 
applic. No. 39473/98. 
45 ECtHR, PAD and others v. Turkey, decision of 28 June 2007, applic. No. 
60167/00. 
46  ECtHR, Andreou v. Turkey, judgment of 27 October 2009, 
applic. No.45653/99. 
47 ECtHR, Jaloud v. The Netherlands, judgment of 20 November 2014, applic. No. 
47708/08. 
48 See the response of A. Sari to J. Lehmann’s post “The Use of Force against 
People Smugglers: Conflicts with Refugee Law and Human Rights Law”, European 
Journal of International Law: Talk!, 22 June 2015, http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-use-of-
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of public authority and manning checkpoints would have been quite 
unnecessary”. 
In the present case, however, none of the decisions opening a 
window to a functional approach were referred to. On the contrary, 
the Court emphasized the necessity of exceptional circumstances as 
grounds for extraterritorial jurisdiction, rejecting all the arguments of 
the applicants and of the intervening NGOs in favour of the existence 
of such circumstances in the MN case and adhering completely to the 
position of the respondent Government, supported by numerous 
Member States49. 
The applicants, after recalling that the Court’s case-law clearly 
indicated that the responsibility of the States could be engaged when 
acts by their authorities produced effects outside the national territory, 
stressed that in the present case “the Belgian State bodies were 
exercising a State function of border control”50, adding that “this was 
necessarily a manifestation of its jurisdiction, which entered into play 
regardless of where it was exercised, regardless of which authorities, 
territorial or consular, implemented them, and regardless of whether 
or not the authorities involved exercised de facto or physical control 
over the individuals concerned”51. In addition, the applicants referred 
to the case-law on expulsion, established since the ruling in the Soering 
case, which had found that a State Party to the Convention could be 
held responsible for the extraterritorial consequences of decisions 
taken by it in the event of a risk of torture or ill-treatment, or of 
failures, attributable to it, to take measures with a view to avoiding or 
preventing exposure to such risks52. 
It is also worth mentioning the written submissions in support of 
the applicants, from third Parties interveners (from now on TPI), of 
the AIRE Centre, the Dutch Council for Refugees, ECRE and the 
International Commission of Jurists. In their observations, the TPI 
emphasized that in Bankovic the Court had clearly recognised that 




49 In this case eleven States intervened in support of the Belgian government: the 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.  
50 MN decision, para. 83. 
51 Ibidem. 




could exist in cases concerning acts or omissions by diplomatic or 
consular agents when exercising a governmental function. In their 
view, since issuing visas corresponds to a prerogative of government 
power in the field of immigration control, it falls within the 
jurisdiction of the sending State and has to be exercised, in the case of 
States Parties to the Convention, in accordance with the rights and 
freedoms recognised by it, as emerges from the extensive case-law of 
the former Commission (X. v Federal Republic Germany, App no 
1611/62, Commission decision of 25 September 1965); X v. the United 
Kingdom, App. no. 7547/76, Commission decision of 15 December 
1977; M. v Denmark.; App. no. 17392/90, Commission decision of 14 
October 1992), consistent with recent case-law of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee 53  and of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights54. 
In addition, the interveners – basing their arguments on the 
Soering case and more extensively on the theory of positive obligations 
as applied in previous ECHR case-law - submitted that “State 
responsibility may be engaged when refusing treatment of a visa 
application, in circumstances where the State is or ought to be aware 
that applicant if returned faces a real risk of serious Convention 
human rights violations, in the absence of available alternatives that 
would prevent such outcome”55.  
A similar approach, in favour of a positive obligation of member 
States to issue humanitarian visas derived from article 3 ECHR if no 
other escape is possible, had already been envisaged by a former judge 
of the European Court of Human Rights, Pinto de Albuquerque. 
Indeed, in his separate opinion in the landmark Hirsi case, after 
stressing that “States cannot turn a blind eye to an evident need for 
protection”, he used as example precisely the hypothesis of a person in 
an embassy of a State party to the ECHR in danger of being tortured 
	  
53 See C. Danisi, “A “formalistic” approach to jurisdiction in the European Court 
of Human Rights’ decision on humanitarian visas: Was another interpretation 
possible?”, cit. 
54 See A. De Leo, J.Ruiz Ramos, “Comparing the Inter-American Court opinion 
on diplomatic asylum applications with M.N. and Others v. Belgium before the 




55 TPI written submissions, para. 19. 
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in his or her country, concluding that “a visa to enter the territory of 
that State has to be granted, in order to allow the launching of a 
proper asylum procedure in the receiving State. This will not be a 
merely humanitarian response, deriving from the good will and 
discretion of the State. A positive duty to protect will then arise under 
Article 3”56.  
In the MN case, however, the Strasbourg Court completely 
ignored this approach, conversely entirely aligning itself with the 
Member State’s line on jurisdiction. 
In fact the Court, despite acknowledging that the Belgian 
authorities exercised a public power in ruling on the applicants’ visa 
applications, states that “[T]he mere fact that decisions taken at 
national level had an impact on the situation of persons resident 
abroad is … not such as to establish the jurisdiction of the State 
concerned over those persons outside its territory”57, stressing that it is 
necessary to assess exceptional circumstances in order to come to the 
conclusion that Belgium was exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
respect of the applicants.  
After pointing out that “this is primarily a question of fact, which 
requires it to explore the nature of the link between the applicants and 
the respondent State and to ascertain whether the latter effectively 
exercised authority or control over them”58, the Court comes to the 
conclusion that none of the former Commission case-law precedents 
cited above (involving the actions and omissions of diplomatic agents) 
are comparable, because the connecting links which characterised 
these previous cases are not present in this case: the applicants are not 
nationals seeking to benefit from the protection of their embassy and 
at no time did the diplomatic agents exercise de facto control over the 
Syrian family, since the applicants “freely chose to present themselves 
at the Belgian Embassy in Beirut, and to submit their visa applications 
there”59 and “had then been free to leave the premises of the Belgian 
Embassy without any hindrance”60. 
	  
56 Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, judgment of 23 February 2012 [GC], applic. No. 
27765/09, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Alburquerque, p. 70. 
57 Para. 112, referring to Banković, at para. 75. 
58 Para. 113. 
59 MN decision, para. 118. 
60 In M.N. the Court took a much more restrictive approach than the one adopted 
in its precedents: as pointed out by Stoyanova (“M.N. and Others v Belgium: no 




The Court further rejects the additional argument that the 
applicants placed themselves within Belgian jurisdiction by suing 
courts at domestic level with a view to securing their entry to Belgium, 
affirming that the mere fact that an applicant brings proceedings in a 
State Party with which he has no connecting tie cannot suffice to 
establish that State’s jurisdiction over him61 and because “to find 
otherwise would amount to enshrining a near-universal application of 
the Convention on the basis of the unilateral choices of any individual, 
irrespective of where in the world they find themselves, and therefore 
to create an unlimited obligation on the Contracting States to allow 
entry to an individual who might be at risk of ill-treatment contrary to 
the Convention outside their jurisdiction”62. 
This last statement unveils the real ratio at the basis of the decision, 
masked under a formalistic approach which has selectively picked only 
some of ECHR previous case-law, and surprisingly neglected other 
relevant ones (the deafening silence on a landmark decision such as 
the Hirsi case is indeed meaningful63).  
	  
Court introduced “a distinction between ‘State’s nationals or their property’, on the 
one hand, and ‘certain persons’ over whom a State exercises physical power and 
control, on the other”, which was not present either in Al-Skeini (see para. 134), nor 
in the highly criticized Bankovic decision, clearly going against “other, more optimistic 
assessments of the public powers doctrine to situations of migration control” (see T. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, N. F. Tan, “Adjudicating old questions in refugee law: MN and 
Others v Belgium and the limits of extraterritorial refoulement”, cit., referring in 
particular to T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, J.C. Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World 
of Cooperative Deterrence”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,, 2015, pp. 266 
ff.). 
61 To this end the Court refers to its own decision of 28 January 2014 in the case 
Abdul Wahab Khan v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 11987/11, para. 28. 
62 The Court adds that such an extension of the Convention’s scope of application 
would also have the effect of negating the well-established principle of public 
international law according to which the States Parties, subject to their treaty 
obligations, including the Convention, have the right to control the entry, residence 
and expulsion of aliens. At this point of the judgments the Strasbourg Court recalls 
the ruling of the CJEU in X. and X v. Belgium, examined above, i.e. that the issuing of 
long-stay visas falls solely within the scope of the Member States’ national law (para. 
124). 
63 As pointed out (E. Lenain, “Il était une fois, un visa obligatoire qui n’existait 
pas. Quand les Cours européennes dansent la polka autour des lacunes du droit”, cit., 
p. 8), mentioning this judgment would have confirmed that the scope of the principle 
of non-refoulement is not restricted to removal from the territory of the defendant 
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With respect to jurisdiction, the Strasbourg Court has undeniably 
adopted a self-restraint position, because, as suggested by scholars, 
other approaches to jurisdiction are indeed possible64. 
In this paper we will focus in particular on one of these alternative 
approaches, concerning the notion of jurisdiction in relation to 
positive obligations, widely developed by the third interveners in their 
written submissions before the Court.  
In fact, in their submissions the TPI pointed out that State 
responsibility under Article 3 is engaged when state authorities “fail to 
take preventive measures to protect the individual from inhuman and 
degrading treatment. This includes, amongst others, all the steps that 
the State can reasonably be expected to take to protect individuals, in 
the case of a particular threat to an individual or a group, from harm 
to their physical integrity of which it knew or ought to have known”65. 
To this end they explicitly quote the case Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey66 ( 
“State responsibility may therefore be engaged where the framework 
of law fails to provide adequate protection […] or where the 
authorities fail to take reasonable steps to avoid a risk of ill-treatment 
about which they knew or ought to have known”) and E v. United 
Kingdom67 ( “a failure to take reasonably available measures which 
could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating 
the harm is sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State”), 
coming to the conclusion that – under the specific circumstances of 
the case –, the refusal to grant a humanitarian visa would be a violation 
of positive obligations inherent in article 3 ECHR. Indeed, if 
“[c]onduct of non-admittance of an individual in need of international 
protection without an effective opportunity given to apply for 
protection may thus constitute constructive refoulement 68  under 
	  
state or non-admission at the borders but is extended to anyone within the jurisdiction 
of the States Parties, no matter where he is.  
64 See literature quoted at note n.39 and most recently Moreno- Lax in this 
volume. 
65 Para 11. 
66 Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 22535/93 (ECtHR, 28 March 2000), para 
115. 
67 E. and Others v. United Kingdom, Appl no 33218/96 (ECtHR, 26 November 
2012), para 99. 
68 On the notion of “constructive refoulement” see P. Mathew, in S. Juss (ed.), 
Research Handbook on International Refugee Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 




international law”69, this is particularly true in the present case because 
the applicants represent the paradigmatic family entitled to 
international protection and because denying visas in this specific 
circumstance surely exposed them to inhuman treatment as Lebanon 
was not able to offer appropriate reception conditions to them and the 
family’s only alternative was to return to Syria (or face a dangerous 
journey through the Mediterranean Sea).  
If the Court had decided to consider the approach based on the 
theory of positive obligations, it might have referred to some 
interesting precedent case-law which could have paved the way for 
establishing jurisdiction in the present case. 
Indeed, as pointed out, “while it is counter-intuitive to assume that 
the requirement to find jurisdiction may be easier with respect to 
positive obligations than the traditional, ʻnegative dimensionʼ of 
human rights, some paradoxical elements of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR may indeed point in this direction”70 .  
In fact, according to the circumstances of the case, the theory of 
positive obligations could be a useful tool for holding outsourcing 
States responsible, because in some cases the Strasbourg Court has 
been ready to accept a lower threshold for jurisdiction, disentangled 
from “effective control”, in claims related to positive obligations71. 
Among the judgments in which the ECtHR adopted such a notion of 
jurisdiction with respect to positive obligations, the most relevant are 
Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia72, Manoilescu and Dubrescu v. 
Romania and Russia73 and Treska v. Albania and Italy74, where the 
Court affirmed in general terms that: “Even in the absence of effective 
control of a territory outside its borders75, the State still has a positive 
obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, 
economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and 
	  
69 Para. 18 of the TPI. 
70  H. P. Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 404. 
71 Ibidem; see also M. den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2012, p. 48 and A. Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization 
of Border Controls-European State Responsibility, cit., p. 38 ff. 
72 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], judgment of 8 July 2004, 
applic. No. 48787/99. 
73 Decision of 3 March 2005, applic. No. 60861/00 
74 Decision of 29 June 2006, applic. No. 26937/04. 
75 See Treska v. Albania and Italy, cit. Italics added. 
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are in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention” . As pointed out, the formula 
used in these cases supports the conclusion that “the duty to take 
preventive or other positive action in respect of human rights 
interferences taking place in a foreign territory derives primarily from 
the influence a State wields over a particular situation, therewith the 
‘power’, or capability, it has to prevent the occurrence of human rights 
violations” 76, and that “the ECtHR is at the least receptive for claims 
relating to positive obligations in an extraterritorial setting”77. In other 
words, in these decisions the Court explicitly disregarded “the test of 




4. Conclusions  
 
In conclusion, the two Courts have come to the same outcome by 
different reasoning: no possibility for the Syrian family to reach 
Belgium, notwithstanding the well-known fact that the family was in 
danger of incurring inhuman treatment in the event of refusal of a 
humanitarian visa at the embassy.  
	  
76 See M. den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum, cit., p. 81, adding that 
“The establishment of the scope of this duty requires an inquiry, on the one hand, of 
the substantive international obligations of the state and the duties of due diligence 
inherent in them; and, on the other hand, an examination of the legal and factual 
capabilities of the state to change the course of events”. See also Ilascu and Others, 
para. 392-393. 
77 See M. den Heijer, R. Lawson, “Extraterritorial Human Rights and the Concept 
of ‘Jurisdiction’”, in Martin Scheinin, Malcolm Langford, Willem van Genugten, 
Wouter Vandenhole (eds.), Global justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 188. 
78 See C. Rozakis, “The Territorial Scope of Human Rights Obligations: The Case 
of the European Convention on Human Rights”, in The Status of International 
Treaties on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2005, pp. 70-72; see also V. Tzevelekos, P. 
Proukaki, “Migrants at Sea: A Duty of Plural States to Protect (Extraterritorially)?”, 
Nordic Journal of Int. Law, 2017, p. 427 ff. Contra K.M. Larsen, The Human Rights 
Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 
220-224; see also S. Besson, “Due Diligence and Extraterritorial Human Rights 





The impression is that both courts made the fear of the intervening 
States their own, despite the special vulnerability of the applicants: in 
both proceedings as the case concerned a family from Syria with minor 
children79, each option at the applicants’ disposal in case of refusal – 
widespread violence in the event of a return to Syria, harsh living 
conditions in Lebanon or high risks of inhuman treatment and even 
death in the case of an irregular crossing to Europe through the 
Mediterranean sea – exposed them to a treatment in breach of art. 3 
ECHR (and of art. 4 of the ECFR). Had the two European Courts 
reached a different conclusion in the cases under review, member 
States would have abided by their obligation to issue a humanitarian 
visa in the future only in extreme circumstances80, since not everyone 
applying for visas from embassies would be in a similar situation. 
Unfortunately, both Courts recurred to a formalistic approach 
which led the Strasbourg Court to deny its jurisdiction, on the one 
hand (although the endorsement for a different position from a former 
judge – Pinto de Albuquerke, and interesting precedents supporting a 
different approach to jurisdiction when positive obligations are at 
stake, both in its case law and in other regional and universal human 
rights bodies81); and the Luxembourg Court, on the other, to adopt a 
self-restraint decision, stating that the granting of humanitarian visas 
	  
79 As pointed out (C. Danisi, A “formalistic” approach to jurisdiction in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ decision on humanitarian visas: Was another 
interpretation possible?”, cit.), the principle of the best interests of the child is totally 
absent in the MN decision despite the involvement of children. 
80 See D. Schmalz, “Will the ECtHR Shake up the European Asylum System?”, 
cit., referring to Mengozzi’s opinion. 
81 On recent developments with respect to the interpretation of “jurisdiction” 
(mostly concerning positive human rights duties) in other regional and universal 
human rights bodies see also D. Desierto, “The ICESCR as a Legal Constraint on 
State Regulation of Business, Trade and Investment: Notes from CESCR General 
Comment No. 24 (August 2017)”, European Journal of International Law: Talk!, 13 
September 2017 <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icescr-as-a-legal-constraint-on-state-
regulation-of-business-trade-and-investment-notes-from-cescr-general-comment-no-
24-august-2017/>(07/20); A. Berkes, “A New Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Link 
Recognised by the IACtHR”, European Journal of International Law: Talk!, 28 March 
2018 <https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-new-extraterritorial-jurisdictional-link-recognised-
by-the-iacthr/>(07/20); D. Møgster, “Towards Universality: Activities Impacting the 
Enjoyment of the Right to Life and the Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR”, 
European Journal of International Law: Talk!, 27 November 2018 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/towards-universality-activities-impacting-the-enjoyment-of-
the-right-to-life-and-the-extraterritorial-application-of-the-iccpr/>(07/20). 
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does not fall within the scope of EU law but solely of national law 
(notwithstanding the fact that Advocate General Mengozzi had 
convincingly suggested a different possible interpretation).  
The outcome reveals the incoherence of European policies: 
although the rhetoric discourse, especially in official EU documents, is 
in favour of “safe passages” for those in need of international 
protection, the possibility of a practical legal path – such as the one at 
stake in the present decisions (applying for humanitarian visas at 
embassies) is in the end left to the discretion of the single member 
States. Unfortunately, the attempt of the European Parliament to 
reform the Visa Code “for the benefit of greater legislative coherence 
by combining the subject of humanitarian visas (access) with that of 
asylum procedures (after access)”82 met the strong opposition of the 
Council and the reluctance of the Commission; as a result the recent 
recast of the Visa Code does not introduce rules concerning the issue 
of humanitarian visas83 and the later Parliament’s legislative impulse84 
has been left without a concrete follow-up85.  
In this context the self-restraint of both European Courts, passing 
the buck to the States, and refusing to intervene at least in such 
paradigmatic cases as the ones at stake in the abovementioned 
proceedings, in order to avoid the violation of a fundamental (and 
absolute) rights, such as the prohibition of torture and inhuman 
	  
82 See J.Y. Carlier, L. Cools, E. Frasca, F. Gatta, S. Sarolea, “Humanitarian visa: 
does the suspended step of the stork become a hunting permit?”, cit. 
83  Regulation (EU) 2019/1155 amending Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). See N. Vavoula, “Of Carrots 
and Sticks: A Punitive Shift in the Reform of the Visa Code”, EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law and Policy, 5 September 2018, available at 
<http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/of-carrots-and-sticksa-punitive-shift-in-the-reform-of-
the-visa-code >(07/20). 
84  See European Parliament Resolution of 11 December 2018 with 
recommendations to the Commission on Humanitarian Visas (2018/2271(INL), 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-
0423_EN.html>(07/20). 
85 The Commission has declared that its Proposal on resettlement meets the 
Parliament’s recommendations for the creation of protected entry channels, adding 
that “it is politically not feasible to create a subjective right to request admission and 
to be admitted”: see Follow up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution 
with recommendations to the Commission on Humanitarian Visas, (SP(2019)149), 





treatment – creates a dangerous vacuum of protection not only for 
people seeking humanitarian visas at embassies, but also for all those 
situations that are the foreseeable consequences of the increasingly 
frequent strategies of externalization of border controls at European 




86 See A. Liguori, Migration Law and the Externalization of Border Controls-
European State Responsibility, cit. and literature quoted therein. So far, the outcome of 
another important case concerning the consequences of externalization, the pending 
case S.S. and Others v. Italy (see V. Moreno-Lax, “The Architecture of Functional 
Jurisdiction: Unpacking Contactless Control—On Public Powers, S.S. and Others v. 
Italy, and the “Operational Model” in this volume), is indeed at risk, also in light of 
the latest developments in the Strasbourg case-law. As pointed out, the recent trio 
(Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary , N.D. and N.T. v. Spain and M.N. and others v. Belgium) 
“point to a new and more cautious direction of the Court in regard to migration-
related rights under the ECHR” (T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, N. F. Tan, “Adjudicating 
old questions in refugee law: MN and Others v Belgium and the limits of 
extraterritorial refoulement”, cit.). 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION: 
UNPACKING CONTACTLESS CONTROL –  
ON PUBLIC POWERS, S.S. AND OTHERS V. ITALY,  









Debates on the extraterritorial reach of human rights are often 
channeled through debates on jurisdiction. In substance, it is the 
exercise of jurisdiction that determines whether a state can be held 
accountable for human rights violations in a specific situation, hence 
the importance of defining the term and identifying the factors 
through which it can be ascertained. This is particularly true in the 
context of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),1 
where the notion is construed as a “threshold” criterion that 
determines its applicability in concrete cases,2 but it is a common 
feature across the field of international human rights instruments.3 
	  
∗ Queen Mary University of London. This is a reprint of the article published as: 
V. Moreno-Lax, ‘The Architecture of Functional Jurisdiction: Unpacking Contactless 
Control – On Public Powers, S.S. and Others v. Italy, and the “Operational Model”’, 
German Law Journal, 2020, pp. 385-416. 
1 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4 
1950, C.E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR].  
2 Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom [GC] 53 E.H.R.R. 18, para. 130, 2011. 
See also Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, para. 74 (7 July 2011), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612> (06/20). Speaking of a “necessary 
condition” instead, see N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], Apps. 8675/15 and 8697/15, 
para. 102 (13 February 2020), <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-201353> 
(06/20). 
3  For a thorough discussion and further references, see M. Milanovic, 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011. See also R. Wilde, “The Extraterritorial Application of International 
Human Rights Law on Civil and Political Rights”, in N. Rodley, S. Sheeran (eds.), 
Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law, 2013, p. 635; M. Langford 
et al. (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in International Law, 2013; M. Gibney, S. Skogly (eds.), Universal 
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Ultimately, what these discussions reveal is a tension between 
competing conceptions of the mission and rationale of human rights, 
whether seen as essentially underpinned by an universalist vocation or 
as fundamentally constrained by national borders as key delineators of 
state powers and state obligations.  
Adjudicators, particularly at the European Court of Human 
Rights, have reflected this dialectic in their judgments, expanding the 
scope of human rights provisions to situations outside national 
territory, but over which states exhibit high levels of “effective 
control,” adapting the territorial model to extraterritorial settings. 
Their findings, however, do not follow a straightforward, fundamental 
tenet, and have generated confusion as for what constitutes “control” 
that can be deemed “effective” and thus tantamount to an exercise of 
jurisdiction in the individual circumstances. Rather than “apprais[ing] 
the facts against [a set of] immutable principles,” the Court has been 
criticized for “fashioning doctrines which somehow seem to 
accommodate the facts,” but reach conclusions in a piecemeal way.4 
To overcome this limitation, several authors have suggested 
alternative approaches. Lawson, for instance, has done so by reference 
to relative control and the cause-and-effect relationship between state 
action and foreign territory or persons abroad, proposing that states 
be considered responsible for the consequences of their conduct 
wherever performed5—somewhat equating the ability to violate rights 
with the duty not to violate them, without expounding how to avoid 
the conflation between capability and obligation. Others, like 
Milanovic, rely on the nature and content of obligations and whether 
they entail positive or negative duties, presuming that the latter are 
easier to comply with offshore and should therefore be ubiquitously 
respected—as if the distinction between positive and negative duties 
	  
Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia, 2010; M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising 
World. Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp, 
2009. 
4 Al-Skeini, 53 E.H.R.R. 18, Concurring Opinion of Judge Bonello at para. 8. 
5 R. Lawson, “Life after Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights”, in F. Coomans, T. Kamminga (eds.), 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004, p. 
83, 20. See also Applicants in Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, 11 B.H.R.C. 
435, 2001. 
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was warranted, as a matter of principle, or easy to operate, as a matter 
of practice.6 
These propositions, as plausible as they may be, leave a significant 
amount of unpredictability, which may lead to unsatisfactory 
outcomes. They fail to provide a coherent construction of jurisdiction 
that is applicable across the board, within and beyond borders, and 
that is principled and non-contingent on levels of physical control or 
the legal characterization of the nature of obligations (as positive or 
negative). So, contributing to this discussion, but offering an 
alternative reading, this article proposes a new conceptualization, 
taking extraterritorial maritime migration multi-actor interventions as 
a case in point. 
Starting from pronouncements of international human rights 
courts and treaty bodies, the goal is to distil a principled and workable 
concept of jurisdiction that reconciles the universal ethos of human 
rights with the existence of national borders in an inter-dependent, 
globalized world. With this in mind, the objective is to unpack the 
normative premise unifying the generally accepted models of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (that is, “control over an area,” or 
territorial, and “State agent authority,” or personal) and, on that 
foundation, propose a paradigm that resolves the current difficulties 
with the appraisal of extraterritorial action. 
This model, which I call “functional”—in a sense somewhat 
different from the one implied by other authors, as discussed in Part 
D—aspires to provide a more intelligible approach to the 
establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction, highlighting the 
importance of the normative foundation of sovereign authority overall, 
whether exercised territorially or abroad. It is predicated on the 
exercise of public powers, such as those ordinarily assumed by a 
territorial sovereign, 7  taking the form of policy delivery and/or 
operational action translating into “situational control.” 
Against this background, I will assert that instances of 
“contactless” control by an ECHR party,8 exercised through remote 
	  
6 See M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, cit., p. 
210 ff. 
7 Al-Skeini, 53 E.H.R.R. 18, para. 149. 
8 The argument will elaborate upon V. Moreno-Lax, M. Giuffré, “The Rise of 
Consensual Containment: From “Contactless Control” to “Contactless Responsibility” 
for Migratory Flows”, in S.S. Juss (ed.), Research Handbook on International Refugee 
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management techniques and/or in cooperation with a local 
administration acting as a proxy, 9  may nonetheless amount to 
“effective” control and engage Convention obligations—whether it be 
exercised over persons, territory, or specific situations abroad. The 
role of knowledge and the extent of due diligence owed to avoid 
prospective harm will be considered as well, in view of conduct 
occurred “during the course of, or contiguous to, security [or 
equivalent] operations” performed under state direction. 10  Such 
“operations,” qua complex mechanisms of governance that implement 
broader policies, with a planning, rollout and post-implementation 
phase—rather than random, one-off, haphazard encounters between a 
state and its potential subjects11—are key to the conceptualization of 
functional jurisdiction posited herein. 
The pending case of S.S. and Others v. Italy, lodged by the Global 
Legal Action Network (GLAN), in collaboration with the Italian 
Association of Immigration Lawyers (ASGI), where I act as lead 
counsel, will illustrate the argumentation. 12  I will claim that the 
constellation of events of November 6, 2017, recounted in Part B and 
contextualized in Part C, falls within Italy’s “jurisdiction” under 
Article 1 ECHR, in a way comparable to the Hirsi case.13 While in 
Hirsi a “push-back” operation was conducted directly by Italian 
forces, here the same underlying policy was carried out by proxy.14 As 
	  
Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, p. 81. For a similar argument on military 
occupation but without “boots on the ground”, see O. Ben-Naftali, Y. Shany, “Living 
in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories”, Israel 
L.Rev., 2003–2004, p.37; O. Ben-Naftal et al. (eds.), “Illegal Occupation: Framing the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2005, p. 551. 
9  Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Apps. 43370/04, 8252/05, and 
18454/06, para. 106 (19 October 2012), <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
114082> (06/20). 
10 Al-Skeini, 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at para. 150. 
11 This has been discarded in Bankovic, supra note 5, para. 75. Further on these 
“encounters,” see I. Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations 
of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016. 
12 S.S. and Others v. Italy, App. No. 21660/18, communicated on 26 June 2019 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194748> (06/20). 
13 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (23 February 2012), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109231> (06/20). 
14 On “pull-backs”, see further N. Markard, “The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal 
Limits on EU Migration Control by Third Countries”, European Journal of Int. Law, 
2016, p. 591. 
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Part E will expound in detail, Italy exercised—though remotely15—a 
sufficient degree of “effective control” over the applicants’ fate,16 
reaching the jurisdictional threshold of the Convention. 
This will serve to clarify the limits of multi-actor cooperation that 
contributes, or leads, to human rights violations through capacity 
building, financial transfers, and/or intervention in the command and 
control structure of a partner State. It will demonstrate that human 
rights responsibility can be engaged through consensual measures of 
pre-emption and containment of unwanted migration,17 challenging 
systems of “contactless control” of irregular flows, like the one built by 
Italy with Libya, which impedes access to protection by refugees and 
others in need. Under the functional approach, the elimination of 
direct physical contact with the individuals concerned no longer 
amounts to the severance of a possible jurisdictional link that may 
trigger human rights obligations. On the contrary, the functional 
understanding maintains that operational power projected and 
actioned abroad, like other methods of territorial and/or personal 
control, amounts to an exercise of jurisdiction. 
The wider ramifications of this model for armed conflict, peace 
building programs, development policies, or democratization efforts, 
beyond the immediate migration by sea terrain, should be duly 
considered and problematized in further research. It is anticipated 
that this new understanding of jurisdiction—which I deem implicit in 
the existing extraterritorial bases already recognized in international 
human rights law—can have revolutionary implications and serve to 
close important accountability gaps,18 but it will also give rise to new 
questions around consolidating practices of collaboration in the 
management of cross-regional challenges, including disaster relief or 
the consequences of the climate crisis, with an impact throughout the 
	  
15 Further on techniques of “remote control”, see D.S. FitzGerald, “Remote 
Control of Migration: Theorising Territoriality, Shared Coercion and Deterrence”, 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (advance access), 2019, 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1680115> (06/20). 
16 Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, App. No. 48787/99, para. 392 (8 July 2004), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61886> (06/20). 
17 See, e.g., T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, J.C. Hathaway, “Non-refoulement in a World 
of Cooperative Deterrence”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2015, 53, p. 235. 
18 See I. Mann, “Maritime Legal Black Holes: Migration and Rightlessness in 
International Law”, European Journal of Int. Law, 2018, p. 347. 
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legal sectors implicated in states’ international relations. The limits and 
possible objections to this model will therefore be addressed in Part F. 
 
 
2. The Events of November 6, 2017 
 
The facts of S.S. have been reconstructed in detail by the research 
hub Forensic Oceanography, 19  through evidence collected by the 
Search and Rescue Observatory for the Mediterranean 
(SAROBMED),20 on the basis of materials provided by the search and 
rescue (SAR) NGO Sea Watch. The evidence includes video footage 
and audio recordings of the event, survivors’ testimonies, interviews 
with key actors, and complementary documentation gathered from a 
variety of official sources. There is, however, no commonly agreed 
account of how the situation unfolded, since the Italian Government is 
yet to respond to the applicants’ allegations and the Court is still to 
render a decision on the case. The description below, therefore, 
presents the facts as they were communicated to Italy.21 
The case concerns the LYCG’s interception/rescue of a migrant 
dinghy on the high seas, carrying around 150 persons, including the 
applicants, which had departed the Tripoli area around midnight on 
November 5, 2017, and began to capsize soon after. The Italian 
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) located in Rome was 
	  
19  See C. Heller, L. Pezzani, Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU’s Undeclared 
Operation to Stem Migration across the Mediterranean, Forensic Oceanography, 4 May 
2018, <https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2018-
05-07-FO-Mare-Clausum-full-EN.pdf> (06/20) [hereinafter Mare Clausum Report]; 
for the visual minute-by-minute reconstruction of events, see C. Heller, L. Pezzani, 
Mare Clausum: The Sea Watch v. Libyan Coast Guard Case, Forensic Architecture, 
(May 4 2018), <https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/seawatch-vs-the-libyan-
coastguard> (06/20) [hereinafter Mare Clausum Video]. 
20 The Search and Rescue Observatory for the Mediterranean (SAROBMED) is 
an international, multi-disciplinary consortium of researchers, civil society groups, and 
other organisations working in the field of cross-border maritime migration, either on 
the ground, or through advocacy, research and/or strategic litigation that records and 
documents human rights violations occurring at sea as a result, or in the course, of 
rescue/interdiction operations and of which the current author is the coordinator, 
<https://sarobmed.org/> (06/20). 
21 See (only in French) Requête no 21660/18 S.S. et autres contre l’Italie introduite 
le 3 mai 2018, Communiquée le 26 juin 2019, Exposé des faits, 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194748> (06/20). 
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first to receive its distress signal, which it communicated to “all ships 
transiting in the area,” including the Sea Watch 3 (SW3) and the Ras 
Al Jadar of the LYCG, requesting that the dinghy be assisted.22 MRCC 
Rome provided exact coordinates about an hour later.23 Meanwhile, 
the dinghy had started sinking. 
Survivors recall a Portuguese military aircraft—belonging to the 
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia24—overflying and circling them 
several times, throwing down lifejackets. A French warship, Premier 
Maître l’Her, also under EUNAVFOR MED command, and an Italian 
navy helicopter, within the Italian Operation Mare Sicuro,25 were in 
close proximity. It was only about another hour later that the SW3 
and the LYCG arrived on site. Apparently, the LYCG made it first, 
but did not assist immediately. By contrast, the SW3 crew started 
rescue procedures right away, assuming on-scene command (OSC), a 
role to which the LYCG objected – although the LYCG vessel was 
initially unresponsive to radio communication and lacked the 
necessary equipment, including rigid-hulled inflatable boats 
(RHIBs).26 
The survivors recall the Ras Al Jadar did not help them. Instead, 
	  
22 See copy of Inmarsat distress signal received by the SW3, in Mare Clausum 
Report, supra note 19, p.89.  
23 See copy of Hydrolant message received by the SW3, in Mare Clausum Report, 
supra note 19, p.90. 
24 This is the EU maritime security mission tasked with the fight against human 
trafficking and migrant smuggling from Libya, launched in 2015. Council Decision 
2015/778/CFSP of 18 May 2015 on a European Union Military Operation in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), 2015, O.J. (L 122/31). The 
unpublished EUNAVFOR MED documents cited hereinafter have been leaked to the 
press and are available via Z. Campbell, Europe’s Deadly Migration Strategy: Officials 
Knew EU Military Operation Made Mediterranean Crossing More Dangerous, Politico 
(28 February 2019), <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-deadly-migration-
strategy-leaked-documents/> (06/20). 
25 This is the Italian maritime security operation launched in March 2015, in 
replacement of the mixed rescue-security mission Mare Nostrum. See Ministero della 
Difesa, Operazione Mare Sicuro, 19 June 2015, 
<http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/NazionaliInCorso/MareSicuro/Pagine/defa
ult.aspx> (06/20). 
26 It was latter claimed by a LYCG spokesman that the LYCG RHIBs are 
dysfunctional. See S. Scherer, A. Lewis, Exclusive: Italy Plans Big Handover of Sea 
Rescues to Libyan Coastguard, Reuters, 15 December 2017, 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-exclusive/exclusive-italy-
plans-big-handover-of-sea-rescues-to-libya-coastguard-idUSKBN1E91SG> (06/20). 
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the crew “took pictures and cursed.”27 Its entry into the rescue theatre 
“created a big wave, which made people sink and others drift away,”28 
including the child of one of the applicants. The LYCG crew then 
“beat people with ropes who were in the water.” 29  They also 
established contact with the SW3, “inviting her to stay away,”30 and 
stating that “[w]e are now responsible for this rescue.”31 The SW3 
rejected the proposition, informing the LYCG that “[w]e have orders 
from MRCC [to assist the dinghy in distress].”32 
It is unclear what the orders were. It appears that MRCC Rome 
had communicated by phone with the LYCG Joint Operation Room 
(JOR) in Tripoli. 33  From the transcript of the conversation, it 
transpires that MRCC Rome had directly asked the official in charge 
to assume OSC and that he “confirmed ‘yes’ the LYCG will conduct 
the operation and assume OSC.”34 Generally, as per the official’s 
account, the LYCG “are in contact 24/7 with MRCC Rome.” It is 
MRCC Rome who “provide[s] all information about SAR’, including 
“all distress signals” – which, as the next section expounds, the LYCG 
has no infrastructure to systematically register and further 
disseminate.35 
	  
27  Testimonies of survivors (on file). Confirming: U.N. Office of the High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Libya, and the Effectiveness 
of Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Measures Received by the Government of 
Libya – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/37/46, para. 46 (21 February 2018). 
28 Testimonies of survivors (on file). 
29 Id. For similar practices in other incidents, see, e.g., B. Trew, T. Kington, Video 
Shows Libyan Coastguard Whipping Rescued Migrants, The Times, 14 February 2017, 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/video-shows-libyan-coastguard-whipping-
rescued-migrants-6d8g2jgz6> (06/20). 
30 EUNAVFOR MED, Monitoring Mechanism Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, 
Monitoring Report October 2017 – January 2018 [hereinafter LYCG Monitoring 
Report], Annex C, p. 3 (on file). 
31 Audio recording of the SW3’s bridge communications (November 6 2017) (on 
file). 
32 Id. 
33 LYCG Monitoring Report, supra note 30, Annex C, p.3.  
34 Transcript of interview with Brigadier M. Abdel Samad (10 November 2017) 
(on file), also cited in Mare Clausum Report, supra note 19, p.94. 
35 Id. The information has been corroborated in a second interview, undertaken 
on Mar. 23, 2018 (on file). Confirming, see also EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly 
Report 1 November 2016 – 31 May 2017, p.8 (on file), reporting how “MRCC 
[Rome] . . . requested the Libyan Coastguard to assume responsibility for the 
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While the LYCG vessel approached the dinghy, the SW3 had 
lowered two of its RHIBs to reach out to migrants scattered around at 
risk of being lost. The LYCG vessel deployed a rope instead, only 
after several persons had already passed away, causing the dinghy to 
tip and others to fall into the water.36 Amidst the chaos, some climbed 
on board the Ras Al Jadar unaided, including several of the applicants. 
Others, fearing for themselves, swam towards the SW3 RHIBs. Video 
footage shows how the LYCG shouted and threw objects at them, 
endangering rescue procedures. This caused the SW3 RHIBs to 
retreat, and several other persons to drift and drown.37 Regarding 
those on board the Ras Al Jadar, including some of the applicants, 
LYCG crewmembers used a rope to tie them up and beat them, 
pointing firearms in their direction.38 Unable to establish order, the 
LYCG patrol speeded up abruptly to leave the scene, leaving one 
person hanging on the flank of the ship, who was only recovered after 
repeated calls by the Italian military helicopter.39 
In the interim, six of the applicants managed to jump overboard 
and regain the SW3, which, in total, rescued 59 of all survivors and 
took them to Italy. The body of the child of one of the applicants was 
	  
coordination of the search and rescue operation” of May 10, 2017. See also U.N. 
Support Mission in Libya & U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, 
Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the Human Rights Situation of Migrants and 
Refugees in Libya, at p.17 (20 December 2018), reporting an interview where a LYCG 
spokesperson confirmed that coordination of SAR operations takes place “with the 
support of the MCCR [i.e., Rome MRCC]” and that the distress calls they receive and 
respond to are “coming through Italy,” 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/LibyaMigrationReport.pdf> 
(06/20). 
36 See C. Heller et al. “It’s an Act of Murder”: How Europe Outsources Suffering as 
Migrants Drown, New York Times, (26 December 2018), 
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/26/opinion/europe-migrant-crisis-
mediterranean-libya.html> (06/20).  
37 See Sea Watch, Update: Beweismaterial für unverantwortliches Verhalten der 
Libyschen Küstenwache, undated, <https://sea-watch.org/update-beweise-libysche-
kuestenwache/> (06/20). 
38 U.N. S.C., Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya, U.N. Doc. S/2018/140, para. 49, (12 February 2018), 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s2018140.php> 
(06/20). 
39 Sea Watch, EXKLUSIVE [sic]: Full incident of 06 November 2017 with the 
Libyan Coast Guard (13 November 2017), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_phI-
f_yFXQ> (06/20). 
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retrieved too, making it the second infant known to have been lost in 
the commotion. The remaining two applicants staying on the Ras Al 
Jadar were taken to the Tajura camp in Libya,40 where they were 
abused for over a month.41 From there, they were returned to Nigeria 
after agreeing to “voluntary repatriation,” as the only alternative to 
indefinite detention they were offered.42 Two witnesses, who had been 




3. The Bigger Picture of Italy–Libya Relations 
 
The involvement of the LYCG in S.S. is not an isolated event and 
must be appraised against its wider context. It is part of a broader 
plan, in which Italian (and EU) authorities have invested vastly, to 
establish a Libyan SAR and interdiction capacity so they can assume 
responsibility for rescue (and disembarkation) and stymie irregular 
	  




41 On the treatment of detainees, see among many others U.N. Office of the High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, Detained and Dehumanised – Report on Human Rights 
Abuses Against Migrants in Libya (13 December 2016), 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.p
df> (06/20); Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (CoE CommHR), 
EU Agreements with Third Countries Must uphold Human Rights (2 February 2017), 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/eu-agreements-with-third-countries-
must-uphold-human-rights> (06/20); U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-
General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2312, 2016, U.N. Doc. S/2017/761 (7 
September 2017); U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights & U.N. 
Support Mission in Libya, Abuse Behind Bars: Arbitrary and Unlawful Detention in 
Libya (April 2018), 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/AbuseBehindBarsArbitraryUnlaw
ful_EN.pdf> (06/20). 
42 I. Leghtas, “Death Would Have Been Better”: Europe Continues to Fail Refugees 
and Migrants in Libya, Refugees International Field Report, at pp.14–19 (April 2018), 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/5ad3ceae03ce
641bc8ac6eb5/1523830448784/2018+Libya+Report+PDF.pdf> (06/20). 
43 These two persons filed a separate application, once GLAN was able to collect 
their powers of attorney in Libya. Their case reference is C.O. and A.J. v. Italy, Appl. 
40396/18 (not yet communicated). 
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migration across the Central Mediterranean. Efforts date back to the 
early 2000s,44 with the 2008 Treaty of Friendship of the Berlusconi-
Gaddafi period marking a particularly significant inflection point.45 
But they have continued in the post-Gaddafi era, with Italy providing 
key logistic, financial, political, and operative support. 
 
3.1. The Legal and Political Framework 
 
The 2008 Treaty of Friendship, as developed in the Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) of February 2017,46 is the pivotal agreement, 
providing legal coverage to the Italian-Libyan cooperation in the field 
of irregular migration. It specifically buttresses the re-establishment of 
a Libyan Navy and Coast Guard (LN/LCG), with Italy assuming “a 
leading role.”47 
The Treaty contains a provision, in Article 19, calling on both 
parties to intensify their collaboration in the establishment of an 
integrated system of frontier surveillance in Libya, for the Italian 
actors with the requisite technological competence to administer, 
committing Italy to pay half of the cost, with the EU bearing the other 
half.48 The provision also explicitly commits the parties to jointly 
define actions to “stem irregular migration flows”49 – with no mention 
	  
44 Listing the different documents and reconstructing the history of migration 
management cooperation during this period, see E. Paoletti, “A Critical Analysis of 
Migration Policies in the Mediterranean: The Case of Italy, Libya and the EU”, 
Ramses Working Paper 12/09, European Studies Centre, Oxford (April 2009). For the 
book-length elaboration, see E. Paoletti, The Migration of Power and North-South 
Inequalities: The Case of Italy and Libya, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010. 
45 Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione tra la Repubblica italiana e la 
Grande Giamahiria araba libica popolare socialista (30 August 2008), 
<https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2009/02/18/009G0015/sg> (06/20) 
[hereinafter Treaty of Friendship]. 
46 Memorandum d'intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto 
all’immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento 
della sicurezza delle frontier tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana (2 February 
2017), <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/it-libya-memo-immigration-
border-security-2-2-17.pdf > (06/20) [hereinafter MoU]. 
47  Ministero degli affari esteri, La Strategia Italiana Nel Mediterraneo, p. 21 
(December 2017), <https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2017/12/med-maeci-
ita.pdf> (06/20) [hereinafter MAE Report]. 
48 Treaty of Friendship art. 19. 
49 Id. art. 19(3). 
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of human rights obligations. While the implementation of the Treaty 
led to the joint push-back campaign conducted in 2009, and for which 
Italy was condemned in Hirsi,50 cooperation was halted during the 
civil war period. 
The 2017 MoU has revived the Treaty of Friendship by expanding 
on its Article 19.51 It sets up, on that basis, specific structures of 
collaboration, including a “Joint [Italy-Libya] Commission” charged 
with the definition of priorities, funding needs, implementation 
strategies, and monitoring actions.52 The ultimate goal remains to 
“stem irregular migrant flows”53- again, with no reference to human 
rights. To that end, the division of labor foresees that Italy provide the 
financial, technical, technological and other means, specifically to the 
LYCG. 54  The financing of detention centers, the training of its 
personnel, and overall support to return and readmission from Libya 
is also part of the agreement.55And Article 4 reiterates that it is for 
Italy, including via EU funding, to cover the expense.56 
Regarding political support, Italy has not been alone in sustaining 
the LYCG and the plan for comprehensive containment of unwanted 
flows departing from Libya. The EU, besides providing significant 
financial and logistic assistance, has also celebrated the Italian-Libyan 
cooperation at the highest political level. Already in January 2017, the 
EU Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
called for the enhancement of support to Libya and the LYCG.57 And, 
far from condemning the MoU, the Malta Declaration, adopted by all 
EU Heads of State and Government, “welcomes and … support[s] 
	  
50 This was the direct result of an (unpublished) Additional Protocol of February 
4, 2009, cited in Hirsi, supra note 13, para. 19. 
51 MoU, supra note 46. 
52 Id. art. 3. 
53 Id. art. 1a. 
54 Id. arts. 1b and 1c. 
55 Id. art. 2. 
56 Id. art. 2. EUNAVFOR MED has also delivered training to the LYCG upon 
extension of its mandate via Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993 of 20 June 2016 
Amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union Military Operation in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA), 2016 O.J. 
(L 162/18).  
57  Joint Communication on Migration on the Central Mediterranean Route: 
Managing Flows, Saving Lives, JOIN, 2017 4 final (25 January 2017), <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0004&from=en> (06/20).  
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Italy in its implementation,” pledging funds and capacity building, 
with the explicit aim of “preventing departures and managing 
returns.”58 Despite the wealth of sources denouncing it, the situation 
facing migrants in Liby – known to former Italian Minister of Interior, 
Minniti59 and his fellow ministers of the other Member States60 – has 
been no impediment to the EU’s backing of this cooperation.  
 
3.2. Funding and Equipment 
 
Capacity-building initiatives within the framework of the Treaty of 
Friendship and the MoU intensified in the summer of 2017, with Italy 
creating a dedicated “Africa Fund” and allocating €2.5 million for the 
maintenance of Libyan boats and the training of their crews.61 In 
parallel, Italy also secured EU funding in excess of €160 million for 
Libya. An EU project was awarded to the Italian Coast Guard, 
through which €46.3 million have been channeled to border 
management and migration control in Libya.62 The project specifically 
aims at “[s]trengthening the operational capacities of the Libyan 
coastguards”, via “training, equipment … repair and maintenance of 
the existing fleet,” so as to “strengthen the authorities’ capacities in 
	  
58  European Council, Malta Declaration, para. 6(j) (3 February 2017), 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/malta-
declaration/> (06/20). 
59 Migranti, Minniti: “Condizioni di chi è riportato in Libia sono mio assillo”, 
Repubblica TV (15 August 2017), <https://video.repubblica.it/cronaca/migranti-
minniti-condizioni-di-chi-e-riportato-in-libia-sono-mio-assillo/282714/283328> 
(06/20). 
60 Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses against Europe-
bound Refugees and Migrants, pp. 56–59 (11 December 2017), 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/7561/2017/en/> (06/20), counting 
over 20 reports from reliable monitors, including UN and EU sources. See further list 
of nearly 50 reports by Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
spanning the period 2013 to 2019 appended to their joint Third-Party Intervention in 
S.S., Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International Submissions to the European 
Court of Human Rights, Annex, 12 November 2019, 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/hrw_amnesty_interna
tional_submissions_echr.pdf> (06/20).  
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General for Italians abroad and migration 
policies, Decree 4110/47 of 28 August 2017. 
62 EU Commission, EU Trust Fund for Africa Adopts €46 Million Programme to 
Support Integrated Migration and Border Management in Libya (28 July 2017), 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2187_en.htm> (06/20). 
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maritime surveillance and rescuing at sea.”63 The final goal is “to 
provide the Libyan coast guards with initial capacity [absent hitherto] 
to better organise their control operations” and “coordinate maritime 
interventions.”64 This, the EU Commission has noted, “will involve the 
full design of an Interagency National Coordination Centre … and a 
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre,”65 which does not yet exist – 
its completion being “estimated in 2020”66 – as well as “assistance to 
the authorities in defining and declaring a Libyan Search and Rescue 
Region [SRR]”67 – which was only recognized by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) in June 2018.68 
In terms of equipment, Italy has donated ten fast patrol boats to 
the LN/LCG,69 which seem to be “the most effective and reliable 
ships [in the LYCG inventory].” The best appears to be precisely the 
Ras Al Jadar, which performed “approximately half of all sorties” 
between October 2017 and January 2018,70  including the one of 
	  
63 Id. 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 Id. 
66 EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 June – 30 November 2017, EEAS, 
2017, 1612, p.14 (on file). 
67 EU Commission, Press Release, July 28, 2017, supra note 62. 
68 The coordinates were uploaded on June 26, 2018, on IMO’s Gisis database, 
<https://gisis.imo.org/Public/COMSAR/NationalAuthority.aspx> (06/20). See the 
former Ambassador of Italy to Libya, Giuseppe Perrone, congratulating the Libyan 
authorities via Twitter for completing the procedure on June 28, 2018, 
<https://twitter.com/Assafir_Perrone/status/1012235279141359616> (06/20). For an 
elaboration on the declaration process, see Mare Clausum Report, supra note 19, 
pp.50–52. For the controversies surrounding the process, see also Statement by Mr 
Leggeri, Frontex Executive Director to the European Parliament, LIBE Committee 
Meeting (27 March, 2018): “Je ne considère pas comme acquise la zone SAR de la 
Lybie,” <http://web.ep.streamovations.be/index.php/event/stream/20180327-0900-
committee-libe> (06/20). Cf. Parliamentary Questions – Answer given by Mr 
Avramopoulos on behalf of the European Commission, P-003665/2018(ASW), 4 
September 2018, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2018-
003665-ASW_EN.html> (06/20) 
69 Italian Ministry of Interior, Contro il traffico dei migranti: consegnate le prime 
motovedette alla Marina libica (21 April 2017), 
<http://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/contro-traffico-dei-migranti-consegnate-prime-
motovedette-alla-marina-libica> (06/20); Minniti in Libia: fronte comune control il 
traffico di migranti (16 May 2017), <https://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/minniti-
libia-fronte-comune-contro-traffico-migranti> (06/20). 
70 EUNAVFOR MED, LYCG Monitoring Report, supra note 30, at 19, 5, raising 
the number to “75% of [all] LCG&N missions.” This continues to be the case. See 
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November 6, 2017. The vessels were gifted disregarding the widely 
publicized malpractices of the LYCG – also witnessed in the S.S. 
events – and the series of violent incidents occurred just a few days 
before the ceremony of award.71 In one such incident the LYCG had 
interrupted a rescue, intercepted migrants at gunpoint, and pulled 
them back to Libya using perilous tactics.72 Several actors, including 
the UN Secretary-General, have denounced similarly violent behavior 
by the LYCG73 – of which the Italian Coastguard was aware74 – 
including the firing of live shots,75 the intimidation of NGO rescue 
boats,76 and the use of force against migrants.77 
 
3.3. Operational Involvement 
 
For many years, and especially since the Arab Spring, “the only 
	  
EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 June – 30 November 2018, EEAS(2019) 18, 
Part A, p.13 (on file). 
71  EUNAVFOR MED has noted how migrants “rescued” by the LYCG, 
immediately “mak[e] attempts to escape LCG&N vessels.” See EUNAVFOR MED, 
Six-Monthly Report 1 December 2017 – 31 May 2018, EEAS, 2018, 710, p.6 (on file). 
72  Sea Watch, official Facebook account, (10 May 2017), 
<https://www.facebook.com/seawatchprojekt/videos/1865822903635782/> (06/20). 
73 UNSC, Report S/2018/140, supra note 38, para. 49. See also Mare Clausum 
Report, supra note 19, at pp.57–62; Dark Web of Collusion, supra note 60, pp. 35–37. 
74 See, e.g., A. Rettman, Italy Backs Libya as NGOs Chased Out of Mediterranean, 
EU OBSERVER, 14 August 2017, <https://euobserver.com/migration/138736> (06/20), 
reporting how MSF had been “warned” by MRCC Rome “about security risks 
associated with threats publicly issued by the Libyan Coast Guard against 
humanitarian … vessels operating in international waters.” 
75 Migranti. Guardia costiera libica spara contro motovedetta italiana, Avvenire (26 
May 2017), <https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/guardia-costiera-libica-spara-
contro-vedetta-italiana> (06/20).  
76 S. Scherer, Rescue Ship Says Libyan Coast Guard Shot at and Boarded It, Seeking 
Migrants, Reuters (September 26 2017), <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-
migrants-libya-ngo/rescue-ship-says-libyan-coast-guard-shot-at-and-boarded-it-
seeking-migrants-idUKKCN1C12LJ> (06/20). 
77 See, e.g., B. Trew, T. Kington, Video Shows Libyan Coastguard Whipping 
Rescued Migrants, The Times (14 February 2017), 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/video-shows-libyan-coastguard-whipping-
rescued-migrants-6d8g2jgz6> (06/20). And this is routine practice. A LYCG 
commander told HRW that the use of force against migrants during rescues was 
“necessary to control the situation as you cannot communicate with them.” See HRW, 
EU: Shifting Rescue to Libya Risks Lives, Italy Should Direct Safe Rescues (June 2017), 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/19/eu-shifting-rescue-libya-risks-lives> (06/20). 
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country that provide[d] SAR to the area sitting next to the territorial 
waters of Libya [was] Italy.”78 After the termination of the Mare 
Nostrum operation in 2014, the Italian Government carried on 
“coordinat[ing] virtually all rescue operations” in that area79 – a fact 
corroborated by EUNAVFOR MED, confirming that the “Italian 
MRCC … continued to coordinate rescue operations” throughout 
2016 and 2017.80 In fact, LYCG coordination capabilities peaked at a 
mere “54% of [all] SOLAS events” only in the second semester of 
201881 – long after the S.S. events. 
This situation of de facto Italian-led Libyan interventions was 
consolidated in 2017, on the basis of the MoU. Within that 
framework, not only the establishment of a capable coast guard, but 
also of a reliable Libyan MRCC became top priorities. The 
aforementioned EU project awarded to the Italian Coast Guard 
supported implementation.82 Completion was planned in consecutive 
phases, including activities such as “organiz[ing] [LYCG] SAR units” 
and “develop[ing] SAR SOPs.”83 But the actual creation of the Libyan 
MRCC only began in December 2018, when the project entered its 
	  
78 Italian Coalition for Civil Liberties and Rights (CILD), Guidance on Rescue 
Operations in the Mediterranean, p.8 (July 2017), <https://cild.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/KYR-Protection-and-Maritime-Safety_EN.pdf> (06/20). 
79 Shifting Rescue to Libya, supra note 77. See also Amnesty International, Lives 
Adrift: Refugees and Migrants in Peril in the Central Mediterranean (September 2014), 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/8000/eur050062014en.pdf> 
(06/20). 
80 EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 January – 31 October 2016 (on file), 
p. 11; and EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 November 2016 – 31 May 2017, 
supra note 35, p. 8. 
81 EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 June – 30 November 2018, supra 
note 70, Part B, p. 2. “SOLAS” refers to the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter SOLAS Convention]. 
82 EU Commission, Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in 
Libya – First Phase (T05-EUTF-NOA-LY-04) (27 July 2017), 
<https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-noa-ly-04_fin.pdf> 
(06/20).  
83  Italian Coastguard, LMRCC [Libyan MRCC] Project briefing, Shade Med 
Presentation, 23–24 November 2017 (on file), mentioned in EUNAVFOR MED, Six-
Monthly Report 1 June – 30 November 2017, supra note 66, p. 22, and reproduced in 
Mare Clausum Report, supra note 19, p.11. “SOPs” stands for “standard operating 
procedures.” 
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second phase, with the “development of the MRCC Communication 
network along the coast.”84 
Meanwhile, an incipient LYCG – still “far from being fully 
operational” by EUNAVFOR MED’s own admission 85  – started 
operating with the support of a Joint Operation Room (JOR), 
consisting of some “basic operational rooms in a joint building in 
Tripoli” set up in the first phase of the project,86 but “with limited 
[space] and communication capabilities [and] relatively equipped to 
communicate with naval assets at sea.”87 The JOR, involved in the 
November 6, 2017, events, was and still remains “in a critical 
infrastructural situation … [that] is further adversely conditioned by a 
limited presence of personnel with insufficient language (English) 
skills and limited software tools … knowledge.”88 In fact, the JOR is 
incapable of operating at a “self-sustaining level,”89 and its capacities 
“do[] not allow properly carrying out the institutional tasks as 
MRCC,”90 so that, as per the EUNAVFOR MED’s assessment, they 
“still need further sustainment … also in operational terms.”.91 
Especially, the “lack of effective and reliable communication 
systems hampers Libyan capacity for the minimum level of execution 
of command and control [C2], including that necessary to coordinate 
SAR/SOLAS events,” 92  hence Italy has secured the necessary 
functions. To this effect, in August 2017, it launched Operation 
Nauras, an extension into Libyan territorial and internal waters of the 
	  
84 EU Commission, Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in 
Libya – Second Phase (T05-EUTF-NOA-LY-07), pp. 9–12 (27 December 2018), 
<https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-noa-ly-07.pdf> 
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85 EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 June – 30 November 2017, supra 
note 66, p. 3. 
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87 EUNAVFOR MED, LYCG Monitoring Report, supra note 30, p. 8. 
88 Id. p. 22. 
89 EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 November 2016 – 31 May 2017, 
supra note 35, p. 17. This level has not yet been reached. See EUNAVFOR MED, Six-
Monthly Report 1 December 2017 – 31 May 2018, supra note 71, p. 10; and 
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Part A, p. 13. 
90 EUNAVFOR MED, LYCG Monitoring Report, supra note 30, Annex C, p. 4. 
91 EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 June – 30 November 2018, supra 
note 70, Part C, p. 12 (emphasis added). 
92 EUNAVFOR MED, LYCG Monitoring Report, supra note 30, p. 26. 
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military mission Mare Sicuro,93 including “a factory vessel” sent to 
Tripoli with the task “to restore the efficiency of other Libyan naval 
units, and coordinate patrol and sea rescue operations.”94 
Operation Nauras consists of four ships, four helicopters, and 600 
servicemen, of which 70 per cent are deployed at sea, with the 
remaining 30 per cent staying in Tripoli harbour. Their key mission is, 
specifically, to “establish [the] operational condition[s] for 
LN/LNCG assets and develop C2 capabilities.”95 In the interim, their 
“naval asset in Tripoli Harbour [is] acting as LNCC [i.e., Libyan Navy 
Communication Centre] and logistic assistance/support hub.”96 This 
vessel is permanently “in contact with SAR assets and ITCG [i.e. 
Italian Coast Guard] and MRCC Centres,”97 thus playing the role of a 
floating MRCC for Libya. Its function—also at the time of the S.S. 
events98 – was explicitly “the cooperation and coordination of the joint 
activities of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, with a view to carrying 
out their Command and Control (C2) tasks and maintaining an 
adequate Maritime Situational Awareness to fight illegal migration.”99 
It is, therefore, via the Italian authorities, within the MRCC Rome 
and aboard the Nauras warship in Tripoli, that the LYCG received 
distress calls. And, because, on receipt, it lacked the means to further 
communicate with, let alone coordinate, assets at sea, the LYCG 
	  
93 Italian Chamber of Deputies, Deliberazione del consiglio dei ministri in merito 
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systematically relied on Italian (and EUNAVFOR MED100) infra-
structure to liaise with the relevant actors. A case of 2019, documented 
by the SAR NGO Mediterranea, discloses how, oftentimes, 
communication is even entirely done by Italian officials supposedly 
“on behalf of” their absent LYCG counterparts, creating the 
impression of autonomous Libyan action. 101  A usual mode of 
engagement – confirmed by the EU Commission – involves the early 
detection via “sightings” performed by Italian or EUNAVFOR MED 
aerial assets, transmission of the information to the LYCG through the 
Nauras warship in Tripoli acting “as a “communication relay,”102 and 
then further action coordinated by Italy “on behalf of” the LYCG.103 
This pattern consolidated through sustained practice since August 
2017,104 and has been reinforced with Italy (and the EUNAVFOR 
MED) introducing a post-operation evaluation of the LYCG’s 
conduct, precisely as a consequence of the November 6, 2017, 
incident. The lack of “professional behaviour” of LYCG personnel 
was raised through this channel on this occasion and a “basic ‘lessons 
learnt’ process” introduced, with disciplinary measures taken “in one 
specific case.”105 Apparently, the monitoring system in place entails an 
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Forensic Oceanography, especially p. 64 (December 2019), <https://content.forensic-
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105 EUNAVFOR MED, LYCG Monitoring Report, supra note 30, Annex C, p. 4. 
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“advising role in order to strengthen accountability and follow up,”106 
including “feedback and recommendations” to which the LYCG has 
been “receptive” so far.107 
Accordingly, what the next sections will substantiate is that, from 
the launch of Nauras, it has been Italy, both remotely through its 
MRCC and via direct military presence in Libya, which has assumed 
the overall coordination of the LYCG operational response in the 
Central Mediterranean in a way that amounts to an exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Italy’s pervasive political, financial, and 
operative involvement equates “effective control.” 
 
 
4. Defining (Extraterritorial) Jurisdiction 
 
Before entering into a discussion on what constitutes “effective 
control” with a view to ascertaining extraterritorial jurisdiction—as I 
claim Italy exercised in the S.S. case—it is worth pausing to reflect on 
what jurisdiction itself amounts to in the context of human rights. A 
main contribution this article attempts to make is precisely in regards 
to the identification of a common thread that runs through territorial 
and extraterritorial configurations of the term, leading to principled 
inferences and predictable outcomes. 
 
4.1. Jurisdiction as Sovereign-authority Nexus 
 
The definition of the concept and its specific role in international 
human rights law has long attracted doctrinal attention. But there is 
disagreement as to its utility and its centrality for the establishment of 
	  
106 EUNAVFOR MED, Six-monthly Report 1 November 2016 – 31 May 2017, 
supra note 35, p.18 (emphasis added). EUNAVFOR MED monitoring competence is 
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responsibility for human rights violations. Some authors, like Scheinin, 
argue that “jurisdiction” does not add anything to the key aspects of 
admissibility within the state responsibility framework and should, 
therefore, be considered an empty notion for the purposes of 
substantiating legal accountability. For him, there is apparently no 
distinction between the attribution of wrongful conduct to the state 
concerned and the determination of an exercise of its jurisdiction. The 
two are one and the same. Adding an extra step that functions as a 
threshold and precludes the establishment of responsibility is, 
therefore, seen as unhelpful. 108  Another strand of the literature 
questions the appropriateness of attempting a general synthesis of the 
concept, in light of the variety of human rights duties and their 
different manifestations, which would require a more tailored and 
nuanced approach. Only so can the complexities of (especially positive 
“facilitation” and “fulfillment”) obligations, entailed in particular by 
economic, social and cultural rights, be adequately reflected.109 
By contrast, other writers, such as Besson, consider jurisdiction to 
be fundamental to the proper understanding of the relationship that 
unites human rights holders and duty bearers.110 For her, without 
jurisdiction, the universality of human rights would imply that any 
state would owe human rights duties to any human rights holder, 
regardless of any specific political-legal nexus between them. This is 
why jurisdiction, in this relational sense,111 has an essential role to play 
in arbitrating between duty, capability, and desirability of compliance 
by any specific state vis-à-vis any specific human rights holder. And 
this is also why jurisdiction should be understood as an “all-or-
nothing” condition for the activation of human rights obligations, 
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110 S. Besson, “The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts 
to”, Leiden Journal of Int. Law, 2012, p. 857. 
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rather than as gradual or incremental.112 Either there is a jurisdictional 
link between the state and the person concerned or there isn’t. What 
may, then, be “divided and tailored” in the specific case, and be 
proportionate to the level of control applied, are the ensuing 
obligations, but not jurisdiction per se.113 
From this perspective, the term should best be understood as the 
“de facto political and legal authority” of the sovereign, amounting to 
more than mere coercion,114 including a normative dimension that 
demands compliance. It is not “facticity [that] creates normativity.”115 
Normativity must precede and underpin the account of a factual basis 
qua jurisdiction. It is the normative aspect of an exercise of state 
power that makes its interaction with a particular individual human-
rights relevant. In Besson’s view—which I espouse—jurisdiction refers 
to “some kind of normative power” that the sovereign exercises vis-à-
vis an individual “with a claim to legitimacy,” and that serves to 
establish the human-rights relevant link between them. Whether the 
state concerned may have acted ultra vires in the specific situation 
constitutes a separate question. A priori, to be an expression of 
jurisdiction, state actions/omissions do not have to be lawful, but only 
stem from a “lawfully organized institutional and constitutional 
order.”116 What matters to characterize state conduct as jurisdiction in 
the human rights sense is the underlying sovereign-authority nexus 
that connects the state to those within its might and the control it 
thereby purports to exercise, whether de jure or de facto, rather than 
the legality of its conduct. In this sense – which seems to be the one 
tacitly embraced by the Strasbourg Court – jurisdiction works as a 
trigger of human rights obligations.117 
Without a (pre-existing) jurisdictional link between a State party 
and a certain individual, no human rights duties can be owed in 
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specific circumstances. Potential or hypothetical connections are 
hence irrelevant. Also claimed connections, which are not effectuated 
in the real world, are immaterial.118 Jurisdiction requires an “external 
manifestation of the power of the State”119 – whether having a legal or 
factual dimension, or being constituted by a combination of both. So, 
for instance, simply having the capacity to counter famine in a remote 
land to which there is no prior public-power relation does not suffice 
to entail responsibility. Unless there is an underpinning basis of 
prescriptive, executive and/or adjudicative authority – with or without 
legal title – through which actual state activity has taken place, the 
jurisdictional link will not be established. If, on the contrary, there is a 
piece of legislation enacted, a policy plan implemented, and/or a 
Court decision enforcing the legislation or the policy plan in relation 
to said famine in said remote land, there should be no obstacle to 
consider such action as one demonstrative of state jurisdiction. Once 
the sovereign authority-nexus has been ascertained, there seems to be 
no principled reason justifying a distinction on the basis of the locus of 
such activity in deeming it a manifestation of jurisdiction, whether 
territorially or extraterritorially exercised. It would be 
“unconscionable” to create a double standard on that ground alone 
and, in consequence, “permit a State … to perpetrate violations … on 
the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate 
on its own territory.”120 
To my mind, the role that territoriality plays within this 
understanding of the concept – in line with the basic tenets of public 
international law121 – is to generate a (rebuttable) presumption of the 
	  
118 S. Besson, cit., p. 872. 
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121 S. Allen et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisdiction in International Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008; V. Lowe, “Jurisdiction”, in M. Evans (ed.), 
International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 335; I. Brownlie, 
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existence of such a link within the national domain, applying 
“throughout the State’s territory”. 122  What distinguishes 
extraterritorial settings is the absence of such a presumption, given the 
principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic 
affairs. But that does not alter the fundamental premise on which the 
concept of jurisdiction rests. As soon as a concrete public-power 
relation has been established, a jurisdictional connection is activated, 
triggering the application of human rights obligations. This, however, 
does not mean that all human rights will be owed in all situations. For 
instance, a military surveillance mission over non-national territory will 
be irrelevant to the right to education of those concerned, but it may 
engage responsibility from the perspective of the right to privacy, if it 
entails the collection of personal data.123 
This approach, therefore, unifies the premise underpinning all 
forms of jurisdiction qua normative power with a claim to legitimacy 
by a state that, if and when acted upon, establishes a sovereign-
authority link with those concerned. It also “normalizes” the 
possibility of extraterritorial manifestation—just like the Strasbourg 
organs did before Bankovic.124 Indeed, the now-disappeared European 
Commission on Human Rights consistently held that the “High 
Contracting Parties are bound to secure the … rights and freedoms [in 
the Convention] to all persons under their actual authority and 
responsibility, not only when the authority is exercised within their 
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own territory, but also when it is exercised abroad.” 125  The 
Convention was supposed to govern the actions and omissions of 
Contracting Parties wherever they exercised jurisdiction. And 
jurisdiction, under Article 1 ECHR, was not deemed “equivalent … to 
or limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Party 
concerned.” This was “clear from the language … and the object of 
this Article, and from the purpose of the Convention as a whole …”.126 
It has been in Bankovic that the Court “exceptionalized” 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and conceptually decoupled it from its 
territorial counterpart. 
 
4.2. The “Exceptionalization” of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
 
In Bankovic the Court likened the term “jurisdiction” to the 
concept of legal title under international law, thus affirming that “the 
jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial.”127 In fact, 
“a State may not actually exercise jurisdiction on the territory of 
another without the latter’s consent, invitation or acquiescence, unless 
the former is an occupying State”.128 There must, otherwise, be a legal 
basis allowing the state to exercise its power extraterritorially, whether 
“nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, 
passive personality [or] universality.”129 This understanding, however, 
conflates jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR with the existence of a 
right or prerogative of the state to act, which a contrario leads to the 
absurdity that states operating unlawfully abroad, without legal title 
conferred by international law, can additionally be human rights 
exempt. 
Even in Bankovic did the Court avoid this conclusion and decided, 
instead, that the implication of “the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the relevant 
term in Article 1 of the Convention” was that jurisdiction should be 
understood as “primarily territorial,”130 other bases “being exceptional 
and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of 
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each case.”131 While it delivered other controversial findings regarding 
the effect of the so-called “colonial clause” in Article 56 ECHR and 
the “espace juridique européen,” 132  these have been subsequently 
overturned in Al-Skeini.133 
What Al-Skeini has retained is the notion that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is exceptional and, as such, must be demonstrated in the 
specific instance134 – an assertion I only partly share: While I accept 
that jurisdiction should be “presumed to be exercised normally 
throughout the State’s territory,”135 over which the state is sovereign, 
that alone does not render extraterritorial jurisdiction exceptional in 
the material sense, it only requires that proof of an actual sovereign-
authority link be produced in the individual situation. The 
presumption allocates the burden of that proof, but should have no 
bearing on the substantive finding of whether jurisdiction has indeed 
been exercised. It is also unclear what “exceptional” refers to in the 
eyes of the Court: Does it concern frequency or justifiability? The 
elimination of the presumption does not make the occurrence of 
extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction any less frequent, or any less 
legitimate, per se. Questions on the lawfulness of jurisdictional action 
are separate from whether such jurisdictional action obtains in a 
particular case. 
 In any event, this “exceptionalization” has led to a narrow 
understanding of the material circumstances that can count as an 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Only two models have been 
accepted: The “State agent authority” or personal model and the 
“control over an area” or territorial model.136 In both cases the accent 
is put on the factual dimension of jurisdiction, understood as 
equivalent to “effective control,” but without defining the term or 
clarifying what “effective” means in this framework. 
The territorial model refers to situations in which jurisdiction 
arises as a consequence of state military action outside national 
territory, whether lawfully or unlawfully engaged.137 The obligation to 
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secure Convention rights derives from “the fact of such control,” 
whether exercised directly, by the state’s own army, or through a 
subordinate local administration.138 In the latter case, if the existence 
of “overall control” can be established, then it becomes unnecessary to 
demonstrate that the state exercises detailed control over each and 
every of the policies and actions of the subordinate local 
administration.139 And, again, determining whether effective control 
exists in such a situation is deemed a “question of fact,” which, 
according to the Court, must be resolved by reference to the strength 
of the military deployment in the area or the degree to which military, 
economic, and political support to the local administration is 
“decisive” to influence its behavior.140 
“Overall control” is considered to involve a measure of constant 
dominium over the foreign area at hand, to a point comparable to state 
sovereignty. In this sense, “overall control” is the de facto counterpart 
of the de jure title entailed by state sovereignty, thus justifying the (re-
)emergence of the presumption of jurisdictional authority throughout 
the area concerned and its transposition to the extraterritorial context. 
“Overall control” liability becomes equivalent to that of the de jure 
sovereign. Therefore, within the area under its overall control, the 
controlling state has the responsibility to secure “the entire range of 
substantive rights set out in the Convention.”141 Otherwise, discrete 
forms of geographical control give rise to a duty to ensure only the 
rights that are relevant in the circumstances.142 
This is also what happens under the personal model, where 
effective control over an individual also entails a duty to secure only 
the relevant protections – presumably on consideration that, unlike in 
situations of overall territorial control, there has not been a 
replacement of the territorial sovereign. Under this model, the Court 
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operates under the general rule that jurisdiction may extend to acts of 
state authorities “which produce effects outside its own territory”143 
and distinguishes three cases. 
First, the acts of diplomatic and consular agents, “present on 
foreign territory in accordance with provisions of international law,” 
may count as an exercise of jurisdiction whenever they “exert 
authority and control over others.”144 Second, state acts that amount to 
an exercise of “public powers normally to be exercised by [a national] 
Government” may also reach the threshold, if underpinned by “the 
consent, invitation or acquiescence” of the territorial sovereign. If such 
is the case, responsibility may be incurred by the ECHR party “as long 
as the acts in question are attributable to it rather than to the 
territorial State.”145 
These first two categories thus appear to attach importance to 
elements of de jure jurisdiction, but the Court has failed to provide a 
detailed elaboration. In Hirsi, it did suggest that legal bases under 
customary international law, and in particular “the relevant provisions 
of the law of the sea,” are significant, so that “acts carried out on 
board vessels flying a State’s flag” shall be considered “cases of 
extraterritorial exercise of … jurisdiction.”146 But it did not dwell on 
whether on that ground alone – without additional elements of de 
facto control – Article 1 ECHR could have been engaged.147 
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The Court’s attention has rather focused on the third tier of the 
personal model, concerning the use of force, under which it has 
concluded that what tends to be “decisive” in this context is “the 
exercise of physical power” over persons abroad.148 The circumstances 
that have been considered to reach the threshold, and that the Court 
invokes to illustrate its findings, are instances of arrest, detention, 
abduction, and extradition, 149  thus highlighting forms of de facto 
control. And the same is true on the high seas, where in most cases the 
Court has ascertained the existence of jurisdiction on account of the 
“full and exclusive control” exercised “in a continuous and 
uninterrupted manner” over a foreign vessel or persons apprehended 
aboard.150 This was the test applied in Hirsi, in the context of the 
push-back operation of migrants to Libya carried out by Italy, where 
the Court concluded that, “in the period between boarding the ships 
of the Italian armed forces” after rescue “and being handed over to 
the Libyan authorities,” the applicants had been subjected to “the 
continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian 
authorities.”151 
However, the Court has also made clear that direct physical 
contact is not always necessary as long as the control thereby exerted is 
indeed effective. So, in a case involving the maritime blockade of a 
Dutch vessel by the Portuguese authorities impeding access to 
Portugal’s territorial waters, the jurisdictional link was not 
contested.152 In parallel, the rerouting of a foreign ship in Medvedyev, 
imposing a specific course, but without boarding it, was also deemed 
to meet the jurisdictional test. Jurisdiction was exercised “from the 
stopping” of the boat, throughout the period of enforced navigation.153 
This, as the next Part elaborates, opens up a range of possible 
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configurations in which instances of “contactless control” may be seen 
as an expression of jurisdiction—particularly when exercised against a 
background of existing legal competence in the relevant domain, 
lending a de jure basis for action.154 
 
 
5. The Functional Approach 
 
What ensues from the discussion so far is that the Court retains an 
“exceptionalist” approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction; that it does 
not define what jurisdiction tout court entails; and that the prevalent 
notion of “effective control” is one that attaches importance to 
physical force, leaving the role of de jure factors uncertain. Perhaps, 
aware of these limitations, the Court can be seen to delineate an 
alternative approach, which is of particular importance to the S.S. 
events and tallies with the streamlined notion of jurisdiction that I 
endorse. 
In Al-Skeini, relying on the second tier of the personal model of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court concluded that the UK had 
exercised “authority and control” over individuals killed during a 
security operation carried out by British soldiers in Basra. Even the 
death of the third applicant’s spouse, killed during an exchange of fire 
with a gang, was considered to fall within Article 1 ECHR. The fact 
that “it [was] not known which side fired the fatal bullet” did not alter 
this conclusion. Instead, the Court affirmed that, because the death 
occurred “in the course of a United Kingdom security 
operation … there was a jurisdictional link between the United 
Kingdom and this deceased also.” 155  What mattered was the 
“functional” connection established between the deceased and the 
British forces through the medium of the security operation’s 
implementation. Also of relevance was the fact that the operation itself 
entailed an assumption of “public powers,” “normally … exercised by 
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a sovereign government,”156 which, in this case, had been sanctioned 
by UN Security Council Resolutions and regulations of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq. It was arguably on that de jure basis that 
the UK was expected to carry out executive (jurisdictional) 
“functions” on the territory of Iraq in line with human rights, thus 
retaining ECHR responsibility for “as long as the acts [and omissions] 
in question [were] attributable to it rather than to the territorial 
State”.157 
For some commentators, this creates a “sub-heading” under the 
state agent authority exception, which allows for inclusion of a wider 
array of factual profiles on account of de jure elements.158 For others, it 
is a distinct third model – or a “halfway house”159 – based on a mix of 
the territorial and personal paradigms, which may have a positive 
impact in the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 160 
Conversely, another group of scholars thinks this approach can restrict 
the scope of Article 1 ECHR, if the de facto and de jure factors are 
taken to both be jointly necessary for jurisdiction to exist.161 Still 
others question the necessity of a legal basis in all cases for “public 
powers” to be ascertained – for example, in anti-terrorism and drone-
strike operations undertaken without the territorial state’s 
authorization.162 
All these readings are plausible – and denote the strategic 
ambiguity with which the Court formulates certain doctrines, allowing 
for adaptation to different scenarios over time. Taken together, what 
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they jointly come to display is the emergence of an incipient functional 
conception of jurisdiction that can bridge the gap between territorial 
and extraterritorial conceptualizations. The importance it attaches to 
the exercise of “public power” for the establishment of a jurisdictional 
link follows the line of argument advanced above, defining jurisdiction 
qua an exercise of normative power by a state, with a claim to 
legitimacy, that establishes a sovereign-authority nexus with those 
concerned through factual or legal means, or a combination of both. 
But my understanding of jurisdiction as “functional” differs from 
interpretations offered by other authors using the same term. For 
instance, Besson, examining the specific role of Article 1 ECHR within 
the scheme of the Convention, uses the term to refer to the threshold 
function that it plays. She infers that what Article 1 ECHR does is to 
“situate[] human rights within a relationship of jurisdiction and 
make[] them dependent on it.” From this perspective, the criterion 
within the ECHR “is not territorial . . . but functional,” in the sense 
that “it pertains to the function of jurisdiction.”163 Shany, in turn, 
employs the term in its capacious meaning, to designate the faculty or 
“potential” to assume responsibility, requiring states to protect human 
rights in situations where they can and may reasonably be expected to 
do so, whenever they have the means to prevent harm. What renders 
such an expectation reasonable, in his view, is the specific context and 
“the intensity of power relations” or “special legal connections” that 
put the state in a unique position to afford protection.164 Finally, the 
ESCR Committee mentions “functional” in contradistinction to 
“geographical . . . or personal” versions, as a third variation of 
jurisdiction.165 
My reading is closer to Gavouneli’s, who, in her discussion of the 
law of the sea, describes it as a function of state sovereignty.166 In 
connection with this, I use “functional” to literally denote the 
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governmental “functions” through which the power of the state finds 
concrete expression in a given case.167 This agglutinates the tasks 
normally conducted by its officials, including those they are legally 
obliged to undertake. Jurisdiction, from this perspective, is therefore 
always functional and expressed through legislative, executive, and/or 
adjudicative activity, by which the state exercises its powers, 
combining personal and geographical aspects. Jurisdiction through 
this prism is multifactorial and composite. 
The implication is that not only effective control over persons or 
territory matters for the activation of ECHR obligations. Control over 
(general) policy areas or (individual) tactical operations, performed or 
producing effects abroad,168 matters as well. These are the vehicles of 
the exercise of “public powers” that amounts to jurisdiction. It is 
through policy measures and operational procedures that states exert 
personal or spatial control – carried out as claiming legitimacy and 
expecting compliance by those concerned.169 In these situations, the 
jurisdictional nexus between the state and the individual exists prior to 
any potentially ensuing violations – through the planning and 
execution of policy and/or operational conduct over which the state 
exerts effective (if not exclusive) control. Policy implementation and 
operational action are no accidental events. They manifest a degree of 
state deliberation and volition that, when actuated, constitute a 
fundamental expression of its powers as sovereign. 
In Bankovic – leaving the question aside of whether the 
designation of a non-military objective respected international 
humanitarian law standards – if the Court had considered the 
operational context within which the bombardment took place, rather 
than examining the attack in isolation, the conclusion could not have 
been the same. 170  Of importance would have been the practical 
situation on the ground, in terms of the operational powers which the 
defendant States were actually purporting to exercise, and not the 
legality or legal basis of their operations. The air strike of the radio-
television of Belgrade was the last point in an operational chain of 
action, undertaken by a military aircraft within a NATO-led mission. 
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It was not a one-off, “instantaneous” actuation of state authority,171 the 
immediate consequences of which were unpredictable or irrelevant. It 
was part and parcel of a pre-planned operation, similar to the one in 
Al-Skeini or in any of the other extraterritorial cases in which the 
Strasbourg Court has recognised there to be a jurisdictional link.172 In 
virtually all cases, including Loizidou, Öcalan, Hirsi, or Jaloud, the 
action considered jurisdictionally relevant was integrated within a 
wider military, security, or rescue operation through which the state 
exercised “effective control.”173 So, the conclusion must be that it is 
the “situational,” rather than the personal or spatial, control thereby 
exerted, executed through operational or policy-implementing action, 
what triggers the application of the Convention. 
“Effective control,” in the context of the functional approach to 
jurisdiction, does not readily amount to direct physical constraint. 
Control, in this framework, should be deemed effective, not on the 
basis of the intensity or directness of the physical force it may imply, 
but when it is determinative of the material course of events unlocked 
by the exercise of jurisdiction, even when the relevant activity takes 
place from a distance.174 In Bankovic, the control the military mission 
exercised through the striking aircraft over its pre-determined 
operational target was effective, in that it was brought within firing 
range and subjected to the destructive outcome programmed in the 
operational plan of which the bombing was part. It is not the act of 
bombing alone that brought the applicants within the “effective 
control” of the state concerned, but the wider spectrum of operational 
action within which the bombing was inscribed – and which should 
not have omitted to take account of the very predictable consequences 
the bombing of a civilian target would entail. The effectiveness of 
control should be judged against its influence on the resulting 
situation and the position in which those affected by an exercise of 
	  
171 Using this vocabulary, see Hirsi, App. No. 27765/09 at para. 73. 
172 Al-Skeini, 53 E.H.R.R. 18.  
173 Loizidou (Merits), 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513; Öcalan, App. No. 46221/99; Hirsi, 
App. No. 27765/09; Jaloud v. The Netherlands, App. No. 47708/08, 20 November 
2014, <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148367> (06/20). In the latter case the 
manning of a checkpoint in Iraq, on the basis of S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003), was equated to an exercise of “elements of governmental 
authority” by the Netherlands, whereby its art.1 ECHR jurisdiction was considered to 
be engaged. 
174 Cf. Hirsi, App. No. 27765/09 at para. 180. 
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public powers find themselves upon execution of the measure 
concerned. This means that not only de facto elements of effective 
control, but also de jure factors (that may coalesce with them) should 
be taken into account in the establishment of functional jurisdiction.175 
The Norstar decision illustrates this proposition. 176  The 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) considered in 
this case that the issuance of a decree of seizure vis-à-vis a foreign 
vessel on the high seas was sufficient to reach the jurisdictional 
threshold, arguably not because it produced physical control on its 
own, but because it generated the conditions for its actual 
enforcement.177 Admittedly, it was the combination of the issuance of 
the decree by Italy and the accompanying request for its enforcement 
addressed to Spain, which did subsequently enforce it, that generated 
the jurisdictional link between the foreign vessel and the Italian 
State.178 While the decree alone could be understood as an instance of 
merely “claimed” jurisdiction, if taken in isolation – particularly on 
consideration that it was secret and could have remained unknown to 
those concerned179 – no enforcement action would have taken place 
without the related request for its execution, in turn based on the 
decree itself. The decree is, therefore, the sine qua non condition in the 
sequence of (de jure and de facto) events that established effective 
control; it is the “but for” element in the absence of which the 
jurisdictional chain could not be ascertained. A functional reading, 
rather than splitting the chain, takes account of both: the prescriptive 
and enforcement aspects of jurisdiction that, in combination, 
constitute the expression of the constabulary functions of the Italian 
State in the particular case – exercised in part directly, by its own 
authorities, and in part through recourse to Spain. 
	  
175  See, e.g. Jaloud, App. No. 47708/08 at para. 141: “For the purposes of 
establishing jurisdiction … the Court takes account of the particular factual context 
and relevant rules of international law.” 




177  Cf. E. Papastavridis, “The European Convention of Human Rights and 
Migration at Sea: Reading the “jurisdictional threshold” of the Convention under the 
Law of the Sea Paradigm”, German Law Journal, 2020. 
178 Norstar, cit., para. 226, last sentence. 
179 Id. at para. 206. 
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There seems to be, a priori, no good reason to disaggregate or 
distinguish between the different facets of jurisdiction. They constitute 
the often inseparable, composite ways in which “public powers” may 
be expressed. 180  In fact, from the international perspective, the 
adoption of domestic laws “express[es] the will and constitute[s] the 
activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or 
administrative measures.” 181  So, instances of legislative, executive, 
and/or judicial activity should be deemed equally relevant towards the 
establishment of (functional) jurisdiction. Their occurrence in the 
specific case, whether jointly or in isolation, must be taken in 
consideration. If this is true, functional jurisdiction as equivalent to an 
exercise of “public powers” can be manifested through different 
factors of policy-related and/or operational control, not all of which 
may always be required in the aggregate, but which, as the next section 
will argue, are present in the S.S. case, so that they cumulatively give 
rise to an Article 1 ECHR claim.  
 
 
6. A Functional Approach to S.S. 
 
S.S. offers a paradigmatic example of the kind of policy and 
operational control that portrays the functional approach to 
jurisdiction designed above. It entails a series of elements 
characteristic of public powers that are exercised by the Italian State – 
both territorially and extraterritorially; both directly and through the 
intermediation of the LYCG – that taken together generate overall 
effective control. The so-called “impact” element, the “decisive 
influence” element, and the “operative involvement” element 
considered below have already been recognized by international 
courts and Treaty bodies, including the Strasbourg Court, to be 
generative of a jurisdictional link that triggers the applicability of 
human rights obligations. They can each separately and independently 
amount to an exercise of (functional) jurisdiction, lending combined 
force to the activation of Article 1 ECHR in the S.S. case, where they 
occur in conjunction. 
	  
180 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Fran. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 10, p. 
25 (7 September). 
181 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), Judgment, 
1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, p. 19 (25 May). 
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6.1. The Impact Element 
 
Very much in the line of the Norstar case,182 the impact element 
refers to the “sufficiently proximate repercussions” of state action “on 
rights guaranteed by the Convention”, that the Strasbourg Court has 
deemed pertinent to the establishment of jurisdiction, “even if those 
repercussions occur outside” national territory.183 What is of relevance 
is their origin in an exercise of public powers by the authorities of the 
state concerned. Sovereign activity – arguably of whatever nature: 
legislative, executive, or judicial 184  – with direct and predictable 
consequences beyond territorial boundaries can thus engage Article 1 
ECHR. So, for instance, in Andreou, the opening of fire from within 
state territory on a crowd from close range was deemed to amount to 
jurisdiction, “even though the applicant sustained her injuries in 
territory over which Turkey exercised no control,” since the shooting 
by state officials was “the direct and immediate cause of those 
injuries.”185 
The Inter-American Commission, in a very similar case, concluded 
the same. In Brothers to the Rescue, Cuba was considered to have 
exerted sufficient control through the shooting down of two aircrafts 
outside its aerial space, because “the victims died as a consequence of 
direct actions of agents of the Cuban State” operating within Cuban 
territory.186 The Inter-American Court has followed suit and declared 
that “a person is under the jurisdiction of the State … if there is a 
causal link between the action that occurred within its territory and 
the negative impact on the human rights of persons outside its 
territory.” 187  So, the mere fact that the impacted individuals are 
situated outside national territory does not preclude the engagement 
of extraterritorial responsibilities. The jurisdictional link is established 
	  
182 Norstar, supra note 176.  
183 Ilaşcu, App. No. 48787/99 at para. 317.  
184 Drozd & Janousek, App. No. 12747/87 at para. 91. 
185 Andreou v. Turkey, App. No. 45653/99, Admissibility Decision (3 June 2008), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-95295> (06/20). 
186 Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 86/99, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II. 106, doc. 3 rev., 1999, paras. 24–25 [hereinafter Brothers to the 
Rescue]. 
187  Environment and Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-
Am.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, para. 74 (15 November 2017). 
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through the effects of state conduct that is initiated within territorial 
domain. 
However, the significance of the presence of the state authorities 
exercising jurisdiction within national territory has, subsequently, been 
downplayed. The Human Rights Committee has inferred that the 
extraterritorial “impact,” which is the “direct and reasonably 
foreseeable” result of state action, is relevant also vis-à-vis “individuals 
who find themselves in a situation of distress at sea.”188 Actually, the 
Committee had already previously held that a State party could be 
considered responsible for extraterritorial violations of the ICCPR,189 
where there was a “link in the causal chain” that would make possible 
violations on the territory of another state – wherever the location of 
state organs. 190  In such situations, the risk of an extraterritorial 
violation must be a “necessary and foreseeable consequence,” judged 
on the knowledge the state had at the time of events.191 So, knowledge 
of the probable result becomes a factor in the jurisdictional analysis, 
whereas the locus of the action is immaterial. In Munaf, for instance, 
the Committee evaluated the conduct of diplomatic staff in the 
Romanian Embassy in Baghdad applying this paradigm, and implying 
that only remote and unforeseeable consequences fail the jurisdictional 
test.192 
The Strasbourg Court has also endorsed this understanding. In 
Loizidou, it declared that “the responsibility of Contracting Parties can 
be involved because of acts of their authorities, whether performed 
within or outside national boundaries, which produce effects outside 
their own territory.”193 And more recently, in Al-Saadoon, it applied 
	  
188 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), on the Right to Life, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 63 (3 September 2019) (emphasis added). 
189  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
190  U.N. Human Rights Comm., Mohammad Munaf v. Romania, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/96/D1539/2006, para. 14.2 (30 July 2009). 
191  See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., A.R.J. v. Australia, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (11 August 1997); Judge v. Canada, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (13 August 2003); Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/2/1990 (31 March 1983); Alzery v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (10 November 2006). 
192 Munaf, supra note 190, para. 14.2. 
193 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at para. 
62. 
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the so-called Soering reasoning to an extraterritorial extradition by UK 
agents of a terrorist suspect in Iraq.194 Therefore, while pure causation 
is insufficient to establish jurisdiction in relation to utterly accidental 
and unpredictable outcomes,195 the proximate and predictable results 
must be taken into account when planning and executing state action, 
whatever the location of its agents and of the action itself. 
In the S.S. case, the coordination of the rescue/interdiction 
operation was undertaken by MRCC Rome through a combination of 
prescriptive and executive action – with knowledge of the likely 
outcome. The Italian Coast Guard acted territorially, within its 
Headquarters, taking the decisions of launching the SAR response and 
delivering instructions to all assets in the SAR theatre on the high seas. 
This alone, amounting to the “institution of … proceedings” 
extraterritorially by the authorities of an ECHR party, has, in 
comparable cases, been considered to be “sufficient to establish a 
jurisdictional link” by the Strasbourg Court. 196 Here, such action 
“produced effects outside its own territory” with very significant 
consequences for those concerned,197 which Italy could and should 
have taken into account when planning and deploying its intervention. 
The fact that Italy’s conduct “facilitated the whole process” that led to 
the involvement of the LYCG and “created the conditions” for the 
several violations complained of to materialize, 198  is a further 
	  
194  Al-Saadoon, App. No. 61498/08. For commentary, see, e.g., C. Janik, T. 
Kleinlein, “When Soering went to Iraq . . .: Problems of Jurisdiction, Extraterritorial 
Effect and Norm Conflicts in Light of the European Court of Human Rights’ Al-
Saadoon Case”, Goettingen Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 459. In Soering, an 
extradition case, the Court first deduced a non-refoulement obligation from the 
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment in Article 3 ECHR; Soering v. U.K., 
11 E.H.R.R. 439, 1989. 
195 Cf. Bankovic, 11 B.H.R.C. 435 at para. 75. 
196 Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, App. No. 36925/07, para. 188 
(29 January 2019), <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-189781> (06/20). 
197 Drozd & Janousek, App. No. 12747/87 at para. 91; Al-Skeini, 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at 
para. 133.  
198  Al-Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11, para. 517 (24 July 2014), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146044> (06/20). See similar extraordinary 
rendition cases, where the ECtHR has concluded to the existence of state jurisdiction 
on account of the facilitating role played by the ECHR party in question, e.g., El-Masri 
v. FYROM, App. No. 39630/09, para. 239 (13 December 2012), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115621> (06/20); Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. 
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indication of the existence of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR.199 
This factual dimension of the jurisdictional constellation present in 
the S.S. case is complemented by a de jure basis in international law. 
Indeed, the coordinating role assumed by MRCC Rome could not 
have been ignored or avoided. It was legally predetermined by the 
maritime conventions, which, rather than creating any new sovereign 
entitlements in favor of coastal states, instead produce “area[s] of 
responsibility” to be overseen (in good faith) in order to preserve the 
safety of human life at sea.200 These conventions stipulate that upon 
receipt of a distress call, the first MRCC contacted becomes and 
remains responsible for the coordination of rescue procedures until 
the MRCC in charge of the SAR region (SRR) within which the 
incident occurs assumes responsibility.201 Like Papastavridis argues in 
this Special Issue, it is the knowledge of the situation of distress that 
triggers the obligation under the law of the sea, in line with the object 
and purpose of the maritime conventions. Their objective is to ensure 
cooperation in completing the rescue and disembarking survivors202 – 
a duty that would normally fall on to the MRCC in whose SRR the 
incident takes place.203 
However, in the absence of an officially declared SRR and a fully 
functioning Libyan MRCC, that responsibility could not be validly 
transferred to the LYCG, and the first MRCC receiving the distress 
call – and thus with knowledge of the event – remained bound to 
	  
Poland, App. No. 7511/13, para. 512 (24 July 2014), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146047> (06/20). 
199 This is the conclusion reached by the Tribunale di Trapani, resolving a similar 
SAR case, in its Judgment of June 3, 2019, at 27, <https://www.asgi.it/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/2019_tribunale_trapani_vos_thalassa.pdf> (06/20). 
200 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; SOLAS Convention, Annex, Ch V, Reg 7(1); International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Preamble, Recitals 1 and 3, and Annex, 
para. 2.1.1, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter SAR Convention] 
201 IMO, Maritime Safety Committee, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea [hereinafter IMO Guidelines], 2004, MSC.167(78), MSC 78/26/Add.2 
(Annex 34), para. 6.7. IMO Guidelines are not strictly binding, but must “be taken 
into account” by SAR and SOLAS Convention parties accepting of the 2004 
amendments, as is Italy’s case. See SAR Convention, Annex, para. 3.1.9. See also the 
U.N. General Assembly urging members to implement them in their domestic 
procedures in Res. 61/222, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/222, para. 70 (20 December 2006). 
202 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 3.1.9. 
203 Id. Annex, para. 2.1 and 2.3; SOLAS Convention, Annex, Ch V, Reg 7(1). 
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proceed with the effective coordination of the operation. This 
responsibility includes making sure that the rescue is conducted safely 
and in compliance with the relevant rules, bringing survivors to 
landfall in a place of safety204 – which Libya is not.205 
Any information, instructions, and guidance delivered by MRCC 
Rome must take into account their likely repercussions – bearing in 
mind that reliance on law of the sea norms does not release from 
parallel human rights obligations concurrently applying in situations of 
distress.206 In particular, an MRCC that coordinates a SAR operation 
outside its own SRR “should refrain from giving directions or advice 
which it knows or ought reasonably to know would have negative 
human rights implications for those requiring assistance.” 207  This 
arguably includes the requisitioning of vessels from actors, like the 
LYCG, which are known for their unsafe, threatening, and abusive 
conduct towards survivors, invariably leading to their refoulement.208 
While “the search and rescue service concerned … has the right to 
requisition ships [so that they] render assistance,”209 it has also the 
	  
204 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 3.1.9 and IMO Guidelines, paras. 6.12, 6.17, 
defining “place of safety” as “a location where rescue operations are considered to 
terminate … where the survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened and where their 
basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met,” stressing 
“[t]he need to avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those 
alleging a well-founded fear of persecution would be threatened” (emphases added). 
205 This has been the explicit finding of the Tribunale di Trapani, supra note 199, 
p. 32 and 46 et seq. 
206  Confirming: Hirsi, supra note 13. For commentary, see V. Moreno-Lax, 
“Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU 
Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 
2011, p. 174. 
207 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, General Legal Considerations: Search and 
Rescue Operations Involving Refugees and Migrants at Sea, para. 20 (November 2017), 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a2e9efd4.html> (06/20). See also CoE CommHR, 
Lives Saved, Rights Protected: Bridging the Protection Gap for Refugees and Migrants in 
the Mediterranean, p. 30, recommendation 9 (June 2019), <https://rm.coe.int/lives-
saved-rights-protected-bridging-the-protection-gap-for-refugees-/168094eb87> 
(06/20). 
208 CoE CommHR, Third Party Intervention in Application No. 21660/18, S.S. 
and Others v. Italy, CommDH, 2019, p. 29, para. 30 (15 November 2019), 
<https://rm.coe.int/third-party-intervention-before-the-european-court-of-human-
rights-app/168098dd4d> (06/20).  
209 SOLAS Convention, Annex, Ch V, Reg 33(2) (emphasis added). See also SAR 
Convention, Annex, para. 5.3.3.5. 
VIOLETA MORENO-LAX 224 
duty to exercise this power in line with “other rules of international 
law.”210 Arguably, this includes the prerogative to release masters of 
ships that could potentially be requisitioned from their obligation to 
render assistance, when they are unsuitable.211 A shipmaster should 
only be asked to proceed to the rescue “in so far as such action may be 
reasonably be expected of him.”212 
The Italian authorities knew or ought to have known that the 
LYCG was inadequate. They knew or ought to have known that 
calling upon it to intervene would mean for the survivors to be taken 
back to Libya,213 to face “dismal circumstances” amounting to “crimes 
against humanity,” as described in EUNAVFOR MED 
documentation.214 And this foreseeability of the likely result of their 
actions was relevant to the establishment of a jurisdictional link with 
the S.S. applicants. 
Acting in the knowledge that the life and integrity of the persons 
in distress will be threatened when delivered to the authorities of an 
unsafe country215 amounts to an exercise of jurisdiction under the 
impact model, which thus suffices to activate the positive, due 
diligence obligations attaching to the rights of the persons directly 
affected by the action concerned. 216  In the S.S. case, SAR duties 
intersect with human rights responsibilities, which constrain state 
	  
210 UNCLOS arts. 2(3) and 87(1). 
211 SOLAS Convention, Annex, Ch V, Reg 33(3)–(4). 
212 UNCLOS art. 98(1). 
213 EUNAVFOR MED has noted that “migrants doesn’t [sic] want to be rescued 
by the Libyan Coast Guard because they obviously don’t want to go back in Libya.” 
See EUNAVFOR MED, LYCG Monitoring Report, supra note 30, Annex C, p. 3 
(emphasis added).  
214 EUNAVFOR MED, Six-Monthly Report 1 November 2016 – 31 May 2017, 
supra note 35, pp. 2, 5–6. 
215 That Libya was unsafe for returns has been well known for a long time. Since 
the 2011 upraising and civil war, UNHCR’s views on the disembarkation of refugees 
and migrants in Libya have been unequivocal. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 
UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya (12 November 2014), 
<https://www.unhcr.org/jp/wp-
content/uploads/sites/34/protect/Libya_position_on_returns_12_November_2014.pd
f> (06/20), updated in October 2015 (Update I), 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/561cd8804.html> (06/20) and in September 2018 
(Update II), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b8d02314.html> (06/20). 
216 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 53 E.H.R.R. 2, paras. 258–259, 263, 358–
359, and 366–367, 2011; and Hirsi, App. No. 27765/09 at paras. 118, 123, 125–126, 
156–157.  
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discretion and limit the options left for choice of action.217 Italy could, 
therefore, not legitimately indicate a transfer of responsibility for the 
survivors to the LYCG, whether directly or indirectly, including 
through the provisions regulating OSC, without thereby engaging its 
(functional) jurisdiction and violating its international obligations.218 
MRCC Rome should, instead, have avoided the intervention of the 
LYCG, by not calling on the Ras Al Jadar, as a measure “within the 
scope of [its] powers which, judged reasonably, might have been 
expected to avoid [the] risk.”219 Alternatively, at the very least, it 
should have refrained from asking it to assume OSC, a task that 
MRCCs must allocate “taking into account the apparent capabilities of 
the on-scene co-ordinator and operational requirements.”220 Rather, it 
should have preferred the better alternatives offered by the SW3 and 
the multiple units readily available within the Mare Sicuro and 
EUNAVFOR MED missions present in proximity, which could have 
completed the rescue safely. 
 
6.2. The Decisive Influence Element 
 
Besides the impact element, the decisive influence element regards 
the exercise of functional jurisdiction through indirect means. “Public 
	  
217  See, e.g., Leray v. France, App. No. 44617/98, (16 January 2001), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60010> (06/20), where the Strasbourg court 
concluded that SAR operations are susceptible of judicial review in light of the right to 
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236. 
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U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth and Sixth 
Periodic Reports of Italy, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/ITA/CO/5-6 (17 December 2017). 
219 Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 87/1997, para. 11 (28 October 1998), 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58257> (06/20). 
220 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 4.7.2> (06/20). 
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powers,” in this instance, rather than being carried out by the 
authorities of the state concerned, are deployed through the medium 
of a local administration in a third country – whether with its legal 
consent, de facto connivance or none of them, as the situation was in 
Ilaşcu and subsequent line of cases.221 
The Strasbourg Court has maintained in this constant 
jurisprudence, regarding Russian and Moldovan (co-)responsibility for 
the violations perpetrated by the separatist government of 
Transdniestria, that an ECHR party engages its jurisdiction for the 
actions and (crucially also for the) omissions of a third actor, when the 
latter comes under its “decisive influence.” 222  Such “decisive 
influence” can lead to the establishment of functional jurisdiction on 
account of the degree of dependency of the third actor in question on 
the support received by the ECHR party. Where the third actor 
survives “by virtue of the military, economic, financial and political 
support given to it” by the ECHR party,223 this entails “that [same 
ECHR party’s] responsibility for its policies and actions.” 224  The 
reason is that this kind of critical support engenders a “continuous 
and uninterrupted link of responsibility . . . for the applicants” fate.”225 
And this is true even when there may not be any “direct involvement” 
of the influencing ECHR party in the specific human rights violations 
	  
221 Ilaşcu, App. No. 48787/99. See also Catan, Apps. 43370/04, 8252/05, and 
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alleged.226 What is more, such a “continuous and uninterrupted link of 
responsibility” is considered to give rise to positive obligations to 
prevent human rights violations in the area controlled by the 
dependent third actor over which the ECHR party exercises “decisive 
influence.”227 
Although the Court designed this paradigm with a geographical 
rather than a functional area of control in mind, the parallels with S.S. 
are paramount, considering the multiple ways in which Italy has 
influenced Libya’s policy and practice in the Central Mediterranean, 
entailing control over a wide range of interdependent stakes, as Part C 
demonstrates. In November 2017, Libya lacked an SRR, an MRCC, 
and a coastguard function capable of receiving and responding to 
distress calls autonomously, which is why Italy’s input was essential.228 
In 2016, the LYCG was barely functional, due to vital assets and 
equipment having been destroyed by the NATO’s offensive during 
2011–12.229 For the former Italian Minister of Interior, Minniti, prior 
to 2017, “when we said we had to re-launch the Libyan coastguard, it 
seemed like a daydream.”230 Plans to develop a system of border 
surveillance in Libya, in general, and a functioning LN/LCG, in 
particular, as Part C has shown, were entirely “dependent” on Italy’s 
(and EU’s) assistance.231 It was only after the MoU, and the related 
financial, logistic, and operative support provided by Italy, that the 
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LYCG performed 19,452 pullbacks in 2017,232 up from 800 in 2015.233 
However, rather than contributing to diminishing the “horrific 
abuses” faced by migrants,234 in accordance with the due diligence 
obligations attached to (an exercise of functional jurisdiction taking 
the form of) decisive influence,235 the Italian plan deliberately led to 
their containment in Libya. Its interventions so far “have done 
nothing … to reduce the level of ill-treatment suffered by migrants” in 
the country. On the contrary, UN monitoring “shows a fast 
deterioration of their situation,” 236  including at the hands of the 
LYCG and after being pulled back.237 
What is clear and the European authorities have recognized is that 
the “increased performance of the Libyan Coast Guard [is a] direct 
consequence of the support … provided.”238 “[T]here could not be a 
sufficient operational capability [of the LYCG] without … [the] 
training [and] equipment” delivered.239 As the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs acknowledged in a public report, it is their 
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“partnership with Tripoli which … has … produced [these] important 
results.”240 It is “thanks” to Italy,241 rather than to Libya’s independent 
efforts,242 that there has been a near 90 per cent decrease in the 
number of arrivals at Italian shores by mid-2018.243 
These results are not accidental, unforeseen or unintended. They 
are planned and expected. They stem from the direct application of 
the Treaty of Friendship and the 2017 MoU. They constitute the 
concrete realization of their object and purpose. Indeed, Italy’s 
support has specifically been targeted at “reinforcing the autonomy of 
[Libyan] operational capacities,” 244  with a view to transferring 
coordination responsibilities for rescue and interdiction in what was to 
become the Libyan SRR. And that investment in capacity building of 
the LYCG is not unconditional. In the words of the EUNAVFOR 
MED command, it is provided “in exchange for [Libyan] cooperation 
in tackling the irregular migration issue.”245 So, the support lent to the 
LYCG has explicitly been understood as a quid pro quo, in a bid to 
exert influence over the manner in which Libyan constabulary 
functions are implemented at sea, in order to achieve the desired 
outcome of foreclosing maritime crossings towards Italy. Accordingly, 
it has only been “under pressure” from Italy (and the EU) that 
“Libyan authorities [have] increased their efforts to address the 
irregular flow of migrants.”246 
The pressure has come from different directions, not only from the 
political and operational spheres, but also from the dedicated Italian-
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Libyan Joint Commission created by the MoU.247 In accordance with 
its mandate, the Joint Commission has formulated the “strategic 
priorities” of the Italian-Libyan collaboration pursuant to which Italy 
has delivered funding, training, equipment, and the main patrol vessels 
in the Libyan fleet. So, the definition of such “strategic priorities” and 
their practical implementation are key towards the establishment and 
full capacitation of the LYCG. They are, arguably, tantamount to “the 
formulation of essential policy,” as defined by the Strasbourg Court in 
Jaloud,248 further supporting the conclusion that Italy, although not 
directly involved in each and every individual action of the LYCG, did 
not merely exert pressure, but “decisive influence” in the overall 
implementation of the plan to stem irregular migration across the 
Central Mediterranean. It is Italy’s comprehensive investment that 
made pull-backs a reality in the course of 2017, thus providing “a 
strong indication” that it exercised decisive influence over the LYCG 
in a way such as to trigger Article 1 ECHR.249 
 
6.3. The Operative Involvement Element 
 
Beyond its implication from a distance, through the “impact” and 
“decisive influence” elements identified in the previous Parts, Italy’s 
involvement in the operative capacities of the LYCG, especially in the 
course of 2017, has been very direct too – so much so that it fits the 
“public powers” doctrine to the letter, as formulated in Al-Skeini. To 
be sure, not only did Italy assume state functions of those normally 
pertaining to the territorial sovereign, but it did so on the grounds of 
the MoU and related decisions of the Joint Commission established by 
it – therefore, with “the consent, invitation, or acquiescence of the 
state concerned.”250 
As elaborated upon in Part C, November 6, 2017, was not an 
isolated occurrence, in terms of the overall functional authority 
undertaken by Italy in the coordination of SAR in the waters off Libya. 
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Although Libya had ratified the SAR Convention, it had not officially 
declared an SRR according to the applicable formalities at the time of 
the S.S. events. An information document submitted by Italy (not 
Libya) to the IMO in December 2017 reveals that the process of 
“assist[ing] the relevant Libyan authorities in identifying and declaring 
their SRR” was still ongoing.251 
Actually, for the declaration of an SRR to be valid, the SAR 
Convention foresees that there be an agreement among the Parties 
concerned (usually including all neighboring coastal states) to be 
notified to the IMO for dissemination,252 and that SAR services be 
fully operational within the SRR being declared, so that they “are able 
to give prompt response to distress calls.”253 That the existence of a 
functioning MRCC is “a prerequisite for efficiently coordinate [sic] 
search and rescue within the Libyan search and rescue zone, in line 
with international legislation,” has been jointly declared by the EU 
Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs.254 
The obligation on coastal states is to run “an adequate and 
effective” SAR service.255 To that end, parties responsible for an SRR 
normally undertake “overall coordination of SAR operations,”256 for 
which purpose they “shall make provision for the coordination 
facilities required to provide SAR services round their coasts” and 
“shall establish a national machinery for the overall coordination of 
SAR services,”257 in the form of rescue coordination centers.258 Above 
all, MRCCs “shall have adequate means for the receipt of distress 
communications” and “adequate means for communication with its 
rescue units and with MRCCs in adjacent areas.”259 And rescue units 
attached to them must, in turn, be “suitably … equipped,” staffed and 
managed, with appropriate “facilities and equipment” that allow for 
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an effective response260 – all of which was, and still is, lacking in the 
Libyan case. 
As shown in Part C, Libyan MRCC functions have, instead, been 
secured by Italy, arranging for the dispatch and coordination of 
resources within SAR missions, ascertaining the movement and 
location of vessels in distress, developing rescue plans, designating 
OSC, communicating with rescue assets at sea, coordinating their 
action, and even arranging for briefing and debriefing of LYCG 
personnel.261 Italy should, therefore, be considered to have assumed 
“overall control,” in the functional sense, of this Libyan 
competence,262 which it exercises both “directly, through its [own 
naval] forces” – deployed in Libya and at sea, within Operation 
Nauras, and within its own Coastguard and MRCC – as well as 
“through a subordinate local administration” embodied in the 
LYCG.263 It is Italy (also with the EU’s input) that has put in place the 
whole technical and material infrastructure (not only the ships and the 
equipment, but also the whole detection and communication 
apparatus) that enables the interception and return of migrants back 
to Libya. And it is Italy that has assumed “effective authority” over 
individual SAR operations,264 including the one it deployed in S.S. As a 
result, Italy should be considered responsible to “secure, within the 
[policy] area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set 
out in the Convention” that arise in SAR and interdiction situations.265 
The nature of the LYCG as a subrogate Italian proxy for 
interdiction and pull-back at sea has been confirmed by the Tribunal 
of Catania adjudicating on a related case concerning the rescue ship 
Open Arms of the NGO Proactiva. In his decision, the judge takes as 
proven the crucial role played by the Italian Nauras assets in detecting 
migrant boats off the Libyan coast and in leading LYCG operations.266 
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The judge goes as far as to affirm that the interventions of Libyan 
patrol vessels happen “under the aegis of the Italian navy” and that the 
coordination of SAR missions is “essentially entrusted to the Italian 
Navy, with its own naval assets and with those provided to the 
Libyans.”267 The phone number of the LYCG, as provided in their 
official headed paper, at least until the spring of 2018, corresponded 
to the phone number of the Italian Nauras vessel docked in Tripoli,268 
which further corroborates the “high degree of integration” between 
the two.269 Ayoub Qassem, a spokesperson for the LYCG Tripoli 
sector, back in November 2017, had already confirmed this modus 
operandi. He explained how the LYCG uses “the information 
[delivered by Italy] to intercept people and return them to Libya, even 
if they are apprehended [rather than rescued] in international 
waters.”270 
Italy de facto commands the SAR and interdiction response of the 
LYCG. In these circumstances, it should not be able to “evade its own 
responsibility by relying on its obligations arising out of bilateral 
agreements with Libya.”271 It should, instead, be considered that the 
practice it promotes of refoulement by proxy, employing the LYCG to 
that end, amounts to an “exercise of [Italy’s] sovereign authority, the 
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effect of which is to prevent migrants from reaching [its] borders,” 
thus engaging ECHR responsibility.272 
On November 6, 2017, the measure of comprehensive dominium 
that Italy exercised over Libya’s SAR and interdiction functions was 
similar to that recognized by the Strasbourg Court in relation to 
occupied areas of territory of a foreign country in its case law.273 
Against this background, it should not be necessary to determine 
whether Italy exercised “detailed control” over every individual action 
of the LYCG.274 Italy’s significant naval presence, through its Nauras 
and Mare Sicuro missions, as well as its all-encompassing provision to 
the LYCG – which only “survives as a result of [that] support”275 – 
determine that it exercised “effective control” over the S.S. applicants 
throughout the chain of events of November 6, 2017. This includes 
those who drown or were injured at sea, alongside those who were 
maltreated by LYCG officers and/or pulled back to Libya, “during 
the course of or contiguous to [SAR/interdiction] operations” carried 
out under Italy’s direction.276 
 
 
7. Conclusions. Limits, and Implications of the Functional Model 
 
When jurisdiction is understood in a functional sense, as an 
expression of public powers that may combine elements of legislative, 
executive and/or judicial action, there is no longer a need for 
unjustified distinctions between territorial and extraterritorial, or 
between personal and spatial manifestations. Ultimately, what 
underpins the various jurisdictional models accepted by the 
Strasbourg Court and other adjudicators of international human rights 
law is the sovereign-authority nexus established between the state and 
the individual in a specific situation through an exercise of “public 
powers.” And in extraterritorial settings, like in territorial locations, 
this can be ascertained not only through the exertion of direct physical 
constraint, but also through indirect forms of control. What makes 
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control “effective” under the functional reading of jurisdiction is its 
capacity to determine a change in the real and/or legal position of 
those concerned with human rights-relevant implications. The 
isolation of particular segments of that control is not warranted, 
however. I posit that the evaluation of a concrete situation requires 
that attention be paid to the entire constellation of all the relevant 
channels through which state functions are exercised, be they factual, 
legal or both at the same time. Rather than insulating supposedly 
prevalent de facto elements, the proposition is to appraise situations in 
toto, taking account of de jure factors that may concur with exercises 
of physical force. 
This approach allows for contextualized applications and 
principled outcomes. Under this paradigm, the very act of bombing 
taken in isolation or the absence of comprehensive control over the air 
space above the TV station in Belgrade would not have been the only 
elements considered to assess jurisdiction in Bankovic. The entire 
operation of which the bombing was but one part would also have 
been taken into account. It would not have been the power to kill or 
its random occurrence, but the orchestration of a military mission with 
a specific target and its implementation through deliberate recourse to 
lethal force that would have counted as an exercise of jurisdiction. 
State operations—military or otherwise—are multi-staged processes, 
entailing elements of prescriptive and enforcement action, comprising 
a sequence of planning, launching, and completion phases. Isolating 
one of them, or selecting a single factor detaching it from the rest, 
misses the wider structure to which it belongs and through which it 
articulates itself. It is arbitrary and – as in Bankovic – it leads to 
arbitrary findings. 
If what is significant is not one part but the whole of the operation, 
its foreseeable impact and the knowledge of likely consequences of 
operational action are relevant and come to inform the jurisdictional 
analysis. Planning and deployment must be considered together as 
part of the same continuum. They must take account of predictable 
results and be undertaken in a human-rights compliant fashion. This 
applies both when state intervention is carried out directly, through its 
own organs and agents acting or producing effects abroad, and when 
it is undertaken indirectly, by a proxy third actor. 
Italy’s actions and those it orchestrated in Libya should, therefore, 
be taken as a whole, rather than disaggregated. When taken as a 
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whole, its sovereign decisions (adopted territorially, but producing 
effects abroad) together with the comprehensive support lent to the 
LN/LCG (including through direct involvement in their command 
and control capabilities) create a system of contactless, yet effective, 
control of the SAR and interdiction functions of Libya that amounts to 
an exercise of functional jurisdiction. Taking together the “impact,” 
“decisive influence” and “operative involvement” factors through 
which its public powers materialized, the conclusion should be that, 
on November 6, 2017, Italy triggered Article 1 ECHR. Through its 
pervasive investment in the LYCG, it created the fiction of Libya’s 
“ownership” of its intervention at sea,277 achieving, by proxy, the same 
result for which it was condemned in Hirsi, accomplishing through 
another state what it was forbidden from doing itself.278 And, like in 
Hirsi, it should be condemned in S.S. as well, for its “recourse to 
practices which are not compatible with [its] obligations under the 
[European Human Rights] Convention.”279 
One of the implications of the functional jurisdiction model, as 
posited herein, is the potential chilling effect it may have on joint 
efforts to administer migration, and on international cooperation more 
broadly. Since it requires that the human rights repercussions of state 
action be taken into account when planning and rolling out 
operations, this may be seen as overburdening states and rendering 
collaborative projects more difficult. Nonetheless, this difficulty is not 
tantamount to inapplicability. Even in (extraterritorial) situations of 
armed conflict has the ICJ affirmed that the application of human 
rights is not suspended,280 also in the most atypical of circumstances, 
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when the use of nuclear weapons is being contemplated.281 
This conclusion that human rights obligations continue to bind 
when states cooperate with one another has been embraced within the 
ECHR domain. In several cases has the Strasbourg Court concluded 
that the Convention imposes obligations on ECHR parties that these 
cannot evade through collaboration inter se or with other entities. It is 
not that the Convention prohibits international cooperation. It just 
conditions the conclusion of international agreements (in whatever 
form), and any cooperation based thereupon, on the continued 
observance of human rights commitments. 282  When this is not 
possible, ECHR parties cannot see themselves as relieved from their 
obligations. On the contrary, they become precluded from “enter[ing] 
into an agreement with another state which conflicts with its 
obligations under the Convention,” with the principle carrying “all the 
more force” in the case of absolute and non-derogable rights – such as 
those at stake in S.S.283 
Due diligence is required too, so that ECHR parties’ conduct, on 
the basis of such agreements, does not contribute (directly or 
indirectly) to the perpetration of human rights violations. What is 
more, faced with a risk of irreversible harm, the Convention “places a 
number of positive obligations . . . designed to prevent and provide 
redress” for any ill-treatment that may eventually occur.284 And in 
situations where a country – like Libya – is perpetrating “a serious 
breach” of “an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
international law,”285 a migration management agreement, conflicting 
with jus cogens norms – like the prohibition of torture, slavery, or 
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[hereinafter ARSIWA], arts. 41(1) and 41(2). These provisions are considered to 
reflect the current state of customary law. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, paras. 173, 385, 388 (Feb. 26). 
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arbitrary deprivation of life286 – becomes invalid outright.287 In such 
circumstances, states must not only refrain from cooperation, but must 
also proactively engage in collaboration with others “to bring an end 
[to the violations in question] through lawful means.”288 Italy, in a 
situation like the one in S.S., rather than facilitating abuse by the 
LYCG, is “required by its own international obligations to prevent 
certain conduct by another state, or at least to prevent the harm that 
would flow from such conduct,”289 and to take the necessary steps to 
mitigate any related foreseeable damage. 
I understand there can be a potential backlash, if the Strasbourg 
Court follows my reasoning, embraces the functional conception of 
jurisdiction and the operational model, and finds in favor of the S.S. 
applicants.290 At the most extreme, countries could menace withdrawal 
from the ECHR.291 Another possibility is that the ruling precipitates a 
counter-reaction by State parties that is worse than the pull-back 
policy the ruling may illegalize—like the shift from the US 
extraordinary rendition program, comprising indefinite offshore 
detention and “enhanced” interrogation techniques in Guantanamo, 
to targeted killings via drone strikes.292 However, these shifts are 
	  
286 The Tribunale di Trapani, supra note 199, p. 32, has included the principle of 
non-refoulement in this list. 
287 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, art. 53. See also Tribunale di Trapani, supra note 199, p. 38, declaring the 2017 
MoU invalid on this ground. 
288 ARSIWA art. 41(1). 
289  ARSIWA Commentary p. 64, para. 4 (emphasis added). See also Corfu 
Channel, (U.K. v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, p. 22 (Apr. 9). 
290 M. Baumgärtel, “High Risk, High Reward: Taking the Question of Italy’s 
Involvement in Libyan “Pullback” Policies to the European Court of Human Rights”, 
EJIL:Talk! (14 May 2018), <https://www.ejiltalk.org/high-risk-high-reward-taking-
the-question-of-italys-involvement-in-libyan-pullback-policies-to-the-european-court-
of-human-rights/> (06/20). 
291 Like U.K. Conservative governments have threatened to do at different points 
in time. See, e.g., Conservative Party in the Run Up to the May 2015 General Election, 
Protecting Human Rights in the UK, undated, 
<https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20files/human_rights
.pdf> (06/20). See also R. Merrick, Theresa May to Consider Axeing Human Rights Act 
after Brexit, Minister Reveals, The Independent (18 January 2019), 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-human-rights-act-
repeal-brexit-echr-commons-parliament-conservatives-a8734886.html> (06/20). 
292 Alerting to this, see R. Wilde, The Unintended Consequences of Expanding 
Human Rights Protections, AJIL UNBOUND (12 March 2018), 
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already taking place.293 They will not be changes that S.S. might 
instigate. Blocking strategies of potential migration flows are already 
happening further down the line, and ever closer, if not directly 
within, countries of origin of potential refugees, like Sudan or 
Afghanistan.294 The apparatus of border coercion and extraterritorial 
containment has deep roots and has been forming for decades now, 
containing the movement of those most needing to move.295 
To my mind, there is more to gain than there is to lose with S.S. 
Just like a positive decision in Al-Skeini helped build the case in Hirsi, 
a positive finding in S.S. will, in incremental fashion, provide tools to 
counter the changing means through which states perpetrate violations 
offshore. S.S. can, therefore, make a crucial contribution to close the 
gap between extraterritorial interventions and the traditional, and still 
predominantly territorial, mechanisms of legal accountability, giving 
teeth to ECHR guarantees, and bringing borders and globalization 




protections/3F2C1AFDBFF42E08DD6F226DF55FDE6E> (06/20).  
293 See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Unlawful Death of Refugees and Migrants, U.N. Doc. A/72/335 (15 
August 2017). 
294 EEAS, Joint Way Forward on Migration Issues between Afghanistan and the EU 
(4 October 2016), <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
Homepage/11107/node/11107_nl> (06/20); A. Nestlen, EU Urged to End Cooperation 
with Sudan after Refugees Whipped and Deported, The Guardian (27 February 2017), 
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/27/eu-urged-to-end-
cooperation-with-sudan-after-refugees-whipped-and-deported> (06/20). 
295 For analysis of the main measures in the EU, see Moreno-Lax, supra note 147, 
especially Part I, chs 2 to 6.  
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The refugee crisis is above all a political crisis1 and the Union’s 
response to the massive influx of migrants and asylum-seekers who 
have arrived in Europe confirms that it “is not a refugee crisis facing 
Europe, but a European crisis facing refugee” 2.  
The need to manage the Union’s external borders through a legal 
standard common to all Member States has “the ultimate aim to 
creating a single legal area”3. The Union is seeking to achieve this 
objective by moving past the first stage of Common European Asylum 
System4 (hereinafter Ceas) which was based on minimum standards to 
regularize the asylum sector, towards a new phase that includes, 
pursuant to Article 78 TFEU, common asylum procedures and a 
uniform standard of protection for both asylum seekers and anyone in 
need of subsidiary protection, through a “full and inclusive application 
	  
∗ University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
1 See M. Den Heijer, J Rijpma, T. Spijkerboer, “Coercion, prohibition, and great 
expectations: The continuing failure of the common European asylum system”, 
Common Market Law Review ,53, 2016, p. 607; G. Campesi, “Seeking Asylum in 
Times of Crisis: Reception, Confinement, and Detention at Europe’s Southern 
Border”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 37, 2018, pp. 44 ff. 
2 M. Basilien-Gainche, “Hotspots, cold facts. Managing Migration by Selecting 
Migrants”, in Carolus Grutters, Sandra Mantu, Paul Minderhoud (eds.), Migration on 
the Move. Essays on the Dynamic of Migration, Brill, 2017, p. 153. 
3 E. Zaniboni, “No room for you in here? The past and the future of the asylum 
seekers’ reception conditions in Italy”, Freedom, Security & Justice, 2, 2018, p. 80. 
4 Launched by the Tampere Program of 1999 and concluded on 1 December 
2005. See also S. Carrera, “The impact of Treaty of Lisbon over EU policies on 
migration, asylum and borders: the struggles over the ownership of the Stockholm 
Program”, in E. Guild, P. Minderhoud (eds.), The first decade of EU migration and 
asylum law, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Boston, 2012, pp. 232 ff.  
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of the Geneva Convention and other relevant Treaties”5. The aim of 
the second phase of the Ceas and the recasting of acts adopted in the 
first stage6, has certainly not led to the expected results with a view to 
harmonizing asylum procedures between Member States. 
The crisis of 2015, following the arrival of thousands of migrants 
seeking protection, represents “a “turning point” in the operation of 
the CEAS, revealing the latent tensions of the system”7. However, 
Europe has only provided a fragmented response, unable to meet its 
obligations to welcome those seeking refuge in adequate and dignified 
conditions. In a context in which “protectionism prevailed over 
protection”8, the intensification of internal border controls within 
Europe, the implementation of policies that have created new 
obstacles to the integration of asylum seekers and an insufficient 
degree of cooperation between Member States has “contributed to 
revealing the weakness of the Ceas and its structural flaws”9.  
Thus the crisis that Europe is facing – and that’s what we’re 
interested in emphasizing – is linked more to its reception system than 





5 See C. Favilli, “Il trattato di Lisbona e la politica dell’Unione europea in materia 
di visti, asilo e immigrazione”, Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza, 2, 2010, pp. 26 ff.; 
among others, see also G. Morgese, “La riforma del sistema europeo comune di asilo e 
i suoi principali riflessi nell’ordinamento italiano”, Diritto immigrazione e cittadinanza, 
4, 2013, pp. 16 ss.; S. Carrera, “The impact of Treaty of Lisbon over EU policies on 
migration”, cit. 
6 The so-called asylum-package adopted on June 26, 2013 includes Directive 
2011/95/EU (recast), Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU (recast), Asylum Procedures 
Directive 2013/33/EU (recast), the Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (Dublin III 
Regulation), replacing the Dublin II Regulation and being part of the so-called Dublin 
System and the Regulation (EU) 603/2013 Eurodac (recast).  
7 G. Campesi, “Seeking Asylum in Times of Crisis”, cit., p. 46. 
8 S. Lavenex, “‘Failing Forward’ Towards Which Europe? Organized Hypocrisy 
in the Common European Asylum System”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 56, 
2018, p. 1201. 
9 E. Zaniboni, “Money for Nothing, Push-back ‘for Free’: On the (Missed) 
Implementation of the CEAS and the New Italian Agenda for Asylum Seekers 
Reception”, cit., p. 258; See also V. Chetail, “Looking beyond the Rhetoric of the 
Refugee Crisis: The Failed Reform of the Common European Asylum System”, 
European Journal of Human Rights, 2016, p. 584 ss. 
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In this context, we consider it highly important to analyze 
Directive 2013/33/EU10 which regulates the standards of reception 
applied to applicants for protection in the European Union. 
Although this Directive aims at harmonizing reception conditions 
among European countries by providing for “dignified standards of 
living” 11  for applicants, it also aims to help reduce secondary 
movements, limiting as far as possible the movements 12  of the 
applicants and their choices which might affect the balance of the 
Dublin system13.In other words, two opposing forces regulate the 
Directive through “two potentially conflicting policy objects (…), the 
protection of fundamental rights and migration management 
objectives”14. From the foregoing it is clear that one of the aims is to 
achieve a real securitarian management of the reception that actually 
tends to prevail over the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights 
of applicants. The “failure” of its original purpose to implement a 
standardized legislation in the reception of applicants is probably 
inherent in the very nature of the directive. By leaving Member States 
a wide discretion in the implementation of the Directive’s provisions 
in their own reception systems, these conditions are implemented 
differently within the various national systems, bringing to light 
already existing deficits and accentuating the structural limitations of 
national asylum systems15. In a limbo of practice where the initial 
reception is mixed with detention practices and the second reception 
is often subordinated to the increasingly frequent use of emergency 
accommodations, there is the risk of overestimating the true capacities 
of the States to offer an adequate level of reception that is not below 
the required standards and is in line with the protection of the 
	  
10 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
(recast), L 180/96, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0033&from=IT> (06/20). 
11 Ibid., Recital 11. 
12 Ibid., Recital 12. 
13 See also G. Campesi, “Seeking Asylum in Times of Crisis, cit., p. 48. 
14 See J. Silga, “The fragmentation of reception condition for asylum seekers in 
the European Union: Protecting fundamental rights or preventing long-term 
integration?”, Freedom, Security & Justice,3, 2018, p. 90. 
15 Wrong counts and closing doors: The reception of refugees and asylum seekers in 
Europe, March 2016, <http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/shadow-
reports/aida_wrong_counts_and_closing_doors.pdfhttp://www.asylumineurope.org/>
(06/20). 
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fundamental rights of applicants, in line with the protection offered by 
international instruments. In addition, the so-called Dublin System has 
done nothing but contribute to exacerbate this situation by making the 
burden of applications and the subsequent reception of applicants for 
protection in the countries of first entry16, in particular Italy and 
Greece 17 , unsustainable and unreasonable. In this regard, the 
judgments of the Courts of Strasbourg and Luxembourg have had 
fundamental importance in revealing the profound deficiencies in the 
reception systems of these countries, penalized by the “Dublin 
transfers” 18 . A proper reform of the Dublin Regulation 19  would 
therefore be extremely urgent, not least in order to help alleviate 
reception problems. This contribution aims in particular at focusing 
on the regulatory framework offered by Directive 2013/33/EU, with 
particular regard to the contribution of the case-law of the Court of 
Justice and the capability of that Court to respond to the complex 
challenges related to reception. 
 
	  
16 See G. Caggiano, “Alla ricerca di un nuovo equilibrio istituzionale per la 
gestione degli esodi di massa: dinamiche intergovernative, condivisione di 
responsabilità fra gli Stati membri e tutela dei diritti degli individui”, Studi 
sull’integrazione europea, 3, 2015, pp. 468 ss.  
17 Besides these, Spain, Poland and Hungary must also be mentioned. 
18 In the leading case M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, the ECTHR condemned 
Greece, directly responsible, and Belgium, indirectly responsible, for the delay in the 
applicant’s asylum request under Regulation Dublin II, precisely because of the 
serious systemic deficiencies in the reception and asylum system of Greece. Resuming 
these principles, the Court of Justice of the European Union in the N.S. v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department and others reiterated that States cannot ignore these 
lacks when "they constitute serious and proven reasons to believe that the applicant 
runs a real risk of undergoing inhuman or degrading treatment" under Article 4 of the 
Chart of Fundamental Rights. Among others, see comment on C. Favilli, “L’Unione 
che protegge e l’Unione che respinge. Progressi, contraddizioni e paradossi del sistema 
europeo di asilo”, Questione giustizia, 2, 2018, in particular par. 6.  
19 On this point see C. Favilli, “La crisi del Sistema Dublino: quali prospettive?”, 
in Mario Savino (ed.), La crisi migratoria tra Italia e Unione europea, Editoriale 
scientifica, Naples, 2017, pp. 293 ss.; with regard to future prospects for reforming the 
current Dublin system, see also Between tighter controls at EU’s external borders and a 
will to impose compulsory solidarity, Asylum and Migration Pact slowly maturing, 10 
July 2020, <https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/12524/2>(07/20); Pact on 
Asylum and Migration will not be presented “before early summer”, says Ylva 
Johansson, 19 May 2020, 
<https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/12489/14>(07/20). 
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2. Directive 2013/33/EU: the fragmentation of reception conditions 
for international asylum seekers 
 
Directive 2013/33/EU, recast act of the previous 2003/9/EC, 
covering all Member States except the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Ireland, was adopted on 26 June 2013 within the framework of the 
Common European Asylum System, which represents “a constituent 
part of the European Union’s objective of progressively establishing an 
area of freedom, security and justice open to those who, forced by 
circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the Union”20. Its aim is 
to ensure an improvement in reception conditions by offering 
applicants an equivalent level of protection in all EU Member States21. 
Deviating from the provisions of the first Directive 2003/9/EC laying 
down minimum requirements, it aims to ensure a harmonization of the 
reception conditions in the EU and a uniform standard of protection 
for any third-country national in need of protection, pending, in the 
light of Article 78 TFEU, realization of a “much more ambitious 
common policy” 22 . As specified in the preamble to the current 
Directive, this policy follows the natural development of a “uniform 
status for those granted international protection based on high 
protection standards and fair and effective procedures”23.Although the 
possibility for Member States to establish or maintain more favourable 
provisions is likely to further delay achievement of the desired 
harmonization, it is the directive itself that makes it clear that this is 
possible “insofar as these provisions are compatible with this 
Directive”24, as also stated in the Saciri judgment25 with which the 
Court of Justice states that such discretion by Member States must in 
any case comply with the minimum requirements laid down by the 
	  
20 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international 
protection (recast), cit. 
21 Recital 8 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
22 Art. 78 TFUE. 
23 Recital 5 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
24 Ivi, Art. 4. 
25 CJEU, judgment of 27 February 2014, Federaalagentschapvoor de opvang van 
asielzoekersvSelverSaciri and Others, case C-79/13. 
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Directive 26 . In the Reception Directive “the very notion of 
“reception”, however, is clouded by conceptual uncertainty” 27 . 
Reception conditions are defined as “the full set of measures that 
Member States grant to applicants in accordance with this 
Directive”28, definition that appears generic and incomplete in its 
content, avoiding any reference to both the obligations of the Member 
States in this regard, and with respect to the fundamental rights that 
are completely absent in this definition29. Before giving a general 
overview not only of the material reception conditions but also of the 
procedural guarantees, it is important to stress that, going beyond the 
original scope of application provided by Directive 2003/9/EU for 
asylum seekers only, the current Directive refers to applicants for 
international protection, including applicants for subsidiary 
protection, in line with the existing Union acquis30. Pursuant to art. 3.1 
“all third-country nationals and stateless persons who make an 
application for international protection on the territory, including at 
the border, in the territorial waters or in the transit zones of a Member 
State, as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory as 
applicants” benefit from the reception measures, even when a form of 
protection different from the one provided by the “Qualifications 
Directive” 2011/95/EU31 is requested. 
	  
26 Ivi, par. 49; see E. Guild, V. Moreno-Lax, “Reception Conditions”, in S. Peers, 
V. Moreno-Lax, M. Garlick, E. Guild (Eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law, 2nd 
rev. ed., Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2015, p. 505. 
27 Wrong counts and closing doors: The reception of refugees and asylum seekers in 
Europe, cit., p.8. 
28 Art. 2 (f) of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
29 See J.Silga, The fragmentation of reception condition for asylum seekers in the 
European Union, cit., p. 99. 
30 Recital 13 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit.; it should be said that most of member States had already 
extended the scope of Directive 2003/9/EC to include applicants for subsidiary 
protection although this status was not yet contemplated in the acquis of the Union, 
on this point see A. Del Guercio, “La seconda fase di realizzazione del Sistema 
europeo commune d’asilo, AIC, 2014, p. 14, 
<https://www.osservatorioaic.it/images/rivista/pdf/Osservatorio%20Del%20Guercio
_FINALE%20(1).pdf>(06/20). 
31 It is emphasized that States can decide, pursuant to art. 3.4 of Directive 
2013/33 / EU, to include different types of protection covered by national law, 
compared to those provided by directive 2011/95 / EU. 
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It is, of course, important to define when an applicant can actually 
begin to enjoy the reception conditions laid down. This may give rise 
to problems with regard to the concepts of “making and lodging an 
application”32, as provided in the original wording since the Directive 
uses those terms in various ways in some articles33. In this sense, the 
same Directive tries to evade the issue by stating at art. 17, with 
reference to material reception conditions, that “Member States shall 
ensure that material reception conditions are available to applicants 
when they make their application for international protection”, even 
though it is the Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU34 that clarifies the 
point by stating “given that third-country nationals and stateless 
persons who have expressed their wish to apply for international 
protection are applicants for international protection, they should 
comply with the obligations, and benefit from the rights, under this 
Directive and Directive 2013/33/EU”35. Art. 3.1 should also be read in 
conjunction with Recital 8 which, by establishing its implementation at 
all stages and in all types of procedures relating to applications for 
international protection, in all places and in all reception centers, 
implements what is stated in the judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Cimade and Gisti36, providing that common standards in reception 
procedures should be guaranteed for all applicants for international 
protection also in reference to the transfer procedure under the 
Dublin III Regulation. In this respect, not only does the EU Court of 
Justice state that Directive 2003/9/EC “provides for only one category 
of asylum seekers”37, but also that it must be read in the light of the 
fundamental rights and principles recognized by the Charter of 
	  
32 Vedi J. Silga, The fragmentation of reception condition for asylum seekers in the 
European Union, cit., p. 100; see also L. Slingenberg, The Reception of Asylum Seekers 
under International Law – Between Sovereignty and Equality, Hart Publishing, 2016, 
pp.46 ss. 
33 See art. 17.1, 14.2, 5.1, 6.1 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
34 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament And of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection (recast), L 180/60, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013L0032&from=en>(06/20). 
35 Ivi, recital 27. 
36 CJEU, judgment of 21 September 2012, Cimade, Groupe d’information et de 
soutien des immigrés (GISTI) v Ministre de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-mer, des Collectivités 
territoriales et de l’Immigration, caseC-179/11 
37 Ibidem, par. 40. 
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union, since the purpose of the 
Directive is to “ensure full respect for human dignity and to promote 
the application of Articles 1 and 18 of the Charter”38. Accredited 
doctrine believes that in full respect of the human dignity of protection 
applicants the reference in the Reception Directive to article 1 of the 
Charter may entail obligations of a wider scope than the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment39. The Court, having 
clarified that those requirements do not exclude applicants for 
protection pending the determination of the Member State competent 
to examine the application under the Dublin III Regulation, states that 
the asylum seeker cannot be deprived of the reception conditions laid 
down in the Directive “even for a temporary period”40. In this respect 
“only the actual transfer (...) by the requesting Member State brings to 
an end the examination of the application for asylum by that State and 
its responsibility for granting the minimum reception conditions”41. 
After a full review of the scope of this directive, we will now deal 
with the general provisions on reception conditions. In this respect, we 
shall not explore the issue of detention any further, referring the point 
to the next paragraph.  
Among the procedural rights of the Directive, with regard to the 
right to information, Article 5 provides that “Member States shall 
inform applicants for international protection, within a period of 15 
days, at least as regards the benefits granted and their obligations with 
regard to reception conditions, in writing and in a language which the 
applicant understands or is reasonably supposed to understand”42, 
regarding the possibility of coming into contact with organizations 
providing legal or humanitarian assistance. As regards the right to 
documentation, Member States must provide, within three days of the 
submission of the application, a document certifying the status of the 
applicant, allowing him to stay in the territory of the State for the time 
	  
38 Ibidem, par. 42. 
39 See E. Tsourdi, “EU Reception Conditions: A Dignified Standard of Living for 
Asylum Seekers?”, in V. Chetail, P. De Bruycker, F. Maiani (eds.), Reforming the 
Common European Asylum System – The New European Refugee Law, Brill, Nijhoff, 
2016, p. 301. 
40 CJEU, Cimade e Gisti, cit., par. 56; see E. Guild, V. Moreno-Lax, Reception 
Conditions, cit., p. 510. 
41 Ibidem, par. 55. 
42 Art. 5.2 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
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required to examine an application that is pending or under 
consideration43.The subsequent provision seems to be more proble-
matic because it allows Member States to circumvent the obligations 
of the aforementioned article for applicants in detention, for those 
who are at the border during the examination of the application for 
protection or in the context of a procedure aimed at determining 
whether the applicant has the right to enter the territory. 44 This 
provision makes the situation of such applicants particularly 
uncertain45. They could be excluded from access to material reception 
conditions, as required by the directive, from the moment they arrive 
until they obtain the documents allowing them to stay in the country, 
assimilating their status to that of those who are illegally in the 
country. This is in opposition to art. 27 of the Geneva Convention, 
according to which “the Contracting States shall issue identity papers 
to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel 
document” as well as with art. 31 prohibiting the imposition of 
criminal penalties on applicants for asylum who are not allowed to 
enter or stay illegally on national territory.46As far as this is concerned, 
it is interesting that the recent Sadikou Gnandi47 judgment, citing the 
Cimade and GISTI case, although the latter deals with an applicant 
whose application has been rejected and a repatriation decision taken 
on the matter, clarifies the concept of being “allowed to remain in the 
territory” under the Directive. The Court of Justice states that even 
pending an action at first instance on the rejection of an application 
for protection, the person concerned is entitled to benefit from the 
guarantees of Directive 2003/9/EC because “[the] article 3(1) makes 
its application conditional only on the existence of an authorization to 
remain on the territory as an applicant and, therefore, does not 
exclude the directive’s application in the case where the person 
concerned has such an authorization and is staying illegally, within the 
meaning of Directive 2008/115” 48 since the individual retains the 
	  
43 Ibidem, art. 6.1. 
44 Ibidem, art. 6.2. 
45 J. Silga, The fragmentation of reception condition for asylum seekers in the 
European Union, cit., p. 100. 
46 See A. Del Guercio, La seconda fase di realizzazione del sistema europeo comune 
d’asilo, cit., p. 15; see also E. Guild, V.Moreno-Lax, Reception Conditions, cit., p. 513 
e ss. 
47 CJEU, Judgment of 19 June 2018, Sadikou Gnandi v État belge, C-181/16. 
48 Ibidem, par. 63. 
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status of an applicant for protection until the final decision on his 
application.  
As regards material reception conditions, these shall include 
“housing, food and clothing provided in kind, or as financial 
allowances or in vouchers, or a combination of the three, and a daily 
expenses allowance”49 .The Member States, as mentioned above, must 
ensure that applicants can benefit from these conditions as soon as 
they wish to apply for international protection, ensuring “an adequate 
standard of living (…), which guarantees their subsistence and 
protects their physical and mental health”50 . In accordance with art. 
20.5, States shall in all circumstances ensure not only access to 
healthcare, but also “a dignified standard of living for all applicants”. 
What constitutes this standard and how it should be achieved is not 
only not specified in the directive, but is left to the discretion of the 
Member States. Reception standards therefore remain fragmentary 
and particularly variable between States, failing to achieve a uniform 
level of treatment for applicants for protection51. Accommodation can 
be provided in the form of an economic grant or, as explained by art. 
18, in kind. Art. 18.9 also grants the possibility of derogating from this 
provision by laying down different material reception conditions than 
those provided before, where accommodation capacities are 
temporarily unavailable, “exceptionally” and only “for a reasonable 
period which shall be as short as possible”. The judgment by the 
Court of Justice in the case of Saciri52 intervened to interpret the scope 
of that article regarding the granting by States of material reception 
conditions in the form of economic subsidies. On the basis of the 
principles cited above in the Cimade and Gisti53 case, the Court states 
that 
  
where a Member State has opted to grant the material reception 
conditions in the form of financial allowances or vouchers, that those 
allowances must be provided from the time the application for asylum is 
	  
49 Art. 2 (g) of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
50 Ivi, Art. 17.2. 
51 Current migration situation in the EU: Oversight of reception facilities, 
September 2017, p. 5, <https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-
september-monthly-migration-report-focus-oversight_en.pdf>(06/20). 
52 CJEU, Selver Saciri and Others, cit. 
53 CJEU, Cimade et Gisti, cit., par. 56 
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made (…).That Member State must ensure that the total amount of the 
financial allowances covering the material reception conditions is sufficient to 
ensure a dignified standard of living and adequate for the health of applicants 
and capable of ensuring their subsistence, enabling them in particular to find 
housing, having regard, if necessary, to the preservation of the interests of 
persons having specific needs54.  
 
Furthermore, the principle stressed by the Court that “saturation 
of the reception networks not being a justification for any derogation 
from meeting those standards”55, appears to be particularly effective 
and relevant with regard to the assessment of the compatibility of the 
reception systems implemented in the Member States with the rules 
laid down in the European acquis56. 
In the zones designated as places of accommodation for applicants 
for international protection, Member States have a duty to ensure the 
protection of family life, the possibility of interviews with relatives, 
lawyers or representatives of international organizations and the 
UNHCR, but also to take into account gender and age differences, 
prevent incidents of violence especially against women and train 
personnel who are qualified in assistance. 
Directive 33/2013/EU also calls for Member States to provide 
health care, including, as a minimum, first aid and necessary medical 
and mental care to applicants with special needs. Access to the labor 
market shall be granted within nine months (no longer twelve months 
as in Directive 2003/9/EC) from the date on which the application was 
submitted. The host State may authorize the applicant’s vocational 
training, even if he has not already had access to a job. Although these 
provisions are more secure than the previous directive in this area, 
they remain much too vague to govern such a complex matter, leaving 
a broad margin for Member States with regard to the conditions of 
access and in practice leading to differentiated treatment from one 
Member State to another57. 
The applicants for international protection “do not have an 
	  
54 CJEU, SelverSaciri and Others, cit., par. 46. 
55 Ibidem, par. 50. 
56 See E. Zaniboni, Money for Nothing, Push-back ‘for Free’: On the (Missed) 
Implementation of the CEAS, cit., p. 274. 
57 Vedi J. Silga, The fragmentation of reception condition for asylum seekers in the 
European Union, cit., p. 105. 
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absolute right to reception”58. In fact, article 20 states that material 
reception conditions may be revoked or reduced when the applicant 
leaves his residence without informing the authorities, contravenes the 
obligation to report to the authorities to provide information or to be 
interviewed for the asylum procedure, “has lodged a subsequent 
application as defined in Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU, … or 
has not lodged an application for international protection as soon as 
reasonably practicable, … has concealed financial resources, and has 
therefore unduly benefited from material reception conditions” 59. 
Although Member States have a wide margin of discretion, decisions 
to this effect must be taken objectively and impartially on a case-by-
case basis. In view of the grounds for withdrawal or reduction of 
reception conditions, applicants for protection may avail themselves of 
Article 26, which provides for the possibility of challenging the 
decision of the State authority, and, at the last instance, for the 
possibility of an appeal before a judicial authority, where States must 
ensure, on request, a free legal representation provided by 
appropriately qualified personnel. Member States may, in accordance 
with paragraph 4 of that Article, apply penalties in respect of serious 
infringements by applicants of the rules of reception centers. It is 
precisely with regard to such an infringement that the Court of Justice 
ruled in the recent judgment Zubair Haqbin v Federal agentschapvoor 
de opvang van asielzoekers60. The applicant, an Afghan citizen who 
arrived in Belgium as an unaccompanied minor, following a brawl in 
which he was involved in the reception center where he was staying, 
the Belgian authorities had temporarily withdrawn the reception 
measures and all the services associated with them such as medical and 
psychological assistance, forcing the child to seek makeshift 
accommodations. Without going into the specific issues with reference 
to a preliminary ruling, what is of interest here is the Court’s 
interpretation of the compatibility of the scheme for the withdrawal of 
material reception conditions with the protection of fundamental 
rights, in particular with regard to the category of unaccompanied 
minors in need of special protection. Although the Court highlights 
	  
58 G. Campesi, “Seeking Asylum in Times of Crisis”, cit., p. 49. 
59 Art. 20 par. 1,2,3 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
60 CJEU, judgment of 12 November 2019, Zubair Haqbin v Federal agentschapvoor 
de opvang van asielzoekers, case C-233/18. 
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the lack of a definition of the concept of “sanction”61 in Directive 
2013/33/EU to ensure a certain margin of discretion in the imposition 
of such measures, it also states that in reducing or withdrawing 
reception conditions Member States must take into account the 
particular situation of the applicant for protection and all the 
circumstances of the case which “complies with the principle of 
proportionality and does not undermine the Dignity of the 
applicant”62. In this judgment, in view of the overriding interest of the 
child as a fundamental criterion in the implementation of the relevant 
provisions of the Directive, “the legality of a withdrawal measure in 
the present case is excluded, in view of the characteristics of the case 
and the vulnerability of the applicant as an unaccompanied minor”63. 
The Court concluded that “Article 20(4) and (5) of Directive 
2013/33 (…) must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State 
cannot, among the sanctions that may be imposed on an applicant for 
serious breaches of the rules of the accommodation centers as well as 
seriously violent behaviour, provide for a sanction consisting in the 
withdrawal, even temporary, of material reception conditions” 64 . 
Although it leaves a possible margin of discretion to the Member 
States, it limits the same margin strictly in order to protect not only the 
fundamental rights of applicants for protection but also the purpose 
and aims of the directive itself.65 
Directive 2013/33/EU, as clarified by the Court of Justice in the 
judgment analyzed above, places the interest of the child as a 
fundamental criterion. States must provide for the possibility of family 
reunification, ensure the well-being and development of the child, also 
in the light of his or her life experiences, considering his or her 
security. Children, depending on their age, must have the opportunity 
to play and to enjoy recreational activities in spaces to be provided in 
the reception centers, and must have access to rehabilitation services, 
in case they have suffered any form of abuse. Member States shall 
ensure, in accordance with the Directive, that minors are 
	  
61 Ibid., par. 41. 
62 Ibid., par. 51. 
63 M. Marchegiani, “Revoca delle condizioni materiali di accoglienza e minori 
richiedenti protezione: l’orientamento della Corte di giustizia nel caso Haqbin”, 
SIDIBlog, http://www.sidiblog.org/ (07/07). 
64 CJEU, Zubair Haqbin v Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers, 
cit., par. 56 
65 See M. Marchegiani, “Revoca delle condizioni materiali di accoglienza”, cit. 
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accommodated together with their parents, younger siblings or adults 
who are responsible for them, allowing them access to the education 
system “under similar conditions as their own nationals”66 and, if 
necessary, language courses to facilitate access to education67. 
Particular attention is paid to unaccompanied minors for whom, 
pursuant to art. 24, Member States “shall as soon as possible take 
measures to ensure that a representative represents and assists the 
unaccompanied minor to enable him or her to benefit from the rights 
and comply with the obligations provided for in this Directive”68. They 
can be accommodated with a foster family, in reception centers with 
specific facilities or in other accommodations for minors, who shall, as 
far as possible, remain with their siblings. In this regard, it should be 
noted that States have the burden of tracing the family members of the 
unaccompanied minor as soon as possible, including with the 
assistance of international organizations or with the assistance of 
competent organizations69. Emphasis is placed on vulnerable people in 
respect of whom the previous Directive 2003/9/EC provided rather 
limited legislation70. Once the application has been submitted Member 
States should, assess, within a reasonable time, whether the applicant 
has special needs and, consequently, provide for specific reception, 
even if this occurs at a later stage of the asylum procedure. In addition, 
special treatment and access to necessary medical and psychological 




66 Art. 14 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
67 See Access to Education for Refugee and Migrant Children in Europe, September 
2019,<https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/access-to-education-
for-refugee-children.pdf>(06/20); see also E. Guild, V. Moreno-Lax, Reception 
Conditions, cit., p. 530. 
68 In this regard see the document of the European Commission of the 28 
September 2012 Shaping a common approach on unaccompanied minors 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_12_716>(06/20). 
69 See A. Del Guercio, La seconda fase di realizzazione del sistema europeo comune 
d’asilo, cit., p. 16. 
70 Art. 21 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit.; see art. 17 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 
2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, L 31/18, 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/>(06/20). 
71 Ivi, art. 25. 
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3. The administrative detention of applicants for international 
protection in the “Reception Directive” 
 
With the 2013 asylum package, the European Union has a body of 
rules (Directive 2013/33/EU and 2013/32/EU). Procedures, as well as 
provisions, are also provided for in Regulation no. 604/2013), aimed at 
regulating the matter of detention of applicants for protection. 
Detention of protection applicants is one of the most interesting 
aspects of Directive 2013/33/EU.72 
In the previous Directive 2003/9/EC it was stated, in a rather 
vague and concise manner, that Member States could, where necessary 
for legal or public policy reasons, confine asylum seekers to a place in 
accordance with national law73. Following fragmented practices and 
widespread use of administrative detention among Member States74 , 
as well as numerous criticisms by international and NGOs75, including 
the UNHCR76, the European Commission proposed “to clarify the 
rules on detention and address the issue in a holistic way in the recast 
	  
72 See G. Morgese, La riforma del sistema europeo comune di asilo e i suoi 
principali riflessi nell’ordinamento italiano, cit., p. 25.  
73  Art. 7.3 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, cit.; Art. 18 of the directive 
procedures 2005/85/ CE also established the obligation for Member States to subject 
the arrest of the asylum seeker to a quick judicial review. 
74 For what concerns the length of detention different timeframes as well as 
different legal basis with regard to the States practice were highlighted: in Germany 
this limitation occurred in an exceptional way, in other countries such as Malta, 
however, it was used almost systematically towards everyone who entered the territory 
irregularly. See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and 
to the European Parliament On The Application Of Directive 2003/9/EC Of 27 January 
2003, Laying Down Minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, 
COM(2007) 745 final, Brussels, 26.11.2007, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0745&from=EN>(07/20). For more 
detailed data on the situation of the Member States, please refer to the report of 
European Migration Network (EMN), Reception Systems, their Capacities and the 
Social Situation of Asylum Applicants within the Reception System in the EU Member 
States, http://ec.europa.eu/(07/20). 
75 Submission from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles in response to the 
Commission’s Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum System (COM 
(2007) 301), 2007, https://www.refworld.org/docid/472723902.html(06/20). 
76 UNHCR’s Response to the European Commission's Green Paper on the Future 
Common European Asylum System, September 
2007,<https://www.unhcr.org/4d934aa19.html> (06/20). 
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Reception Conditions Directive”77 , providing for legislation making 
detention possible only in certain circumstances, after an individual 
assessment, in line with the principle of necessity and 
proportionality78. Although the recasting act of the 2013 Reception 
Directive in this sense represents an improvement over the previous 
act79, by introducing not only a detailed regime for administrative 
detention with an exhaustive list of cases in which it is possible to use 
it as well as many procedural guarantees in this regard, this legislation 
does not put an end to arbitrary detention practices by Member States, 
as it still leaves a broad margin for discretion both in terms of 
transposition of the directive itself and in the practices and treatment 
of applicants for protection.80 
In the reception Directive, art. 7 states “that applicants may move 
freely within the territory of the host Member State or within an area 
assigned to them”, although the host State may derogate from this 
provision by providing for the possibility of residence, established for 
reasons of public policy or for the rapid analysis of their application, 
from which applicants may depart only if authorized. If this appears as 
a possibility of confinement of applicants without the norm detailing 
the material conditions within those places81 , the following art. Article 
8 of the Directive provides for a genuine restriction of the freedom of 
applicants for protection by implementing specific rules on detention. 
Article 8 opens with a reference to the Geneva Convention (Art. 
31) which states that the Member States “shall not hold a person in 
Detention for the sole reason that he or she is an applicant”, in line 
with recital 15, which reiterates the reference to the provisions of the 
	  
77 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of The Council laying 
down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, COM(2008) 815 final, 
3 December 2008, Brussels, 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com(2
008)0815_/com_com(2008)0815_en.pdf> (06/20). 
78 See E. Guild, V. Moreno-Lax, Reception Conditions, cit., p. 519. 
79 E.L. Tsourdi, “Asylum Detention in EU Law: Falling between Two Stools?”, 
Refugee Survey Quarterly,35(1), 2016, pp. 13–14; C. Costello & M. Mouzourakis, “EU 
Law and the Detainability of Asylum-Seekers”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 35(1), 2016, 
p. 71. 
80 See A. Del Guercio, “La detenzione amministrativa dei richiedenti asilo nel 
diritti dell’UE e in quello italiano”, in G. Cataldi, A. Del Guercio, A. Liguori (eds.), Il 
diritto di asilo di Europa, Naples, 2014, p.36, G. Campesi, “Seeking Asylum in Times 
of Crisis”, p. 50. 
81 G. Campesi, “Seeking Asylum in Times of Crisis”, cit., p. 49. 
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Refugee Convention, the ECHR and the EU Charter. On the basis of 
the necessity criterion and after a case-by-case assessment, Article 8 
allows for detention of the applicant where access to less coercive82 
alternative measures is not possible, such as the obligation to report 
regularly to the authorities, a stay in an assigned place or the provision 
of a financial guarantee. It is interesting to underline the requirement 
of necessity with regard to all the cases provided for detention, a 
parameter that does not appear among those in the analysis of the 
ECHR on compatibility, in particular art. 5.1 as regards the arbitrary 
nature of the measure of deprivation of personal freedom, since “there 
is no requirement that the detention is justified as necessary for 
detaining aliens to prevent their entry or for their expulsion and 
deportation”83. 
The detailed list pursuant to Article 8.3 of the cases in which 
detention is envisaged offers a series of possibilities that make 
detention systematic.84 
The first of these concerns the application of a detention measure 
to determine or verify the identity of the applicant. This situation is 
vague indeed as many of the applicants who have just arrived on 
national territory do not possess documents that are often lost on the 
difficult route to Europe. Although the UNHCR guidelines state that 
“the inability to produce documentation should not automatically be 
interpreted as an unwillingness to cooperate”85 since such information 
may be acquired through less coercive measures, they clarify that 
“minimal periods in detention may be permissible to carry out initial 
identity and security checks”86. The EU Court, in judgment K.87 of 
	  
82 On this subject, see A. Edwards “ʽLess coercive meansʼ: The legal case for 
alternatives to detention for refugees, asylum seeker and other migrants”, in S. S. Juss 
(eds), The Ashgate research companion to migration law, theory and policy, Routledge, 
2013, p. 447 ff. 
83 See M. Pichou, “Reception or Detention Centres? The Detention of Migrants 
and the New EU ‘Hotspot’ Approach in the Light of the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Critical Quarterly for Legislation and Law, 2, 2016, p. 118. 
84 See A. Del Guercio, “La detenzione amministrativa dei richiedenti asilo”, cit., 
p. 67. 
85 Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of 
Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, 
2012, <https://www.refworld.org>(07/20). 
86 Unhcr takes up the 1983 Conclusion on the detention of refugees and asylum 
seekers, the original source of the Reception Directive 2003/9/EC, Unhcr ExCom, 
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2017, also ruled that this reason for detention is valid in the light of 
Article 6 of the EU Charter (right to freedom and security), in so far as 
it is necessary for the proper functioning of the Common European 
Asylum System and in order to strike the right balance between the 
right to freedom of the applicant and the requirements relating to the 
identification of the applicant for the purposes of determining the 
elements on which his application is based. 
The second reason why a detention measure is possible is: “in 
order to determine those elements on which the application for 
international protection is based which could not be obtained in the 
absence of Detention, in particular when there is a risk of absconding 
of the applicant” pursuant to art. 8.3 (b). Detention is justified only as 
a last resort and this measure constitutes an exception to the general 
principle that cannot be used to justify detention for the entire 
duration of the procedure to grant status, nor for an unlimited 
period88. It also seems clear that the risk of flight will always be the 
determining reason for such detention by the "host" State, because, in 
the absence of such intention by the applicant, there could be no other 
reason to resort to deprivation of liberty. 
As regards the possibility of detention "in order to decide, in the 
context of a procedure, on the applicant’s right to enter the territory", 
provided for in point (c) of the aforementioned article, the Directive 
seems implicitly to exclude a right of entry by the applicant. To 
confirm this, in fact, the 2003 Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers89, among the reference sources of the original reception 
directive, specifies “when a decision needs to be taken on their right to 
enter the territory of the state concerned”. The 2013 recast act, in line 
with the abovementioned, only provides for a mere concession by the 
Member State, placing an obstacle to entry into the territory if “it is 
	  
Conclusion on Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, No. 44 (XXXVII) –1986, 
<http://www.unhcr.org/>(07/20). 
87 CJEU, judgment of 14 September 2017, K. c Staatssecretaris van Veiligheiden 
Justitie, case C-18/16. 
88 Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of 
Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, cit. 
89 Recommendation Rec(2003)5of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
measures of detention of asylum seekers, 16 April 2003, 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f8d65e54.html> (07/20). 
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not compatible with the principle of non-refoulement, a principle 
expressly enshrined in European Union law”90. 
Another case of detention concerns a return procedure under 
Directive 2008/115/EC, when the Member State “can substantiate on 
the basis of objective criteria … that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that he or she is making the application for international 
protection merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of the 
return decision” 91. Although, as further defined by the UNHCR 
guidelines, authorities may “consider detention – as determined to be 
necessary and proportionate in the individual case – in order to 
prevent their absconding, while the claim is being assessed”, detention 
for expulsion purposes “can only occur after the asylum claim has 
been finally determined and rejected”92. As a guarantee of this we 
cannot fail to highlight important judgments of the Court of Justice. 
Having stated in the judgment Hassen El Dridi93 that detention under 
the Return Directive can be used where less coercive measures are not 
sufficient and only to proceed with removal, in the Arslan94 ruling the 
Court, to answer two preliminary questions concerning the interaction 
between the Procedures Directive and the Return Directive, wonders 
whether the applicant’s detention should be terminated if he applies 
for international protection. Without going into the substance of that 
decision, as far as the reception directive is concerned, it is interesting 
to report what the Court has specified, namely, whether following an 
individual assessment “appears in such circumstances to be objectively 
necessary to prevent the person concerned from permanently evading 
his return”, such measure is compatible with art. 7.3 of Directive 
	  
90 Principle affirmed by art. 78.1 TFEU and art. 19.1 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, to be interpreted in the light of the jurisprudence rendered by 
the Court of Strasbourg on the basis of art. 3 ECHR. See A. Del Guercio, “La 
detenzione amministrativa dei richiedenti asilo”, cit., p. 68; A. Saccucci, “The 
protection from removal to unsafe countries under the ECHR: not all that glitters is 
gold”, Questions of International Law, 5, 2014, p. 3 ff. 
91 Art. 8.3 (d) of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
92 Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of 
Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, cit. 
93 CGUE, judgement of 28 April 2011, Hassen El Dridi, case C-61/11 PPU. 
94 CGUE, judgement of 30 May 2013, Mehmet Arslan c. Policie ČR, 
KrajskéředitelstvípolicieÚsteckéhokraje, odborcizinecképolicie (Czech Republic), case 
C-534/11. 
ANGELA PACELLI 260 
2003/995 . However, it stresses that “the mere fact that an asylum 
Seeker, at the time of the making of his application, is the subject of a 
return decision and is being detained (…) not allow it to be presumed, 
without an assessment on a case-by-case basis of all the relevant 
circumstances, that he has made that application solely to delay or 
jeopardize the enforcement of the return decision and that it is 
objectively necessary and proportionate to maintain detention”96. In 
the Gnandi judgment 97  already cited, the Court confirms the 
suspensive effect of the decision on repatriation as “the period granted 
for voluntary departure (...) should not start to run as long as the 
person concerned is allowed to remain. In addition, during that 
period, that person may not be held in Detention with a view to 
removal pursuant to Article 15 of that directive”98 and while the 
applicant holds the status of applicant for international protection.  
Grounds of security or public order as a reason for detention were 
examined in the J.N.99 judgment. The Court of Justice, in verifying the 
validity of art. 8.3 (e) with respect to art. 6 (right to freedom and 
security) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, stresses that this 
ground for an applicant’s deprivation of freedom is subject to a 
number of procedural and judicial limitations. A prejudice to national 
security or public order may justify the detention of the applicant for 
protection under that Article of Directive 2013/33/EU “only if the 
applicant’s individual conduct represents a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat, affecting a fundamental interest of society or 
the internal or external security of the Member State concerned”100. 
Detention of applicants for protection during transfer to the State 
responsible for the analysis of the application for protection in 
accordance with Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation is also covered 
by Article 8.3 (f) of the Reception Directive. Deprivation of the 
personal freedom of the applicant is provided for only if there is a 
considerable risk of absconding of which the Regulation mentioned 
gives a definition that is rather elusive and not exhaustive. The 
	  
95 Ibidem, par. 59. 
96 Ibidem, par. 62. 
97 CJEU, Sadikou Gnandi v État belge, cit.  
98 Ibidem, par. 62. 
99 CGUE, judgment of 15 February 2016, J.N. c. Staatsecretariat van Veiligheid en 
Justitie case C-601/15 PPU 
100 Ibidem, par. 67; see J. Silga, The fragmentation of reception condition for asylum 
seekers in the European Union, cit., p. 111. 
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provision states that such a risk may be assumed where there are 
“reasons ... which are based on objective criteria defined by law to 
believe that an applicant ... may abscond”101. In addition to a case-by-
case assessment, detention, which is only possible if less coercive 
measures are not available, must be necessary and proportionate. 
Once again the Court of Justice, in the recent Al Chodor102 judgment 
of 2017, clarifies that objective criteria in the event of a risk of 
abscondment, is absent in the Regulation in question and cannot be 
deduced from the consolidated jurisprudence on the matter, but that 
such criteria must be contained and prepared “in a binding provision 
of general application” which the Member States are obliged to lay 
down. The absence of such a rule makes it illegal to deprive applicants 
of their freedom, thereby undermining the applicability of the 
detention measure under this article103. 
The 2013 Directive presents important procedural guarantees for 
detained applicants. Pursuant to art. 9 the duration of detention must 
be as brief as possible, without the Directive making any specific 
reference to it, as long as the circumstances of art. 8.3, of which we 
have spoken extensively, persist. The administrative formalities must 
be carried out with due diligence, without any delay in this regard 
justifying an extension of detention, which must always be ordered by 
the court or administrative authority in writing. It is interesting to note 
that there is no time limit to detention, though it is laid down in other 
acts such as the Return Directive 2008/115/EC. This point can be 
criticized not only because it is contrary to the very purpose of the 
Directive “to ensure full respect for human dignity and to promote the 
application of Articles 1 and 18 of the Charter”104, but also to the 
desired harmonization within the CEAS of state practices which the 
Reception Directive contributes to make particularly varied in the 
differential treatment of applicants for protection. Even the 
assumption of due diligence seems somewhat vague and not sufficient 
	  
101 Art. 2 (n) del Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person (recast), L 180/31, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=en> (07/20). 
102 CJEU, judgment of 15 March 2017, Al Chodor, case C-528/15. 
103 Ibidem, par. 45 – 47. 
104 CJEU, Cimade e Gisti, cit., par. 42. 
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to prevent long periods of detention although “the length of detention 
should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose 
pursued”105. 
The right to information of detained applicants is explained in par. 
4 of art.9 wherein it is stated that they must be informed of the reasons 
for detention, national procedures to counter the measure and be 
provided with access to legal assistance in writing “in a language which 
they understand or reasonably supposed to understand”. This 
formulation does not appear to be much of a guarantee with regard to 
the correct information of the applicant and his rights, not being, 
moreover, in line with art. 5.2 of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of 
its Court so that “everyone who is arrested shall be informed 
promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his 
arrest and of any charge against him” although this wording is 
nevertheless better than the earlier Commission proposal, which 
referred “only to a language which is reasonably supposed to be 
understandable to them”106. 
Detention must always be authorized by a judicial or 
administrative authority and, if ordered by that authority, must be 
subject to review by a court, as soon as possible, at the request of the 
applicant or of its own motion (if it were found to be unlawful, this 
would lead to the immediate release of the applicant).107 The detention 
order pursuant to art. 9.5 is carried out at regular intervals, regardless 
of whether it was issued by a judicial or administrative authority108 , at 
the request of the applicant and especially in the case of long-term 
	  
105 See M. Pichou, Reception or Detention Centres? The Detention of Migrants and 
the New EU ‘Hotspot’ Approach, cit., p. 119. See also D. Wilsher, “Immigration 
detention and the common European asylum policy”, in A. Baldaccini, E. Guild, H. 
Toner (eds), Whose freedom, security and justice? EU immigration ad asylum law and 
policy, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2007, p. 399 ff. 
106 See A. Del Guercio, “La detenzione amministrativa dei richiedenti asilo”, cit., 
p. 72. See also European Commission, Amended proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers (Recast), COM(2011) 320 final, Brussels, 1.6.2011, <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/>(07/20). 
107  See art. 9 par. 2 and 5 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
108 Even the Court of Strasbourg has constantly highlighted the fundamental 
nature of this guarantee: among others the ECtHR judgement of 22 September 2009, 
Abdolkhani e Karimnia c. Turchia, application n. 30471/08; ECtHR, judgement of 11 
June 2009, SD c. Grecia, application n. 53541/07. 
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detention, also to verify new factors that may call into question the 
legitimacy of the imposed measure. In cases of judicial review of this 
measure, Member States will ensure that the applicant can obtain free 
legal assistance from suitably qualified staff, but there are several 
exceptions which have given rise to the concerns of humanitarian 
organizations that legal assistance should always be granted to the 
applicant for protection in view of his special status109. 
With regard to detention conditions110, the examined directive 
provides that it takes place in specialised detention facilities, allowing 
that the state, if obliged, can place applicants in a prison 
accommodation, but keeping them separately from ordinary prisoners 
and applying the detention conditions provided for in the Directive. 
Since applicants held in detention must be treated with full respect 
for human dignity, they must have access to the outdoors, they must 
be able to communicate with representatives of the UNHCR and with 
lawyers, family members and representatives of NGOs. Par. 4 of art. 
10 is controversial as it states that States may impose restrictions on 
access to the detention center, where objectively necessary, under 
national law, for reasons of security, public order or administrative 
management, as long as they do not drastically restrict or make access 
impossible111. 
Also questionable is the provision of par. 5 on the basis of which 
applicants are first expected to be systematically informed of the rules 
regarding their rights and duties, but allows for a derogation with 
respect to places of transit or at the border “for a reasonable period 
which shall be as short as possible”112. The legislation on vulnerable 
persons is also highly questionable, given that the reception of persons 
with special needs should be “a primary concern for national 
authorities in order to ensure that such reception is specifically 
designed to meet their special reception needs”113 as the same directive 
	  
109 A. Del Guercio, “La detenzione amministrativa dei richiedenti asilo”, cit., p. 
73. 
110  See on this point art. 10 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
111 A. Del Guercio, “La seconda fase di realizzazione del sistema europeo comune 
d’asilo”, cit., p. 20.  
112  See art. 10.5 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
113 Recital 14 of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, cit. 
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does not exclude the detention provided for in article 11. In order to 
protect the vulnerable, it would have been more appropriate to 
exclude the possibility of detention altogether, at least by avoiding the 
possibility of prison which, in the light of the directive, is also 
envisaged for the most vulnerable of all, that is minors. 
As far as detention is concerned, this should be used as a last 
resort, only if less coercive measures cannot be applied, be as short-
lived as possible and in suitable accommodations. Unaccompanied 
minors “shall be detained only in exceptional circumstances … and 
shall never be detained in prison accommodation” 114  ensuring 
accommodations that meets their needs and separates them from 
adults. In this regard, it seems difficult to believe that the primary 
protection of the child referred to in art. 23 and the best interests of 
the child in the light of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, mentioned by the same directive in Recital 18. The 
Member State must ensure that minors, whether accompanied or not, 
have access to education, including special classes in detention centers, 
since the rule does not exclude this possibility115. With due regard for 
families and their unity, accommodation must be provided to protect 
the intimacy of the family (Art. 11.4) and, except in the case of 
members of the family or in the case of those concerned, women and 
men must be separated (Art. 11.5). 
 
 
4. Conclusive remarks 
 
We have examined the main aspects of the 2013 Reception 
Directive in the light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and 
its contribution to the interpretation of the provisions contained 
therein. However, further observations are still necessary. The aim of 
the directive to guarantee common standards in the reception systems 
of the Member States is in practice disregarded. Profound differences 
exist not only in the definition of the expected standards in qualitative 
terms, but also in the actors and procedures responsible for the 
management and control of reception facilities 116 . Although the 
	  
114 Ivi, art. 11 par. 3. 
115 Ivi, Art. 14; see A. Del Guercio, “La detenzione amministrativa dei richiedenti 
asilo”, cit., p. 71. 
116 Current migration situation in the EU: Oversight of reception facilities, cit., p. 2. 
THE RECEPTION DIRECTIVE 2013/33/EU 265 
directive itself urges States to put in place appropriate mechanisms 
with which to ensure adequate levels of reception conditions, it “does 
not create any individual rights”117 leaving wide discretionary powers 
also in this important respect. Although the 2013 recast act represents 
an improvement over the previous one, in other various respects it 
“fails” in the full implementation of the obligations of the States with 
respect to the protection of applicants seeking protection. This aspect 
cannot fail to affect the needs of vulnerable people. Although the 
Directive contains ad hoc provisions, it does not provide for an 
administrative procedure to assess whether an applicant has particular 
reception needs and thus leaves Member States ample room to choose 
the type of assistance provided and thus risks making such provisions 
meaningless. 
Another particularly problematic point concerns the 
administrative detention of applicants for protection. In practice, the 
boundary between reception and detention is somewhat blurred, 
especially in the very first reception. The practice known as the 
Hotspot method118, provided by the European Agenda on Migration119 
as a response of the European Union to the strong wave of migration 
in 2015120 proved to be particularly problematic. This approach, based 
on the old logic of “permanent emergency”121, has not led to “a reform 
	  
117 Ivi, p.3. 
118 This approach has been carried out in Italy and Greece. For comments see M. 
Basilien-Gainche, Hotspots, cold facts. Managing Migration by Selecting Migrants, cit. 
p. 153 ff.; F. Casolari, “The EU’s Hotspot Approach to Managing the Migration 
Crisis: A Blind Spot for International Responsibility?”, The Italian Yearbook of 
International Law, 2016, p. 109 ff.; M. Den Heijer, J Rijpma, T. Spijkerboer, 
“Coercion, prohibition, and great expectations: The continuing failure of the common 
European asylum system”, cit., p. 623. 




120 S. Carrera et al. (eds.), “The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis. Taking 
Stock and Setting Policy Priorities”, CEPS Essay, n. 20/16, December 2015, 
<https://www.ceps.eu/>(07/20). 
121 In this regard and for a comment on the reception system for asylum seekers in 
Italy see E. Zaniboni, “No room for you in here?”, cit., p. 87; see also J. Silga, “The 
fragmentation of reception condition for asylum seekers in the European Union”, cit., 
p. 92. 
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of the legal basis concerning the reception of asylum-seekers”122, which 
remains essentially the one defined by the directive under 
consideration, although it has a deep impact on it. In such “crisis 
points”, in fact, “the line between open accommodation and 
confinement often becomes difficult to draw in practice” 123  not 
sparing, in some cases, even the most vulnerable of all, that is, 
unaccompanied minors whose living conditions inside are often well 
below the standards set out in the 2013 Directive. 
Although, on the one hand, the case law of the Court of Justice has 
never intervened with regard to the compliance of the conditions for 
reception of applicants for protection in hotspots with European 
Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, on the other hand, 
it sets out the fundamental rights of applicants at the forefront of the 
treatment arrangements in transit zones. By judgment C-924/19 PPU 
and C-925/19 PPU, FMS and Others 124  the Court establishes the 
primacy of the protection of those seeking protection over the 
securitarian logic of border management implemented by the States 
and in this case by Hungary125 . The facts underlying the reference for 
a preliminary ruling concern two families, one Iranian and the other 
Afghan, who arrived in the transit zone at the Serbian-Hungarian 
border of Röstze in December 2018 and February 2019, respectively. 
According to the Hungarian legislation, the applications for protection 
submitted by the applicants had been declared inadmissible, with the 
national authorities attempting the readmission card in Serbia, a 
country considered “safe”. Following the latter’s refusal to take charge 
of the persons concerned, Hungary adopted a return decision 
replacing Serbia with the two countries of origin of the appellants and 
also examined their request for international protection. After seeing 
their administrative appeals rejected, without the possibility of legal 
remedies provided for by Hungarian law, the applicants appealed to 
	  
122 G. Campesi, “Seeking Asylum in Times of Crisis: Reception, Confinement, and 
Detention at Europe’s Southern Border”, cit., p. 53. 
123 Wrong counts and closing doors: The reception of refugees and asylum seekers in 
Europe, cit., p. 12. 
124  CJEU, judgment of 14 May 2020 (GC), FMS and Others v Országos 
Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos 
Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság. joined cases C-924/19 PPU e C-925/19 PPU. 
125 Among others Ungheria: l’orribile trattamento dei richiedenti asilo, un volute 
stratagemma populista, September 2016, <https://www.amnesty.it/>; Hungary: Locked 
up for Seeking Asylum, December 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/>(07/20). 
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the Administrative and Labour Court which suspended execution of 
the provision and requested the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling on important questions. 
This case will not be further analysed in all its parts here. I shall 
not go into the details either regarding the interpretation of art. 13 of 
Directive 2008/115, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, 
elaborated by the Court, or of the possibility for the Hungarian 
authorities to change in the return order to the destination country of 
those subject to this procedure without the latter having recourse to a 
judge to establish the legality of such an order.126 
The issue here, however, is the legality of the applicants being 
placed in the Röszke transit area and whether this measure can be 
qualified as detention. The referring court questions the interpretation 
by the Hungarian authorities of the provisions of Directive 
2013/33/EU and Directive 2008/115 on the detention of applicants 
and asks whether an obligation for a third-country national to remain 
permanently in a transit zone at the border of a Member State, without 
being able to leave that place freely, may constitute a “detention” 
within the meaning of that Directive. 
According to the Court, starting from the concept of detention 
under Directive 2013/33/EU and also the UNHCR Guidelines on 
detention127, this measure, as defined in art. 2 (h) must be interpreted 
as “a coercive measure which deprives that applicant of his freedom of 
movement and isolates it from the rest of the population, by requiring 
	  
126 CJEU, FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi 
Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság. cit., par. 109-147. 
In this regard see L. Marin, “La Corte di Giustizia riporta le ‘zone di transito’ 
ungheresi dentro il perimetro del diritto (europeo) e dei diritti (fondamentali)”, ADiM 
Blog, May 2020, <http://www.adimblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ADiM-
Blog-maggio-2020-Osservatorio-L.Marin_.pdf> (07/20). 
127 According to the UNHCR Guidelines “[detention] refers to the deprivation of 
liberty or confinement in a closed place which an asylum-seeker is not permitted to 
leave at will, including, though not limited to, prisons or purpose-built detention, 
closed reception or holding centres or facilities (...) Detention can take place in a 
range of locations, including at land and sea borders, in the “international zones” at 
airports, on islands, on boats, as well as in closed refugee camps, in one’s own home 
(house arrest) and even extraterritorially”. See Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria 
and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to 
Detention, cit, p. 9. 
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it to remain permanently within a restricted and closed perimeter”128. 
This notion must also be considered valid for the purposes of the 
Return Directive 2008/115 “in the absence of definitional rules found 
in the same and other reasons from which to infer that the Union 
legislator has considered to give it a different meaning”129. The Court 
also assesses the conditions imposed in the transit area, which is also 
surrounded by barbed wire and fences, without the applicants being 
able to visit or move freely, as they are constantly monitored by the 
police authorities. The Court rejected the Hungarian Government’s 
objection that the applicants could have walked away to Serbia. In that 
case, on the one hand, removal from the transit zone would have 
entailed, under Hungarian law, the surrender of the application for 
asylum and the possibility of obtaining the status of applicant for 
protection in that country, on the other hand their entry into Serbia 
would be considered "illegal" and therefore subject to sanctions130 . In 
the light of the foregoing, it is not possible for the Court to consider 
that applicants had the real possibility of leaving Röszke’s transit zone, 
defining it as “a deprivation of liberty, characteristic of ‘detention’”131 
in accordance with the directives in question.  
The above-mentioned judgment is particularly important because, 
in supporting a genuine detention of the applicants, the Court reports 
the “rule of law” and respect for human rights in Hungarian 
legislation. The decision of the Court of Justice is a better guarantor 
than that of the ECHR in the case of Ilias and Ahmed c. Hungary132. 
	  
128 CJEU, FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi 
Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság. cit., par. 223. 
129 S. Zirulia, “Per Lussemburgo è “detenzione”, per Strasburgo no: verso un 
duplice volto della libertà personale dello straniero nello spazio europeo?”, Sistema 
Penale, 25 May 2020, <https://sistemapenale.it/> (10/07). 
130 CJEU, FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi 
Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság, cit., par. 229-230. 
131 Ibidem, par. 231. 
132 ECtHR, judgment of 21 November 2019 (GC), Ilias e Ahmed c. Ungheria, 
applicationn. 47287/15; For comments see V. Stoyanova, “The Grand Chamber 
Judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary: Immigration Detention and how the 
Ground beneath our Feet Continues to Erode”, Strasbourg Observers, 23 December 
2019, <https://strasbourgobservers.com/> (07/20); F. L. Gatta, “Diritti al confine e il 
confine dei diritti: La Corte Edu si esprime sulle politiche di controllo frontaliero 
dell’Ungheria (Parte II – Detenzione e Art. 5 CEDU)”, ADiM Blog, January 2020, 
<http://www.adimblog.com/> (07/20); S. Zirulia, Per Lussemburgo è “detenzione”, per 
Strasburgo no, cit. 
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The Court of Strasbourg in the judgment cited, in fact, completely 
reverses the decision of 2017133 which condemned the applicants’ 
deprivation of freedom pursuant to art. 5.1 Cedu during the 23 days 
spent in the transit zone of Röszke134. The Court, taking a “practical 
and realistic approach, having regard to the present-day conditions 
and challenges”, recognizes not only the right of states to control their 
own borders, but also that of “taking measures against foreigners 
circumventing restrictions on immigration” 135  . Not only did the 
applicants enter the transit zone of their own free will136, but the 23-
day stay did not seem excessive in carrying out the administrative 
procedures necessary for the analysis of the asylum application. Unlike 
the previous judgment Amuur c. France137, the Court considers the 
return to Serbia and the possibility of leaving the transit zone of 
Rӧszke “not only theoretical but realistic”138. In the light of that 
assessment of the facts, it does not consider that art. 5.1 of the 
Convention by taking a further step backwards in the protection of 
fundamental rights creates uncertainty about the criteria that 
constitute the arbitrary measure of deprivation of personal freedom139. 
On the contrary, the decision of the Court of Justice through the 
correct interpretation of the Treaties and European secondary law 
adds “an important element to the most complex mosaic of "personal 
freedom" in the Euro-Union context”140, giving prominence to the 
protection of applicants and the exercise of the right to seek asylum 
even in transit and border areas. 
In the decision examined, by guaranteeing the protection of 
applicants it thus re-establishes the primacy of the law over practices 
of deprivation of freedom of those seeking refuge in the Member 
States of the Union, concerned with focusing their attention on border 
	  
133 ECtHR, judgment of 14 March 2017, Ilias e Ahmed c. Ungheria, application n. 
47287/15; for comments B. Gornati, “‘Paesi terzi sicuri’, respingimenti a catena e 
detenzione arbitraria: il caso Ilias e Ahmed”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 11, 
2017, p. 542 ff. 
134 Ibidem, par. 58 – 69. 
135 ECtHR, (GC), Ilias e Ahmed c. Ungheria, cit., par. 213. 
136 Ibidem, par. 220. 
137 ECtHR, judgment of 14 June 1996, Amuur c. France, application n. 19776/92. 
138 ECtHR, (GC), Ilias e Ahmed c. Ungheria, cit., par. 236. 
139 See F. L. Gatta, “Diritti al confine e il confine dei diritti: La Corte Edu si 
esprime sulle politiche di controllo frontaliero dell’Ungheria”, cit. 
140 S. Zirulia, “Per Lussemburgo è “detenzione”, per Strasburgo no”, cit. 
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controls and return practices rather than on a full compliance with 
basic human rights standards and principles. 
	  
THE PROTECTION OF MIGRANTS AGAINST COLLECTIVE 
EXPULSIONS BETWEEN RESTRICTION  
AND UNCERTAINTY: READING THE ECtHR’S  







1. Introduction  
 
The N.D. and N.T. judgment of February 13th 20201, in which the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth 
ECtHR) ruled for the first time on the so-called “hot returns” 
implemented at Melilla’s land borders, was met with great dismay by 
the academic world2. The Court, indeed, overturning what the Third 
Section had stated in 20173, concluded that there was no violation of 
	  
* University of Naples “L’Orientale” 
1 European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), N.D. and N.T. v. Spain 
Judgment of 13 February 2020, Application No. 8675/15 and 8697/15. 
2 See, inter alia, M. Pichl, D. Schmalz, “Unlawful may not mean rightless”, 
Verfassunblog, 14 February 2020, <https://verfassungsblog.de/unlawful-may-not-
mean-rightless/> (7/20); C. Oviedo Moreno, “A Painful Slap from the ECtHR and an 
Urgent Opportunity for Spain”, Verfassunblog, 14 February 2020, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/a-painful-slap-from-the-ecthr-and-an-urgent-opportunity-
for-spain/> (7/20). 
3 European Court of Human Rights (from now on ECtHR), N.D. and N.T. v. 
Spain, Application No. 8675/15 and 8697/15, Judgment of 3rd October 2017. For 
comments on the case, see G. Cellamare, “Note in margine alla sentenza della Corte 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo nell’affare N.D. e N.T. c. Spagna”, Studi sull’integrazione 
europea, 1-2018, XIII, pp. 153-164; 
<https://www.academia.edu/36343861/Note....N.D._e_N.T._c._Spagna.pdf> (7/20); 
L. Salvadego, “I respingimenti sommari di migranti alle frontiere terrestri dell’énclave 
di Melilla”, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 12, 2018, no. 1, pp. 199-206; A. 
Pijnenburg, “Is N.D. and N.T. v. Spain the new Hirsi?”, Ejil:Talk!, 2017, 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-n-d-and-n-t-v-spain-the-new-hirsi/> (7/20); D. Moya, 
“Judgment N.D. and N.T. v Spain: on the legality of police ‘push-backs’ at the 
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the prohibition of collective expulsions and of the right to an effective 
remedy in relation to the immediate return of two migrants to 
Morocco, N.D. and N.T, who had attempted to cross the border 
irregularly. In the present case, according to the Court’s judgment, the 
absence of individual expulsion orders against the two migrants is not 
imputable to the Spanish State, but to the applicants themselves, on 
the basis of their “culpable conduct”. Such conduct is determined by 
the fact that they voluntarily placed themselves in an illegal situation, 
attempting to cross the border irregularly and exploiting group 
dynamics, when it was possible to resort to legal access routes, which 
the Spanish authorities had made available. 
The reasoning developed by the Court, in fact, presents a complex 
argument, which is not exempt from contradictory and questionable 
aspects. 
Indeed, if on the one hand the Court stands in view of the 
progressive strengthening of the protection guaranteed by the Article 4 
of Protocol no. 4 (henceforth art. 4 Prot. n. 4) to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (henceforth ECHR), subject to all the 
cornerstones of its own jurisprudence, on the other hand the Court 
reduces the scope of the provision, by introducing a highly 
controversial exception to the rule, which in fact exempts the States 
from complying with their obligations in some cases. 
In this regard, it is important to note that the interpretation of the 
prohibition of collective expulsions developed in the jurisprudence of 
the Court has not been subverted and its general structure remains 
intact4. The Court reaffirms the general principles on the matter, 
recalling, in particular, that the prohibition of collective expulsions 
applies to all foreigners and not to particular categories of foreigners, 
such as those who fall within the scope of art. 3 ECHR, that is to say 
those who would run the risk of suffering torture and inhuman and 
	  
4 See D. Thym, “A Restrictionist Revolution? A Counter-Intuitive Reading of the 
ECtHR’s N.D. & N.T. Judgment on ‘Hot Expulsions’”, EU Migration Law Blog, 17 
February 2020, <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-restrictionist-revolution-a-counter-
intuitive-reading-of-the-ecthrs-n-d-n-t-judgment-on-hot-expulsions/> (7/20); R. 
Wissing, “Push backs of ‘badly behaving’ migrants at Spanish border are not collective 
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degrading treatment once sent back to their countries of origin or 
transit. 
However, the argument developed later by the Court “nullifies” 
those same principles: by relating factual issues, such as the irregular 
entry and the “possibility” of accessing legal channels, with the State 
obligations under the ECHR and in particular under art. 4 Prot. n. 4, 
which should exist regardless, the Court de facto excludes the 
application of the safeguards provided by the prohibition of collective 
expulsions if special circumstances arise5. 
Indeed, the Court seems to attempt a not perfectly successful “test 
of equilibrium” between the maintenance of consolidated safeguards 
and new restrictions. The effect is to produce a “confused” picture of 
the protection provided by art. 4 Prot. n. 4, inconsistencies between 
purely formalistic safeguards and effective safeguards and new 
uncertainties and contradictions.  
In this article, after having looked into the meaning of the 
prohibition of collective expulsions, the “heart” of the judgment in 
question, I will analyze the case N.D. and N.T., highlighting the most 
questionable aspects of the Court’s reasoning from a legal point of 
view, with particular reference to the notion of “culpable conduct” 
and to the standard of “legal pathways” within the context of art. 4 
Prot. n. 4. Finally, the relationship emerging between the prohibition 
of collective expulsions and the principle of non-refoulement, which is 
equally ambiguous, will be deepened. 
 
 
2. The protection of migrants against collective expulsions 
 
The expulsion of a foreigner from the territory of a State 
represents the “paradigm of the classic tension between sovereignty 
and the protection of human rights in the field of migration”6. In fact, 
	  
5 F. Mussi, “La sentenza N.D. e N.T. della Corte europea dei diritti umani: uno 
schiaffo ai diritti dei migranti alle frontiere terrestri?”, SIDIBlog, 19 March 2020, 
<http://www.sidiblog.org/2020/03/19/la-sentenza-n-d-e-n-t-della-corte-europea-dei-
diritti-umani-uno-schiaffo-ai-diritti-dei-migranti-alle-frontiere-terrestri/> (7/20). 
6 F.L. Gatta, “The Problematic Management of Migratory Flows in Europe and 
its Impact on Human Rights: the Prohibition of Collective Expulsion of Aliens in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, in Giovanni Carlo Bruno, Fulvio 
Maria Palombino et Adriana Di Stefano (eds.), Migration Issues before International 
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States have the sovereign right to control the entry and stay of 
foreigners in their territory and to decide on their admission or 
expulsion, as repeatedly affirmed by the ECtHR’s jurisprudence7. 
However, these sovereign prerogatives must be exercised in 
compliance with the obligations under international human rights law 
towards foreigners and migrants. This assumption is reflected in the 
international framework relating to the expulsion of foreigners. In fact, 
it is the premise of the “Memorandum by the Secretariat on Expulsion 
of Aliens”8 of 2006, which states that “every State has the right to 
expel aliens”, but that, however, “this right is subject to general 
limitations as well as specific substantive and procedural 
requirements” 9 , and of the “Draft Articles on the Expulsion of 
Aliens”10, adopted in 2014 within the International Law Commission, 
which is the point of arrival of the codification process on the matter.  
Within this framework, it is also clear that, unlike individual 
expulsions, which are allowed in compliance with certain substantive 
and procedural guarantees, collective expulsions are firmly prohibited, 
as “contrary to the very notion of the human rights of individuals”11.  
Within the ECHR system, the prohibition of collective expulsions, 
sanctioned by art 4 of Protocol no. 4 of the Convention12, has been the 
subject of an evolutionary interpretation by the ECtHR, which played 
an essential role in clarifying the fundamental aspects of the rule, such 
	  
Courts and Tribunals, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche Edizioni, Rome, 2019, p. 
121. 
7 The “undeniable” right of the States to control the entry and stay of foreigners 
in their territory has been more recently affirmed in ECtHR (Chamber), Khlaifia and 
Others v. Italy, Application No. 16483/12, Judgment of 1st September 2015, para. 119. 
8  International Law Commission (from now on ILC), Memorandum by the 
Secretariat, Expulsion of Aliens, UN Doc. A/CN.4/565 of 10 July 2006. 
9 Ivi, p. 1. 
10 ILC, Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with Commentaries, in Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/69/10, 2014. 
11 ILC, Memorandum, cit., p. 2; the “Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens” 
states that collective expulsions are forbidden in art. 9. 
12 Protocol no. 4 to ECHR, adopted in 1963, is the first international text to have 
codified the prohibition of collective expulsions. Other regional instruments that 
provide for such a prohibition are: the American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 
22. 9), the Arab Charter on Human Rights (Art. 26. 2) and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Art. 12. 5). 
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as its scope, the notion of expulsion and its “collective” character13. 
Indeed, by adopting a broad and dynamic interpretative approach in 
its jurisprudential path, the Court of Strasbourg has strengthened the 
protection of migrants’ rights in this matter, limiting the sovereign 
prerogatives of the States. 
As is known, the first ruling in which the Court ascertains the 
violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions is the Čonka14 case, 
relating to the expulsion of a group of foreigners of Roma origin from 
the Belgian territory. It should be noted, in this regard, how the Court 
immediately identified the crucial element for ascertaining the 
violation of the provision in the lack of an individualized examination 
of the situation of each foreigner. The Court affirmed in the judgment 
that art. 4 Prot. n. 4 applies “to any measure of the competent 
authority compelling aliens as a group to leave the country, except 
where such a measure is taken after and on the basis of a reasonable 
and objective examination of the particular case of each individual 
alien of the group”15.  
However, if the first pronouncements in which art. 4 Prot. n. 4 
finds application concern cases of expulsion of foreigners who were 
already in the territory of the State (often, as in the aforementioned 
case, as a consequence of discriminatory measures16), it is in the last 
decade that the violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions is 
found also in cases of push-backs at the European external borders, 
together with the increase of the control and interception practices of 
the migratory flows in the Mediterranean Sea promoted by the 
European States.  
	  
13 For more details on the interpretative evolution of the standard, see F.L. Gatta, 
The Problematic Management, cit. pp. 131-146. 
14 ECtHR, Čonka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February 
2002 
15 Ivi, para 59 
16 It should be noted that the discriminatory character is not a requirement for 
ascertaining the “collective” character of the expulsion, but it may represent an 
additional circumstance which, in certain cases, reinforces the suspicion of the 
existence of a collective expulsion, see Gatta, The Problematic Management, cit. p. 142 
ff. Several cases, in which the violation of the provision was ascertained, were about 
discriminatory measures based on ethnicity or nationality: besides the Čonka case, see 
ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Judgment 
of 3 July 2014 
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In particular, it is with the Hirsi 17  ruling that the protection 
guaranteed by art. 4 Prot. n. 4 is significantly extended, with particular 
reference to the territorial scope of the rule and to the evolutionary 
interpretation of the term “expulsion”18.  
With regard to the first aspect, in fact, the Court affirms the 
extraterritorial scope of the rule, which for the first time finds 
application in the context of rejections that occurred on the high seas. 
According to the Court, in fact, similarly to the notion of jurisdiction 
under the ECHR, art. 4 Prot. n. 4 has a primarily territorial character 
and most often finds application in removals from the territory of a 
State. However, it can also be applied in extraterritorial contexts. If 
this were not the case, it would result in “a discrepancy between the 
scope of application of the Convention as such and that of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 4”19. 
The notion of “expulsion”, on the other hand, in the light of the 
travaux préparatoires of Protocol no. 4, must be understood “in the 
generic meaning, in current use (to drive away from a place)”20. 
Therefore, it includes not only actions that imply expulsion in the 
strict sense (removal from the territory), but also actions and practices 
that take place without the foreigners necessarily having reached the 
territory of the State. So, the notion includes interception on the high 
seas, push-back operations and other practices aimed at preventing the 
landing of migrants on the territory of a State.  
The Court also adopts a similar approach in the subsequent 
Sharifi21, which is about the immediate return to Greece of asylum 
seekers who had landed in Italian and Greek ports. These judgments 
actually complete the evolutionary trajectory of the prohibition of 
collective expulsions, which is therefore consolidated as “une 
	  
17 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 
27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012; for a comment on the case, see A. Liguori, 
“La Corte Europea Condanna L’Italia Per I Respingimenti Verso La Libia Nel 2009: 
Il Caso Hirsi”, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2, 2012, pp. 415-443. 
18 M. Di Filippo, “Walking the (barbed) wire of the prohibition of collective 
expulsions: an assessment of the Strasbourg case law”, Diritti umani e Diritto 
internazionale, 2, 2010 (forthcoming). 
19 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Hirsi, para. 178. 
20 Ibid., para. 174. 
21 ECtHR, Sharifi e and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, 
Judgment of 21 October 2014. 
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obligation plus générale d’opérer an examen individualisé de la 
situation d’un étranger avant de procéder à son expulsion”22.  
However, the Court subsequently preferred not to infer specific 
procedural guarantees from this general obligation. In the Khlaifia23 
case, relating to the detention and then the return of three Tunisian 
citizens, the Grand Chamber affirmed that the prohibition of 
collective expulsions does not in any circumstances imply a real right 
to an individual interview, but it is sufficient that the foreigner “has a 
genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against his or 
her expulsion, and where those arguments are examined in an 
appropriate manner by the authorities of the respondent State”24. 
These conclusions reduce the procedural guarantees under art. 4 Prot. 
n. 4, the content of which appears rather uncertain, being able to 
“vary” depending on the examined situation. They also seem to 
contrast with the framework outlined in Hirsi and Sharifi, where the 
Court had highlighted the need to ensure a detailed examination of 
the situations of individuals for the purpose of compliance with the 
provision. In these rulings, in fact, it should be noted the importance 
given to some elements for the purpose of ascertaining the violation: 
the presence of staff members who were not adequately trained to 
	  
22 L. Leboeuf, “Interdiction des expulsions collectives et mesures d’expulsions 
immédiates et systématiques : la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme entre 
équilibrisme et contorsions”, CeDIE, 1 April 2020, <https://uclouvain.be/fr/instituts-
recherche/juri/cedie/actualites/cour-eur-d-h-13-fevrier-2020-n-d-et-n-t-c-espagne-req-
nos-8675-15-et-8697-15.html#_ftn6> (7/20). 
23 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, cit. The second section 
had instead affirmed the violation of art. 4 Prot. n. 4, noting that the rejection 
measures in question were completely identical to each other and the Government had 
not provided evidence that individual talks had been conducted with respect to the 
specific situation of each applicant. Furthermore, the same treatment had been 
reserved to many other citizens who had the same nationality, on the basis of an 
agreement between Italy and Tunisia. This element supported the suspicion that the 
Italian practice had the purpose of determining simplified procedures for the 
expulsion of Tunisian citizens. See A. Giliberto, “The judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR on the detentions (and consequent rejections) of Lampedusa 
in 2011”, Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, 23 December 2016; 
<https://archiviodpc.dirittopenaleuomo.org/d/5123-la-pronuncia-della-grande-
camera-della-corte-edu-sui-trattenimenti-e-i-conseguenti-respingimenti-di> (7/20). 
24 Ivi, para. 248. 
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conduct individual interviews and the absence of interpreters or legal 
advisors in such circumstances25.  
Khlaifia, in fact, represents the first case that stops the evolutionary 
path of art. 4 Prot. n. 4, in favor of a “new” restrictive trend, aimed at 
compressing the qualitative standard of the procedural guarantees 
under the prohibition of collective expulsions26. 
 
 
3. The N.D. and N.T. case and the Court’s assessment 
 
As anticipated, the case N.D. and N.T. is based on facts that 
occurred in August 2014, when the two applicants, N.D. and N.T., 
respectively from Mali and the Ivory Coast, attempted to irregularly 
cross the border of Melilla, a Spanish enclave located in Moroccan 
territory, after having stayed several months in Morocco 27 . In 
particular, the two applicants, together with about eighty people, 
attempted to climb over the fences placed at the border, which were 
several kilometers long and characterized by multiple levels of height. 
Arriving at the highest point of the fence at different times, the Civil 
Guard made them climb down and immediately returned them to 
Morocco, without identifying them or subjecting them to any 
	  
25 See in particular Hirsi, para. 185, but also the Sharifi judgment para. 217, in 
which the Court deemed the presence of an interpreter fundamental. 
26 For a critical reading of the judgment, see, inter alia, A.I. Matonti, “Garanzie 
procedurali derivanti dall’art. 4 del Protocollo n. 4 CEDU: il caso Khlaifia”, Diritti 
umani e diritto internazionale 2017, p. 523 ff .; A. Saccucci, “I ‘ripensamenti’ della 
Corte europea sul caso Khlaifia: il divieto di trattamenti inumani e degradanti e il 
divieto di espulsioni collettive «alla prova» delle situazioni di emergenza migratoria”, 
Rivista di diritto internazionale 2017, p. 552 ff.; A. Pacelli, “Khlaifia and others v. Italy: 
lights and shadows in the judgment of the Great Chamber of the European Court of 
the Human Rights”, in Giuseppe Cataldi, Michele Corleto, Marianna Pace (eds), 
Migrations And Fundamental Rights: The Way Forward, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 
2019. 
27 The story of the two applicants does not represent an isolated case, but falls 
within the controversial practice of “devoluciones en caliente” that has been carried 
out by Spain in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in recent decades. Following the 
numerous protests by civil society and NGOs, the Spanish government modified the 
“Ley Orgánica 4/2000 sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su 
integración social” into the “Ley Orgánica 4 / 2015 de Protección de la Seguridad 
Ciudadana”, introducing a new and controversial provision that converts “rejections” 
into legitimate “rechazos en frontera”. The Spanish Constitutional Court will rule on 
the law in the near future. 
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individual examination of their situations. After several months, 
finally, they managed to cross the border and entered Spanish 
territory, where they were subjected to a new expulsion measure.  
In February 2015, N.D. and N.T. addressed the European Court 
of Human Rights, in relation to the facts of the first crossing, 
complaining a violation of art. 3 of the ECHR, art. 4 of Protocol n. 4 
and art. 13 of the ECHR in conjunction with art. 4 Prot. n. 4.  
In October 2017, the ECtHR (Third Section), ruled against Spain 
for the violation of art. 4 Prot. n. 4 and art. 13 ECHR, since the 
applicants had been subjected to a forced removal without any 
individual examination of their situation. The complaint relating to 
art. 3 ECHR, instead, had been previously declared inadmissible, as 
the Court did not find the risk that the applicants could suffer torture 
or inhuman and degrading treatments in Morocco.  
At the request of the Spanish government, the case was referred 
back to the Grand Chamber, that, with a final and unappealable 
judgment, ruled on February 13th 2020 and reached opposite 
conclusions. 
In the judgment in question, the Court focuses primarily on the 
possibility of asserting the Spanish jurisdiction in relation to the events 
that had occurred. The Court recalls its case law (in particular 
Banković28 and Ilaşcu29), stating that, although essentially territorial, 
jurisdiction under the ECHR can also be established in extraterritorial 
contexts, in particular where the State exercises effective control over 
an area. After unquestionably placing the facts in question in Spanish 
territory30, the Court rejects the preliminary objection of the defendant 
government, which had invoked an exception to the exercise of 
jurisdiction on the basis of the difficulties encountered in the 
management of migratory pressure and in particular of the assault 
suffered at the borders of Melilla. The Court states in a passage that, 
although in previous cases it had found that the enormous difficulties 
faced by States, due to the strong migratory pressure at the external 
borders of the Schengen area, represent a peculiarity in the current 
political context, this does not constitute a valid element to exclude 
	  
28 ECtHR, Bankovic and Others v. Belgium, Application No. 52207/99, Decision 
of 28 October 1999. 
29 ECtHR, Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Application No. 48787/99, 
Judgment of 8 July 2004. 
30 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, para. 104. 
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the exercise of jurisdiction. The Convention – the Court states – 
“cannot be selectively restricted to only parts of the territory of a State 
by means of an artificial reduction in the scope of its territorial 
jurisdiction”31. The Court also does not fail to note the full authority 
exercised by the Guardia Civil on the facts in question and the 
absence of other authorities operating in the area.  
Therefore, the Court proceeds with the examination of the 
complaint relating to art. 4 of Prot. n. 4, by analyzing whether the 
removal of the applicants could constitute “expulsion” within the 
meaning of the provision and, in this case, whether it could be defined 
as “collective” in nature. 
With regard to the first point, the Court refers to its case law (in 
particular Khlaifia) and the aforementioned “Draft articles on the 
expulsion of aliens”, stating that “expulsion” means any measure of 
forced removal from the territory of a State (and exceptionally also in 
extraterritorial contexts), regardless of the circumstances of the case, 
of the legal or irregular stay of the foreigner and of the conduct 
assumed during the crossing 32 . This way the argument of the 
defendant government regarding the possibility of excluding the “non-
admission to borders” from the notion of expulsion is rejected.  
Once it is established that the removal of N.D. and N.T. 
constitutes “expulsion”, the Court examines whether it can be 
considered of “collective” nature. In this regard, the Court recalls that 
“collective character” means an expulsion of foreigners not carried out 
on the basis of an individual examination of the circumstances33. With 
respect to the case in question, however, the Court states that, in the 
light of its established case law (the Court cites the Berisha and 
Haljiti34 and Dritsas35 cases), in certain circumstances the lack of an 
individual examination can be attributed to a “culpable conduct” of 
the applicants. Therefore, in the first place, the Court found that the 
applicants voluntarily placed themselves in an illegal situation, taking 
advantage of the numerical dynamics in order to create a situation of 
	  
31 Ibid., para. 110. 
32 Ibid., para. 173-187. 
33 Ibid., para. 193. 
34 ECtHR, Berisha and Haljiti v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Application No. 18670/03, Decision of 10 April 2007. 
35 ECtHR, Dritsas and Others v. Italy, Application No. 2344/02, Decision of 1 
February 2011. 
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danger to public safety. In the second place, the Court checked 
whether the Spanish State had made authorized access points available 
along the border, at which it was possible to apply for international 
protection, and whether the applicants had had cogent reasons not to 
use these channels. By applying the reasoning to the present case, the 
Court concludes for the non-violation of art. 4 Prot. n. 4. From the 
Court’s assessment, in fact, it emerges that the Spanish State 
guaranteed effective legal entry channels (in particular the border 
crossing point of Beni-Enzar, which was not far away from the 
applicants’ crossing point, but also the embassies present in the 
countries of origin and transit) and that there were no valid reasons on 
the part of the applicants for not using these channels (reasons which 
were, in the Court’s opinion, mostly of a practical nature). 
 
 
4. Main critical issues: the exception of “culpable conduct” and the 
“legal pathways” requirement  
 
The exception to the protection afforded by art. 4 Prot. n. 4, thus 
outlined by the Court, represents one of the main weaknesses of its 
reasoning, as well as a “hole of unclear dimensions”36. 
In the first place, it is questionable that the focus of the Court’s 
assessment is the “own conduct” of the applicants and not the conduct 
of the Spanish State. In fact, the Court does not evaluate to what 
extent the State had observed or not its obligations under the ECHR 
and, therefore, violated or not human rights, but rather to what extent 
individuals can access the protection guaranteed by the Convention, in 
relation to their “behavior”. This type of approach is at odds with the 
function of the Court, which, as enshrined in art. 19 ECHR, was 
established to ensure that the “High Contracting Parties” respect the 
commitments under the ECHR and its Protocols and more generally 
the mandate of the Convention itself, that is focused on the person and 
aimed at safeguarding their human rights in interactions with States37. 
	  
36 See N. Markard, “A Hole of Unclear Dimensions; Reading N.D. and N.T. v. 
Spain”, EU Migration Law Blog, 1 April 2020, <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-hole-
of-unclear-dimensions-reading-nd-and-nt-v-spain/> (7/20). 
37 See S. Carrera, The Strasbourg Court Judgement N.D. and N.T. v Spain A Carte 
Blanche to Push Backs at EU External Borders?, EUI Working Papers RSCAS n° 
2020/21, pp. 8-10, 
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Furthermore, the argument proposed by the Court is questionable. 
It claims to be based on a consolidated definition of “culpable 
conduct” by making references to its precedents (the aforementioned 
Berisha and Haljiti and Dritsas), which however do not appear to be 
legally relevant. In fact, in them the culpable conduct was found in the 
context of the obligations to cooperate with the State authorities (for 
example in case of the refusal to show ones’ documents and the 
consequent impossibility for the authorities to formalize individual 
expulsion orders). This case is completely different, since N.D. and 
N.T. had not posed obstacles for the Spanish authorities to examine 
their situations individually. In N.D. and N.T., it rather appears that a 
new “culpable conduct” test has been introduced, which acts as a 
general criterion for identifying behaviours suitable to exclude the 
operability of the prohibition on collective expulsions38. 
Secondly, the assessment regarding the “effective availability” of 
the legal entry channels, the other key element in ascertaining the 
violation of art. 4 Prot. n. 4, appears to be very deficient. 
In fact, the Court fully accepts the government’s argument, which 
affirms the existence of an access channel at the Beni-Enzar border 
crossing, even before the actual establishment of an office in 
September 2014. This argument was validated by the fact that, from 
January to August 2014, 21 asylum applications had been sent to 
Melilla and 6 of them were from this same crossing39. The Court 
therefore does not seem to take into consideration what was stated by 
the intervening third parties40, who had highlighted the absence of a 
realistic possibility for Sub-Saharan Africans to access such channels: 
the Beni-Enzar crossing could only be reached by Syrian refugees, 
since Sub-Saharan migrants were discriminated and subjected to racial 




38 Mussi, La sentenza N.D. e N.T., cit. 
39 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, para. 212-213. 
40 In particular, the intervention of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Other 
parties involved were OHCHR, AIRE Center, Amnesty International, ECRE, 
International Commission of Jurists and the Dutch Council for Refugees. 
41 The reports of the intervening third parties also testify to a very small number 
of asylum applications lodged in Melilla by Sub-Saharan citizens over the past few 
years. These data are also reflected in the statistics relating to the issue of work visas 
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Furthermore, the Court notes (raising further doubts) that “even 
assuming that difficulties existed in physically approaching this border 
crossing point on the Moroccan side, no responsibility of the 
respondent Government for this situation has been established before 
the Court”42.  
Therefore, Spanish practice seems to be assessed in rather abstract 
terms, while the control over the effectiveness of the legal pathways for 
entry would seem quite formalistic or at least superficial. This is at 
odds with the claim that “the Convention is intended to guarantee not 
rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and 
effective”43. 
Finally, the legal implications relating to the introduction of the 
standard of “legal pathways” within the context of art. 4 Prot. n. 4 add 
to the criticism. In this regard, the Court states that “the effectiveness 
of Convention rights requires that ... States make available genuine 
and effective access to means of legal entry” and that these means must 
allow people “to submit an application for protection, based in 
particular on Article 3 of the Convention”44. 
In this regard, in fact, it is not clear whether the Court introduced 
a positive obligation for States to provide effective legal access routes 
under art. 3 ECHR, a completely new obligation, which would lead 
the Court to move away from its own jurisprudence on the matter, or 
if it only expressed complementary considerations to the assessment of 
the applicants’ culpable conduct 45 . In fact, the meaning of the 
standard of legal pathways within the context of art. 4 Prot. n. 4 
remains completely vague and imprecise and, together with the 
nebulous and formalistic evaluation of the effectiveness of the Spanish 





by the Spanish authorities. There is a clear preference for visa applications made by 
North African citizens, in particular those from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. 
For an in-depth picture about these data, see Carrera, The Strasbourg Court Judgement 
N.D. and N.T. v Spain, cit. 
42 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, para. 221. 
43 Ibidem. 
44 Ibidem, para. 209. 
45 D. Thym, A Restrictionist Revolution?, cit. 
46 Ibidem. 
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5. The relationship between art. 4 of Protocol no. 4 and the principle 
of non-refoulement 
  
With respect to the applicability of art. 4 Prot. n. 4, the Court – as 
anticipated – stated that the notion of expulsion refers to all 
foreigners, “irrespective of ... his or her status as migrant or as asylum 
seeker and his or her conduct when crossing the border”47. 
This represents the main point of disagreement with Judge 
Koskelo, who, in her partially dissenting opinion, maintains that such a 
broad notion of expulsion makes the scope of art 4 Prot. n. 4 
unlimited and indefinite. Indeed, the judge argues that an individual 
examination of the circumstances of each foreigner should be 
guaranteed only in the presence of the risk of non-refoulement, by 
virtue of a restrictive interpretation of art. 4 Prot. n. 4, to be read in 
close connection with art. 3 ECHR. Therefore, unlike the majority, 
Judge Koskelo believes that the Court should have ruled for the non-
applicability of art. 4 Prot. n. 4, since a violation of art. 3 ECHR had 
already been excluded48. 
The judge’s position is questionable in several respects49, although 
it was also appreciated by those 50  who pointed out that this 
differentiation would have been a valid alternative to the “Court’s 
baffling proposition that those entering irregularly cannot rely on the 
Convention”51. It should be noted in this regard that judge Koskelo 
herself considers the approach adopted by the majority “paradoxical”, 
since they do not set “limits” to the scope of art. 4 Prot. n. 4 and then 
“develop a “carve-out” in the assessment of whether there has been a 
	  
47 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, para. 185. 
48 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, (partly dissenting opinion), 
para. 44. 
49 The essence of the prohibition of collective expulsions, as an independent and 
autonomous provision with respect to art. 3 ECHR, consists in preventing the 
arbitrariness of State authorities in their border policies and in ensuring a set of 
guarantees for each individual, not only for those who apply for asylum: e.g. fair trial 
guarantees, access to effective remedies for forcibly returned persons who had not 
received an individual assessment of their situation, access to complaint mechanisms, 
essential in the event of violence or ill-treatment. This approach also aims to ensure 
access to essential protections such as: legal representation, interpretative assistance, 
medical and psychological assistance, respect for the best interests of the child. See 
Carrera, The Strasbourg Court Judgement N.D. and N.T. v Spain, cit. p.2 ff. 
50 See in particular Thym, A Restrictionist Revolution?, cit. 
51 Ibidem. 
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violation of that provision”52. This way, in her opinion, the majority 
determined a shift of focus from the notion of non-refoulement and its 
safeguards to that of “own conduct”, as elaborated in the judgment, 
which is based on new and problematic application criteria53. 
In any case, rejecting the restrictive interpretation of Judge 
Koskelo, the Court has, on a theoretical level, preserved the 
autonomous scope of the prohibition of collective expulsions, from 
which guarantees derive that are additional and independent from the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
However, at the same time, in assessing the compliance with art. 4 
Prot. n. 4, the Court does not seem to “detach” from evaluating a 
potential violation of art. 3 ECHR, thus providing a confused and 
inconsistent picture. 
In fact, the Court, due to the fact that art. 4 Prot. n. 4 applies to all 
foreigners without any distinction, seems to resort to a certain 
flexibility in assessing the compliance with the provision, which would 
justify a more superficial individual examination, as already happened 
in Khlaifia (the absence of an individual interview) and now in N.D. 
and N.T. (absence of an individual examination in certain 
circumstances of “culpable conduct”), when the applicants do not fall 
within the scope of application of art. 3 ECHR54. 
Actually in N.D. and N.T., the Court repeatedly observes that the 
case in question does not concern a violation of art. 3 ECHR and 
points out that the two applicants, after the events in question, had not 
obtained the refugee status (N.T. had not even requested it). The 
absolute character of the principle of non-refoulement, which the State 
authorities must nevertheless respect when “protecting” their borders, 
is also reiterated55. 
	  
52 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, (partly dissenting opinion), 
para. 33. 
53 Ivi, para. 34-36 and 43. 
54 See L. Leboeuf, Interdiction des expulsions collectives, cit. 
55 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, para. 232. In any case, the 
argument proposed by the Court in para. 210 raises perplexity. Here the Court states 
that ECHR does not prevent States from requesting that asylum applications be 
presented at existing border crossings and that, consequently, States can refuse entry 
into their territory of foreigners, including potential asylum seekers, who did not 
comply with these provisions. It is in fact questionable how this argument is 
compatible with the absolute and mandatory nature of the principle of non-
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Therefore, if the restriction introduced to the prohibition of 
collective expulsions does not affect the principle of non-refoulement, 
one can reasonably assume that, if in N.D. and N.T. the admissibility of 
art. 3 ECHR had remained outstanding, the Court would have 
developed different arguments. 
In any case, by restricting the scope of art. 4 Prot. n. 4, when in 
some way it is a gateway to the protection of art. 3 ECHR56, a 
contradiction is generated57.  
By downsizing the scope of the prohibition of collective expulsions 
and assuming that the absence of an individual examination does not a 
priori violate the ECHR, is there no risk of compromising the absolute 
protection of the principle of non-refoulement itself, since such an 
examination is necessary to ascertain its violation?58 In other words, is 
it possible to legitimize collective expulsions in particular 
circumstances and, at the same time, to keep ensuring that no one is 
sent back to countries where there is a risk of treatments contrary to 
art. 3 ECHR?  
In this regard, in the recent Ilias and Ahmed59 judgment, the 
Grand Chamber stated that it is only through the examination of 
asylum applications that it can be assessed whether the applicant runs 
the risk of undergoing treatments contrary to art. 3 in his/her country 
of origin. The post-factum finding that the applicant did not take such 
a risk cannot absolve the State of this procedural duty, otherwise it 
	  
refoulement, see Carrera, The Strasbourg Court Judgement N.D. and N.T. v Spain., cit., 
pp. 5-6. 
56 The Court affirms in the judgment that the prohibition of collective expulsions 
“is aimed at maintaining the possibility for each of the aliens concerned to assert a risk 
of treatment which is incompatible with the Convention – and in particular with 
Article 3 ‒ ”, para. 198.  
57 See Leboeuf, Interdiction des expulsions collectives, cit., A. Fazzini, “La sentenza 
N.D. e N.T. e il divieto di espulsioni collettive: una prova di equilibrismo tra 
flessibilità, restrizioni e più di una contraddizione”, ADiM Blog, Osservatorio della 
Giurisprudenza, April 2020, <http://www.adimblog.com/2020/04/30/la-sentenza-n-
d-e-n-t-e-il-divieto-di-espulsioni-collettive-una-prova-di-equilibrismo-tra-flessibilita-
restrizioni-e-piu-di-una-contraddizione/> (7/20). 
58 Ibidem; See also A. Lübbe, “The Elephant in the Room: Effective Guarantee of 
Non-Refoulement after ECtHR N.D. and N.T.?”, Verfassunblog, 19 febbraio 2020, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/the-elephant-in-the-room/> (7/20), in which the author 
refers to this contradiction by using the expression “The elephant in the room”. 
59  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, Application No. 
47287/15, Judgment of 21 November 2019. 
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would risk to render “meaningless the prohibition of ill-treatment in 
cases of expulsion of asylum seekers”60.  
In conclusion, the interaction between art. 4 Prot. n. 4 and art. 3 
ECHR seems to be the result of a failed test of equilibrium between 
elements of dynamism and restriction, which in fact produces some 
contortions61. Preserving the dynamism of art. 4 Prot. n. 4, in the 
scope of which all the aliens fall, and restricting its scope, while 
considering it instrumental to art. 3 ECHR, may cause the risk of 





The analysis carried out so far has attempted to prove that, 
although in the present case the Court did not intend to authorize 
collective expulsions at the borders, it did in fact elaborate an highly 
controversial exception to the rule, which allows to exclude from its 
scope of application those who cross land borders irregularly while 
being able to access effective channels to request international 
protection. The emerging picture poses many uncertainties, with 
regard to both the effective protection of migrants against collective 
expulsions, and the obligations for the States under art. 4 Prot. 4. 
As we have seen, the Court’s reasoning raises concerns in several 
respects. Issues such as the irregular border crossing and the 
possibility of using legal access channels should not in fact constitute 
arguments that can discharge Spain from the compliance with the 
procedural guarantees under art. 4 Prot. n. 4, since these guarantees 
should instead exist regardless. Furthermore, the same argument that 
led to the elaboration of the notion of “culpable conduct” is debatable 
and the assessment of the effective availability of the legal access 
routes is ascertained in formalistic and not very rigorous way. Finally, 
this same notion is not exempt from further legal implications, because 
	  
60 Ivi, para. 137; for more information see F.L. Gatta, “Diritti al confine e il 
confine dei diritti: La Corte Edu si esprime sulle politiche di controllo frontaliero 




61 See Leboeuf, Interdiction des expulsions collectives, cit., Fazzini, La sentenza 
N.D. e N.T. e il divieto di espulsioni collettive, cit. 
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it is not clear whether the Court intended to establish a positive 
obligation for the States parties pursuant to art. 3 ECHR to provide 
for effective legal access routes, thus creating an even more nebulous 
picture. 
These uncertainties actually risk to reduce the scope of the 
safeguards provided by ECHR as well as the effectiveness of the 
principle of non-refoulement itself. In fact, it has been noticed how, by 
reducing the scope of art. 4 of Prot. n. 4, which is the “access door” to 
the protection under art. 3 ECHR, there is the risk of causing a 
reduction in the safeguards provided by art. 3 itself.  
Several authors have observed how these legal conclusions, 
together with the “worrying” language used by the Court (that 
repeatedly uses expressions such as “assault on borders”, “use of 
force”), can represent a concession to the pressure of States that are 
increasingly inclined to take repressive measures in the management of 
migratory flows62. The concern is also justified by the most recent 
jurisprudence of the Court of Strasbourg: the Asady 63  case, 
immediately following the judgment under examination, confirms the 
tendency of the Court to reduce the qualitative standard of the 
guarantees under the prohibition of collective expulsions started with 
Khlaifia, and feeds the indeterminacy that surrounds the obligations of 
the States in this matter64.  
There is no shortage of those who, however, hope for a “change of 
course” by the Court of Strasbourg, and appeal for the consolidation 
of a restrictive interpretation of the “culpable conduct” exception, 
	  
62 See, inter alia, Mussi, La sentenza N.D. e N.T., cit., Carrera, The Strasbourg 
Court Judgement N.D. and N.T. v Spain, cit. 
63 ECtHR, Asady e altri c. Slovakia, Application No. 24917/15, Judgment of 24 
March 2020. 
64 In the Asady case, several Afghan citizens were expelled from Slovakia after 
being identified and interviewed for about ten minutes each, with completely identical 
questions. The Court did not find the breach of art. 4 Prot. n. 4. Also in this case, it is 
possible to highlight a weak reconstruction of the facts in question by the Court and 
the use of an approach which is marked by an empty formalism rather than the 
evaluation of the effective possibility for the applicants to assert their arguments 
against expulsion, see A. Bufalini, “L’insostenibile incertezza sul contenuto degli 
obblighi degli Stati derivanti dal divieto di espulsioni collettive”, ADiM Blog, 
Osservatorio della Giurisprudenza, April 2020, 
<http://www.adimblog.com/2020/04/30/linsostenibile-incertezza-sul-contenuto-degli-
obblighi-degli-stati-derivanti-dal-divieto-di-espulsioni-collettive/> (7/20). 
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which the Court will have, in the near future, several opportunities to 
“perfect”65.  
If this were not the case, after decades of revolutionary judgments, 
the credibility of the Court of Strasbourg, as a fundamental stronghold 
for the protection of human rights, would risk to be seriously 
compromised, together with the very foundations of the European 
project. 
	  
65 Di Filippo, Walking the (barbed) wire of the prohibition of collective expulsions. 
cit. 
	  
LOOKING BEHIND TEITIOTA V. NEW ZEALAND CASE: 
FURTHER ALTERNATIVES OF SAFEGUARD FOR “CLIMATE 









Issues dealing with individual migrations caused by climate change 
have been very rarely addressed at the international level by human 
rights treaty bodies1. Although in the last decades the different, but 
related, question of the impact of environmental pollution on the 
effective enjoyment of human rights was explored, especially by the 
European Court of Human Rights2, the specific problem of migrations 
due to environmental degradation made its appearance only recently 
in some act or documents released by human rights international 
organizations3. As known, the Human Rights Committee had the 
	  
* University of Palermo.  
1 For a comprehensive and thorough study of the issue of forced migration due to 
climate change, under the perspective of the international law, see J. McAdam, 
Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
2 For an analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on 
the right to a healthy environment see ex plurimis: O. W. Pedersen, “The European 
Court of Human Rights and International Environmental Law”, in J. Knox, R. Pejan 
(eds.), The Human Right to a Healthy Environment, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2018, pp. 86 ff.; A. Saccucci, “La protezione dell’ambiente nella 
giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti umani”, in G. Cataldi, N. Napoletano E 
A. Caliguri (eds.), La tutela dei diritti umani in Europa, Padova, CEDAM, 2010, pp. 
493-531; M. Bothe, “The right to a healthy environment”, in F. Bestagno (ed.), I diritti 
economici sociali e culturali, Milano, Vita e pensiero, 2009, pp. 129 ff.; D. García San 
José, La protection de l’environnement et la Convention européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme, Éditions du Conseil de l’Europe, Strasburgo, 2005; M. Dejeants-Pons, “Les 
droits de l’homme à l’environnement dans le cadre du Conseil de l’Europe”, Revue 
Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, XV, 60, 2004, pp. 861 ff.; L. Loucaides, 
“Environmental Protection through the Jurisprudence of the European Convention 
on Human Rights”, British Yearbook of International Law, 75, 1, 2004, pp. 249 ff.  
3 See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General 
recommendation No. 37 on the gender-related dimensions of disaster risk reduction in 
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opportunity to adopt views on this matter for the first time when 
ruling on the case Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand on October 24, 20194. 
Before focusing on the mentioned decision, it is worth clarifying 
that phrases like “climate change refugees” or “environmental 
refugees” are often used in an interchangeable way to indicate groups 
of people crossing national borders because of environmental factors 
that seriously affect their quality of life or jeopardize their existence. 
Nevertheless, this terminology is evocative, but not technical and 
	  
the context of climate change Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/37, 13 March 2018: “The increasing frequency 
and intensity of extreme weather events and environmental degradation resulting from 
climate change are likely to lead to significant population displacement both within 
countries and across borders” (par. 73); “… States parties should: (a) Ensure that 
migration and development policies are gender responsive and that they include 
sound disaster risk considerations and recognize disasters and climate change as 
important push factors for internal displacement and migration. This information 
should be incorporated into national and local plans to monitor and support the rights 
of women and girls during migration and displacement” (par. 78 (a)). See also 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding 
observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: 
Tuvalu, Forty-fourth session, 20 July-7 August 2009, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/TUV/CO/2, par. 56: “The Committee recommends that the State party 
develop disaster management and mitigation plans in response to the potential 
displacement and/or statelessness arising from environmental and climatic change and 
that women, including women in the outer islands, be included throughout the 
planning processes and adoption of such strategies”. 
4 Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, Communication No. 
2728/2016, Views of 24 October 2019. For doctrinal comments concerning this 
decision see: J. McAdam, “Climate refugees cannot be forced back home”, The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 20 January 2020, https://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-
change/climate-refugees-cannot-be-forced-back-home-20200119-p53sp4.html 
(06/07); E. Delval, “From the U.N. Human Rights Committee to European Courts: 
Which protection for climate-induced displaced persons under European Law?”, EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 8 aprile 2020, 
<http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/> (06/20); J. Hamzah Sendut, “Climate Change as a 
Trigger of Non-Refoulement Obligations Under International Human Rights Law”, 
EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 6 February 2020, 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/climate-change-as-a-trigger-of-non-refoulement-obligations-
under-international-human-rights-law/> (06/20); B. Behlert. “A significant opening. 
On the HRC’s groundbreaking first ruling in the case of a ‘climate refugee’ “, 
Voelkerrechtsblog, 30 gennaio 2020, <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/a-significant-
opening/> (06/20). F. Maletto, “Non refoulement e cambiamento climatico”, Sidiblog, 
23 March 2020, <http://www.sidiblog.org/2020/03/23/non-refoulement-e-
cambiamento-climatico-il-caso-teitiota-c-nuova-Zealanda/> (06/20). 
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therefore misleading5. The use of the term “refugees”, in fact, does not 
mean that these people fall under the legal definition of “refugee” laid 
down in article 1 lett. A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, or even that they are entitled to international 
protection within the meaning of article 33.1 of the mentioned 
Convention6. On the contrary, as a general rule, the principle of non-
refoulement cannot be applied to them7. This is exactly why human 
rights treaty bodies play a crucial role for the protection of these 
individuals. More precisely, as it is well known, the main judicial and 
quasi-judicial human rights bodies, both at the regional and at the 
	  
5 See J. McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, cit., 
p. 39. 
6 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951 
and entered into force on 22 April 1954, read in conjunction with the Protocol 
adopted in 1967. Pursuant to article 1, lett. A(2) of this Convention: “the term 
“refugee” shall apply to any person who … owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it”. Moreover in accordance to article 33.1 of the same Convention: no 
Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion”.  
7 For an examination of the reasons why it is very difficult to argue that people 
displaced by the impacts of climate change can be defined as “refugees” within the 
meaning of the Refugee Convention, see J. McAdam, Climate Change, Forced 
Migration, and International Law, cit., p. 42 ss. The author identifies even some 
exceptional cases in which individuals exposed to climate impact or environmental 
degradation might be defined as “persecuted” in the meaning of the Refugee 
Convention (Ivi, p. 47). It might be added that another phrase sometimes used to 
define people displaced because of environmental degradation is “environmental 
migrants”: this term was criticized too, since it covers even phenomena which are 
irrelevant for international law, as it is attributable to any kind of displacement, even 
those taking place inside the same country. For a reconstruction of the terminological 
debate see W. Kälin, N. Schrepfer, “Protecting People Crossing Borders in the 
Context of Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches”, Legal and 
Protection Policy Research Series, 2012, p. 28 ff., 
<https://www.unhcr.org/4f33f1729.pdf> (06/20). See also: E. Delval, “From the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee to European Courts: Which protection for climate-induced 
displaced persons under European Law?”, cit. 
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global level, provide protection from expulsion and extradition 
through an extensive interpretation of some human rights. The chiefly 
concerned rights are those to life and not to be subject to torture; 
however, although less frequently, other rights are involved, such as 
the right to a fair trial and the right to respect for private and family 
life. Thus, in the practice of the aforementioned organs, the non-
refoulement principle is widened and even individuals who are not 
classifiable as “refugees” in a strict sense may be safeguarded from 
forcible return. The Teitiota case can be placed precisely in this 
decisional strand. 
After a description of the content of the cited ruling (par. 2), the 
present article will be focused on the issue of the burden of proof and 
it will explore possible developments of the practice of the Human 
Rights Committee under article 17 ICCPR, which would make the 
threshold easier to reach (par. 3). Then, in the last part, a brief 
reference will be made to the topic of protection of “climate refugees” 




2. The ruling of the Human Rights Committee and its innovative 
features 
 
The petitioner, Ioanne Teitiota, had migrated to New Zealand 
from the atoll of Tarawa, in the Republic of Kiribati, because of the 
extremely precarious conditions of life in his homeland, due to climate 
change. After having unsuccessfully tried to apply for asylum in New 
Zealand, and having exhausted all available domestic remedies8, he 
submitted an individual communication to the Human Rights 
Committee, claiming the breach of the right to life under article 6 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In 
particular, he argued that the sea level rise, caused by global warming, 
had led in Tarawa to a series of consequences, such as: the scarcity of 
habitable space, related violent land disputes, severe environment 
degradation, including saltwater contamination of freshwater supply. 
	  
8 For an in-depth analysis of the domestic proceeding see Xing-Yin Ni, “A Nation 
Going Under: Legal Protection for ‘Climate Change Refugees’”, Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review, 38, 2, 2015. 
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Under such circumstances, by removing him to Kiribati, New Zealand 
would exposed him to a risk of violation of his right to life9. 
The Committee firstly considered whether the communication was 
admissible, given that the State party had contested the claimant’s 
victim status. New Zealand, indeed, had argued that Mr. Teitiota had 
not sufficiently demonstrated an existing or imminent threat to his 
enjoyment of the right contemplated by article 6 ICCPR. On this 
point, it is remarkable that the Committee assessed that “in the 
context of attaining victim status in cases of deportation or 
extradition, the requirement of imminence primarily attaches to the 
decision to remove the individual, whereas the imminence of any 
anticipated harm in the receiving state influences the assessment of the 
real risk faced by the individual”10. In other words, according to the 
Committee, in order to verify the precondition of imminence of harm, 
what is mainly at stake is the temporal proximity of the expelling 
decision implementation. Regarding the assessment of the “real risk” 
faced in the receiving State, imminence seems to play a less decisive 
role. And yet, the Committee does not clarify precisely to what extent 
the imminence affects this evaluation. Anyway, it can be said that, 
according to the Committee, the assessment on the “real risk” cannot 
be limited to the simple foreseeability of the event, disregarding the 
temporal element11. In the case taken into consideration in the present 
article, however, the Committee found that “the author sufficiently 
demonstrated, for the purpose of admissibility, that due to the impact 
of climate change and associated sea level rise on the habitability of 
the Republic of Kiribati and on the security situation in the islands, he 
faced … a real risk of impairment to his right to life under article 6 of 
the Covenant”12. 
Having considered the admissibility, the Committee then took 
	  
9 Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 3. 
10 Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 8.5. 
11 For a criticism of the introduction of the test of imminence in international 
refugee and human rights law, see A. Anderson, M. Foster, H. Lambert, J. McAdam, 
“Imminence In Refugee and Human Rights Law: A Misplaced Notion for 
International Protection”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 68, 1, 2019, 
pp. 111 ff. In B. Çalı, C. Costello, S. Cunningham, Hard Protection through Soft 
Courts? Non-Refoulement before the United Nations Treaty Bodies, German Law 
Journal, 21, 3, the authors hold that “while some language in the decision emphasizes 
imminence as the standard, overall the approach cites foreseeability” (there, p. 368). 
12 Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 8.6. 
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under examination the merits. It started by recalling some relevant 
principles. More precisely, the Committee reminded 13  its General 
Comment No. 31 on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed 
on States parties to the Covenant, in so far as it states that the latter are 
required: “not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a 
person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that 
contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, … in the country to 
which removal is to be effected”14. It also referred to its General 
Comment No. 36, according to which “the obligation not to extradite, 
deport or otherwise transfer pursuant to article 6 of the Covenant may 
be broader than the scope of the principle of non-refoulement under 
international refugee law, since it may also require the protection of 
aliens not entitled to refugee status”15. In addition, it stressed that the 
right to life must be interpreted in a wide sense and that in implies 
positive obligations to the States parties. Again, it recalled its General 
Comment No 36, where it stated that the right to life includes the right 
to “enjoy a life with dignity” and “concerns the entitlement of 
individuals to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or 
may be expected to cause their unnatural or premature death”16, and 
where it also maintained that “environmental degradation, climate 
change and unsustainable development constitute some of the most 
pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future 
generations to enjoy the right to life”17. 
Against this background, the Human Rights Committee pointed 
out that in the case at stake, rather than establishing autonomously if 
the claimant faced a real risk to the enjoyment of his rights to life, it 
must be verified “whether there was clear arbitrariness, error or 
injustice in the evaluation by the State party’s authorities of the 
	  
13 Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 9.3. 
14  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 29 March 2004, par. 12. 
15  Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36 on article 6 of the 
Covenant on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, par. 31; 
Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 9.3. 
16 Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36, cit., par. 3; Human Rights 
Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 9.4. 
17 Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36, cit., par. 62; Human 
Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 9.4. 
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author’s claim”18. This evaluation, in particular, must have provided 
the author “with an adequate and individualized assessment”19. This 
means that the decision on the merits is based on monitoring judicial 
domestic proceedings. Notably, concerning the author’s claim about 
the scarcity of habitable land, which had caused violent disputes 
endangering his life, the Committee recalled its previous practice, 
according to which a general situation of violence may create a real 
risk of irreparable harm under article 6 and 7 only in the most extreme 
case20. In any case, the Committee noted the absence of a situation of 
general conflict in Kiribati, as the author had referred only to sporadic 
incidents of violence. Moreover, it considered that Mr. Teitiota had 
not demonstrated clear arbitrariness or error in the domestic 
authorities’ assessment. The second item under examination was the 
problem of the lack of access to potable water, due to the saltwater 
contamination produced by sea level rise. Dealing with this matter, the 
Committee noted that the claimant had not provided sufficient 
information about the inaccessibility, unsafeness or insufficiency of 
fresh water supplies in Tarawa, so that had he been returned there he 
would predictably suffer health risk, severe enough to undermine his 
right to enjoy a life with dignity or even cause his unnatural or 
premature death21. Finally, the Committee focused its attention on the 
applicant’s allegation concerning the threat to his right to life, due to 
the deprivation of means of subsistence, as his crops had been 
destroyed because of salt deposit on the ground. Also with regard to 
this assertion, it maintained that the information available to the 
Committee itself did not indicated a real and foreseeable risk that Mr. 
Teitiota would be exposed to a situation of indigence, deprivation of 
food and extreme precarity in Kiribati that would endanger his right 
to life. Moreover, it estimated that it was not proven that the domestic 
authorities had analysed this subject in a clearly arbitrary or erroneous 
way22. 
Following these considerations, the Committee formulated an 
extremely noteworthy obiter dictum. After having recognized that 
	  
18 Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 9.6. 
19 Ibid., par. 9.7. 
20 Ibid., par. 9.7. 
21 Ibid., par. 9.8. 
22 Ibid., par. 9.9. 
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change-induced harm can occur through both sudden-onset events 
and slow-onset processes, it asserted that: 
 
without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate 
change in receiving states may expose individuals to a violation of their rights 
under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, thereby triggering the non-refoulement 
obligations of sending states. Furthermore, given that the risk of an entire 
country becoming submerged under water is such an extreme risk, the 
conditions of life in such a country may become incompatible with the right 
to life with dignity before the risk is realized23. 
 
As it can be seen, through a broad interpretation of article 6 and 7 
ICCPR the Committee identified a new obligation of non-refoulement. 
Albeit in principle and with a statement having no effect in the 
concrete case, it established the unlawfulness of the expulsions 
towards places where, by reason of climate-change, individuals could 
be exposed to violations of the right to life or the right not to be 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment24. It also 
highlighted that the specific case of a country being likely to be 
submerged might give rise to such negative obligation. 
The above mentioned statement is undoubtedly a significant 
feature of the decision, but it is not the only relevant one. In fact, even 
if shortly thereafter the Committee considered the communication as 
ill-founded on the merits, it also made another remarkable assertion. 
In particular, it noted that the estimated time frame of 10 to 15 
years 25 , within which the Republic of Kiribati would become 
uninhabitable so that serious harm would occur to the author, “could 
allow for intervening acts by the Republic of Kiribati, with the assistance 
of the international community, to take affirmative measures to protect 
and, where necessary, relocate its population”26. Therefore, bearing in 
mind that the national courts had “thoroughly examined this issue and 
found that the Republic of Kiribati was taking adaptive measures to 
	  
23 Ibid., par. 9.11. 
24 With an emphasis on this part of the pronouncement, J. McAdam talk about a 
«landmark decision», see J. McAdam, “Climate refugees cannot be forced back 
home”, cit., p. 1. 
25 The Committee briefly dwelled on the determination of the time frame at par. 
9.10 of the decision (Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., 
par. 9.10). 
26 Ibid., par. 9.12 (italics added). 
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reduce existing vulnerabilities and build resilience to climate change-
related harms”, the Committee concluded that the assessment of the 
domestic authority and the consequent negative decision on the 
author’s claim for asylum was neither clearly arbitrary or erroneous in 
this regard, neither amounted to a denial of justice. Getting to the 
point, if it is true that, on the one hand, the Committee dismissed the 
petition, it cannot be overlooked that, on the other hand, its decision 
is based on the assumption that the Republic of Kiribati, with the 
assistance of the international community, was already taking actions, 
and would do so even in the following years, in order to protect its 
population from the negative effects of climate change. As it has been 
observed, it sounds like a warning 27  made to the international 
community as a whole to cooperate in stemming the harmful 
consequences of environmental degradation on individuals. It should 
be further noted that the unfavourable outcome for the applicant 
seems closely connected to the temporal element: the Committee held 
that the time frame of 10-15 years was wide enough to enable the 
Republic of Kiribati to adopt sufficient measures to protect the 
author’s right to life. It could be argued that, in this assessment, the 
above referred element of imminence plays an important role. 
In short, the main elements of interest in the Human Rights 
Committee decision, here under analysis, are the following. The 
Committee paves the way to feasible future decisions, in which the 
non-refoulement obligations under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant for 
the safeguard of the so-called “climate refugee” would be activated. At 
the same time, the Committee establishes some procedural obligations 
under the ICCPR. Before expelling an individual from his territory, 
indeed, the State party is required to take thoroughly into account the 
environmental situation in the land toward which he is to be returned, 
having recourse to new and updated data28. Finally, the views adopted 
by the Committee contain an indirect exhortation to the international 
community to cooperate in reducing the impact of climate change. 
	  
27 E. Delval, “From the U.N. Human Rights Committee to European Courts: 
Which protection for climate-induced displaced persons under European Law?”, cit., 
p. 3. 
28  The Committee specified that its ruling was “without prejudice to the 
continuing responsibility of the State party to take into account in future deportation 
cases the situation at the time in the Republic of Kiribati and new and updated data 
on the effects of climate change and rising sea-levels thereupon” (Human Rights 
Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, cit., par. 9.12). 
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3. The burden of proof and further alternatives of safeguard under 
article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
As it can be deduced from the previous considerations, the burden 
of proof placed on the petitioner to establish the real risk of arbitrary 
deprivation of life is heavy. Actually, the Committee members Vasilka 
Sancin and Duncan Laki Muhumuza, in their dissenting opinions, 
addressed considerations concerning precisely this high standard29. In 
particular, the Committee member Vasilika Sancin focused on the 
evidence of access to safe drinking water. She noted that in Kiribati, 
the 2008 National Water Resources Policy and a 2010 National 
Sanitation Policy’s priorities set for the first 3 years (both containing 
policies and goals of direct relevance to the water) have yet to be 
implemented. Hence, in her appraisal, the burden of proof should be 
reversed: it should fall on the State Party, and not on the author, to 
demonstrate that the applicant would in fact enjoy access to safe 
drinking or even potable water in Kiribati30. Whereas, the Committee 
member Duncan Laki Muhumuza held more in general that the State 
Party had placed an unreasonable burden of proof on the author. 
Viewed the considerable difficulty in accessing fresh water, the 
significant difficulty to grow crops, the circumstance that in Kiribati 
the child of the author had already suffered significant health hazards 
on account of the environmental conditions, he is of the opinion that 
the claimant risks, in his homeland, a livelihood short of the dignity 
that the Convention seeks31.  
Now one might wonder if the threshold would have been the same 
even if the communication had concerned a right different from the 
	  
29 Individual opinion of Committee member Vasilka Sancin (dissenting), Ioane 
Teitiota v. New Zealand, Communication No. 2728/2016, Views of 24 October 2019, 
Annex 1; Individual opinion of Committee member Duncan Laki Muhumuza 
(dissenting), Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, Communication No. 2728/2016, Views of 
24 October 2019, Annex 2. 
30 Individual opinion of Committee member Vasilka Sancin (dissenting), cit., par. 
5. 
31  Individual opinion of Committee member Duncan Laki Muhumuza 
(dissenting), cit., par. 5. Interestingly, he emphasized that “it would indeed be 
counterintuitive to the protection of life, to wait for deaths to be very frequent and 
considerable; in order to consider the threshold of risk as met” (Ivi, par. 5) and that 
“New Zealand’s action is more like forcing a drowning person back into a sinking 
vessel, with the “justification” that after all there are other voyagers on board” (Ivi, 
par. 6). 
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one to life and, more specifically, the right to a private and family life 
provided for in article 17 ICCPR. 
Just before the adoption of his Views in Teitiota v. New Zealand, 
the Human rights Committee decided the case Portillo Cáceres v. 
Paraguay 32 , establishing for the first time a connection between 
environment degradation and the right to a private and family life. In 
the mentioned case, the communication was submitted by the 
members of two peasant families, who, because of large-scale use of 
toxic agrochemicals by neighbouring industrial farms, had suffered 
negative consequences on their health, living conditions and 
livelihood. As a result of the pollution due to pesticides, water 
resources and aquifers had been contaminated, causing the loss of fruit 
trees, the death of various farm animals and severe crop damage. In 
addition, the authors of the claim had experienced pollution 
symptoms and had been hospitalized; one of them had even died. 
Besides the violation of the petitioners’ right to life, the Human Rights 
Committee, even acknowledged the breaching of article 17 ICCPR. It 
observed that the applicants depended on their crops, fruit trees, 
livestock, fishing and water resources for their livelihoods, so that 
these elements constituted components of their way of life and fell 
under the scope of protection of article 17 of the Covenant. Therefore, 
the member State was compelled to adopt positive measures to ensure 
the effective exercise of this right, even in the light of interference by 
physical or legal persons. Deemed that the State party did not place 
appropriate controls upon illegal activities that were creating 
pollution, the Committee recognised the violation of the authors’ right 
to private and family life33. 
Patently, the case differs from the one here at stake, because it 
does not address the issue of expulsion. But it might serve as a 
precedent to acknowledge the violation of article 17 ICCPR also in the 
event of forcible return to a country where the individual faces a real 
risk of serious interference in the enjoyment of his right to private and 
family life, due to environment degradation. In other words, the 
recognition of the right to a healthy environment, through the 
progressive interpretation of article 17 ICCPR, is a first step that could 
lead to the enactment of this practice even in the event of forced 
	  
32 Human Rights Committee, Portillo Cáceres v. Paraguay, Communication No. 
2751/2016, Views of 25 July 2019. 
33 Ivi, par. 7.8. 
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removal. Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee has already 
recognised that the protection against expulsion can stem from article 
17 ICCPS, albeit in cases – it seem needless to specify – not involving 
matters of environmental degradation34. 
Relying on article 17 ICCPR in the so-called climate refugee cases 
could result in an interesting opportunity to safeguard this category of 
people, insofar it might imply a lower burden of proof than the one 
employed in the Teitiota case. Clearly, the threshold needed to 
substantiate an infringement of the right to life is higher than that 
necessary to prove an invasion in the right to private and family life. 
But a question still remains without answer. Could the Human 
Rights Committee have considered of its own motion the case Teitiota 
under article 17 ICCPR, even if the complaint did not relied on this 
disposition of the Covenant? Or, on the contrary, the Committee was 
bound by the characterisation given in law by the applicant to the facts 
of the case? Technically the Human Rights Committee can make use 
of the principle iura novit curia, and thus address a communication on 
the basis of provisions different from those invoked by the petitioner. 
Nevertheless, it did so very seldom in the past, especially with the aim 




4. The “Climate refugees” and the European regional systems 
 
Could the views published in the case Ioane Teitiota v. New 
Zealand produce an impact at the European level? Neither the 
European Court of Human Rights, nor the European Court of Justice 
of the European Union (hereinafter EU Court of Justice) have this far 
ruled on cases of returns connected to climate change.  
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) system 
	  
34 See Human Rights Committee, Jama Warsame v. Canada, Communication No. 
1959/2010, Views of 21 July 2011, par. 8.7; Human Rights Committee, Stefan Lars 
Nystrom v. Australia, Communication No. 1557/2007, Views of 18 July 2011, par. 7.7 
ff. 
35  Moreover, without making express mention of the principle under 
consideration. See D. Shelton, “Jura Novit Curia in International Human Rights 
Tribunals”, in N. Boschiero, T. Scovazzi, C. Pitea, C. Ragni (eds.), International 
Courts and the Development of International Law. Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves, 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Hidelberg, 2013, pp. 189 ff., particularly p. 194. 
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certainly seems to be a fruitful ground to extend the non-refoulement 
principle even to climate refugees for two reasons. Firstly, as it is well 
known, the Strasbourg Court developed a nourished and constant 
jurisprudence about protection of individuals from expulsion. Since 
the case Soering v. The United Kingdom, which more precisely dealt 
with extradition, it affirmed the principle that the article 3 ECHR 
prohibits the expulsion to a country where the person concerned faces 
a real risk of being subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment36. Subsequently the monitoring body at stake had broadly 
applied this principle, considering non-refoulement cases non only 
under article 3 ECHR, but even under other provisions, such as article 
2 (right to life)37, Article 6 (right to a fair trial)38 or Article 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life)39. Secondly, there is a quite well 
established case-law of the Strasbourg Court that recognizes the right 
to a healthy environment. It is here briefly recalled that this right is not 
provided for by the text of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, but the Court in several cases had identified a positive 
obligation incumbent on member States in environmental issues, 
either under article 2 ECHR40, either, more frequently, under article 8 
ECHR41. The mix of these two jurisprudential trends just described, 
could result in the adoption of judgments in which climate refuges 
would find protection. The Strasbourg Court, namely, may apply 
	  
36 European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application 
no. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989, par. 91. 
37 See, for instance, European Court of Human Rights, Al Nashiri v. Poland, 
Application No. 28761/11, Judgment of 24 July 2014. 
38 For instance: European Court of Human Rights, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The 
United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012. 
39  For instance: European Court of Human Rights, Paposhvili v. Belgium, 
Application No. 41738/10, Judgment of 13 December 2016. 
40 To give some examples under article 2 CEDUECHR: European Court of 
Human Rights, Öneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], Applications No. 48939/99, Judgment of 
30 November 2004; Budayeva and others v. Russia, Applications Nos. 15339/02, 
21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02), Judgment of 20 March 2008. 
41 To give some examples under article 8 ECHR: European Court of Human 
Rights, Tătar and others v. Romania, Application No. 67021/2001, Judgment of 27 
January 2009; European Court of Human Rights, Di Sarno e altri v. Italy, Application 
No. 30765/2008, Judgment of 10 January 2012; European Court of Human Rights, 
Taşkın e altri v. Turkey, Application No. 46117/99, Judgment of 3 March 2004, 
Cordella and others v. Italy, Application Nos. 54414/13 54264/15, Judgment of 24 
January 2019. For some references to the scholars on this topic, see above, nt. No. 1. 
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articles 2 or 8 ECHR , dispositions which are already used in 
environmental cases, to the events of forced return toward countries 
affected by climate change or environmental disasters. 
As far as the European Union system is concerned, it is necessary 
to make reference to article 15 lett. b) of the so-called “Qualification 
Directive”, according to which the third country nationals are eligible 
for subsidiary protection if they risk suffering torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the country of origin42. This 
provision must be connected to article 4 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of The European Union, which establishes the 
prohibition of torture. This ban, according to article 52, par. 3 of the 
mentioned Charter, must be interpreted in the light of the analogous 
prevision of article 3 ECHR. Accordingly, the wide interpretation of 
article 3 ECHR, as provided for by the European Court of Human 
Rights, may be mirrored by the EU Court of Justice. But, clearly, the 
EU subsidiary protection regime is not permeable to a broad 
interpretation of other ECHR articles. As stated right above, the 
Strasbourg Court usually analysed cases concerning the impact of 
environmental condition on human rights under article 2 or 8 
ECHR43. Unless the European Court of Human Rights will develop a 
jurisprudence on the right of a healthy environment even based on 
article 3 ECHR44, it seems impossible for the EU Court of Justice to 
	  
42 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011. 
43 More precisely the European Court of Human Rights examined under article 3 
ECHR cases concerning the partially different question of prison environment. For 
instance: European Court of Human Rights, Florea v. Romania, Application No. 
37186/03, Judgments of 14 September 2010; European Court of Human Rights, 
Elefteriadis v. Romania, Application No. 38427/05, Judgment of 25 January 2011.  
44 It is indeed possible to envisage a development of the jurisprudence involving 
migrants affected by severe diseases. In this event, according to the European Court of 
Human Rights, the removal could amount to a violation of Article 3 ECHR (European 
Court of Human Rights, Paposhvili v. Belgium [GC], Application No. 41738/10, 
Judgment of 13 December 2016 par. 172 ff. (spec. par. 183); European Court of 
Human Rights, D. v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 
May 1997, par. 46 ff. (spec. par. 53)). Obviously, the cause of the illness could be of 
any source, even pollution or precarious environmental condition. Nevertheless, these 
are cases in which the claimant’s health conditions acquire a decisive role (scholars 
usually talk about ‘medical cases’): without this precondition it would be impossible to 
fall into the scope of article 3 ECHR. Furthermore, the transposition of this 
jurisprudence to the EU system met the resistance of EU Court of Justice. In fact, in 
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recognise climate refugees as eligible for subsidiary protection trough 
the combined provisions of article article 15 lett. b) of the 
“Qualification Directive” and the articles 4 and 52, par. 3 of the 





The views of the Human Rights Committee in the case Ioane 
Teitiota v. New Zealand paves the way to afford protection, within the 
scope of article 6 ICCPR, to people who escaped from their country of 
origin, by reason of environmental degradation. Moreover, this case 
could act as a leaver to foster international cooperation for the 
protection of the environment. One might wish that the safeguards 
granted by the Human Rights Committee to the so-called ‘climate 
refugees’ or ‘environmental refugees’ would be strengthened in the 
future. A way to reach this aim could be providing protection to them 
under article 17 ICCPR. This could allow the use of a burden of proof 
easier to meet. The recently adopted practice of the Human Rights 
Committee could lead other international bodies to choose analogous 
solutions. In particular, within the European Convention on Human 
Rights system it is possible to trace the preconditions, which should 
lead to the extension of the non-refoulement principle to individuals 
who cross borders on account of negative impact of climate change or, 
more in general, precarious environmental conditions. 
	  
some judgements, this latter Court affirmed that the expulsion of the ill migrant is 
contrary to article 15 lett. b) of the “Qualification Directive” only if he faces the risk 
to be subject to “intentional” deprivation of health care (see: Court of Justice of the 
European Union, MP v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Application No. 
C353/16, Judgement of 24 April 2018; Court of Justice of the European Union, 
Mohamed M’Bodj v. Belgium, Application No. C542/13, Judgement of 18 December 
2014, par. 35 and 36). Only partially in agreement with this approach, see E. Delval, 
“From the U.N. Human Rights Committee to European Courts: Which protection for 


























Speech of Antonio Di Muro-UNHCR 
 
 
Naples, October 1951. In a day like this, this unique city was the 
venue of one of the most ambitious migration policy initiatives of 
those times: the ILO Migration Conference.  
The conference objective was the institution of an ILO Migration 
Administration, through which that organisation, with the United 
Nations support, would have helped some 1,700,000 refugees and 
migrants, stranded and strained in the post-war Europe, to 
successfully resettle in other European Countries or overseas. 
Political tensions, rivalries between States and the emerging logic 
of the cold-war divisions doomed the conference to fail.  
This is only one example of the many failures in the History of 
refugee and migration policies, and the core cause for all failures is 
always the same: lack of sufficient cooperation and solidarity among 
States. 
In the aftermath of WWII, The United Nations decided to engage 
in the refugee issue because they clearly saw its international scope and 
nature, and the impossibility to reach satisfactory solutions without 
organised cooperation between States.  
While this awareness is clearly expressed in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention preamble, the States have so far failed to translate it into 
practical action to an adequate extent.  
Whilst some voices in Europe continue to spread fear by 
misrepresenting a manageable flow of refugees and migrants as an 
unprecedented crisis, the developing regions of the world continue to 
host the overwhelming majority of the refugee population, and at least 
one refugee out of three is hosted, with laudable generosity but limited 
resources, by the poorest countries. 
On December 2018, all EU States, with the sole exception of 
Hungary, have approved the Global Compact on Refugees, whose first 
line explicitly says that “the predicament of refugees is a common 
concern of humankind”.  
What we expect from EU States and EU Institutions is now to 
honour their undertaking, by pledging themselves to concrete steps for 
showing their concern. The Global Refugee forum convened in 
Geneva for December 2019 will offer them the right opportunity to do 
so. 
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The solidarity we expect should aim at two distinct, but 
complementary objectives: the first one consists in helping refugees 
thrive, and not just survive, where they are, by mobilising more 
appropriate resources in support of them, the communities they live 
in, and the States who are hosting them. The second consists in 
expanding and strengthening the opportunities of resettlement. To 
this end, we would strongly encourage an ambitious, protection-
oriented EU Resettlement programme, and a Humanitarian protection 
framework.  
Humanitarian corridors, an initiative recently awarded with the 
Regional Nansen prize, have hugely helped vulnerable refugees and 
migrants; other Complementary Pathways, including University VISA, 
have also proven to be useful tool to expand solidarity and reduce the 
need of refugees to engage in dangerous journeys to pursue their life 
objectives and realise their potentials.  
A second aspect on which we see a clear need of more solidarity is 
the issue of sea rescue and disembarkation. 
Saving lives and minimising the suffering of those in distress at sea 
should be seen as an essential element of any decent policy on 
migration and asylum. We have unfortunately assisted, in the recent 
years, to a despicable reduction of rescuing capacity in the 
Mediterranean, as a consequence of downsizing of public SAR 
operations first, and unfair penalisation of NGO rescue later.  
At any rescue ship approaching the European shores, we have also 
assisted to intolerably long negotiations among EU States, unduly 
delaying the assignation of a port of safety and the access of the sea 
survivors to that first assistance and relief they were urgently in need of.  
In this context, UNHCR has consistently reminded to all 
concerned States that saving lives at sea is not a choice, nor a matter of 
politics, but an age-old obligation. We have publicly commended the 
NGOs for their invaluable role in saving the lives of refugees and 
migrants, and expressed our deep concern for legal initiatives, 
including the Italian “Security bis” decree, aimed at making more 
difficult for them to perform their role.  
UNHCR has also consistently advocated for replacing the logic of 
ship-by-ship negotiations, fraught with avoidable political tensions and 
unnecessary human costs, with predictable, well-planned sharing of 
responsibilities, capable of honouring that aspiration to a deeper 




UNHCR, aware of the legal and political complexities of this 
objective, is appreciating the progress the EU States are now making 
in this direction, and is supporting their effort. We felt encouraged by 
the discussions held in Paris in July, and we do hope that, in the 
today’s ministerial meeting in Malta, further steps in the right 
direction will be taken.  
A third policy aspect which I would like to focus on is integration. 
Investing in well-designed, participative and culturally-sensitive 
integration programmes is beneficial to everyone: it is beneficial to 
refugees, who face disproportionate challenges in adjusting to a new 
country and often need support to rebuild their life, and it is beneficial 
to the hosting societies, which get enriched, culturally and 
economically, by the diverse set of talents, experiences and skills the 
refugees can give. 
While, under the EU treaties, integration policies chiefly remain in 
the responsibility of the Member States, the European Union and Its 
institutions have an important role to play, by providing appropriate 
incentives and support.  
In all EU States, we have seen many examples of civil society 
organisations, including those in the for-profit private sector, local 
institutions and single citizens passionately engaged, in full partnership 
with migrants and refugees, to build a more just, more inclusive and 
more tolerant society for all.  
The free initiative of the civil society is, in this regard, an 
irreplaceable force, to be nurtured and preserved, but in order to have 
a systemic and long-lasting impact, the integration initiatives also need 
to be coordinated and promoted by the Governments, which only can 
provide strategy and vision at a national scale.  
As for Italy is concerned, on 26 September 2017 we publicly 
commended the Government for having adopted its first national 
integration plan for international protection beneficiaries.  
We saw in it an essential tool for the promotion of concrete 
initiatives in this sense, and particularly appreciated its understanding 
of integration as a two-way process, as well as its being based on the 
outcome of focus group, facilitated by UNHCR, were refugees had the 
opportunity to direct express their views.  
Unfortunately, in the following years, integration does not seem to 
have been among the top priorities of our governmental counterparts. 
We are firmly convinced, however, that, in Italy and elsewhere in 
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Europe, times are ready for departing from the recent hyper-
politicization of the refugee and migration issues, and returning to the 
more constructive effort of addressing the complexity through 
effective and inclusive policies, functioning and human-centred 
systems, and realistic, protection-oriented solutions.  
If this direction is taken, under the guiding star of solidarity, 
UNHCR will never miss to provide its contribution and support. 
Thank you  
 
Naples, 23 September 2019 
	  
	  
Speech of Riccardo Gatti-OPEN ARMS 
 
 
My name is Riccardo Gatti, I represent here the NGO Open 
Arms, the volunteers who collaborate with us and all the people who 
work in the NGO. I am the head of mission aboard the ship Open 
Arms, often also as commander of the Astral sailing ship and I am also 
president of the Association Open Arms Italy.  
Open Arms was born in 2015 in Greece, on Lesbos, to cope with 
one of the most dramatic humanitarian emergencies of our century. 
Since then, we have rescued about 60,000 people and completed 65 
missions in the Central Mediterranean, and after almost two years in 
the Aegean Sea. our goal was (and continues to be) that people do not 
die at sea in an attempt to reach a safe place;  
We are going to rotate their rights, first of all the right to life, and 
they denounce violations at sea of their own rights.  
Reaching a safe haven inherently means crossing real or sometimes 
imaginary borders.  
When we started operating in September 2015, we immediately 
realized that there was a gap caused by the absence of coordinated EU 
action in the field of sea rescue, a vacuum in protecting the lives of 
people trying to reach European shores in search of better living 
conditions. We have also seen the lack of decisive and direct action in 
the defense and protection of their rights.  
Since then, we have realized that enormous abuses were taking 
place, perpetrated by the institutions, through actions or inactions, 
against the migrants and against those who defend their rights.  
The agreement signed between Turkey and the EU sought to erect 
an invisible wall with the aim of outsourcing borders instead of 
safeguarding and protecting people and their rights. It is unfortunately 
well known that the creation of this “barrier” between Turkey and 
Europe, as between Spain and Morocco, creates situations of serious 
violations of people’s rights; violence and inhumane conditions have 
been documented on both sides of “borders”. 
If we give in to thinking about borders in this way, we are not 
talking or seeking the common goal of prosperous coexistence for all. 
In 2016, at Open Arms we started the rescue project at sea also in 
the central Mediterranean, thanks to our ships Astral first and then 




As I said, we had found ourselves in the Aegean Sea filling a void 
left by the institutions with regard to the protection of human life at 
sea and the same situation we found in the Central Mediterranean. I 
would like to remind you that after the Italian government’s operation 
“Mare Nostrum” concluded in 2014, no coordinated operation on 
SAR (search and rescue) was created and organized by any EU 
member state. At that time, in the central Mediterranean, only the 
Italian coastguard dealt with SAR operations.  
When the NGOs started operating in the central Mediterranean, 
thanks to the coordination, direction and cooperation of the Italian 
Coast Guard, it was possible to build an “informal international rescue 
operation”, counting with 12 different rescue vessels of NGOs.  
Since the first half of 2017 everything I am expressing has been 
gradually destroyed. Slowly, we were faced with the destruction of the 
structure of coordinated rescue operations and currently the scenario 
that the NON-governmental organizations of the SAR are facing is 
very hostile and has been so for the last two years and half. There is no 
active support from the authorities, even when it comes to receiving 
information about people who are at risk to their lives. Since the 
beginning of the self-proclaimed Libyan SAR zone, normal sea rescue 
procedures have now been largely distorted.  
Duties that should be respected by the authorities, and which 
should lead to the maximizing of resources to complete the rescue as 
soon as possible with the landing of the people rescued in a safe place, 
are not respected.  
Proof of this are the long waits before a safe haven is dictated to 
which the rescued persons are subjected and of which they suffer the 
violence of having to stay on board our ships for long periods before 
they can be landed in a safe place.  
Prohibition or denial of the disembarkation of people rescued at 
sea not only shows an impunity for international conventions and 
maritime law, but clearly shows the worst face of discriminatory 
policies that put in place a despicable contempt of human life.  
In the Central Mediterranean, the process of outsourcing the 
borders has led to the creation of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard, of 
dubious origin, now in charge, with the support and help of the Italian 
and European military forces, of intercepting boats in the Central 
Mediterranean and return them to Libya, where people’s lives run a 




The number of non-governmental organizations at sea has fallen 
dramatically and each of us has witnessed multiple abusive and 
repressive actions that go beyond regulatory procedures. It is easy to 
demonstrate the campaign of criminalization to which NGOs have 
been subjected, attacks and defamation by the media or politicians, 
with the obvious aim of creating a false narrative and avoiding dissent. 
A dynamic of institutionalized abuses has been established and has 
been reiterated in totally impunity. There have been armed attacks at 
sea by the so-called Libyan Coast Guard. There have been blockades 
in ports or restrictions on access to Italian ports - we have been denied 
supplies and food. There have been prosecutions and investigations by 
numerous Italian prosecutors, but after years, they have not led to any 
charges. Indeed, the ship Ocean Viking only received permission 
yesterday to disembark, after a long wait at sea. 
Let me remind you that until a few weeks ago our ship Open Arms 
was in the same situation, stranded at sea for 20 days with more than 
150 people on board who were repeatedly denied by the Italian and 
Maltese government requests to disembark, a situation that has 
worsened the condition of those rescued on board and aggravated 
their suffering. After the emergency landing by the Sicilian 
prosecutor’s office in the city of Agrigento, our ship was placed under 
pre-emptive seizure in order to collect the evidence that highlights all 
the irregularities carried out by the various political authorities and 
Italian administrations; our NGO agrees with the investigations which 
have been opened to find those responsible for the worsening of 
people’s mental and physical conditions as a result of the long wait at 
sea produced by the landing prohibition.  
I would also like to emphasize the importance of the presence of 
NGOs at sea, which allows citizens to know what is happening, the 
rescue and rejections and, unfortunately, the deaths as well.  
We protect by presence because when we are at sea we not only 
follow the laws and defend human rights, but we force all actors who 
are present to do so.  
Unfortunately, the conditions of people on land living in the 
streets or refugee camps in different places in Europe, such as in 
Greece, Bosnia, Italy, Spain, are shameful and unacceptable. We 
cannot accept this kind of violence against the human being at all. 
These are situations in which the creation of barriers to the movement 




consequence danger, abuses, violence and deaths. 71,000,000 as 
Filippo Grandi, high commissioner of UNHCR, recalled to be the 
number of people who are migrants and who are now moving in 
search of a better future.  
The tools of violence, danger and death cannot be used as 
deterrents to achieving real and feasible management of migration 
flows on land. It is mandatory to first require the protection of people 
on the move and abuses on them must be prosecuted in a firm 
manner.  
We must continue to create lawyers to protect people’s inalienable 
rights and their dignity.  
At Open Arms, we are confident that this moment will pass, but 
we believe it is essential to continue to imagine moments of 
confrontation that focus on respect for international law, people's lives 
and dignity and that can be a stimulus. to find structural solutions that 
protect men, women and children. Moving, traveling, emigrating in 
this world is not possible for all people equally. It is not a real right, 
even if enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If it is 
not a right for all, it means that it is a privilege, and in itself privileges 
are based on abuses of one another.  
Abuse is the basis of what lies in the exact opposite of peace and 
coexistence: violence.  
As a society worthy of being called civilized, realities such as those 
of Moria, Ventimiglia, Calais, the Central Mediterranean, the enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla, the violence against migrants, the shootings and 
collective rejections and still all people left at the mercy of their fate, 
are not acceptable or justifiable reality.  
Universities are the best platforms in which to create intellectual 
and material tools that lead to the full respect of people and in which 
to develop proposals and structural solutions to animate inclusive, 
ecological and socially sustainable policies.  
We, as defenders of human rights, must continue to witness the 
realities that live the people we seek to support, we need the support 
of civil society and the whole university body. We must demand 
policies that put human beings at the center of economic and social 
decisions.  
Finally, we strongly demand respect for international laws and 
conventions. It is necessary to create safe ways of movement for 




examples of humanitarian runners put in place by non-governmental 
actors (the community of St. Egidio and the federation of Italian 
evangelical churches, for example) but we believe that governments 
should institutionalize such safe routes.  
We must stop the dynamic in which NGOs continue to be under 
attack and criminalized because there is no shadow about our work. 
We need clarity about what is happening on our borders. It is the 
media’s responsibility to provide truthful, objective information.  
We must ensure a quick and smooth disembarkation of those 
rescued at sea, remember that the rescue operation ends once the 
people are landed in a safe place where all their rights are 
safeguarded.  
The relocation system by EU member states must therefore also be 
normalized, fluid and systematic. Today’s Malta summit should give 
some answers on this.  
We must approach the migration discourse with normality and 
with an active and open attitude, an attitude that the old EU does not 
often show.  
I would like to inform you that our ship arrived last night here in 
Naples, tomorrow morning it will enter the port where it will remain a 
few days to prepare for the next mission of observation and protection 
of human life at sea. I thank Laura Marmorale and the municipality of 
Naples for the availability and support vis-à-vis Open Arms and the 
sensitivity and respect of human dignity. We chose Naples as our base 
port in Italy, as we feel at home: a city where our volunteers can walk 
down the street without being attacked as happened in other places. A 
direct consequence of hate speech against migrants that in recent years 
has been freely disseminated too often by representatives of the Italian 
government.  
I want to end my speech with the words of Ibrahim, Egyptian, 
after disembarking from our ship Open Arms: “I wanted to come to 
Europe for the humanity that there is here, it is people who treat 
human beings well, who respect and appreciate people”. Words said 
after, as the last cry for help after 20 days aboard the Open Arms, 
Ibrahim threw himself into the sea in a desperate gesture, without 
knowing how to swim.  
He was rescued by our rescuers.  
Thank you. 
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